1 2025:CGHC:17761 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 771 of 2025 1 - Smt. Gomti Shukla W/o Shri Sitaram Shukla Aged About 70 Years R/o Village And Post - Bhurkoni, Police Station - Tendukona, Tehsil - Pithora, District - Mahasmund (C.G.) 2 - Satish Shukla S/o Shri Sitaram Shukla Aged About 40 Years R/o Village And Post - Bhurkoni, Police Station - Tendukona, Tehsil - Pithora, District - Mahasmund (C.G.) 3 - Pankaj Shukla S/o Shri Sitaram Shukla Aged About 43 Years R/o Village And Post - Bhurkoni, Police Station - Tendukona, Tehsil - Pithora, District - Mahasmund (C.G.) ... Appellants versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - P.S. - Tendukona, Tehsil - Pithora, District - Mahasmund (C.G.) 2 - Smt. Sumitra Bhoi W/o Late Shri Sartik Ram Bhoi R/o Ward No.-15, Vasudev Para, Pithora, P.S. - Pithora, District - Mahasmund (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Shri Sarfaraz Khan, Advocate. For State : Shri K.K. Baharani, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 17.04.2025 1. The present Criminal Appeal has been filed under Section 14(A)(1) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short, the SC & ST Act) filed by the appellants against the impugned order dated 11.03.2025 passed by Special Judge (SC & ST Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2025.05.06 11:13:52 +0530 2 Act) Mahasamund in Special Criminal Case No.11/2023 whereby the trial court has framed charge against the appellants for the offence under Section 447 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 3(1)(iv), 3(1) (v) of the SC & ST Act as amended by Act No.1 of 2016. 2. Brief facts of the case are that, the appellants are accused persons against whom FIR of Crime No.22 of 2018 for the offence under Section 447/34 IPC and Sections 3(1)(iv) and 3(1)(v) of SC & ST Act were registered at Police Station Tendukona, District Mahasamund. The complaint was lodged by one Sumitra Bhoi against them with the allegation that she owns the land Khasra No.268 Area 0.70 Hect. at village Bhurkoni and some part of the said land is being encroached by the accused persons and the village Sarpanch Radheshyam Agrawal and Sanjay Agrawal have allotted her land to the present appellants and permitted them to raise construction over there and the appellants had tried to dispossess her from her land. After investigation, the charge sheet was filed against the appellants and one another co- accused Khemraj Bhoi before the trial court for the offence under Section 447/34 IPC and Sections 3(1)(f),(g) and 3(2)(va) of SC & ST Act and Special Criminal Case No.11 of 2023 was registered against the appellants in which proceedings are going on. 3. During the proceeding of the case, on 19.12.2023 an application was filed by the appellants for their discharge, however the same was rejected by the trial court vide its order dated 11.03.2025 and charge for the aforesaid offences have been framed against the appellants which is under challenge in the present appeal. 3 4. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the impugned order suffers with material irregularity and the trial court without application of mind has framed the charge. From the entire charge sheet there is no ingredient of the offence of Section 447 IPC or the SC & ST Act. The allegation against the appellants are purely civil in nature and civil remedy is available to the complainant to redress her grievances. He would further submit that Tehsildar Pithora has also passed an order on 14.10.2005 under Section 250 of Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code on the application filed by the husband of complainant for illegal dispossession. The said order dated 14.10.2005 passed by Tehsildar Pithora was challenged by the Husband of complainant before the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Mahasamund in an appeal and on 29.12.2007 the said appeal also got dismissed. The complainant was very well aware about passing of orders by the revenue courts and only to create pressure upon the appellants, the report has been lodged and no offence prima facie is made out to frame charge and to proceed with the trial. Framing of charge against the appellants is clear abuse of process of law as well as the procedure and by setting aside the order impugned, the appellants may be discharged. 5. On the other hand the counsel for the State opposes the submissions and supported the impugned order by submitting that the same does not suffer with any irregularity or illegality. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 4 7. The appellants have challenged the order framing charge by the trial court. At the time of framing charge, the court is not required to meticulous examine the allegations available in the charge sheet and it is only to consider that if the allegations in the charge sheet is taken as it is, whether any prima facie offence to proceed with the trial is made out or not? 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak, 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein it has been held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for "presuming" that the accused had committed the offence: (Chitreth Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 613, para 25) "25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has 5 committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction" 17. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P noted that in accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is "sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused of there is ground for "presuming that the offence has been committed. G.P. Mathur. J. held thus: (SCC p. 56, paras 9-10) "9. In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under: '14. Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquity in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evadentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime." 10. The High Court, did not at all apply the relevant text, namely whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed as offence. If the answer is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that 'as the firing was aimed at the other persons and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit and further observing that the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste set aside the order by which the charges had been framed against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant criteria for judging the validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside." (emphasis supplied) 9. In the matter of Captain Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf and Others 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgment that:- “12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap³ Relevant paras are extracted below: (SCC pp. 197-98, para 11) 6 "11....11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to f sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if g the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed. he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter s the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2 to the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. MR. Memah, one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: (SCC p. 526) '25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 219 CPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (N. Suresh Rajan case, SCC 721-22, para 20) "29....... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have the offence on t committed the the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge, though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage." 7 10. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgment that:- “21. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarised the principles in the following terms: (SCC pp. 520-23, paras 12-14) "12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is pressed into service which reads as under: (SCC pp. 41-42) '4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which.... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial 8 stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.' 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan wherein it was held as under. (SCC pp. 401-402, paras 10-11) '10... ..If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact. It is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter of into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the 9 evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him." 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar, this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) '19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is 9 only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face valuc disclose the existence of all the ingredients 10 constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.' " 11. The Hon’ble supreme Court has further held in para 12 of its judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294, that:- “12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial." 12. In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused to proceed with the trial. 13.Reverting to the facts of present case, from the complaint of the complainant which is annexed at page No.43 of the appeal, it appears that the complainant alleged that her land was being encroached by the appellants and they tried to dispossess her illegally. After preliminary enquiry FIR was registered. Registration of FIR has not 11 been challenged by the appellants. Even filing of charge sheet has not been challenged. While considering charge, the trial court is required to consider the material annexed with the charge sheet by the prosecution. From the statement of witnesses Smt. Sumitra Bhoi, Hemant Bhoi, Gowardhan Bhoi, Parmanand Bhoi and Naveen Bhoi it prima facie reflects that the complainant owns the land of Khasra No.268 area 0.70 Hect. At village Bhurkoni in which there was a dispute with respect to its possession. The appellants tried to dispossess them. 14.Section 3(1)(iv) & 3(1)(v) of SC & ST Act (before amendment) provides that: (iv) wrongfully occupies or cultivates any land owned by, or allotted to, or notified by any competent authority to be allotted to, a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or gets the land allotted to him transferred; (v) wrongfully dispossesses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe from his land or premises or interferes with the enjoyment of his rights over any land, premises or water” 15.The provisions of Section 3(1)(iv) and 3(1)(v) of SC & ST Act, after its amendment by Act No.1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.01.2016, reads as follows: “(f) wrongfully occupies or cultivates any land, owned by, or in the possession of or allotted to, or notified by any competent authority to be allotted to, a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, or gets such land transferred; (g) wrongfully dispossesses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe from his land or premises or interferes with the enjoyment of his rights, including forest rights, over any land or premises or water or irrigation facilities or destroys the crops or takes away the produce therefrom. Explanation.––For the purposes of clause (f) and this clause, the expression “wrongfully” includes— (A) against the person’s will; (B) without the person’s consent; (C) with the person’s consent, where such consent has been obtained by putting the person, or any other person in whom the person is interested in fear of death or of hurt; or (D) fabricating records of such land” 12 16.From the entire material annexed with the charge sheet it appears that there are various disputed questions of fact which are to be decided after full fledged trial and it cannot be interfered in an appellate jurisdiction when the trial court has exercised its jurisdiction and framed charges against the appellants. While framing charge, the trial court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence produced by the prosecution along with charge sheet and only to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground to proceed with the trial or not, irrespective of the fact as to whether the ultimate outcome would be conviction or acquittal. From the entire material produced by the prosecution, there appears to be sufficient prima facie evidence available on record to frame charge against the appellants. True it is that certain orders have been passed by the revenue courts, it may be a defence of the appellants, but not relevant at the time of framing of charge. 17. I do not find any sufficient ground to interfere with the order framing charge passed by the trial court. 18. Accordingly, the appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder