APHC010302462025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3333] TUESDAY,THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE V.SUJATHA WRIT PETITION NO: 15193/2025 Between: Sri Chintakayala Yaseen Ali, ...PETITIONER AND The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S) Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. K SRINIVAS Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. GP FOR CIVIL SUPPLIES The Court made the following: ORDER: The present Writ Petition came to be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:- “…to issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, Order or direction declaring the action of the respondents more particularly the 2nd respondent in suspending authorization of the petitioner vide Ref: RDOKDP-CV0SA/4/2025-SA(C1)-RDO-KDP dated 28-02-2025, is illegal, arbitrary and violation of Article 14, 19 and 21 of Indian Constitution. Consequently, set aside the same by continuing the petitioner as Fair price dealer for shop No.1127002, situated at Chennur Village and Mandal, YSR Kadapa District and pass…” 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as a Fair Price Shop dealer for shop No.1127002, situated at Chennur Village and Mandal, YSR Kadapa District and he has been supplying essential commodities to the card holders without any complaints since the date of his appointment. 3. While the matter stood thus, a sudden inspection was conducted at the petitioner’s Fair Price Shop on 14.02.2025 at around 11.50 PM by the Deputy Tahsildar (Civil Supplies) along with the officials of Vigilance and Enforcement Department. During the said inspection, it was alleged that there was a shortage of 149 Kgs of PDS rice. Though the said variation is marginal and within the permissible limits prescribed under the control order, basing on the report submitted by the respondent No.3, the respondent No.2 has straightaway suspended the petitioner’s authorization pending enquiry vide impugned proceedings dated 28.02.2025. 4. The grievance of the petitioner is that the respondent No.2 even without issuing any show cause notice and solely basing on the report submitted by the respondent No.3/the Tahsildar, Cheenur Mandal, YSR Kadapa District, has placed the petitioner’s authorization under suspension pending enquiry vide impugned orders dated 28.02.2025. Challenging the same, the petitioner filed the present writ petition and requested this Court to direct the respondent No.2 to complete the enquiry as required under law as expeditiously as possible. 5. Heard Sri K.Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader for Civil Supplies appearing for the respondents and perused the material available on record. 6. On a perusal of the impugned proceedings, it is an admitted fact that even without issuing any show cause notice to the petitioner, the respondent No.2 solely basing on the report submitted by the respondent No.3/Tahsildar, Chennur Mandal, YSR Kadapa District, dated 15.02.2025, has placed the petitioner’s authorization under suspension pending enquiry vide impugned orders dated 28.02.2025. But, till date no such enquiry was concluded though the stipulated time period of 90 days was elapsed. As such, the present writ petition is squarely covered by the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Joint Collector, Kurnool vs. A. Neelima1 , wherein a Division Bench held as follows: 2. We have gone through the impugned judgment which is based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s.Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab (1) AIR 1982 (S.C.), 1965. In that case, the prescribed form of licence contained the clause for the period of suspension to be maximum for 90 days. A perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge shows that in essence and substance what was meant by him is that the period of 90 days is a reasonable period to conclude the enquiry and the continuance of it beyond 90 days would be unreasonable and shall be, hence, taken as quashed. As we see it was in the nature of a direction to complete the enquiry within 90 days than laying down a general proposition of law that the maximum period of suspension could be only for 90 days. We agree with the view of the learned Single Judge that the order of suspension cannot be used as a pretext for indefinite postponement of the operation of the fair price shop dealership making it in effect cancellation of the dealership. An order of suspension, like every executive and administrative act, has to be founded upon fair play and lack of arbitrariness. The continuation of order of the suspension 1 1996 LawSuit (AP) 956 indefinitely is whole arbitrary and cannot be countenanced. But we must also rush to add that what is reasonable period of suspension will vary from case to case depending upon various factors, though more often than not, a period of 90 days should ordinarily be sufficient to conclude the enquiry. 7. In the present case, though the impugned order was passed on 28.02.2025, suspending the authorization of the petitioner for an indefinite period and even after an elapse of 90 days, there has been no commencement of operation of the enquiry against the petitioner. However, in view of the fact that alternative arrangements have been made by respondent- authorities pursuant to the impugned orders dated 28.02.2025, instead of going into merits of the case, the respondent No.2 is directed to complete the enquiry pending within a period of two (02) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 8. Accordingly, with the above direction, the writ petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Writ Petition shall stand closed. ___________________ JUSTICE V.SUJATHA Date: 14.10.2025 SRT 297 THE HONOURABLE SMT.JUSTICE V.SUJATHA W.P.No.15193 of 2025 Date: 14.10.2025 SRT