1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Order Reserved on : 06/10/2025 Order Delivered on: 15/10/2025 CRR No. 1130 of 2025 1 - Ankit Koshley S/o Shri Laxmidatt Koshley, Aged About 22 Years Occupation Student, R/o Village- Hirri, Near Bus Stand, Police Station- Sarangarh, District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh (C.G.).........(Wrongly Mentioned Surname As Kosle) ... Applicant(s) versus 1 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh, Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Sarangarh, District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Applicant(s) : Mr. Roop Ram Naik, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sanjeev Pandey, Dy. Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. CAV Order 1. The present criminal revision under Section 438 read with Section 442 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short “BNSS”) is filed by the applicant against the order dated 01.09.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act) Sarangarh, Sessions Division Raigarh, District Sarangah-Bilaigarh in Special Criminal Case under POCSO Act No. 16/2025, whereby the charges under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC/64 (2)(m) of BNS, 2023 and Section 5(l)/6 of POCSO Act have been framed against the applicant. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on the report lodged by the victim on 18.05.2025, the FIR has been registered against the applicant for the offence ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2025.10.15 18:46:14 +0530 2 under Section 64 of BNS, 2023 and Section 4 & 6 of POCSO Act. It is alleged in the report that in the month of May, 2021 when she was aged about 16 years, the applicant called her in the field and on the pretext of marriage he committed rape upon her, and asked her not to disclose the incident to anyone. Thereafter, he had gone to Kota for his studies and came back in the month of May 2023. When he return from Kota, he took her to his friends’ house at Raigarh and made physical relation with her. Whenever she asked her to marry with her he evaded for one or other reason. His act of sexually exploitation was continued upto May, 2025 and ultimately, left her on 14.05.2025 at Bilaspur. On 16th May , 2025 the applicant kidnapped another girl and fled some where else. On the complaint made by the victim, the FIR has been registered on 18.05.2025 and after investigation charge-sheet was filed against him for the offence under Section 64(2)(m) of BNS and Section 4 & 6 of POCSO Act, before the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the applicant for the offence under Section 376(2) (n) of IPC/64(2) (m) of BNS and Section 5(l)/6 of POCSO Act, which is under challenge in the present criminal revision. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that from the FIR as well as her statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., no offence of rape is made out prima facie against the applicant. The victim was a consenting party since from very beginning and there is no allurement of marriage. She being the educated girl could not remained in relation with the applicant in such a long period only on the pretext of marriage. She made physical relation with the applicant on various occasion. The FIR has been lodged in a highly belated stage and there is no plausible explanation for the same. She being the educated girl having knowledge of consequence of physical relation on the pretext of marriage and various alternative action against the applicant, continued in physical relation with him. The consensual physical relation was continued upto May, 2025, itself proves that there is no offence 3 of rape, but in order to extort money or to crate pressure upon him to marry with her, gives the consensual physical relation into colour of the offence of rape. The learned trial Court in a mechanical manner has framed charge against the applicant and in view of the facts and evidence available in the charge-sheet no prima-facie offence is made out to frame charge against the applicant and to proceed with the trial. Therefore, the impugned order of framing of charge may be set aside and the applicant may be discharged from the alleged offence. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent/State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the applicant and submitted that there is sufficient prima facie material available on record which prima facie constitutes the offence of rape for which the learned trial Court has rightly framed charge against him. With respect to her age, there is high school certificate which shows that the victim was minor on the first date of alleged incident and the alleged incident of rape was continued upto May, 2025 on the pretext of marriage. From the statement under Section 183 of BNSS, 2023 of the victim as well as statement of other witnesses clearly reveals the alleged incident with the victim. He would further submits that from the seizure memo, it also transpires that the birth certificate of the victim has been seized and according to which also on the first date of alleged incident she was minor. There is sufficient prima-facie material available in the charge-sheet to frame the charge against the applicant and to proceed with the trial. He would further submits that at the time of framing of charge the Court is not required to meticulous examining evidence available in the charge-sheet and only a prima-facie material to be considered at the time of framing of charge irrespective of its result either in conviction or in acquittal. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 4 6. From the complaint of the victim as well as from her statement recorded under Section 180 and 183 of BNSS, 2023, it appears that there is sufficient prima-facie material against the applicant in her statements. It comes that in the month of May, 2021 when she was aged about 16 years, the applicant called her in the field and committed rape upon her and asked her not to disclose the incident to anyone and he will marry with her. Thereafter, he left for Kota for further studies and return in the month of May, 2023. After that also upto 14.05.2025 he made physical relation with her on various occasions and various places on the pretext of marriage. However, on 16.05.2025, he fled away somewhere else along with other girl. From the statement of the parents of the victim, the statement of the victim is corroborated. After some initial obstruction between the families, the marriage between them was settled, however, the applicant fled away with other girl. There is statement of the brother of the victim, neighbour, brother- in-law of the victim and other witnesses who disclosed about the incident that the victim was sexually exploited by the applicant upto May, 2025 on the pretext of marriage. Whether or not the victim was engaged in making consensual physical relation with the applicant or whether she was subjected to sexually exploited by the applicant on the pretext of marriage, the consent given by the victim on misconception of facts i.e. on the pretext of marriage, all are to be considered after the full-fledged trial and the applicant is having every right to cross-examine the witnesses. At this stage, from the material produced by the prosecution along with the charge-sheet, it cannot be said that no offence, prima-facie, is made out against the applicant to frame charge against him. 7. With respect to the consideration of material at the time of framing of charge, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the 5 material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- 16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for "presuming" that the accused had committed the offence: (Chitreth Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 613, para 25) "25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction" 17. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P noted that in accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is "sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused of there is ground for "presuming that the offence has been committed. G.P. Mathur. J. held thus: (SCC p. 56, paras 9-10) "9. In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under: '14. Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquity in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the 6 evadentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime." 10. The High Court, did not at all apply the relevant text, namely whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed as offence. If the answer is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that 'as the firing was aimed at the other persons and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit and further observing that the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste set aside the order by which the charges had been framed against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant criteria for judging the validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside." (emphasis supplied) 8. In the matter of Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgement that:- 12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap³ Relevant paras are extracted below: (SCC pp. 197-98, para 11) "11....11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to f sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if g the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed. he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter s the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 7 11.2 to the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. MR. Memah, one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: (SCC p. 526) '25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 219 CPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (N. Suresh Rajan case, SCC 721-22, para 20) "29....... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have the offence on t committed the the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge, though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage." 9. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgment that:- 21. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarised the principles in the following terms: (SCC pp. 520-23, paras 12-14) "12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is pressed into service which reads as under: (SCC pp. 41-42) '4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge 8 the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which.... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.' 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan wherein it was held as under. (SCC pp. 401-402, paras 10-11) '10... ..If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact. It is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter of into a weighing and balancing of 9 evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the 9 evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him." 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar, this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) '19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. 10 (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face valuc disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.' " 10. The Hon’ble supreme Court has further held in para 12 of its judgement in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294, that:- "12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial." 11 11. In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused to proceed with the trial. 12. 12. In the present case considering the evidence available on record, annexed with the charge-sheet the learned trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that there is sufficient ground for framing of charge and to proceed with the trial and in pursuance thereof framed the charge against the applicant, which cannot be said either perverse or contrary to the facts of the case, calling for an interference by this Court. 13. In the result, the revision fails and hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok