1 2025:CGHC:50514 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 235 of 2025 1 - Ramesh Soni S/o Ramswarup Soni Aged About 55 Years R/o Ward No.03, Simga, Municipal Council Simga, District- Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) ... Applicant versus 1 - Hardeep Singh Bhatiya S/o Late Kulwant Singh Bhatiya Aged About 60 Years R/o Ward No.11, Simga, Municipal Council Simga, District- Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) 2 - Lalit Dewangan S/o Tejram Dewangan Aged About 35 Years R/o Ward No.03, Simga, Municipal Council, Simga District Balodabazar - Bhatapara (C.G.) 3 - Shivdhari Dewangan S/o Late Punaram Dewangan Aged About 45 Years R/o Ward No.03, Simga, Municipal Council Simga, District- Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) 4 - Pappu Hasam Ali S/o Kasham Ali Aged About 40 Years R/o Ward No.01, Simga Municipal Council, Simga, District- Balodabazar- Bhatapara (C.G.) 5 - Khemraj Gitode S/o Avan Gitode Aged About 40 Years R/o Ward No.07, Simga, Municipal Council Simga, District- Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) 6 - Ravishankar Gwal S/o Dukhit Gwal Aged About 53 Years R/o Ward No. 13, Simga, Municipal Council, Simga, District- Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) 7 - Gopal Nat S/o Sewadas Nat Aged About 42 Years R/o Ward No.06, Simga, Municipal Council, Simga, District- Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) 8 - Returning Officer/sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Simga, Municipal Election District, Balodabazar-Bhatapar (C.G.) 9 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Collector, District-Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (Cause title is taken from Case Information System) For Applicant : Mr. Siddharth Dubey, Advocate For State : Mr. Ankur Kashyap, Dy. Govt. Advocate For Resp. No. 1 : Mr. Alok Kumar Dewangan, Advocate Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI 2 (Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge) Order On Board 08.10.2025 1. The applicant has preferred the present revision petition under Section 26 (2) of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961 read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, feeling aggrieved by the order dated 23.07.2025 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Balodabazar, (C.G.), whereby the application filed by the non-applicant No. 1 under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. was allowed and rejected the election petition of applicant herein. 2. Facts of the case, as canvased by the applicant, are that the applicant herein filed an election petition under Section 20 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1961. The said petition was registered as Election Petition No. 01/2025 before the learned Principal District Judge, Balodabazar (C.G.). The petition challenged the election on grounds that included allegations of corruption and undue election expenditure by the respondent candidate. In response, the non- applicant No. 1 / respondent No. 1 herein filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 26.06.2025, seeking dismissal of the election petition on preliminary grounds. The applicant subsequently filed a detailed reply to this application on 01.07.2025, contesting the submissions of the non- applicant and defending the maintainability and merits of the election petition. Despite the reply filed by applicant, the learned Principal District Judge, Balodabazar (C.G.), vide order dated 23.07.2025, allowed the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the election petition 3 filed by the applicant was rejected. Additionally, non-applicant No. 1 / respondent No. 1 filed an application for discovery of documents under Order 11 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 07.05.2025, which was also considered by the learned Principal District Judge in the impugned order. The applicant filed a reply along with an affidavit dated 13.06.2025 contesting the discovery application. Furthermore, non- applicant No. 1 / respondent No. 1 had filed a written statement before the learned Principal District Judge in Election Petition No. 01/2025 on 01.07.2025, along with a supporting affidavit. The election petition filed by the applicant contained specific allegations of corruption, particularly detailing the quantum of expenditure incurred by the non-applicant candidate. Paragraph 7 of the pleadings set out the various heads under which the expenditure was alleged to have been made, directly challenging the sanctity and fairness of the election process. Aggrieved by the rejection of the election petition, the applicant preferred a writ petition bearing WP(227) No. 848/2025 before this Court of Chhattisgarh on 19.08.2025, challenging the impugned order dated 23.07.2025. However, upon realizing that the appropriate remedy in the circumstances was a civil revision, the writ petition was withdrawn. The applicant has been aggrieved by the erroneous adjudication on the maintainability of the election petition and the consequent rejection of the same by the learned Principal District Judge. This has compelled the applicant to file the instant Civil Revision, seeking appropriate relief against the impugned order. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that the learned Principal District Judge has passed the impugned order dated 23.07.2025 (Annexure A/1) in a manner that is both erroneous and 4 perverse, showing a complete disregard for the relevant facts as well as settled legal principles. The order suffers from a fundamental flaw of ignoring the holistic view of the petition and the applicable law, thereby resulting in an unjust rejection of the election petition. A careful examination of the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure reveals a critical omission. The non-applicant has failed to specify the exact sub-rule under which the rejection of the election petition is sought. This lack of precision in pleading amounts to a serious procedural defect. Without a clear and specific legal provision being cited, the election petition could not have been lawfully rejected at this preliminary stage. It is a well-settled legal principle that, for an application under Order VII Rule 11, the Court must confine itself to the allegations contained in the plaint (or election petition) and is not to consider the response of defendant or evidentiary material at this stage. The petition must be read in its entirety, and the possibility of a defense or documentary evidence does not warrant rejection unless the petition is obviously untenable. The learned Principal District Judge gravely erred by considering the pleadings and documents of defendant while deciding the maintainability application, thereby misapplying the law. The impugned order dismisses the allegations as “vague” and “ambiguous,” but such mere labeling does not justify rejection. A prima facie reading of the election petition clearly shows that the applicant has made categorical and specific allegations concerning the quantum of corrupt expenditure and detailed heads under which the expenditure was made. These allegations, at least on their face, are sufficient to require a trial and cannot be discarded merely on the basis of denial by the non-applicant. There was no 5 specific reason articulated as to why the entire petition should be dismissed before trial. This clearly shows a lack of application of judicial mind and a premature adjudication. It is manifestly clear from the impugned order that the learned Judge recognized the necessity of examining evidence to determine the merits of the case. Yet, despite this acknowledgment, the order exhibits a prejudiced and premature conclusion based solely on the application filed by non-applicant, without proper judicial consideration of the issues involved. It is a cardinal principle of law and equity that justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done. In the instant case, the outright dismissal of the election petition, despite the presence of detailed and specific allegations regarding corrupt practices and quantum of expenditure, frustrates the very purpose of justice. Such matters can only be appropriately resolved after full trial and evidence adduction. Further, the principle of "plead and prove" is well-established, wherein documents and evidence are to be produced and examined during the trial, not at the stage of preliminary objections regarding maintainability. It was thus premature and incorrect for the learned trial Court to have examined or demanded the availability of documents at this stage. The applicant has set out specific allegations detailing the quantum of money given to various individuals at different times, providing sufficient clarity and particularity. These allegations cannot be dismissed as vague or general. The examination and evaluation of these documents and their evidentiary value are matters for the trial, not for preliminary rejection. It is also submitted that the learned District Judge erred in relying upon the written statements of non- applicant Nos. 8 and 9, namely the Returning Officer and Collector, 6 while adjudicating the maintainability issue. This is legally impermissible because such applications must be decided on the pleadings alone, not on the basis of any documents or statements filed by the opposite parties. The acceptance of impugned order of preconceived notions expressed by the Returning Officer and Collector, without evidence, demonstrates a flawed approach warranting interference. The application for discovery filed by the non-applicant No. 1 does not encompass the entire factual matrix of the election petition. The rejection of the election petition on the ground that the applicant is not in possession of certain documents is legally unsound. The party in possession of relevant documents can produce the same at any stage prior to evidence being adduced. Thus, the order is premature, unjust, perverse, and illegal. He placed reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in the matter of K. Kamaraja Nadar vs. Kunju Thevar, reported in (1958) AIR SC 687 and in the matter of Chandrika Prasad Vs. Shiv Prasad, reported in (1959) AIR SC 827. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 opposes the submission made by learned counsel for applicant and would submit that the present civil revision is not maintainable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This is primarily on account of the failure of applicant to comply with the mandatory procedural requirement under Section 19(2) of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Election Petition) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter ‘the Rules of 1962’), which mandates the deposit of Rs. 250/- as security for costs at the time of presentation of the revision petition. The applicant did not deposit the said sum when presenting the revision petition on 03.09.2025, and hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. Rule 19(2) of the Rules 7 of 1962 explicitly requires that the petitioner, at the time of filing a revision under Section 26(2) of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961, must deposit Rs. 250/- as security for costs with the High Court. The failure to make this mandatory deposit precludes the Court from entertaining the revision petition. In view of the foregoing, this civil revision is liable to be dismissed on the preliminary ground of non- maintainability due to non-compliance with the mandatory deposit of security as prescribed under Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1962. It is accordingly prayed that this Court be pleased to uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the revision petition. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents annexed along with the revision. 6. Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962 provides for revision which reads as under: "19. Revision.- (1) No petition by way of revision shall lie against any interlocutory order passed by the Judge. (2) At the time of presentation of the petition for revision under sub-section (2) of section 26 against the decision of the Judge, the petitioner shall deposit with the High Court a sum of Rs. 250 as security for the costs of the revision. If the provisions of this rule are not complied with the High Cort shall dismiss the petition." 