1 2025:CGHC:55213 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 320 of 2005 Bhanu @ Tamradhwaj, Aged About 30 years, S/o Babulal Gond, Resident of village Aatokat, P.S. Arang, District Raipur [C.G.] ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh, Through :- Police Station Arang, District Raipur [C.G.] ... Respondent --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant : Mr. Amiyakant Tiwari, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Anuradha Jain, Panel Lawyer. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order on Board 12/11/2025 1. This criminal appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been preferred by the appellant/accused against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10th March, 2005 passed by Sessions Judge, Raipur (C.G.) (henceforth referred to as ‘trial Court’) in Sessions Case No. 397/2004, whereby the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years with fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 10 months. 2 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 23.10.2004, appellant assaulted victim -Keju Ram (PW-4) with a sharp-edged weapon like a knife with an intention to kill him and caused injuries on his neck. Based on above facts, FIR (Ex. P/6) was lodged against the appellant for the offence under Section 307 of IPC at Police Station, Arang, District Raipur. After usual investigation, charge-sheet was filed against appellant for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC and Sections 25 & 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 before Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur. 3. Learned Sessions Judge framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC, which was read over & explained to him, who abjured the guilt and entered into trial. 4. In order to prove the guilt of the appellant/accused, the prosecution has examined as many as 8 witnesses and exhibited 14 documents in support of his case. Statement of the accused/appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., in which he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the deposition of prosecution witnesses and pleaded his innocence and false implication in crime in question. No witness has been examined by the appellant in his defence. 5. After completion of trial, learned Upper Sessions Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellant, as has been mentioned in opening paragraph of the judgment. Against which, instant appeal has been preferred. 6. At the outset, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/accused submits that he is not pressing this appeal as regards conviction part of the impugned judgment and would confine his arguments only to the sentence part thereof only. He further submits that in instant case, as per medical 3 report, injuries sustained to the victim was simple in nature, as no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution to prove alleged injuries sustained to the victim was grievous in nature. Dr. J.P. Chandrakar (PW-3), who examined the victim and prepared MLC report (Ex.P-4), has also not mentioned about the nature of injuries sustained to the victim in the said report. He further submits that only one injury was sustained to the victim, that too, measuring 8 x 4 x deep in the muscle. Hence, it cannot be said that it was caused by appellant with intention to kill victim. It is further contended that appellant was remained in jail right from his arrest dated 14.11.2004 and he was released on bail after order of suspension passed by this Court vide order dated 13.03.2006, It is next contended that though earlier suspension order was passed on 4.7.2005, but appellant could not furnish bail bond, therefore, he remained in jail 14.11.2004 to 13.03.2006 i.e. 1 year, 4 months & 27 days, hence, he prayed that jail sentence imposed upon appellant may be reduced to the period already undergone by him. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supported the impugned judgment of conviction, as also the sentence part of the judgment. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record, including record of Court below with utmost circumspection. 9. Now, the question is whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant under Section 307 of the IPC ? In this regard, it would be appropriate to reproduce the provision of Section 307 of the IPC which reads as under :- 4 “307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life-convicts.—When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.” 10. From perusal of aforesaid provision, it is apparent that, intention or knowledge of causing death is vital part to be proved by the prosecution for punishment of accused for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC. 11. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. Without this ingredient being established, there can be no offence of “attempt to murder”. The intention for the offence under Section 307 precedes the act attributed to accused. Hence, such intention is to be gathered from the circumstances, and not merely from the consequences that ensue. To ascertain such intention, it also be considered that what is the nature of the weapon used, the motive for the crime, severity of the blow, part of body where injury is inflicted etc. 12. In the matter of State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao [(2003) 10 SCC 434}, Supreme Court has held that for the application of Section 307 of the IPC, it is not necessary that the injury capable of causing death should have been actually inflicted. The injuries sustained, the manner of assaults and the 5 weapons used clearly make out a case of Section 307 of the IPC. It has been observed by their Lordships in para 21 of the judgment as under:— “21. In offence under Section 307 all the ingredients of the offence of murder are present except the death of the victim. For the application of Section 307, it is not necessary that the injury capable of causing death should have been actually inflicted. The injuries sustained, the manner of assaults and the weapons used clearly make out a case of Section 307 IPC. But since sentence and fine have been maintained, alteration of conviction notwithstanding no modification of sentence need be made. …” 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Parsuram Pandey v. State of Bihar [(2004) 13 SCC 189] has also held that to constitute an offence under Section 307 of the IPC, two ingredients of the offence must be present : (a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (b) the doing of an act towards it. It has been held in paragraph 15 of the report as under: “15. To constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence must be present: (a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (b) the doing of an act towards it. For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of causing death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is 6 necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence “of attempt to murder”. Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors... …” 14. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana [(2015) 11 SCC 366] has laid down the ingredients of the offence under Section 307 of the IPC and held as under:— “12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc. 14. Having regard to the weapon used for causing the head injuries to Sukhbir, nature of injures, situs of the injury and the severity of the blows, the courts below recorded concurrent findings convicting the second appellant under Section 307 IPC. In our considered view, 7 the conviction of the second appellant Rajbir @ Raju under Section 307 IPC is unassailable.” 15. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in aforecited cases and also from perusal of deposition of victim – Kejuram (PW-4), Gangabai (PW-5) and Ragho (PW-6), who are eye-witnesses to the incident, it is very well proved that appellant /accused had assaulted the victim by sharp-edged weapon like knife, as a result thereof, victim (PW-4) had sustained injuries on his neck. Dr. G.P. Chandrakar (PW-3), who medically treated the victim, has reported aforesaid injuries to be 8 x 4 x muscle deep. There is no evidence to show that the appellant caused aforesaid injuries to the victim intentionally pointing his neck or any vital part of the body, rather if the appellant had such an intention, he could have caused more serious injuries to the victim. Therefore, having considered aforesaid fact and single injury, that too, has not been proved grievous injuries, this Court feel inclined to set aside conviction part of the appellant for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC, instead thereof, the appellant is liable to be convicted for the offence under Section 324 of the IPC. [ 16. So far as sentence part of the impugned judgment is concerned, appellant is remained in jail from the date of his arrest i.e. 14.11.2004, till his release by suspending his jail sentence by this Court. In compliance thereof, the appellant was released from jail on 13.03.2006, thus, he remained in jail for 1 year, 4 months & 27 days. 17. Having considered the fact that both the parties are resident of same village, downtrodden persons; dispute erupted on account of trivial issues; and the appellant has already served jail sentence of more than one year; conviction imposed upon the appellant has been modified for the offence 8 under Section 324 of the IPC instead of Section 307 IPC. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, ends of justice would be served if jail sentence is awarded to appellant for the period already undergone by him i.e. 1 years, 4 months & 27 days 18. In the result, the criminal appeal is partly allowed. Conviction of appellant under Section 307 is altered /converted to Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and he is sentenced to the period already undergone by him i.e. 1 years, 4 months & 27 days. Imposition of fine is also maintained. Other part of the impugned judgment is hereby affirmed. 19. Appellant is reported to be on bail. The bail bonds furnished by him shall remain in operation for a further period of 6 months from today in view of the provisions contained in Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. 20. Record of the concern Upper Sessions Judge be returned forthwith along with a copy of this judgment for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Amit AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Digitally signed by AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Date: 2025.12.03 11:01:19 +0530