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2025 DAILYLAW 51169 (CHH)

VANDANA SONI v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPS/2569/2023 · 2025-11-24

Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:57354 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5125 of 2023 1 - Devendra Singh Chauhan S/o Late Faujdar Singh Chauhan Aged About 44 Years R/o - Qtr. No. 133, Kharmora, Post Dadarkhurd (Manikpur), Block Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh. --- Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Education Depart- ment, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Director Directorate, Education Department, Indrawati Bhawan, Nava Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent(s) WPS No. 2569 of 2023 1 - Vandana Soni D/o Jawahar Soni Aged About 28 Years R/o - 027, Ward No. 06, Thethwar Para, Dhamdha, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Set Kumar Sahu S/o Bipin Kumar Sahu Aged About 32 Years R/o House No. 47, Nanakpali, P.O. - Chattigirola, Tehsil - Saraipali, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh. ---Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of School Education Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Police Station And Post Office - Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 2 - Director Directorate Of Public Instructions Indravati Bhawan, Mantralaya, Police Station And Post Office - Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Raipur. 3 - Joint Director Directorate Of Punlic Instructions, Indravati Bhawan, Mantralaya, Police Station And Post Office - Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission Through - Secretary, Ad- dress - Shankar Nagar, Bhagat Singh Chowk, District : Raipur, Chhat- tisgarh. 5 - Controller Of Examination Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission, Address - Shankar Nagar, Bhagat Singh Chowk, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent(s) WPS No. 5295 of 2023 1 - Nityanand Gupta S/o Gopal Gupta Aged About 36 Years R/o Village Tarda, P.O.- Kondpalli, Police Station- Pussore, District Raigarh (C.G.). 2 - Seema Sahu W/o Sunil Sahu, D/o Birendra Sahu Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Nawapara, P.O. Bade Hardi, Police Station- Pussore, District- Raigarh (C.G.). 3 - Rajani Patel W/o Maheshwar Patel Aged About 30 Years R/o 4/26, Tulsi Awas, Near Bsnl Exchange Office, Raj Kishor Nagar, Bilaspur (C.G.). 4 - Ritu Yadav W/o Maneesh Kumar Yadav, D/o Ramavtar Yadav Aged About 31 Years R/o Ward No. 12, Mahamaya Ward, Chorbhatti, Post And Tahsil- Pathariya, District- Mungeli (C.G.). ---Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of School Education, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.). 2 - Directorate Of Public Instructions Through Its Director, First Floor, Block-C, Indravati Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.). 3 3 - Joint Director Directorate Of Public Instructions, First Floor, Block-C, Indravati Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) --- Respondent(s) For Petitioner in WPS No. 5125/2023 : Mr. C.J.K. Rao, Advocate. For Petitioner in WPS No. 2569/2023 : Mr. Kartik Kathuria, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Advocate. For Petitioner in WPS No. 5295/2023 : Mr. Prashant Dansena, Advocate. For Respondent/ State : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Government Ad- vocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 25.11.2025 1. This batch of writ petitions involves identical issues, therefore, in order to decide the same, they are being clubbed together, heard together and are being decided by this common order. 2. The petitioners are seeking indulgence of this Court with a prayer that though they were selected for the post of Lecturer (Com- merce) and provisional allotment letter has also been issued to them way back in the year 2022, however, till date, they have not been called for counselling for their appointment. Several other candidates were selected for the said post and time and again, counselling has been done and perhaps this would be 7th round of counselling. As such, the petitioners are seeking a direction to the respondent authorities to call them for the 7th round of counselling and to pass appropriate orders in respect of their appointment. 4 Even after 6th round of counselling when the entire posts could not be fulfilled, the respondent authorities, instead of calling the petitioners for further counselling in order to give them appoint- ment, has closed the counselling proceeding and thereafter, the vacant posts, which were not fulfilled, have been carried forward for the next recruitment process for which an advertisement dated 4.05.2023 has been issued by the respondent authorities which is per se illegal and the said advertisement issued for recruitment of the post of Lecturer (Commerce) is liable to be quashed. 3. In all the writ petitions, almost same reliefs have been claimed by the petitioners. For the sake of brevity, the reliefs sought by the petitioners in WPS No.5125/2023 (Devendra Singh Chauhan vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others) has been taken into considera- tion which are quoted hereinbelow:- “10.1. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set-aside the advertisement dated 04.05.2023 (Annexure P-6) issued for the post of Lecturer. 10.2. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent No.2 to con- sider the petitioner for the post of Lecturer (Commerce) and issue appointment order in compliance to the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 01.05.2023. 10.3. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to extend the validity of the select list in compliance to the or- der passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court 5 dated 01.05.2023. 10.4. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief as it may deems fit and appropriate. 10.5. Cost of the petition..” 4. The case, as projected by the petitioners, is that an advertise- ment dated 09.03.2019 was issued by the respondent No.2 Direc- tor, Directorate of Education Department for appointment of Lec- turer (Commerce) and accordingly, on the basis of merit, all the petitioners were called for counselling. Their documents were also verified, however, the petitioners were not being given ap- pointment. Subsequently, a writ petition bearing WPC No.591/2012 and other connected matters were filed before this Court to struck down the Chhattisgarh Lok Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyon, Anusuchit Janjatiyon aur Anya Pichhare Vargon ke Liye Arakshan) Sanshodhan Adhiniyam 2011 and amended Niyam, 2012, which was challenged in an SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C)No.19668/2022 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has passed an order dated 01.05.2023 directing the respondent authorities to go ahead with the selection process and to make appointments and promotions, however, the same shall be subject to final outcome of the SLP preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Based on the aforesaid order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 01.05.2023, a notification dated 03.05.2023 was issued by the State Government and the process 6 of appointment was again initiated. In the order dated 01.05.2023, the validity of the select list was also extended to conclude the selection process. It was the case of the petitioners that the re- spondent authorities have not appointed them on account of pen- dency of SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court though vide or- der dated 01.05.2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that the respondent authorities may continue process of selection and appointment of the concerned persons, however, the appoint- ments were subject to final outcome of the SLP. Inspite of clear order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the respondent au- thorities are not considering the case of the petitioners for ap- pointment even after their selection and in this way, they are go- ing contrary to the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 5. Thereafter, the respondent authorities have issued a fresh adver- tisement on 04.05.2023 for appointment of Lecturer (Commerce) which is illegal in the teeth of order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the acts committed by the respondent author- ities are nonetheless, but culpable exercise of power, as such, the advertisement issued for recruitment of Lecturer (Commerce) dated 04.05.2023 is required to be quashed interalia with a prayer that the petitioners may be considered for appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher for their relevant subjects as they were selected for appointment, however, they could not be appointed due to the inaction on the part of respondent authorities. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that when the peti- 7 tioners were selected and their documents were verified then the petitioners should have been appointed by the respondent au- thorities, however, inspite of appointing petitioners on their re- spective subjects even after their selection, the respondent au- thorities have issued a fresh advertisement dated 04.05.2023 which is per se illegal and contrary to the order dated 01.05.2023 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and requires to be quashed. It is further argued that the posts advertised earlier on 09.03.2019 were not exhausted and instead of calling the peti- tioners for further counselling, the respondents have chosen to carry forward these posts, which cannot be done, as such, the re- spondent authorities be directed to call the petitioners for fresh 7th counselling and to pass appropriate orders in respect of their ap- pointment for the post of Assistant Teacher in their respective subjects. 7. On the other hand, learned State counsel vehemently opposes the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners and submits that in their return, in categorical terms, they have stated that the petitioners could not be selected and called for coun- selling as they could not compete the cut-off marks which have been prescribed for selection to the post of Lecturer (Commerce) in various subjects. Only for the sake of petitioners, who could not get qualified, counselling cannot be done again and again. It is stated that even after 6th round of counselling, the petitioners could not qualify as they could not succeed in getting cut-off 8 marks as prescribed by the respondent authorities and therefore, they could not be selected. It is further submitted that the selec- tion would not give a right to the petitioners to be appointed on the respective posts unless and until they qualify the cut-off marks as prescribed in the counselling. When the posts were ly- ing vacant and the aspirants could not compete the cut-off marks as prescribed by the respondent authorities, the authorities have duly advertised and carry forwarded the same. As such, the peti- tioners were not able to make out a case for their appointment through counselling, which has been closed and cannot be opened again and again. It is finally contended that the petitioners are miserably failed to make out a case for reliefs sought by them, as such, all the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in threshold. 8. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the docu- ments appended with all the writ petitions. 9. From perusal of the documents in the shape of petitions as well as in the rejoinder, it is apparent that the petitioners have applied for the post of Lecturer (Commerce) in their respective subjects. On the basis of their requisite qualification as well as the marks obtained by them, they were selected for counselling, however, in the counselling, they could not get the cut-off marks as prescribed by the respondent authorities. The cut-off marks were was time to time revised, however, instead of that, the petitioners were not able to be accommodated for the appointment of Lecturer (Com- 9 merce) in their respective subjects till 6th round of counselling. From perusal of the documents as well as the advertisement dated 04.05.2023, it is apparent that when the posts could not be fulfilled and were lying vacant for about more than three years, they were carried forward. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to consider the judgments relied upon by the respective counsels. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tej Prakash Pathak and Others vs. Rajasthan High Court and Others reported in (2025) 2 SCC 1, wherein it has been held in paras 25, 64, 64.1, 65.2 & 65.6 which read as under:- “25. Candidates participating in a recruitment process have legitimate expectation that the process of selection will be fair and non-arbitrary. The basis of doctrine of legitimate expectation in public law is founded on the principles of fair- ness and non-arbitrariness in government deal- ings with individuals. It recognises that a public authority's promise or past conduct will give rise to a legitimate expectation. This doctrine is premised on the notion that public authorities, while performing their public duties, ought to honour their promises or past practices. The le- gitimacy of an expectation can be inferred if it is rooted in law, custom, or established procedure. 64. Thus, in light of the decision in Shankarsan Dash, a candidate placed in the select list gets no indefeasible right to be appointed even If va- cancies are available. Similar was the view taken 10 by this Court in Subash Chander Marwaha where against 15 vacancies only top 7 from the select list were appointed. But there is a caveat. The State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a selected candidate. Therefore, when a challenge is laid to State's ac- tion in respect of denying appointment to a se- lected candidate, the burden is on the State to justify its decision for not making appointment from the select list. 65.1.Recruitment process commences from the issuance of the advertisement calling for applica- tions and ends with filling up of vacancies; 65.2. Eligibility criteria for being placed in the se- lect list, notified at the commencement of the re- cruitment process, cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process unless the ex- tant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit. Even if such change is permissible under the ex- tant Rules or the advertisement, the change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the test of non-ar- bitrariness; 65.6. Placement in the select list gives no inde- feasible right to appointment. The State or its in- strumentality for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies. However, if vacan- cies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the select list.” 11. Learned State counsel has also relied upon the judgments 11 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Mohd. Rashid vs. Director, Local Bodies, New Secretariat and Oth- ers reported in (2020) 2 SCC 582 wherein it has been held in paras 13 & 14, which read as under:- “13. The appellants who are aspirants for direct re- cruitment have no right for appointment merely be- cause at one point of time the vacancies were adver- tised. The candidates such as the appellants cannot claim any right of appointment merely for the reason that they responded to an advertisement published on 12-9-2013. Even after completion of the selection process, the candidates even on the merit list do not have any vested right to seek appointment only for the reason that their names appear on the merit list. In Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India³, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that a candidate seeking ap- pointment to a civil post cannot be regarded to have acquired an indefeasible right to appointment in such post merely because of the appearance of his name in the merit list. This Court held as under: (SCC pp. 50-51, para 7) ‘7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an inde- feasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notifica- tion merely amounts to an invitation to quali- fied candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruit- ment rules so indicate, the State is under no 12 legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacan- cies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacan- cies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test. and no dis- crimination can be permitted. This correct po- sition has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha: Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana or Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab.’ 14. Since the selection process has not been com- pleted and keeping in view the mandate of the statu- tory rules, we find that the appellants have no right to dispute the action of the municipal bodies to fill up the posts either by way of promotion or by deputation as such posts are being filled up in terms of mandate of the Rules. It is always open to the municipal bodies to fill up the vacant posts by way of direct recruitment af- ter the posts by way of promotion and/or deputation quota are not filled up either on the basis of recruit- ment process already initiated or to be initiated afresh.” 12. Learned State counsel also places reliance in the matter of Com- missioner of Police and Another vs. Umesh Kumar reported in (2020) 10 SCC 448, wherein vide paras 19, 20, 23, it has been 13 held as under:- “19.The real issue, however, is whether the respon- dents were entitled to a writ of mandamus. This would depend on whether they have a vested right of appointment. Clearly the answer to this must be in the negative. In Punjab SEB v. Malkiat Singh, this Court held that the mere inclusion of candi- dates in a selection list does not confer upon them a vested right to appointment. The Court held: (SCC p. 26, para 4) "4.... the High Court committed an error in proceeding on the basis that the re- spondent had got a vested right for ap- pointment and that could not have been taken away by the subsequent change in the policy. It is settled law that mere inclu- sion of name of a candidate in the select list does not confer on such candidate any vested right to get an order of ap- pointment. This position is made clear