IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) CRR 1519 of 2020 Raj Kumar Das and Ors. -Vs- The State of West Bengal and another For the Petitioners : Mr. Sourav Chatterjee, Mr. Soumya Nag. For the State : Mr. Rana Mukherjee, Mr. Bitasok Banerjee. For the O.P. No. 2 : Mr. Arnab Sinha, Mr. A. Basu. Hearing concluded on : 16.12.2024 Judgment on : 07.01.2025 2 Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.: 1. The present revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing of the proceedings being Special Case No. 12 of 2018 pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, First Court, Alipore, South 24-Parganas arising out of Rabindra Sarobar Police Station Case No. 65 of 2018 dated 2.5.2018 under Sections 448/323/504/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 3/4 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and all orders passed therein including the order dated 2.3.2019 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, First Court, Alipore, South 24- Parganas thereby issuing a non-bailable warrant of arrest against the present petitioners. 2. The petitioners’ case is that he as well as the opposite party no. 2 are employees of the Central Public Works Department (hereinafter referred to as CPWD). The petitioner no. 2 is an employee of the Office of the Assistant Estate Manager (under the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, Directorate of Estates) and the petitioner no. 3 was an employee under the Ministry of Home Affairs. As such the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 were not employees of Central Public Works Department as falsely alleged by the opposite party no. 2 in the application under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 3. That the petitioner no. 3 earlier used to reside at P-19, Southern Avenue, Kolkata-700 029 but after attaining superannuation is living elsewhere. 3 4. It is further stated that earlier, the opposite party no. 2 instituted a criminal case being Lake Police Station Case No. 409 of 2015 dated 2.11.2015 under Sections 3(1)(viii)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the present petitioners. The said case was duly investigated and upon investigation, the Investigating agency arrived at an opinion of closing the investigation declaring the said case as a mistake of fact vide Final Report No. 220 of 2015 dated 26.12.2015. 5. The proceedings in the present case has been initiated on 02.05.2018 on the basis of an application under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C. 6. The complainant’s case therein is that he is an employee of CPWD under Central Government as “Safaiwala” and has been living at the abovenoted quarter with his other family members since the year 2006. 7. The accused persons are also residing by the side of the petitioner’s quarter in the same premises as they are the employees of CPWD. 8. It has been alleged that all the accused persons are continuously creating torture upon the complainant and his family members both physically and mentally with their motive to drive out the complainant from the said premises. 9. That on 16.2.2016, 19.2.2016 and 9.9.2017 the said accused persons forcibly and illegally criminally trespassed in the quarter of the complainant and started to abuse the complainant and his family in filthy languages calling them “Sala, Suorer baccha” etc. and on protest they mercilessly assaulted the complainant by fist and blows and also by iron rod. 4 10. The accused persons also allegedly openly declared that the complainant and his family members have no right to occupy the said quarter because the complainant is lower class man as “Safaiwala”. 11. In the meantime, accused Dulal Chakraborty petitioner no. 3 herein retired from service and hence he left the said quarter but the other two accused persons did not stop their cruelty and torture upon the complainant and his family members. 12. Last on 25.11.2017 at about 11.00 A.M., the accused persons allegedly criminally trespassed into the house of the complainant and assaulted him and his family members and committed theft of some valuables and cash of Rs. 10,000/- from the house, which was kept in the almirah. 13. In Hitesh Verma vs The State of Uttarakhand & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 707 of 2020, on 05.11.2020, held:- “14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors.,(2008) 8 SCC 435. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under: “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our 5 opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.” 14. The Supreme Court in Ramawatar vs State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2021 SC 5228, wherein the Court categorically held:- “16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the 6 legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its power to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer of quashing on the basis of compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objection of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a „special statue’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure.” 15. The Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. in Criminal Appeal No…../2023 (arising out of SLP(CRL) No. 1249 of 2023) in which Paragraph 18 reads as follows:- “18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet that the same makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for the allegation/observation that caste- related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If on calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract 7 section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars invocation of the court‟s jurisdiction under Section 438, Cr.P.C. and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge- sheet(which is prepared based either on statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognizance of the offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied in a case of the present nature, the charge- sheet dated 21st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence having been committed by the appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial.” 16. In Randheer Singh vs The State of U.P. & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 932 of 2021, on September 02, 2021, the Supreme Court held:- “23. Even though an FIR need not contain every detail, an offence has to be made out in the FIR itself. It is the case of the Private Respondents that Bela Rani has no title. Bela Rani executed a false Power of Attorney in favour of Rajan Kumar (since deceased). Alternatively, the Power of Attorney, in itself, was a forged document. 33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings are being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the cost of repetition that the FIR does not disclose any offence so far as the Appellant is concerned. There is no whisper of how and in what manner, this Appellant is involved in any criminal offence and the charge sheet, the relevant part whereof has been extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the 8 ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra (supra) extracted above.” 17. It is seen from the report submitted by the police through the State, that the de facto complainant expired one year back and his family members are not co-operating along with the police as to whether they went to proceed in this case or not. 18. Case diary has been placed by the State. 19. It appears that there are no materials in the case diary to support allegations herein, and the de facto complainant having expired and with his family members not cooperating, continuing the present criminal proceeding shall be an abuse of the process of law. 20. CRR 1519 of 2020 is thus allowed. 21. The proceedings being Special Case No. 12 of 2018 pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, First Court, Alipore, South 24- Parganas arising out of Rabindra Sarobar Police Station Case No. 65 of 2018 dated 2.5.2018 under Sections 448/323/504/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 3/4 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioners namely Raj Kumar Das, Manoj Kumar Jha and Dulal Chakraborty. 9 22. All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of. 23. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 24. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary compliance. 25. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities. (Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)