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2025 DAILYLAW 50868 (KAR)

SRI VEERABHADRAIAH v. MANAGEMENT OF C.S.I. RURAL

WA/40/2025 · 2025-11-24

D K Singh, Tara Vitasta Ganju

body2025

Judgment text

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- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:48486-DB WA No. 40 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH AND THE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU WRIT APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2025 (L-MW) BETWEEN: 1. SRI VEERABHADRAIAH S/O KEMPAIAH, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, R/AT KALLAHALLI VILLAGE, CHAMARAJANAGARA TALUK, CHAMARAJANAGARA DIST-571109. 2. SRI DINESH KUMAR S/O SAMPATH KUMAR AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, R/AT BOGAPUR, CHAMARAJANAGARA TALUK, CHAMARAJANAGARA DIST-571115. &APPELLANTS (BY SRI. NAIK V S., ADVOCATE) AND: MANAGEMENT OF C.S.I. RURAL MISSION HOSPITAL MANGALA, CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT 571115, REP. BY ITS ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. &RESPONDENT (BY SRI. SOMASHEKAR., ADVOCATE FOR R1) Digitally signed by JUANITA THEJESWINI Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:48486-DB WA No. 40 of 2025 THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961 PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE DATED 05.11.2024 IN WP No.2702/2012 (L-MW) AND ALLOW THE WP No.2702/2012 (L-MW) AND GRANT ALL CONSEQUENTIAL BENEFITS AND PASS SUCH OTHER ORDER OR ORDERS AS DEEMED FIT IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE TO MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH and HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH) The present appeal has been filed impugning the judgment and order dated 05.11.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.2702/2012 whereby the writ petition instituted by the appellants-petitioners had been dismissed. 2. The parties are referred to as per their ranking in the writ court. 3. The petitioners were working in Divyanidhi Community Development Project at Kastur, Chamarajanagar Taluk, Mysore District. They were - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:48486-DB WA No. 40 of 2025 appointed with effect from 15.10.1992 on a fixed salary of Rs.500/- per month. The said Project came to be bound up. The respondent-Hospital engaged the petitioners on 01.03.1998. They had continued in the Divyanidhi Community Development Project till 31.08.2000. 4. There is no relationship between the Divyanidhi Community Development Project and the respondent- Hospital. The petitioners were paid the same amount as they were being paid while they were working in Divyanidhi Community Development Project i.e., at the rate of Rs.500/- per month. The petitioners filed the complaint before the authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Authority vide order dated 21.07.2004 in MWA.No.8/2001 directed the respondent-Hospital to pay the minimum wages to the petitioners and the said order was confirmed by this Court with modification in the penalty imposed on the respondent-Hospital. 5. The petitioners were removed from the employment on 31.08.2000. The petitioners raised the - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:48486-DB WA No. 40 of 2025 industrial dispute. However, the Labour Court, Mysore vide common Award dated 26.02.2010 dismissed the reference against the petitioners and held that the petitioners were engaged by the respondent-Hospital from 01.03.1998 to 31.08.2000 as a stop-gap arrangement. They were not in the regular employment of the Hospital and therefore, they were not entitled for reinstatement and backwages as claimed by them. The said Award of the Labour Court, Mysore has been upheld by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order dated 05.11.2024 in W.P.No.2702/2012. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the Labour Court misdirected itself while considering the case of the petitioners on the ground that they were not in permanent employment. 7. The definition of 'workman' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'I.D. Act'), does not provide that a person should be in permanent employment to be a 'workman'. If one considers the - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:48486-DB WA No. 40 of 2025 definition as provided under Section 2(s) of the I.D.Act, the nature of employment is immaterial for determining whether a person is a 'workman' or not. Therefore, the Labour Court misdirected itself to conclude that as the petitioners were not in permanent employment they were not entitled for retrenchment compensation / reinstatement and backwages. 8. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent-Hospital has submitted that the petitioners were employed on humanitarian grounds as they had lost their employment in the project as the project work had come to an end. The Hospital and the Project office were in the same compound and on humanitarian grounds they were engaged by the Hospital without any obligation of the Hospital to engage them. It is further submitted that the humanitarian act of the Hospital has landed them in trouble inasmuch as they have been facing the litigation for providing employment to the petitioners on humanitarian grounds. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:48486-DB WA No. 40 of 2025 9. It is further submitted that their employment was on stop-gap basis from 01.03.1998 to 31.08.2000. They were not on the roll of the Hospital and therefore, they were not entitled for retrenchment compensation/reinstatement and backwages. 10. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties. 11. It is not in dispute that there is no relation between the Divyanidhi Community Development Project and the respondent-Hospital. The petitioners were engaged after their employment was terminated in the Project with effect from 31.12.1997 and they were given a job in the Hospital with effect from 01.03.1998. They continued till 31.08.2000 when their engagement was terminated. 12. The petitioners therefore cannot seek continuity of service in the respondent-hospital. 13. Whether the petitioners are workmen or not has to be seen in the light of the definition as provided under - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:48486-DB WA No. 40 of 2025 Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. Section 2(s) of the I.D.Act, reads as under: "2(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); (VW) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding (ten thousand rupees) per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:48486-DB WA No. 40 of 2025 reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature." 14. If we consider the definition, it is amply clear that the nature of employment i.e., permanent or temporary or ad hoc is not relevant for the purpose of considering whether a person is a workman or not for the purpose of the provisions of the I.D. Act. 15. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioners were working in the respondent-Hospital from 01.03.1998 to 31.08.2000. Therefore, they are to be treated as workmen. The petitioners have completed 240 days in a calendar year in the employment of the respondent-Hospital. Before their employment came to be terminated, they had not been paid any retrenchment compensation as provided under Section 25F of the I.D.Act. 16. If the Management wanted to dispense with the employment of the workmen, the mandatory condition of retrenchment compensation should have been complied with. In the present case, the mandatory provision of - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:48486-DB WA No. 40 of 2025 retrenchment compensation was not complied with before terminating the employment of the petitioners. 17. Now the question is of the relief inasmuch as the mandatory provision of Section 25F of the I.D. Act were not complied with by the respondent-Hospital. We have been informed that one of the petitioners has already attained the age of superannuation. However, one workman viz., Sri Dinesh Kumar is around 54 years of age. 18. In view of the aforesaid facts, we hold that the termination of the employment of the petitioners was in violation of Section 25F of the I.D.Act. To do complete justice, we deem it fit to grant a lumpsum compensation to the petitioners for violation of Section 25F of the I.D.Act by the respondent-Hospital. 19. The learned Counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Counsel for the respondent have left it to the discretion of the Court for granting appropriate lumpsum compensation to the petitioners-workmen. Considering - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:48486-DB WA No. 40 of 2025 the fact that the petitioners have worked only for around two years with the respondent-Hospital, we think it appropriate that Rs.50,000/- lumpsum compensation to each of the workmen would meet the ends of justice. 20. Thus we direct the respondent-Hospital to pay Rs.50,000/- to each of the workmen who are before us in this present appeal within a period of four weeks towards their all claims against the respondent-Hospital. Sd/- (D K SINGH) JUDGE Sd/- (TARA VITASTA GANJU) JUDGE JT/- CT:JL