1 2025:CGHC:49942 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 348 of 2019 1 - Dey Narayan Singh S/o S.R. Nath Aged About 37 Years, R/o Kailesh Nagar, Dantewada, District Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, Police Station Dantewada., District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh ... Applicant versus 1 - Jai Majisa Hardware, Proprietor Ashok Kumar Burad, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Main Road, Congress Bhawan Complex, Dantewada, District Dantewada., District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Applicant : Ms. Madhunisha Singh, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Vikash A. Shrivastava, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 07-10-2025 1. The present criminal revision under Section 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C. filed by the applicant against the impugned judgment dated 22-02-2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, South Bastar Dantewada in Criminal Appeal No.18/2018 whereby the criminal appeal filed by the applicant against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 31- 07-2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Dantewada in Complaint Case No.80/2017 has been dismissed and the conviction of the applicant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short ‘the N.I. Act’) and sentence awarded to him has been affirmed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the applicant was accused in complaint Case No.80/2017 initiated by the respondent/complainant for the offence Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2025.11.07 12:23:01 +0530 2 under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. It is alleged in the complaint case that the respondent/complainant is having business of building material viz. iron rod, pipe, cement, iron angle etc. The applicant is a civil contractor. On 15-12- 2016 the applicant had purchased various building material of iron rod, iron pipe and cement sheet worth Rs.7,00,002/- and he gave a cheque of Rs.7,00,000/- in round figure to the complainant against the said purchase of building material which was the cheque of Chhattisgarh Gramin Bank Dantewada Branch bearing Cheque No.473802 amounting to Rs.7,00,000/- dated 15-12-2016. The applicant/accused had paid the said cheque from his bank account No.77029717956. When the complainant deposited the said cheque in his bank account for its clearance the said cheque was dishonoured by the payee bank on the ground of funds insufficient on 27-01- 2017. On 27-01-2017 itself the complainant informed the applicant/accused about dishonor of the cheque through telephone and also by personal visit to his house and thereafter, on 23-02-2017 he served a legal demand noticed to the applicant/accused. Despite service of legal demand noticed upon the applicant/accused he failed to pay the amount of cheque to the complainant and then a complaint case under Section 138 of the N.I. Act was filed by the complainant on 03-04-2017. The complaint case was registered on 17-04- 2017 and summons were issued to the applicant/accused. The details of offence were explained on 22-05-2017 to the accused. The evidence of complainant were recorded and the statement of the applicant/accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was also recorded, in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 3. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidenced led by the complainant, the learned trial Court has convicted the applicant/accused for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and sentenced him simple imprisonment for 1 year with compensation of Rs.7,20,000/-, in default of 3 payment of compensation additional simple imprisonment for three months has been ordered. 4. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court was challenged by the applicant/accused before the learned Additional Sessions Judge Fast Track Court, South Bastar Dantewada in Criminal Appeal No.18/2018, however, the appeal filed by the applicant/accused has been dismissed vide judgment dated 22-02-2019, against which the present criminal revision has been filed. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant/accused would submit that the complainant has failed to establish that there exists a legally recoverable debt and the cheque was issued for discharge of any liability against him. The legal demand notice was not served upon the applicant/accused and it is burden of the complainant to prove that the legal demand notice was duly served upon him. The subject cheque was issued by the applicant/accused as a security of the amount due against him, but without giving any intimation the complainant filled up the higher amount and produced it in the bank for its clearance. She would further submit that there is no seal on acknowledgment of the notice, therefore, it cannot be said that the notice has been served upon the applicant/accused and therefore, no offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is made out. She would also submit that the complainant has failed to discharge his initial burden to prove the transaction between the parties by leading cogent evidence and no presumption can be drawn against the applicant/accused with respect to issuance of the cheque by him. The learned trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court has committed illegality and irregularity in considering the evidence produced by the complainant and by ignoring the vital omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses. Therefore, the present revision may be allowed and the impugned judgments may be set aside. 4 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/complainant opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the applicant/accused and would submit that the applicant/accused had purchased the building material from the shop of the complainant and in lieu of its consideration he issued the subject cheque in favour of the complainant which was dishonoured by the payee bank for want of sufficient funds in the bank account of the applicant/accused. Thus, there exist legally recoverable debt against the applicant/accused. Although, the acknowledgment does not bear any seal of the postal department, however, from the definition of Section 138 of the N.I. Act the complainant is required to send the legal notice in writing on the correct address of the accused which the complainant has rightly done. It is the burden of the accused/applicant to prove that he has not received the said demand notice, in which he has failed to prove the same. He would further submit that even if the subject cheque was given as a security of any existing legally enforceable liability the offence of Section 138 of the N.I. Act is made out if the said cheque is dishonoured by the payee bank. There is statutory presumption in favour of the complainant that the applicant/accused issued the cheque for discharge of his liability. He would also submit that the learned trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court has rightly considered the evidence available on record and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as various High Courts and there is no scope for interference in the concurrent findings of both the courts below and the criminal revision is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court as well as appellate Court. 8. Section 118 of the N.I. Act provides presumption as to negotiable instruments until contrary is proved, which reads as under:- 5 “118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.—Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:— (a) of consideration —that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; (b) as to date —that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; (c) as to time of acceptance —that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity; (d) as to time of transfer —that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity; (e) as to order of indorsements —that the indorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon; (f) as to stamps —that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped; (g) that holder is a holder in due course —that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course: Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him.” 9. Section 139 of the N.I. Act provides presumption in favour of holder which reads as under:- “139. Presumption in favour of holder.─It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.” 10. When the cheque was drawn by a person on account maintained by him for payment of any amount to another person for discharge of his liability is returned by the bank unpaid because of insufficient balance in the bank account such person shall be deemed to have committed the offence and shall be liable to be punished. Section 138 of the N.I. Act provides that a cheque has to be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within a period of its validity whichever is 6 earlier. The period of six months has been reduced by the Reserve Bank of India to three months vide its notification dated 04-11-2011 w.e.f. 01-04-2012. After receipt of the information by the complainant from the bank regarding return of cheque as unpaid he has to serve a legal demand notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of receipt of such information and then the drawer of the cheque shall pay the amount of cheque within 15 days of receipt of said notice. Section 142 of the N.I. Act provides for cognizance of the offences which provides that the Court may take cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act upon complaint in writing made by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Section 9 of the N.I. Act gives definition of holder in due course which reads as under:- “9. “Holder in due course”.─“Holder in due course” means any person who for consideration became the possessor of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque if payable to bearer, or the payee or indorsee thereof, if payable to order, before the amount mentioned in it became payable, and without having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he derived his title.” 11. It is case of the complainant that on 15-12-2016 the applicant/accused had purchased certain building material from the complainant and in lieu of its consideration the subject cheque was given to him. True it is that the complainant has not produced any receipt or bills of the goods sold to the applicant/accused, however, in the legal demand notice dated 23-02-2017, the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act as well as in his examination- in-chief the complainant has disclosed about the transaction of building material and according to which, the applicant/accused had purchased 2950 kg. of 8 MM iron rod, 4770 kg. of 10 MM iron rod, 5110 kg. of 12 MM iron rod, 7 3190 kg. of 16 MM iron rod, 1150 kg. iron pipe and 748 meter cement sheet which was valued Rs.7,00,002/- and he gave a cheque of Rs.7,00,000/- in round figure of the purchased goods. 12. In the cross-examination of the complainant Ashok Kumar Burad (PW-1) the applicant/accused has given a positive suggestion that the cost of all the materials was Rs.7,00,002/-. It is also suggested that when the complainant sent legal notice to him he had gone to the shop and assured him that he will pay the entire amount very soon. Although, the learned counsel for the applicant/accused had submitted that the cheque was given as security to the complainant, but the applicant/accused could not explain as to for what reason the subject cheque was given as a security and also against which liability. The applicant/accused had failed to establish as to how his cheque has come to the hands of the complainant. It is not a case where he lodged any report or complaint about missing or theft of his cheque and when he himself came with the plea that he gave the said cheque as a security, then the burden shifts upon him to prove that there was no existing liability against him for the value put up on the cheque. The production of account books/cash book to prove the amount due may be relevant in civil suits, but not so in a case under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 13. In the matter of D.K. Chandel Vs. Wockhardt Limited and another, (2020) 13 SCC 471 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 7 of its order that :- “7. As held by the trial Court as well as by the High Court that the cheque was issued towards the amount due and payable by the appellant for purchase of pesticides. As rightly observed by the High Court, production of the account books/cash book may be relevant in the civil court but may not be so in the criminal case filed under Section 138 of the NI Act. This is because of the presumption raised in favour of the holder of the cheque. In view of the concurrent findings recorded by the trial court as well as by the High Court, we do not see any ground 8 warranting interference with the conviction of the appellant under Section 138 of the NI Act.” 14. In the matter of P. Rasiya Vs. Abdul Nazer and another, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1131 it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 7 of the order passed in the above matter that the complainant is not required to show nature of transaction or source of fund, which is reproduced hereinbelow:- “7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and orders passed by the Appellate Court affirming the conviction of the accused under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the accused preferred three different Revision Applications before the High Court. By the impugned common judgment and order, the High Court has reversed the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below and has acquitted the accused on the ground that, in the complaint, the Complainant has not specifically stated the nature of transactions and the source of fund. However, the High Court has failed to note the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. As per Section 139 of the N.I. Act, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Therefore, once the initial burden is discharged by the Complainant that the cheque was issued by the accused and the signature and the issuance of the cheque is not disputed by the accused, in that case, the onus will shift upon the accused to prove the contrary that the cheque was not for any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a statutory presumption and thereafter, once it is presumed that the cheque is issued in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which is in favour of the Complainant/holder of the cheque, in that case, it is for the accused to prove the contrary. The aforesaid has not been dealt with 9 and considered by the High Court. The High Court has also failed to appreciate that the High Court was exercising the revisional jurisdiction and there were concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below.” 15. In the matter of M. Abbas Haji Vs. T.N. Channakeshava, (2019) 9 SCC 606 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is for the accused to explain as to how his cheque entered into hands of the complainant wherein para 6 of the judgment it has been observed that:- “6. It is urged before us that the High Court overstepped the limits which the appellate court is bound by criminal cases setting aside an order of acquittal. Proceedings under Section 138 of the Act are quasi-criminal proceedings. The principles, which apply to acquittal in other criminal cases, cannot apply to these cases. As far as the present case is concerned, in addition to three reasons, given by the High Court, we are of the view that the original appellant has not even explained how the leaves of the cheque entered into the hands of the complainant. It is urged that in cross-examination of the complainant some suggestions were made that since the complainant was visiting the office of the original appellant, he had access to the same. The complainant had only admitted that he visited the office of the original appellant but he denied all the other suggestions. Thereafter, it was for the original appellant to prove his part of the case. The High Court, in our opinion, was right in holding the original appellant guilty under Section 138 of the Act.” 16. So far as the cheque given as security is concerned, in the matter of Sripati Singh (since deceased) through his Son Gaurav Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand and another, (2022) 18 SCC 614 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 28, 29 and 31 of its judgment that:- “28. In the above circumstance, the cheque though issued as security at the point when the loan was advanced, it was issued as 10 an assurance to repay the amount after the debt becomes due for repayment. The loan was in subsistence when the cheque was issued and had become repayable during June/July 2015 and the cheque issued towards repayment was agreed to be presented thereafter. If the amount was not paid in any other mode before June/July 2015, it was incumbent on the Respondent No. 2 to arrange sufficient balance in the account to honour the cheque which was to be presented subsequent to June/July 2015. 29. These aspects would prima-facie indicate that there was a transaction between the parties towards which a legally recoverable debt was claimed by the Appellant and the cheque issued by the Respondent No. 2 was presented. On such cheque being dishonoured, cause of action had arisen for issuing a notice and presenting the criminal complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act on the payment not being made. The further defence as to whether the loan had been discharged as agreed by Respondent No. 2 and in that circumstance the cheque which had been issued as security had not remained live for payment subsequent thereto, etc. at best can be a defence for Respondent No. 2 to be put forth and to be established in the trial. In any event, it was not a case for the Court to either refuse to take cognizance or to discharge Respondent No. 2 in the manner it has been done by the High Court. Therefore, though a criminal complaint under Section 420 IPC was not sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act was maintainable and all contentions and the defence were to be considered during the course of the trial. 31. All contentions of the parties on merit are left open. We make it clear that none of the observations contained herein shall have a bearing on the main trial. The trial court shall independently arrive at its conclusion based on the evidence tendered before it.” 17. The further submission of the learned counsel for the applicant that the acknowledgment does not bear any seal of the postal department, legal demand notice has not been served upon the applicant/accused and therefore, no offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is made out. Sending the notice in writing is provided in proviso (b) of Section 138 of the N.I. Act which reads as under:- 11 “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.— xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and” 18. It is nowhere mentioned that the complainant has to prove the service of notice upon the accused. From perusal of proviso (b) of Section 138 of the N.I. Act it is only provided that the payee or holder in due course of the cheque has to make demand by giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque. The only giving notice in writing is provided. In the present case, by the document Ex.-A/4 and A/5 it has been proved by the complainant that he gave the notice in writing to the accused and sent it through the registered A/D post. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides meaning of service by post which reads as under:- "27. Meaning of service by post.—Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or either of the expressions “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre- paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the times at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post." 19. If the complainant has sent a notice in writing through registered A/D post on the correct address of the accused it shall be presumed that it has been 12 served upon him unless contrary is proved. From the documents Ex.-A/4 and A/5 when it is proved by the complainant that he sent the legal demand notice on the correct address of the applicant/accused then the burden shifts upon the applicant/accused to prove that he has not received any notice sent by the complainant. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussion even if there is no seal of the postal department in the acknowledgment Ex.-A/6, the case of the complainant does not suffers from any infirmity or illegality as the complainant has duly served the legal demand notice to the applicant/accused by sending it in his address through registered A/D post. 21. In the matter of Ajeet Seeds Limited Vs. K. Gopala Krishnaiah, (2014) 12 SCC 685 in which in para 9 and 10 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “9. This Court then explained the nature of presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and under Section 27 of the GC Act and pointed out how these two presumptions are to be employed while considering the question of service of notice under Section 138 of the NI Act. The relevant paragraphs read as under: (C.C Alavi Haji case (2007) 6 SCC 555) “13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read with Illustration (f) thereunder, when it appears to the court that the common course of business renders it probable that a thing would happen, the court may draw presumption that the thing would have happened, unless there are circumstances in a particular case to show that the common course of business was not followed. Thus, Section 114 enables the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of 13 the particular case. Consequently, the court can presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. When applied to communications sent by post, Section 114 enables the court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. But the presumption that is raised under Section 27 of the GC Act is a far stronger presumption. Further, while Section 114 of the Evidence Act refers to a general presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake of ready reference, Section 27 of the GC Act is extracted below: ‘27. Meaning of service by post.—Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve” or either of the expression "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.’ 