in para 7 of the Constitution Bench judg- ment of this Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India 10 which reads: (SCC pp. 50-51) 7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates ac- quire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordi- narily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to ap- ply for recruitment and on their selection 14 they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. How- ever, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary man- ner. The decision not to fill up the vacan- cies has to be taken bona fide for appro- priate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruit- ment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana 12 or Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab 13. (emphasis in original) 20. In the present case, after the name of the re- spondents appeared in the results declared on 17- 7-2015, the process of recruitment was put in abeyance since the results were challenged before the Tribunal. The process of revising the results during the course of the recruitment was necessi- tated to align it in accordance with law. An Expert Committee was specifically appointed following the institution of proceedings before the Tribunal. The report of the Expert Committee established errors in the answer-key, and thereafter a conscious deci- sion was taken, after evaluating the report, to revise the results on 1-2-2016. In the fresh list which was 15 drawn up, both the respondents have admittedly failed to fulfil the cut-off for the OBC category to which they belong. As the learned ASG submitted before the Court, as many as 228 candidates are ranked above Umesh Kumar on merit while 265 candidates stand above Satyendra Singh. The sub- mission of Mr Khurshid that these are the only two candidates before this Court would not entitle them to a direction contrary to law since they had no vested right to appointment. 23. For the above reasons, we are of the view that the judgments delivered by the Delhi High Court on 6-12-2018 in Umesh Kumar v. States and on 19-12- 2018 in Satyendra Singh v. States do not comport with law. The High Court has been manifestly in er- ror in issuing a mandamus to the appellants to ap- point the respondents on the post of Constable (Ex- ecutive) in Delhi Police. The direction was clearly contrary to law. The respondents have participated in the selection process and upon the declaration of the revised result, it has emerged before the Court that they have failed to obtain marks above the cut- off for the OBC category to which they belong.” 13. Now, reverting back to the present writ petitions, when they are examined in the light of aforesaid pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is ample clear that even after selection for the post of Lecturer (Commerce), the petitioners who had been suc- ceeded in selection process and whose documents were verified, did not confer a vested right to be appointed. Admittedly, the peti- tioners, who are aspirants for recruitment to the post of Lecturer 16 (Commerce), have failed to secure marks above the cut-off marks for the post of Lecturer (Commerce), therefore, it cannot be recorded to have acquired an indefeasible right to be appointed on the said posts merely on the ground that their names appear in the select merit list. The respondent authorities did their best in the process of selection as there were as many as 6 rounds of counselling, however, even in the 6th round of counselling, the pe- titioners could not be appointed, as they could not cross the cut- off marks as prescribed the respondent authorities. The judgment cited by the petitioners is also relevant to the aspect that the per- son who gets placed in the select list gets no indefeasible right to be appointed even if the vacancies are available. The rider would be that the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny ap- pointment to any selected candidate. However, in the present matters, there is a plausible reason for not appointing the petition- ers to the post of Lecturer (Commerce) as the petitioners could not compete the cut-off marks prescribed by the respondent au- thorities and in that view of the matter, even if posts are lying va- cant, the petitioners cannot claim for appointment only on the ba- sis of their selection. Selection is altogether different thing from appointed. 14. So far as the quashment of the fresh advertisement dated 04.05.2023 is concerned, when the posts could not be fulfilled even after 6th round of counselling, the respondent authorities were having no way left except to carry forward those vacant 17 posts for new advertisement which cannot be said to be faulted with. The respondent authorities/ State has rightly issued a fresh advertisement dated 04.05.2023 for appointment to the post of Lecturer (Commerce) while carrying forward the remaining seats which could not be fulfilled in the earlier round of recruitment process, which cannot be interfered with by this Court. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue regard- ing exercise of interference under extraordinary jurisdiction has held in the matter of M/s. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors. vs. Naveen Mathew Philip & Anr. Etc. Etc. reported in [2023] LiveLaw (SC) 320, which reads as under:- “18. While doing so, we are conscious of the fact that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide but are required to be exercised only in extraordi- nary circumstances in matters pertaining to pro- ceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involv- ing a lender and a borrower, when the legisla- ture has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal.” 16. Looking into all the aforesaid aspects of the matter, this Court do not consider present to be fit cases for interfering with the acts of respondent authorities/ State, in extraordinary writ jurisdiction un- der Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. Accordingly, the present petitions, being devoid of merits are li- able to be and are hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat