1 2025:CGHC:48528 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 220 of 2018 1 - Batte Singh @ Bateram (Died) Through Lrs A.- Prem Singh S/o Late Shri Batte Singh @ Baterram Aged About 53 Years R/o Imlipara, Kanker, District, North Bastar, Kanker Chhattisgarh. B. - Ramcharan S/o Late Shri Batte Singh @ Bateram, Aged About 50 Years C - Shravan S/o Late Shri Batte Singh @ Bateram, Aged About 47 Years D- Nandlal S/o Late Shri Batte Singh @ Bateram, Aged About 44 Years E - Dinesh S/o Late Shri Batte Singh @ Bateram, Aged About 41 Years B to E all are R/o Village Umki, Post Amodi, P.S. And Tahsil Antagarh, District North Bastar, Kanker Chhattisgarh. --- Appellants versus 1 - Satto Bai W/o Ramlal Netam Aged About 52 Years R/o Godripara, Antagarh, Tahsil Antagarh, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Lalita W/o Nirmal Dugga Aged About 30 Years R/o Godripara, Antagarh, Tahsil Antagarh, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh. 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh . --- Respondents ____________________________________________________________ For Appellants : Mr. D.N. Prajapati, Advocate For Respondent No.3/State : Mr. Kishan Sahu, Dy.G.A Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu Judgment On Board 22/09/2025 1. This second appeal U/s.100 of C.P.C. is filed by appellants/plaintiffs questioning the legality and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree dated 06.12.2016, passed in Civil Appeal No.3-A/2012, BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Digitally signed by BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Date: 2025.10.17 14:16:14 +0530 2 whereby, learned Additional District Judge, Bhanupratappur, District – North Bastar Kanker (C.G.) dismissed the appeal filed by appellants/plaintiff, affirming the judgment and decree dated 11.11.2011, in Civil Suit No.25-A/2011 wherein learned Civil Judge Class -1, Bhanupratappur, District – North Bastar Kanker (C.G.) dismissed the suit of appellants/plaintiff. 2. Brief facts for disposal of this appeal are that original plaintiff- Batte Singh filed a civil suit for declaration that he be declared sole owner of suit property and further seeking declaration that mutation of name of defendants to be null and void in respect of the suit land pleading therein that land measuring 4.60 Hectares, situated at Village Irrabodi, Tahsil – Antagarh, District North Bastar Kanker was recorded in name of his father Indel Singh Gond, which was an ancestral property. Defendants have got their name mutated in the revenue records. It is also pleaded that from marriage of Indel Gond and Rajani Gond, plaintiff is only son and according to custom prevailing within the area in Gond community, it is the sons only, who get right in ancestral property. It is also pleaded that after getting land mutated in their names without knowledge of plaintiff, defendants are raising dispute since 2006. Plaintiff is in possession of suit property even on the date of filing of suit. It is also pleaded that married wife is only having right in the property of her husband. Second wife or their children do not get right over the property in the lifetime of son from first wife. 3. Defendants No.1 and 2 filed written statement to the plaint denying pleadings made therein. It was pleaded that Indel Gond was father of plaintiff and defendant No.1 & 2. Indel Gond was having 44.10 acres 3 of land as per revenue records. Out of above ancestral property, plaintiff has sold 10.94 acres of land by way of registered sale deed on 02.07.1984 in favour of Raisingh, S/o. Sannu Gond, the remaining land measuring 33.16 acres was partitioned on 13.06.1988, between plaintiff, Somnath (the plaintiff’s uncle’s son), and Jugotin Bai, mother of defendants No. 1 and 2. In the said partition, plaintiff and Somnath (son of uncle of plaintiff) got 20.89 acres of land and mother of defendant No.1 got 12.27 acres of land. After partition, Somnath (son of uncle of plaintiff) sold his share of land measuring 6.44 acres in favour of Meharu, R/o. Hirrabodi and got his name deleted from revenue records. Land measuring 14.75 acres is recorded in the name of plaintiff in revenue records on which plaintiff is in possession till date. At the time of partition, name of defendant No.1 was added in the revenue records along with Jugotin Bai since her lifetime. Defendant No.1 and 2 are in possession of suit property. Plaintiff is not having any right over the said property. It is also pleaded that after death of Indel Gond in the year 1981, name of plaintiff and Jugotin Bai mother of defendant No.1 were jointly recorded in revenue records as legal heirs. It is also pleaded that according to the customs of Gond community, Chudi wife is also having equal rights in the property of her husband. Jugotin Bai was Chudi wife of Indel Gond and property received by Jugotin Bai in partition, name of defendant No.1 and 2 were duly mutated. Mutation was not challenged by plaintiff, in any higher court, therefore, it is binding upon him. 4 4. Learned trial Court based on the pleadings made by respective parties, formulated as many as eight issues for consideration including the issue “whether the suit was barred by limitation?”. 5. After conclusion of trial and upon careful appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the respective parties, learned trial Court held that plaintiff failed to establish the custom that only the son of a married wife acquires title to the property of his father according to the customs prevailing in the Gond community of the area. The Court further found that the plaintiff did not prove that a Chudi wife has no equal rights in her husband’s property under such customs. It was further held that plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that, according to the customs in Gond community, daughters do not acquire any title to their father’s property during the lifetime of their brother. The learned trial Court also held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the order of mutation was passed without his knowledge. Finally, the Court concluded that the suit was barred by limitation 6. Judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court was put to challenge in appeal filed U/s. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and learned Appellate Court while recording a finding that plaintiff was having knowledge of order of mutation by Tahsildar dated 13.06.1988. Plaintiff and defendants No.1 and 2 since the date of partition are doing agricultural activity separately on the land received by them in partition. It further recorded that plea of mutating the name of defendant No.1 and 2 in the revenue records without knowledge of the plaintiff is found to be without basis and substance and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment and decree. 5 7. Learned counsel for appellant would submit that judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below are perverse, erroneous and bad in law. Both the Courts failed to appreciate that plaintiff as well as defendants No.1 and 2 are being governed by their customs and according to the custom prevailing in Gond community, daughter is not entitled to share in property of her father. He also contended that, defendant failed to prove that daughters are also entitled to get the property of her father, therefore, finding recorded by learned both the Courts below in this regard are perverse. Jugotin Bai, second wife of Indel Gond and step mother of plaintiff has not executed any will in favour defendant No.1 and 2, therefore, also she is not entitled to disputed land after death of Jugotin Bai. He contended that even if some property was given to Jugotin Bai, second wife of Indel Gond, father of plaintiff, then also after her death, defendant No.1 being daughter of Jugotin Bai, is not entitled for any share to her father’s property. Learned trial Court has not considered the specific plea of plaintiff that mutation of name of defendants No.1 and 2 or the order of mutation dated 13.06.1988, is without knowledge of plaintiff, therefore, it is not binding upon the plaintiff. 8. I have heard learned counsel for appellants and perused the record of trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. 9. Perusal of the plaint would show that plaintiff has pleaded that defendant started dispute on the suit land in the year 2006. He also stated that plaintiffs got knowledge of mutation only on 11.09.2006 whereas the date of mutation order is 13.06.1988. Plaintiff is examined as (P.W.-1). In his evidence (in cross examination) in para-10 though 6 he denied that after death of Indel Gond, name of plaintiff, Jogotin Bai and Somnath was recorded jointly in the revenue records in the year 1983. He also denied the fact of partition between plaintiff and Jugotin Bai in Tahsil Court, Antagarh, however, in para-11, he admitted that Somnath has sold land admeasuring about 6 acres in favour of Mehataru son of Ram Prasasad of his share. He admitted in para -11 that Jugotin Bai got her name entered in revenue records 15-20 years prior. In para-13 he admitted that quarrel with defendant No.1 took place between them about 6-7 years ago. He also denied the suggestion that name of Jugotin was recorded 25 years ago and name of defendant No.1 was recorded about 20 years ago. He admitted the relationship between plaintiff and defendants No.1, Satto Bai as brother and sister. Plaintiff examined Sukhdev as (P.W.-2). In para-5 of his cross-examination, this witness admitted that Indel Gond was having two wives. Rajani was elder wife and Jugotin Bai, mother of defendants No.1 was younger wife, who was brought as Chudi wife. He also admitted in para -6 of his cross-examination that after death of Indel, name of plaintiff, Jugotin and Somnath was recorded jointly in all his property. He also stated that about 12-13 years ago, plaintiff sold five acres of land to Raisingh, son of Sannu Gond. He also admitted that about 20 years ago there was a partition between plaintiff and Jugotin Bai in Tahsil Court. He further stated that on the date of partition, plaintiff was not present. He also admitted that he and Gram Patel were present in earlier partition between plaintiff and Jugotin Bai. He stated that as on the date of partition, plaintiff was not present, therefore, they have raised objection, even thereafter, Tahsildar had partitioned the property between the plaintiff and Jugotin Bai. It is also 7 stated that at the time of partition, plaintiff and Somnath, his cousin brother was having joint holding, out of which, Somnath, cousin brother of plaintiff, sold about 5 acres of his share of land. Remaining land of 14.15 acres is recorded in name of plaintiff. 10 to 12 acres of land were recorded in the name of Jugotin Bai, and after her death, the name of defendant No. 1 was recorded. This witness clearly stated that plaintiff and defendant No.1 are in separate possession of their own share of land and cultivating it. 10. Baisakhu Ram is examined as (P.W.-3). He also gave evidence according to evidence of Sukhdev (P.W.-2) with regard to partition of land in Tahsil Court. He also admitted that proceeding of partition took place between the parties in Tahsil Antagarh and before Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bhanupratappur. He further shows his unawareness about the possession of Satto Bai in the land of share of Jugotin Bai. 11. Defendants have filed sale deed executed by plaintiff, Batte Singh and Somnath in favour of Raisingh measuring 10.94 acres of land as Ex.D- 1, B-1 Kistbandi Khatauni in the name of Indel Gond as Ex.D-2. Ex.D- 3 is a document in form of order by the Revenue Inspector for mutating the name of plaintiff, Jugotin (Chudi wife of Indel Gond and step mother of plaintiff as also Somnath, cousin brother of plaintiff) in revenue records of property recorded in name of Indel Gond. The order of partition of Tahsildar based on Fard Batwara U/s. 178 of Land Revenue Code, 1958 by Tahsildar, Antagarh dated 13.06.1988 is filed as Ex.D-4. Order also mentions that Sukhdev, Mangalu Patel and Jugotin Bai were examined and their statements were recorded. The 8 order of partition dated 13.06.1988 is not put to challenge though it was ordered under the provisions of Section 178 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 by the competent authority i.e. Tahsildar. Copy of Fard Batwara and Map is filed as Ex.D-5. Recording of name of Jugotin Bai and Satto Bai, defendant No.1 in records was pursuant to the order dated 28.07.1988 measuring 4.96 acres of land. Name of plaintiff along with Somnath, was recorded in land measuring 8.27 hectares vide Ex.D-10. Out of joint property recorded in name of plaintiffs and Somnath they have sold about five acres land which is not disputed by plaintiff. 12. From the evidence available on record, it is appearing that plaintiff was having knowledge about partition of land pursuant to the order of Tahsildar on an application U/s. 178 of Land Revenue Code, 1959, in which, plaintiff’s witnesses have also raised objection, however, said order was not put to challenge in an appeal before the appellate Court. Plaintiff even after getting knowledge of partition has not challenged it before the higher revenue authorities nor have filed suit for declaring the order of partition to be null and void or erroneous on the ground, if any, available to plaintiff within time frame. 13. Article 58 of the Limitation Act provides for limitation of three years for seeking declaration from the date when right to sue first accrues. The right to sue accrued when plaintiff got knowledge about the order of partition by Tahsildar and further according to the evidence of plaintiff about 6-7 years ago, when defendant No.1 started dispute and quarrel. 9 14. In view of the aforementioned evidence available in record, it is apparent that suit was filed arising of the dispute after three years between the plaintiff and defendants and after more than 19 years of passing of order of partition by Tahsildar under Section 178 of the Land Revenue Code. In view of the above in the opinion of this Court, learned both the Courts below have not committed any error in recording a finding that suit filed by plaintiff seeking declaration of title and order of Tahsildar to be null and void, is barred by limitation. 15. Further Sukhdev (P.W.-2) examined on behalf of plaintiff had admitted that both the parties i.e. plaintiff and defendant No.1 are in possession of suit property based on the partition, however, plaintiff had not sought further relief of possession. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vasantha (dead) through Legal Representative v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajaram (Dead) Through Legal Representatives, reported in (2024) 5 SCC 282 having discussed about seeking further relief in light of proviso to Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 has concluded while relying on the earlier judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on that issue and observed thus :- “49. We now proceed to examine the law on this issue. As submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, in Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra [Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 129] (two-Judge Bench), this Court while considering Section 42 of the erstwhile Specific Relief Act, 1877 to be pari materia with Section 34 of SRA, 1963 observed that the plaintiff's not being in possession of the property in that case ought to have amended the plaint for the relief of recovery of possession in view of the bar included by the proviso. 10 50. This position has been followed by this Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (two-Judge Bench), elaborated the position of a suit filed without the consequential relief. It was observed : (SCC p. 173, paras 55-58) “55. The section provides that courts have discretion as to declaration of status or right, however, it carves out an exception that a court shall not make any such declaration of status or right where the complainant, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. 56. In Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi [Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi, (1973) 2 SCC 60] this Court had categorically held that the suit seeking for declaration of title of ownership but where possession is not sought, is hit by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and, thus, not maintainable. In Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra [Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 129] this Court dealt with a similar issue where the plaintiff was not in exclusive possession of property and had filed a suit seeking declaration of title of ownership. Similar view has been reiterated observing that the suit was not maintainable, if barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. (See also Gian Kaur v. Raghubir Singh [Gian Kaur v. Raghubir Singh, (2011) 4 SCC 567 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 366] .) 57. In view of the above, the law becomes crystal clear that it is not permissible to claim the relief of declaration without seeking consequential relief. 58. In the instant case, the suit for declaration of title of ownership had been filed, though Respondent 1-plaintiff was admittedly not in possession of the suit property. Thus, the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and, therefore, ought to have been dismissed solely on this ground. The High Court though framed a substantial question on this point but for unknown reasons did not consider it proper to decide the same.” 11 51. In Venkataraja v. Vidyane Doureradjaperumal [Venkataraja v. Vidyane Doureradjaperumal, (2014) 14 SCC 502 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 360] (two-Judge Bench), the purpose behind Section 34 was elucidated by this Court. It was observed that the purpose behind the inclusion of the proviso is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It was further expounded that a mere declaratory decree remains non-executable in most cases. This Court noted that the suit was never amended, even at a later stage to seek the consequential relief and therefore, it was held to be not maintainable. This position of law has been reiterated recently in Akkamma v. Vemavathi [Akkamma v. Vemavathi, (2021) 18 SCC 371] (two-Judge Bench). 17. Plaintiff in his evidence admitted that name of Jugotin Bai was entered in revenue record about 15-20 years ago (in para-11). In para-12 he admitted that appeal preferred by him before Collector of correcting Bandobast (settlement) entry by S.D.O. dated 30.11.2002 was dismissed. He is not aware of separate land account of plaintiff and defendant. Sukhdev (P.W.-2) in para 6 admitted that plaintiff and defendant No.1 are in possession of their own land doing farming. Baisakhu Ram (P.W.-3) in his deposition has not specifically stated that plaintiff is farming all lands including land in dispute. 18. From evidence available in record it is apparent that plaintiff is not in possession of land recorded in name of Jugotin Bai. However, not claimed relief of possession of the suit property. Plaintiff along with relief of declaration of title has not sought further relief of possession. He has not sought further relief which is directly flowing from relief of declaration of title. 19. So far as the pleading and the grounds raised by learned counsel for appellants/plaintiff that according to custom prevailing in the Gond community of area, daughters are not having right on the father’s 12 property during lifetime of son, is not proved. Custom is pleaded by plaintiff, therefore, burden to prove the custom is upon plaintiff, in which he utterly failed. Except the pleadings and oral evidence of plaintiffs, no other admissible evidence is brought in record by him. Witness Sukhdev (P.W.-2) examined on behalf of plaintiff in his evidence has stated that he belongs to Gond community and follows the custom prevailing. He admitted that in Gond community, Chudi marriage is prevailing. He also admitted that where male members belonging to Gond community are having more than one wife then all of them are having equal right over the property of their husband and children born from their marital relationship are also having right over their father’s property. Plaintiff have not submitted any written customs. Plaintiff has even not examined any elder member of community. Proof of custom was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ramcharan and others Vs. Sukhram & Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1465 and held as under :- “19. When applying the principle of justice, equity and good conscience, the Courts have to be mindful of the above and apply this otherwise open-ended principle contextually. In the present case, a woman or her successors, if the views of the lower Court are upheld, would be denied a right to property on the basis of the absence of a positive assertion to such inheritance in custom. However, customs too, like the law, cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others of their right. 20. Apart from the application of this general principle, we also find this to be a question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. There appears to be no rational nexus or reasonable classification for only males to be granted succession over the property of their forebears and not women, more so in the case 13 where no prohibition to such effect can be shown to be prevalent as per law. Article 15(1) states that the State shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. This, along with Articles 38 and 46, points to the collective ethos of the Constitution in ensuring that there is no discrimination against women. * * * 26. This discussion on equality under Article 14, which, needless to state, includes the aspect of gender equality within its fold will be, in our view, incomplete without reference to the first and most commendable step taken under the Hindu Law by way of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which made daughters the coparceners in joint family property. The object and reasons as stated in the Bill are instructive in the general sense and we reproduce the same with profit: “…The law by excluding the daughter from participating in the coparcenary ownership not only contributes to her discrimination on the ground of gender but also has led to oppression and negation of her fundamental right of equality guaranteed by the Constitution. having regard to the need to render social justice to women, the States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra have made necessary changes in the law giving equal right to daughters in Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property. The Kerala Legislature has enacted the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975…” (Emphasis supplied) * * * 28. Granted that no such custom of female succession could be established by the appellant-plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be shown in the slightest, much less proved. That being the case, denying Dhaiya her share in her father's property, when the custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin.” 14 20. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Saraswati Ammal Vs. Jagadambal & Ors., reported in AIR 1953 SC 201 while expounding the law with regard to ingredients to be proved for establishing the custom in the family has held thus : “28. The correct approach to a case where a party seeks to prove a custom is the one pointed out by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Abdul Hussein Khan v. Sona Dero [Abdul Hussein Khan v. Sona Dero, (1917- 18) 45 IA 10 : ILR (1918) 45 Cal 450 (PC) : 1917 SCC OnLine PC 68] . It was there said that it is incumbent on a party setting up a custom to allege and prove the custom on which he relies and it is not any theory of custom or deductions from other customs which can be made a rule of decision but only any custom applicable to the parties concerned that can be the rule of decision in a particular case. It is well settled that custom cannot be extended by analogy. It must be established inductively, not deductively and it cannot be established by a priori methods. Theory and custom are antithesis, custom cannot be a matter of mere theory but must always be a matter of fact and one custom cannot be deduced from another.” 21. In case at hand also, Indel Gond was having two wives one Rajani and another Jugotin. Rajani was pre-deceased. Indel Gond died in the year 1981 and thereafter, name of plaintiff, son from first wife, Jugotin second wife of Indel Gond and Somnath cousin brother and son of uncle of plaintiff were jointly recorded. Application U/s. 178 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 seeking partition of property filed by Jugotin was allowed by Tahsildar vide order dated 13.06.1988 and her name was also recorded and mutated as co-sharer. 22. In the aforementioned facts of the case as discussed above and decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ram Charan (supra) I am of the considered view that plaintiff could not able to prove the custom even slightest, therefore, also defendant No.1 cannot be 15 denied share in property of her father, which was received in partition by her mother pursuant to the order passed by Tahsildar about 19 years ago. 23. For the foregoing, in the opinion of this Court, learned trial Court as also the Appellate Court have not committed any error in dismissing the claim of plaintiff observing that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the pleadings made in the plaint to get the relief as prayed for. 24. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty reported in AIR 1996 SC 3521, has held that the interference with the concurrent findings of the Courts below by the High Court under Section 100 of CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re- appreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the Lower Court. Even assuming that another view is possible on re-appreciation of the same evidence that should not have been done by the High Court, as it cannot be said that the view taken by the First Appellate Court was based on no material. 25. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Shiv Dayal and Another, Reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para Nos. 14, 15 & 16 as under:- “14. True it is as has been laid down by this Court in several decisions that “concurrent finding of fact” is usually binding on the High Court while hearing the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). However, this rule of law is subject to certain well-known exceptions mentioned infra. 16 15. It is a trite law that in order to record any finding on the facts, the trial court is required to appreciate the entire evidence (oral and documentary) in the light of the pleadings of the parties. Similarly, it is also a trite law that the appellate court also has the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence de novo while hearing the first appeal and either affirm the finding of the trial court or reverse it. If the appellate court affirms the finding, it is called “concurrent finding of fact” whereas if the finding is reversed, it is called “reversing finding”. These expressions are well known in the legal parlance. 16. When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded dehors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (See observation made by learned Judge, Vivian Bose, J., as his Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar [Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar, 1942 SCC OnLine MP 26 : AIR 1943 Nag 117] para 43.)” 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhbiri Devi and Others vs. Union of India and Others reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322 while reiterating the view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Dayal and Another (supra), has held that interference with the concurrent findings in subsequent appeal can be made if it is pointed out that it has been passed dehors the pleadings or based on no evidence or based on misreading of material evidence or against the provision of law etc. 17 27. Submission made and the question of law formulated by appellant cannot be said to be substantial question of law involved in this appeal. An attempt has been made to dispute the fact which was considered by the trial Court as also by the Appellate Court. 28. For the forgoing discussions and in light of the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the judgment passed by the learned trial Court and upheld by learned first appellate Court. Thus, having considered the concurrent finding recorded by both the Courts below, I do not find any substantial question of law to be involved in the instant case, hence, this appeal is dismissed at the admission stage itself. 29. The Decree be drawn accordingly. 30. The parties to bear their own costs. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Balram