14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge 14 of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement 'refused' or 'not available in the house' or 'house locked' or 'shop closed' or 'addressee not in station, due service has to be presumed. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh (1992) 1 SCC 647, State of M.P. Hiralal (1996) 7 SCC 523 and V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu (2004) 8 SCC 774 ). It is, therefore, manifest that in view of the presumption available under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to aver in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was evaded by the accused or that the accused had a role to play in the return of the notice unserved." 10. It is thus clear that Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. Section 27 of the GC Act gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. It is not necessary to aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. 22. This Court has also examined the evidence led before the trial Court by the complainant (PW-1) Ashok Kumar Burad, who has stated in his evidence that the applicant/accused had purchased certain building material and in lieu of 15 its consideration, he has given cheque of Rs.7,00,000/- which was dishonoured by the payee bank for want of sufficient amount in the bank account of the applicant/accused and after service of legal demand notice he filed the complaint case. He also proved the cheque Ex.-A/1, deposit slip Ex.- A/2, bank memo Ex.-A/3, demand notice Ex.-A/4, postal receipt Ex.-A/5 and its acknowledgment Ex.-A/6. In his cross-examination he remained stuck in business transaction with the applicant/accused and giving the subject cheque by him which was dishonoured. He also remained firm in saying that he served the legal demand notice to the applicant/accused. The applicant/accused has given suggestion to the complainant that there was no transaction between them, the suggestion remained unanswered, if there is no business transaction between the complainant and the accused then how the cheque of the accused came into hands of the complainant particularly when the accused himself has stated that the cheque was given as a security, but the accused could not explain as to for what security the cheque was given to the complainant and therefore, the learned Courts below have rightly held that the complainant was the holder of the subject cheque in due course and rightly exercised the statutory presumption in favour of the complainant. The dishonour of the subject cheque has further been proved by AW-2 M.A.L. Philips who was the Branch Manager of Gramin Bank Dantewada and AW-3 Sontu Sardar who was the Assistant Clerk at State Bank of India Dantewada Branch who have duly proved dishonour of the subject cheque on the ground of insufficient balance in the bank account of the applicant/accused. 23. From perusal of the entire evidence available on record and the complaint memo, this Court is of the opinion that the learned trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court has rightly considered the evidence and have rightly convicted the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. So far as sentence awarded to the applicant for the offence under Section 138 of 16 the N.I. Act is concerned, Section 138 of the N.I. Act provides punishment for imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice of the amount of the cheque, or with both. There is no minimum sentence provided for the alleged offence, however the courts below have awarded simple imprisonment for one year with compensation of Rs.7,20,000/- against the accused. 24. The law with regard to grant of compensation under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. in cases arising from Section 138 of the N.I. Act is well settled. The object of Section 138 of the N.I. Act appears to be punitive as well as compensatory in nature as it provides a single forum and single proceeding for enforcement in criminal liability (for dishonouring the cheque) and for enforcement of civil liability (for realization of cheque amount). In the matter of R. Vijayan v. Baby and another1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court culled out the following principles in para 17, 18 and 19 that :- “17. The apparent intention is to ensure that not only the offender is punished, but also ensure that the complainant invariably receives the amount of the cheque by way of compensation under Section 357(1)(b) of the Code. Though a complaint under Section 138 of the Act is in regard to criminal liability for the offence of dishonouring the cheque and not for the recovery of the cheque amount (which strictly speaking, has to be enforced by a civil suit), in practice once the criminal complaint is lodged under Section 138 of the Act, a civil suit is seldom filed to recover the amount of the cheque. This is because of the provision enabling the court to levy a fine linked to the cheque amount and the usual direction in such cases is for payment as compensation, the cheque amount, as loss incurred by the complainant on account of dishonour of cheque, under Section 357(1) (b) of the Code and the provision for compounding the offences under Section 138 of the Act. Most of the cases (except those where liability is denied) get compounded at one stage or the other by payment of the cheque amount with or without interest. Even where the offence 1 (2012) 1 SCC 260 17 is not compounded, the courts tend to direct payment of compensation equal to the cheque amount (or even something more towards interest) by levying a fine commensurate with the cheque amount. A stage has reached when most of the complainants, in particular the financing institutions (particularly private financiers) view the proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, as a proceeding for the recovery of the cheque amount, the punishment of the drawer of the cheque for the offence of dishonour, becoming secondary. 18. Having reached that stage, if some Magistrates go by the traditional view that the criminal proceedings are for imposing punishment on the accused, either imprisonment or fine or both, and there is no need to compensate the complainant, particularly if the complainant is not a “victim” in the real sense, but is a well-to-do financier or financing institution, difficulties and complications arise. In those cases where the discretion to direct payment of compensation is not exercised, it causes considerable difficulty to the complainant, as invariably, by the time the criminal case is decided, the limitation for filing civil cases would have expired. As the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act strongly lean towards grant of reimbursement of the loss by way of compensation, the courts should, unless there are special circumstances, in all cases of conviction, uniformly exercise the power to levy fine up to twice the cheque amount (keeping in view the cheque amount and the simple interest thereon at 9% per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss) and direct payment of such amount as compensation. Direction to pay compensation by way of restitution in regard to the loss on account of dishonour of the cheque should be practical and realistic, which would mean not only the payment of the cheque amount but interest thereon at a reasonable rate. Uniformity and consistency in deciding similar cases by different courts, not only increase the credibility of cheque as a negotiable instrument, but also the credibility of courts of justice. 19. We are conscious of the fact that proceedings under Section 138 of the Act cannot be treated as civil suits for recovery of the cheque amount with interest. We are also conscious of the fact that compensation awarded under Section 357(1)(b) is not 18 intended to be an elaborate exercise taking note of interest, etc. Our observations are necessitated due to the need to have uniformity and consistency in decision making. In same type of cheque dishonour cases, after convicting the accused, if some courts grant compensation and if some other courts do not grant compensation, the inconsistency, though perfectly acceptable in the eye of the law, will give rise to certain amount of uncertainty in the minds of litigants about the functioning of courts. Citizens will not be able to arrange or regulate their affairs in a proper manner as they will not know whether they should simultaneously file a civil suit or not. The problem is aggravated having regard to the fact that in spite of Section 143(3) of the Act requiring the complaints in regard to cheque dishonour cases under Section 138 of the Act to be concluded within six months from the date of the filing of the complaint, such cases seldom reach finality before three or four years let alone six months. These cases give rise to complications where civil suits have not been filed within three years on account of the pendency of the criminal cases. While it is not the duty of criminal courts to ensure that successful complainants get the cheque amount also, it is their duty to have uniformity and consistency with other courts dealing with similar cases. 25. As per submission made on behalf of the applicant, during the trial as well as during the appeal the applicant/accused was on bail, but he remained in jail from 22-02-2019, i.e., the date of judgment of appellate Court till 12-03-2019 on which he was ordered to be released on bail by this Court, thereby he remained in jail for about 20 days. Taking into consideration the provisions contained in Section 138 of the N.I. Act and the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that punishment to be awarded in Section 138 of the N.I. Act cases are meant to ensure payment of money and threat of jail is only to ensure recovery and as such, imposition of jail sentence is not mandatory, this Court is of the opinion that ends of justice would be served if the applicant is punished by awarding appropriate compensation to the complainant reducing the jail sentence. 19 26. Accordingly, conviction of the applicant/accused under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is maintained and his jail sentence is reduced to the period already undergone by him and the compensation awarded to the complainant is enhanced to Rs.7,50,000/- instead of Rs.7,20,000/-. The compensation awarded in favour of the complainant and against the applicant is to be paid to the complainant. The default stipulation shall remain intact. The applicant/accused has already paid 30% of the compensation amount awarded by the trial Court in favour of the complainant in compliance of the order dated 12-03-2019 passed by this Court in the present criminal revision. The applicant/accused is directed to pay remaining part of compensation as awarded by this Court against him within a further period of three months from today, failing which he shall be liable for default stipulation of the payment of compensation. The amount of 30% of compensation awarded by the trial Court and deposited by the applicant/accused shall be adjusted in the total amount of compensation awarded against him by this Court and the complainant is entitled to withdraw the entire amount of the compensation awarded in his favour. 27. With the aforesaid modifications and observations, the present criminal revision is partly allowed. 28. Record of the trial Court as well as appellate Court be sent back along with copy of this order. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil