1 CRA No.1378 of 2023 2025:CGHC:52642-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1378 of 2023 Pradeep Mehar @ Padhari S/o Dilharan Mehar Aged About 23 Years R/o Village Ghuthera, Navagaov, Police Station Mugali, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Sarkanda, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh Respondents (Cause title taken from the Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Ajay Kumar Chandra, Advocate For Respondent/State: Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru, J. 29/10/2025 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 01/12/2022 passed by the learned First FTSC (POCSO)/Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, C.G. in Special Sessions Case No.105/2021, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:- AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2025.10.31 10:38:35 +0530 2 CRA No.1378 of 2023 Conviction Sentence Under Section 363 of the IPC R.I. for 5 years & fine of Rs.250/- in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 6 months Under Section 366 A of the IPC R.I. for 5 years & fine of Rs.250/- in default of payment of fine,additional R.I. for 6 months Under Section 5(L)/6 of the POCSO Act Rigorous Imprisonment for 20 years & fine of Rs.500/- in default of payment of fine,additional R.I. for 4 months All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 2. Facts of the case, in brief, is that, PW-1, mother of victim lodged a report at police station that her minor daughter/victim/PW-2 was living at the house of her Mousi (sister of the complainant) Sarkanda and on 21.09.2020, the victim left home at 5:00 PM, telling her brother that she was going to the market, but she did not return. When she came to know, she started searching her daughter at the houses of relatives and acquaintances but could not find her. Based on above facts, FIR was registered. During investigation, the victim was recovered from the possession of the appellant and recovery panchnama was prepared vide Ex.P-2. Crime details form was prepared vide Ex.P-8. The victim was medically examined by Dr. Khushboo Kacchhap (PW-5) and submitted a medical report vide Ex.P/12. With regard to ascertain the age of the victim, Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P-27) was seized. After completing the investigation, the final report was prepared. 3 CRA No.1378 of 2023 3. In order to bring home the above-stated offence, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 30 documents. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein he has pleaded his innocence and false implication in the matter. 4. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case. He submits that the victim herself went to the appellant/accused at various places and stayed with him by her own will. He further submits that the victim and the appellant are known to each other and the victim was a consenting party. The prosecution has miserably failed to prove the actual age of the victim and PW-15 Teacher of the school stated in her evidence that she has not recorded the date of birth of victim in the Dakhil Kharij register. Further, on what basis and by whom, the date of birth of victim was recorded in the register, was not stated by the PW-15. Learned counsel submits that the entire incident is highly doubtful, therefore, the conviction of the appellant is not sustainable and he may be acquitted of the charges framed against him. 4 CRA No.1378 of 2023 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the statement of the victim and other witnesses are fully reliable. There are sufficient evidence available on record to hold that the appellant is guilty for the alleged offence and the learned trial Court has absolutely justified in passing the judgment of conviction and sentence against the appellant which does not require for any interference. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. The first and foremost question arose for the consideration would be whether the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident or not. 9. PW-1, mother of victim stated that at the time of incident, the victim was 15 years of age. However, she has not stated the exact date of birth of victim. PW-2, victim stated in her evidence that she does not know her date of birth. 10. PW-15, Neeta Dayal, Teacher of the school has deposed in her statement that the Dakhil Kharij Register Ex.P-27 was seized by the police. He deposed that the victim got admission in the school in 1st class and in the dakhil-kharij register, the date of birth of victim has been mentioned as 29/07/2005. In cross-examination, she has admitted that the entries in the said register with regard to date of birth of the victim was not made by her. Further she has 5 CRA No.1378 of 2023 specifically admitted that on what basis the entry has been recorded in the said Dakhil Kharij Register, she did not know. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not 6 CRA No.1378 of 2023 tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public 7 CRA No.1378 of 2023 document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 12. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2. If an application is filed before the 8 CRA No.1378 of 2023 Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the 9 CRA No.1378 of 2023 standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in 10 CRA No.1378 of 2023 consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 13. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution 11 CRA No.1378 of 2023 but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or 12 CRA No.1378 of 2023 child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three- judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed 13 CRA No.1378 of 2023 age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 14. Very recently in the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The State Of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court has held that he victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in 14 CRA No.1378 of 2023 the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub-Registrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of 15 CRA No.1378 of 2023 attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. 19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant herein, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.” 15. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the victim (PW-2) has stated in her deposition that she do not know her date of birth. PW-1, mother of victim has deposed that the age of her 16 CRA No.1378 of 2023 daughter/victim is 15 years though she has not stated the exact date of birth of victim. (PW-15), Teacher of school, where the victim was studying, on the basis of dakhil-kharij register, victim’s date of birth recorded in the school is 29/07/2005, but it was not recorded by her; and PW-15 has not stated in her evidence that on what basis and by whom the date of birth was recorded in the said register. 16. No witnesses has been examined with respect to the fact that on what basis, the date of birth of the victim has been registered in the dakhil-kharij register. 17. Except for these evidences, no other evidence like ossification test report have been produced by the prosecution to determine her age that on the date of incident, she was minor or less than 18 years of age. The evidence of Dakhil Kharij Register is not sufficient to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident because of the reason that the author of the registration of birth in Dakhil Kharij Register has not been examined. There is no evidence that on what basis the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the said register. There is every possibility that the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the Dakhil Kharij Register on assumption otherwise, the prosecution must have produced the relevant record on the basis of which her date of birth recorded in the said register. The evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to the age of the victim are not of that 17 CRA No.1378 of 2023 sterling quality which is sufficient to determine the age of the victim. Therefore, there is lack of clinching and cogent evidence to hold her minor on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court held her minor. 18. The next question for consideration would be whether the appellant has committed rape upon her or not. 19. PW-2 Victim stated in her evidence that she has known the accused for about the past five years. She stated that about a year ago, she was living at her maternal aunt’s (mother’s elder sister) house in Bahatarai. Her elder brother was also living with her there. On the day of the incident, she left home telling her brother that she was going to the market. The accused met her at Bahatarai Chowk and took her on his motorcycle to Bilaspur railway station. From there, they both went to Gujarat by train. They stayed in Gujarat for about five to six months, working there. They lived together in the company’s quarters where they were employed. They were living as husband and wife, but they had not actually married. After that, they went to Lucknow and worked at a brick kiln, where they also lived together as husband and wife. They stayed there for about three months. Then they returned to Chhattisgarh to the house of the accused’s sister and brother-in- law. Both of them stayed there for about a week. After that, the police came there and took her. In cross-examination, she admitted that she was in love relationship with the accused even 18 CRA No.1378 of 2023 before she went to her maternal aunt’s house. She stated that her parents had forbidden her from talking to the accused, but even after their warning, she continued to speak with him. She admits that that when she went to her maternal aunt’s house, she always kept phone with her. The appellant gave to her mobile phone. Many other people also worked around us at Gujarat, but she did not tell them that the accused had brought her there. She further admitted that in Lucknow, she along with the accused lived with the parents of the accused. 20. PW-1, Mother of victim stated in her evidence that the victim told her that she had been living with the parents of accused. The victim told to her that she had been with the accused in Gujarat and later with his parents in Lucknow. 21. Dr. Khushboo Kacchhap (PW-5), who conducted the medical examination of victim stated in her evidence that in External genital examination, the labia majora and minora were healthy and developed. There was no injury of any kind. In Internal genital examination, the membranes were multiple and multiple tears and full. There were no injuries or marks of any kind. 22. From the aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution, it is clear from the statement of victim (PW-2) that she has known to accused for about the past five years. She clearly admitted in her evidence that she left home telling her brother that she was going to the market and when the accused met her at Bahatarai Chowk, 19 CRA No.1378 of 2023 she had gone with the accused on motorcycle to Bilaspur railway station. From there, they both went to Gujarat by train and stayed in Gujarat for about five to six months in the company’s quarters where they were working and were living as a husband and wife, but they had not actually married. Thereafter, they went to Lucknow and worked at a brick kiln, where they also lived together as husband and wife with the parents of accused. She admitted that she was in love relationship with the accused. She stated that her parents had forbidden her from talking to the accused, but even after their warning, she continued to speak with him. Further, mother of the victim stated that the victim told her that she had been living with the parents of accused and the victim had been with the accused in Gujarat and later with his parents in Lucknow. 23. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 24. For the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the opinion that the 20 CRA No.1378 of 2023 prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant and the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt. 25. In the result, the appeal is Allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 01/12/2022 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges leveled against him. The appellant is in jail. He be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 26. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 27. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. SD/- SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Gowri/Amardeep