1 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 479 of 2010 State of Chhattisgarh, Through S.H.O. P.S. Chakarbhata, District, Bilaspur, C.G. --- Appellant versus 1. Deepnarayan Rajak S/o Kushalram Rajak, Aged about 25 years, R/o village Parsada, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur. 2. Kushalram, S/o Ram Prasad Rajak, Aged about 52 years R/o village Parsada, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur. 3. Smt. Kalindi Bai, W/o Kushalram Rajak, Aged about 48 years, R/o village Parsada, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur. 4. Smt. Sarlabai, W/o Rajkumar Rajak, Aged about 45 years, R/o village Parsada, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur. 5. Rajkumar Rajak, S/o Ram Prasad Rajak, Aged about 50 years, R/o village Parsada, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur. --- Respondents AND ACQA No. 47 of 2011 Manharanlal Nirmalkar Aged About 50 Years, S/o Budhram Nirmalkar, R/o Village-Mahamand, P.S. Torwa, Bilaspurt, C.G. ---Appellant Versus RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2025.10.14 18:34:58 +0530 2 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through: Police Station, Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur, C.G. 2. Deepnarayan Rajak S/o Kushalram Rajak, Aged about 25 years, R/o village Parsada, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur. 3. Kushalram, S/o Ram Prasad Rajak, Aged about 52 years R/o village Parsada, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur. 4. Smt. Kalindi Bai, W/o Kushalram Rajak, Aged about 48 years, R/o village Parsada, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur. 5. Smt. Sarlabai, W/o Rajkumar Rajak, Aged about 45 years, R/o village Parsada, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur. 6. Rajkumar Rajak, S/o Ram Prasad Rajak, Aged about 50 years, R/o village Parsada, P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur. Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For State : Ms. Soumya Sharma, Panel Lawyer. For Appellant in ACQA No.47/2011 (father of deceased) : Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Advocate. For Respondents (accused) : Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru, J 08.10.2025 1. ACQA No. 479/2010 is filed by the State, whereas, ACQA No. 47/2011 has been filed by father of the Deceased- Mamta. Since, both these appeals arising out of same sessions trial, they are being considered and decided by this common judgment. For the sake of convinence, the parties would be referred as per their status in ACQA No. 479/2010. 3 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 2. These acquittal appeals are arises against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 30.06.2010 passed in Sessions Trial No. 158/2009 by the learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Bilaspur, CG, whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondents from the offence punishable under Sections 302, 304-B and 201 of IPC. 3. Deep Narayan (A1) is husband of the Deceased. Kushal Ram and Kalindi Bai (A2 & A3) are father-in-law and mother-in-law of the Deceased, respectively. Rajkumar Rajak (A5) is the brother of A2 (Chacha Sasur of the deceased), whereas Sarla Bai (A4) is wife of A5 (Chachi Saas of the deceased). 4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 26/04/2007, the deceased Mamta got married to A1 and was residing with him at her matrimonial home. Within two years of the marriage, the deceased succumbed to death in her matrimonial home. Nandkishore PW-2, who is the brother-in-law of the deceased, lodged a report vide Ex.P-3 at P.S. Chakarbahta regarding the death of deceased. During investigation, merg intimation was registered vide Ex.P-3. Nazri Naksha was prepared vide Ex.P-6A. The dead-body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination and in the postmortem examination report (Ex.P/1), Dr. A.R. Banjare (PW-1) opined that the cause of death was due to Asphyxia as a result of Strangulation. After completing the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the respondents herein. 5. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined 15 witnesses. Statements of the respondents under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C were 4 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 recorded wherein they have pleaded that they have been falsely implicated. 6. After appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned trial Court vide its judgment dated 30.06.2010 acquitted the respondents/accused herein from the charges framed against them. Hence, this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the Victim would submit that the learned trial Court wrongly appreciated and interpreted the evidence on record given by Doctor PW-1 and held that the injuries can be caused by the Saree whereas contusions on the parts of the body can never be caused while hanging through Saree. The learned trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that from the deposition of most of the witnesses, it is clear that the deceased was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that the death has been occurred within two years of marriage under unnatural circumstances in the matrimonial home of the deceased and there is no justification given/suggested by the accused persons as to why the deceased committed suicide. Learned counsel would submit that looking to the postmortem report (Ex.P-1), it is a case of murder committed by A1 who was with the deceased in the same house by strangulation. Hence, looking to the act committed by the respondents, the impugned judgment of acquittal, whereby the accused have been acquitted from the charge under Sections 304-B in alternative the offence under 5 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 Section 302 & 201 of the IPC, is bad in law and liable to be set-aside and the accused persons may be convicted and sentenced. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the judgment of acquittal is well merited and does not require any interference. Mr. Tripathi, learned counsel for respondents would submit that the allegation of murder of deceased by A1 is not sustainable as the postmortem report cannot be relied upon as the opinion given by the same doctor to the query (Ex.P/2) is contrary to the postmortem report. He would submit that the judgment of acquittal cannot be set-aside, where the finding of the trial Court is based on the legal evidence and the other documentary evidence. He would submit that specially in a case where no family member of the deceased has lodged a report against A1 prior to the incident and there is no reason for committing the murder of his own wife. He would submit that both the husband and wife (A1 & deceased) frequently used to visit the parental home of the Deceased and they organized the birthday function of their daughter happily and even no complaint made by the Deceased in respect of harassment or ill treatment committed by the A1 towards her. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal is just and proper warranting no interference of this Court and consequently, both the Acquittal Appeal filed by the State as also the father of the Deceased, may be dismissed. By placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court renderred in the matter of Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda & Anr. V State of Gujarat, 2024 INSC 295, learned 6 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 counsel would submit that the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the judgment passed by the trial Court along with the trial Court record annexed with the present appeal with utmost circumspection. 10. These are appeals against the judgment of acquittal filed by the State as also by the father of the deceased. The appellate Courts are required to keep in mind that the trial Court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness-box and also required to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonably person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused. 11. The Supreme Court in the matter of C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair (AIR 2003 SC 182), unless the High Court arrives at definite conclusion that the findings recorded by trial Court are perverse, it would not substitute its own view on a totally different perspective and also as held by the Supreme Court in Ramanand Yadav V. Prabhunath Jha (AIR 2004 SC 1053), the appellate Court in considering the appeal against judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 7 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 12. The scope of interference in appeals against acquittal is well settled. In Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC 1083), the Supreme Court has held in para 6 as under:- “. . . . the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous." 13. The Supreme Court in Murugesan & Others v. State through Inspector of Police (2012) 10 SCC 383 laid down the principle regarding power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against the order of acquittal. It held thus at para 21: “21. A concise statement of the law on the issue that had emerged after over half a century of evolution since Sheo Swarup¹ is to be found in para 42 of the Report in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka. The same may, therefore, be usefully noticed below: (SCC p. 432) "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the 8 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances", 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be 9 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.” 14. Further, in the matter of Babusahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 320 has held at 38 as under:- “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka² this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:- "8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 10 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible." 15. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram (2022 SCC OnLine SC 984) has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.” 16. In the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala (2022 8 SCC 440), the Supreme Court held as under: "25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. 11 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters." 17. While exercising the appellate jurisdiction against judgment of acquittal, the High Courts or the appellate Courts are fully empowered to appreciate and re-appreciate the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. The appellate Court is required to discuss the grounds given by the trial Court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. 18. In the present case, the learned trial Court while acquitting the accused/respondents has observed as follows:- “PW-6 Ramratan Rajak stated in his testimony that when he reached the house of Deepnarayan, the accused Rajkumar was saying, "We should have burnt Mamta in the field" This statement shows the intention of Rajkumar to dispose of the body of Mamta. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the accused attempted to tamper with the crime scene or dispose of the body. During the merg investigation by the Tahsildar, the dead body was found in the room, and it was sent for postmortem after the 12 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 inquiry. No prosecution witness proved that the accused attempted to destroy evidence. There is no direct or circumstantial evidence on record to suggest that the accused/respondents tampered with or attempted to destroy evidence related to the body of deceased. The prosecution has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the deceased was murdered by strangulation and that evidence was destroyed. ” 19. PW-14, M.R. Gaikwad, Tahsildar, stated that during his inquiry he found the room door of the deceased bolted from inside and observed a saree tied to the ceiling fan. He recorded injuries found on the body during the inquest and, on that basis, expressed an opinion in the Panchnama (Ex.P- 5) that the deceased might have hanged herself. To verify the statements of the witnesses, he conducted a practical experiment by closing the door from inside and pushing it from outside, which opened, thus confirming that the door could have been opened without external force. His observations were recorded contemporaneously. 20. The next issue requiring consideration is whether the death of Deceased was a case of murder or a case of suicide. For this purpose, the conduct of the husband and his family members before and after the marriage, and the circumstances leading to the unnatural death, must be carefully examined. 13 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 21. It appears that at the time of alleged incident, A1 was residing along with the Deceased whereas, A2 to A5 were not residing in the same house and they were residing in a different village. 22. PW-4, Manharan Lal, father of the deceased, deposed that his daughter Mamta was married to A1, about two years before her death. He stated that A1 used to harass Mamta by demanding ₹2,000/- per month and by insisting that she ask her father for money. He further stated that A1 also demanded a washing machine and educational expenses, which Mamta conveyed to him over the phone. In cross-examination, he admitted that there was no dowry demand at the time of marriage, which was performed with pomp and ceremony, and that Mamta had initially stayed with her husband for about two months before returning to her parental home. 23. PW-5, Mithila Bai, mother of the deceased, stated that her daughter lived separately with her husband A1 in the village Parsada, while the father-in- law (A2) resided at Akaltara for employment and used to visit occasionally. She further deposed that whenever Mamta visited her parental home every few months, she appeared happy and never made any complaint regarding ill-treatment or dowry demand. She candidly stated that in her presence, none of the accused ever demanded dowry or money. 24. From the testimony of the above witnesses, it appears that no demand was made at the time of marriage and that the relationship initially remained cordial. However, the evidence of PW-4 clearly establishes that after the marriage, A1 began making monetary demands and harassing the deceased, which continued until her death. The fact that Mamta died 14 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 within two years of her marriage, in her matrimonial home, under suspicious circumstances, cannot be ignored. The absence of a prior complaint does not ipso facto negate cruelty, particularly in cases involving newly-married women living under matrimonial control. 25. The prosecution also alleged that the deceased was murdered by strangulation. PW-6, Ramratan Rajak, stated that after reaching the spot, he heard A5 saying, “We should have burnt Mamta in the field,” thereby showing knowledge of the incident. PW-2, Nand Kishore, initially informed the police that Mamta had died by hanging, and PW-14, the Tahsildar, recorded that the death was by hanging. However, the presence of contusions and marks on the neck noted during the post-mortem suggests that the cause of death was due to asphyxia, possibly by ligature, and not conclusively proved to be a simple suicidal hanging. 26. Dr. A.R. Banjare (PW-1), who conducted the postmortem of the deceased, found as follows: “A healthy young female aged about 20 years. R.M. present. Lower limb abdominal distension seen. Blood-stained discharge present in both nostrils and mouth. Contusion and swelling over right eyebrow and eyelid, 5 × 5 cm bluish in colour. Contusion over left eye 4 × 4 cm. Both eyes closed. Subconjunctival haemorrhage in both eyes. Eyeballs swollen. Teeth clean, facial swelling present. Abrasion 1 × 1 cm over chin present. Bruise present over anterior neck around the level of cricoid cartilage about 6 × 6 cm, bluish in colour. Brown-coloured abrasion over 15 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 posterior neck 14 × 5 cm in size, transversely across C6 to C7 vertebra. Abrasion over left side of neck 10 × 5 cm, mark not identified. Contusion over right mid-arm about 8 × 6 cm. Contusion over left medial arm 7 × 5 cm in size. Postmortem lividity in both hands seen. All injuries are antemortem in nature. No faecal matter at perineal region seen. No injury seen in external genitalia. Right wrist: 17 glass bangles + 2 metallic bangles. Left wrist: 16 glass bangles + 2 metallic bangles present.” This witness opined in the postmortem report (Ex.P/1) that the cause of death was due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation. strangulation. 27. The query report (Ex.P/2) prepared by this witness states: “(i) मृत्यु का कारण P.M. में स्पष्ट है; nature of death के सम्बन्ध में circumstantial evidence से proof करे। (ii) मृत्यु का कारण स्पष्ट है; viscera chemical analysis हेतु भेजा जाना कोई औचि त्य नहीं है। (iii) जप्तशुदा साड़ी से आई ligament mark साड़ी लपेटकर खीं ने से आ सकती है। मृतका के बदन में जो ोटें थीं, वे मृत्यु- पूव- की थीं तथा छोटे स्वयं के ” द्वारा नहीं आ सकतीं। 28. The aforesaid postmortem report read along with the query report, it is manifest that according to the doctor who conducted autopsy on body of the deceased categorically opined that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation. Thus, the murder of the deceased cannot be ruled out. 16 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 29. The defence has not offered any plausible explanation for how the deceased died in the home. The theory of suicide propounded by the Tahsildar (PW-14) cannot be accepted at face value when viewed against the backdrop of A1’s continuous harassment. The totality of evidence indicates that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by her husband, A1, shortly before her death, which was unnatural and occurred within two years of marriage. 30. Consequently, the essential ingredients of Section 302 IPC are fully attracted against A1. However, as regards the remaining accused, A2 to A5, the evidence is wholly insufficient to establish their active participation. Their acquittal by the trial Court appears proper and warrants no interference. 31. In view of the foregoing analysis, both the appeals filed by the State and the father of the Deceased against A2 to A5 are devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed in their respect. 32. The chain of circumstances established by the prosecution against A1 (husband of the deceased) is as follows: i. Unnatural death of the deceased Mamta: The post- mortem report (Ex.P-1) establishes that the cause of death was asphyxia, possibly due to strangulation or hanging. Dr. A.R. Banjare (PW-1) confirmed that death by hanging could not be ruled out, and the presence of ante-mortem injuries around the neck and other parts of the body raises doubt about a purely suicidal act. ii. Circumstances of death in the home: The deceased died within two years of marriage, in the home, under 17 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 suspicious circumstances. PW-14, the Tahsildar, recorded that the room door was bolted from inside and a saree was tied to the ceiling fan. A practical experiment demonstrated that the door could be opened from outside, undermining the theory that the deceased hanged herself without external intervention. iii. Absence of plausible explanation by the defence: A1 has not offered any satisfactory explanation for the unnatural death of the deceased or for the harassment made prior to her death. 33. Thus, in respect of A1, the position stands on a distinctly different footing. The evidence of PW-4 (father of the deceased) clearly establishes that it was the husband who subjected the deceased to continuous harassment, which the deceased also communicated to her parents. The deceased died an unnatural death within two years of marriage, inside her matrimonial home, and the defence has failed to provide any satisfactory explanation for the circumstances leading to her death. Therefore, his acquittal by the trial Court is manifestly erroneous, contrary to the weight of evidence, and unsustainable in law. 34. As far as the reliance placed by the accused upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda (Supra) is concerned, the same would not be applicable to the facts of the present case because from the material available on record and looking to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, it is crystal clear that there is ample evidence available against A1 for committing murder of deceased. Even, he has failed to offer any plausible explanation with 18 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 regard to death of his own wife, despite the fact that she died in her matrimonial home, where both used to live. 35. On re appreciation of evidence, it is apparent that the acquittal of A1 was manifestly erroneous and unsustainable in law. Accordingly, his acquittal is set aside. He is held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. 36. Both the appeals are allowed in part. The acquittal of A2 to A5 is confirmed, whereas the acquittal of A1 is set aside. A1 is convicted under Section 302 IPC. So far as the sentence is concerned, considering the continuous cruelty and the unnatural death of the deceased, A1 does not merit any leniency. Considering the gravity of the offence committed by A1 and the continuous harassment and cruelty leading to her unnatural death, the accused is convicted under Section 302 IPC. In view of Section 302(1) IPC, which provides for either death penalty or life imprisonment, and considering the circumstances of the case, the accused is sentenced to life imprisonment for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and to pay a fine of ₹10,000/-, failing which, A1 is required to further undergo RI for 6 months. 37. A1- Deep Narayan Rajak is directed to surrender before the IX Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bilaspur (C.G.) within a period of one month from today for serving sentence imposed upon him by this Court, failing which, he shall be taken into custody for serving the sentence imposed by this Court and compliance report be submitted to this Court. 19 ACQA No.479 of 2010 & ACQA No.47 of 2011 38. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is about to undergo his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 39. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the Trial Court concerned for necessary information and compliance. SD/- SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Rahul/Gowri