7. A meticulous examination of sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Election Petition) Rules, 1962 unequivocally clarifies the legislative intent and procedural mandate regarding the timing and nature of the security deposit. The initial clause of the said sub-rule 8 expressly stipulates that the petitioner, at the time of presentation of the petition for revision, must furnish a security deposit amounting to Rs. 250/- to the High Court, which serves as security for the costs associated with the revision proceedings. This provision is not merely directory but is of a mandatory character, designed to ensure that frivolous or vexatious revisions are discouraged, and the resources of Court are protected from undue strain. 8. The term "presentation" in this legal context carries significant weight and requires careful interpretation. It is a term of art that encompasses various connotations depending on its application within judicial and procedural frameworks. Generally, "presentation" may be understood in its broadest sense as the act of formally delivering or submitting a petition, document, or appeal for consideration before a competent authority or Court. Dictionaries commonly define "presentation" as the act of filing, delivering, or exhibiting a document. Hence, when read in the context of the Rules, "presentation" must be construed to mean the actual filing or submission of the revision petition before the Registry or Court, marking the commencement of the legal challenge. 9. Second part of sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962 provides, "if the provisions of this rule are not complied with the High Court shall dismiss the petition". In this second part, the legislature has consciously provided the consequence of non-fulfillment of the condition enumerated in the first part of the rule by providing that the Court "shall" dismiss the revision petition. 10. Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (12th Edition 2010) unmistakably provides that when consequence of nullification on failure to comply with a prescribed requirement is provided by the 9 statute itself, there can be no manner of doubt that such statutory requirement must be interpreted as mandatory. (Also see Rajsekhar Gogoi v. State of Assam2.) 11. In a decision in the matter of Sharif-ud-din v. Abdul Gani Lone, reported in (1980) 1 SCC 403, Justice E.S. Venkataramiah delivering the judgment for the Supreme Court observed that whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to accept the argument that failure to comply with the said requirement should lead to any other consequences. 12. In the matter of M.Y. Ghorpade v. Shivaji Rao M. Poal and others, reported in (2002) 7 SCC 289, the Supreme Court while considering Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which provides that at the time of presenting an election petition, the petitioner shall deposit in the High Court in accordance with the Rules of the High Court a sum of two thousand rupees as security for the costs of the petition, it has been held that the requirement of making a security deposit of Rs.2,000/- is mandatory and the same has to be made while presenting an election petition, but the mode of deposit as well as the person who could make a deposit is directory. 13.In the matter of Charan Lal Sahu v. Nandkishore Bhatt and others, reported in AIR 1973 SC 2464, it was held by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the High Court has no option but to reject the election petition which is not accompanied by payment of security as provided in Sections 86 and 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as Section 86(1) of the said Act provides that High Court 10 shall dismiss an election which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117. That decision has been followed subsequently by the Supreme Court in the matter of Aeltemesh Rein v. Chandulal Chandrakar and others, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1199. 14.Not only this, the M.P. High Court also in the matter of Radheshyam Nandlalji Patidar v. Jagdish Gangaram Patidar and others, reported in 1995 M.P.L.J. 909, has clearly held that Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1962 is mandatory and the petitioner has to deposit security deposit of Rs.250/- at the time of presentation of revision petition and if he fails to do so, the revision petition would be liable to be dismissed. 15.The judgment rendered in the matter of Radheshyam Nandlalji Patidar (supra) has been followed with approval subsequently by that Court in the matter of Aslam Beg Mirdha v. Babulal and others, reported in 1997 (2) JLJ 154, clearly holding the provisions under Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1962 are mandatory, security amount has to be deposited along with the revision petition and the High Court has no discretion to condone the lapse. It is further held that the revision petition is not maintainable, as the provisions of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962 are mandatory and not directory and observed in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 as under: - "18. The judgment referred in the cases of Kailash Narayan (supra) and Ravi Thakur (supra), and directly in conflict with the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Babulal & another v. State of M.P. & others, 1985 JLJ 644, while considering the provisions of Rule 7 and Rule 8 of Panchayat (Election Petition, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for 11 Membership) Rules, 1962 it was held that on account of deficiency in deposit of security amount the election petition should be dismissed. It was held that the rule is mandatory. Law does not provide any extension of time to deposit security amount. The amount deserves to be deposited at the time of presentation of the petition, as held in the case of Charan Lal Sahu (supra) and in the case of Aoltemesh Rein (supra). 19. The law is also settled by this Court in respect of section 26 of the Act and Rule 19 of the Rules in the case of Radheshyam (supra). 20. Since the mandatory provision of deposit of security at the time of presentation of petition was not complied with, the Court has no option but to dismiss the revision petition under Rule 19 of the Rules. Language of Rule 19 is plain and simple. Since elections of Municipality are subject to challenge under the provision of Article 243ZG of the Constitution of India, the Court had no power to exercise the jurisdiction in extending the period to deposit the security or to condone the delay to deposit the security amount." 16. The above stated two judgments i.e. Radheshyam Nandlalji Patidar (supra) and Aslam Beg Mirdha (supra) have been followed with approval in the matter of Deepak Kumar Soni v. Ashok Kumar and others, reported in 2015 (1) M.P.H.T. 388 by the M.P. High Court. 17.In Sharif-ud-din (supra), Justice E.S. Venkataramiah delivering judgment for the Supreme Court observed that whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement 12 is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow. 18.Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.Y. Ghorpade (supra) considering the pari materia provisions contained in Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 has held that the aforesaid provision requires deposit of Rs.2,000/- to be made at the time of presenting an election petition. The object of having the aforesaid provision could be to discourage entertaining frivolous election petitions and to make provision for cost in favour of the parties who ultimately succeed in the election petition. 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Deepak Sharma @ Bunty vs. Dinesh Dewangan, reported in (2009) 3 CGLJ 347 has held as under : “24. It is crystal clear that the provisions contained in Rule 19(2) of Rides, 1963 requires the petitioner to deposit the amount of Rs. 250/- as security deposit at the time of presentation of the petition and not subsequent thereto. As held earlier, the provisions are mandatory in nature and its non-compliance is fatal, therefore; if the revision has been filed without depositing the amount of security, then it is fatal to the revision and the defect cannot be cured by depositing the same on a date subsequent to the filing of the revision. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrakant Uttam Chodankar v. Dayanand Rayu Mandrakar; has observed in para 68 as under: “68. In Ch. Subbarao v. Member, Election Tribunal; AIR 1964 SC 1027 : (1964) 6 SCR 213, the Constitution Bench accepted the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant therein to the effect that the election petition was not to 13 be equated to an election at law or in equity, but as the rights are purely creature of the statute, if the statute renders any particular requirement mandatory, the courts possess and can exercise no dispensing power of waive non-compliance. The Constitution Bench following Murarka Radhe Shyam case held : (AIR pp. 1033–34, para 26). “We do not however consider that there is really need for so much refinement when one has to look at whether there is a substantial compliance with the requirement of this provision. If the signatures now found on the copies were intended to authenticate the document to which it is appended viz. the copy, it would only mean that the copy did not reproduce the signature in the original. There is no compelling necessity to hold that the signatures were merely intended to be a copy of those on the original in order to spell out a non-compliance with Section 81(3), seeing that a signature in original was not needed on the copy and a writing copying out the name of the signatory would suffice.” 20. Similarly, Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Naushad Ali vs. Mubarak Ali @ Bhura passed in CRA No. 300/2018 vide order dated 16.05.2018 has considered the aforestated pronouncement and held as under : “15. Thus, in view of the forgoing discussion, relying upon the judgment of this Court rendered in the cases of Deepak Kumar Soni (supra), Radheshyam (supra) 14 as well as Aslam Beg Mirdha (supra), it is held that for filing 10 of revision petition before the High Court under Section 26(2) of the Act challenging the order/decision passed in an election petition/reference, at the time of presentation, the security of the cost must be deposited and after pointing out the defect if such deposit is made in the later part of the delay, it would not come within the connotation “at the time of presentation” and it would leave to the consequence of dismissal of the revision petition, as prescribed in Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 19 of Rules 1962. 16. It is further held that there is no discretion with the High Court to condone the delay of non depositing the security cost of revision, as the same has to be deposited at the time of presentation of the revision. 17. Thus, the objection raised by the respondents is upheld and the revision petition deserves to and is hereby dismissed, due to non-compliance of the mandatory Rules 19(2) of Rules 1962. There shall be no order as to cost.” 21. On the basis of aforesaid analysis and in light of the provisions contained in Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1962, this Court do not have slightest doubt that the rule provides mandatorily to the person filing revision petition under sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the Act of 1961 to imperatively deposit Rs.250/- as security for the costs of the revision at the time of filing of the revision and if security for the costs is not deposited, the consequence has also been provided which is dismissal of revision petition by the Court. Though the amount of Rs. 250/- has been deposited but, it was deposited at a later stage on 09.09.2025, and not at the time of presentation of revision i.e. on 03.09.2025, and as such, this Court has no discretion to condone the delay in depositing 15 the security deposit. 22. Therefore, Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1962 is mandatory in nature and if compliance of the same has not been made, the result would be that this Court has no option except to dismiss the revision petition. 23. Accordingly, this Civil Revision is dismissed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad JUDGE Shayna