1 2025:CGHC:49714 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2975 of 2025 1 - Aparna Vishwas W/o Shrikant Das Aged About 34 Years R/o Plot No. 11, Sai Vihar Colony, Yadunandan Nagar, Tifra, Bilaspur, Tah. And Dist.- Bilaspur, C.G. (Husband Name Of The Petitioner Wrongly Mentioned In Cause Title Of Impugned Order As Laxmikant Das) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - S.H.O. P.S. Tarbahar, Dist. Bilaspur, C.G. 2 - Santosh Rai S/o Late Shri Mahendra Rai R/o D. R. 2-1/6, N.E. Colony Torwa, P.S. Torwa, Bilaspur, C.G. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ravindra Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Pandey, Dy. Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 06/10/2025 1. The present criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short “BNSS”) is filed by the petitioner against the order dated 26-06-2025 passed by the learned 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, in Criminal Revision No. 35 of 2025, affirming the order dated 25-09-2024 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, in Criminal Case No. 779 of 2021 whereby the charge under Section 420 of IPC has been framed against the petitioner. 2. Brief facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings and documents annexed with the petition, are that the petitioner is an accused in the offence ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2025.10.14 19:16:36 +0530 2 of Crime No. 151 of 2020, registered at police station Tarbahar, Bilaspur, for the offence under Section 420, 34 of the IPC. It is the case of the prosecution that on 14-06-2020, one Santosh Rai, lodged a written complaint that there was an agreement of sale of an under-construction flat of the co-accused persons, Rajesh Seth and Rajni Seth, for the total consideration of Rs. 34,00,000/-. Up to the execution of the agreement, Rs. 2,50,000/- have been paid by the complainant to Rajesh Seth. In his instance, he contacted the Cent Bank Home Finance Ltd. and deposited the entire documents with the bank employee Shashi Bhushan and deposited the process fee of Rs. 5,900/- with the present petitioner. In the month of October 2017, he was informed that his loan of Rs. 27 Lakhs was sanctioned, and he had to fulfil the requisite formalities of the loan. He has completed the loan formalities on 01-11-2017 and got the sale deed registered in the name of his wife on 20- 11-2017. Thereafter, the builder stopped his work on the construction of the flat and the instalments of his flat was started. He gave an objection to the bank that the remaining amount of the flat shall not be paid to the builder because the remaining work is stopped. When the new branch manager came to the bank, he paid the amount of Rs. 6,75,000/- to the builder on 10- 05-2018. When he obtained his bank account statement, he came to know that he had signed the bank agreement on 01-11-2017, whereas the amount had already been paid to the builder on 21-10-2017, without his knowledge. He stopped payment of the loan amount on 10-07-2019, but the same has been paid to the builder. Thus, the accused persons made a syndicate and cheated the complainant. In the complaint, it is alleged that the present petitioner was the account officer in the bank at the relevant time. 3. FIR has been registered on 28-06-2020. After investigation, a charge sheet has been filed by the police against the petitioner/accused and other accused persons for the offence under Section 420, 34 of the IPC. 3 4. In the proceedings of the case, the charge under Section 420 of the IPC has been framed by the learned trial Court, against the petitioner/accused vide order dated 25-09-2024. The order dated 25-09-2024 was challenged by the petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 35/2025 before the learned 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, which has also been dismissed vide order dated 26-06-2025. Thereafter, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 26-06- 2025 in the present criminal miscellaneous petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the learned trial court has failed to consider that no prima facie case against the petitioner is made out from the material produced by the prosecution along with the charge sheet. He would further submit that even if the uncontroverted allegations made in the charge sheet are taken as it is, no offence of cheating is prima facie made out to frame a charge against the petitioner and to proceed with the trial of the case. The petitioner was a daily wage employee and worked as a clerk. She has no personal interest in the transaction between the complainant and the builder. Being the clerk, the process fee of the loan has been deposited with her, which she accepted on behalf of the bank. Except for the payment of the process fee, there is no allegation against the petitioner. He would further submit that earlier, the charge sheet was filed on 08-02-2021, in which the petitioner was shown to be a witness; however, in the supplementary charge sheet filed on 16-10-2023, the petitioner is made as an accused. The petitioner discharged her official duty and had no nexus with the offence. The bank has also enquired in their department, in which no negligence of the petitioner was found. He would further submit that subsequent to the FIR, the builder has completed the construction of the flat and handed over the possession of the same to the concerned purchasers. There are no ingredients of cheating on the part of the petitioner, and framing of charge against her is an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, she may 4 be discharged from the offence by allowing the petition and setting aside the impugned order. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the state opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and has submitted that at the time of framing of charge, only the prima facie case is to be considered as to whether, from the material annexed with the charge sheet, there is sufficient evidence for framing of the charge and to proceed with the trial or not. The trial court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence at the stage of framing the charge. In the present case, there is an allegation against the petitioner that she, being the account officer in the bank, received the process fee for the loan, and there is an irregularity found in the documentation of the loan. The petitioner is a named accused in the FIR, and her petition for quashing of the chargesheet has been dismissed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 01-07-2024 passed in Cr.M.P. No. 2837 of 2023. The charge of Section 420 of the IPC has been framed against the petitioner. In view of the act of the petitioner and material available in the charge sheet, she is being prosecuted, and a charge has been framed by the learned trial Court. therefore, there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material produced along with the petition. 8. At the stage of framing of charge, the consideration of the learned trial court is discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in umpteen number of cases. In the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak 2019 (13) SCC 62, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only with a view to finding out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, 5 disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- 14. It is of relevance to refer to certain judgments of this Court. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), the appellant and two other individuals were charged under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. It had been alleged that the appellant and the other accused persons had forcibly compelled the deceased to sign a settlement giving up a part of his share in the profits from the sale of certain land. This led to a dispute and as a result of the mental harassment suffered by the deceased, he committed suicide. The Court affirmed the framing of charges by the trial court. The two-Judge Bench of this Court laid down the ingredients of the offence of abetment of suicide. D.K. Jain, J. held thus: (SCC p. 611, para 19) "19. As observed in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, where the accused by his acts or by a continued course of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an "instigation" may be inferred. In other words, in order to prove that the accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to be established that: (i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and (ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation." (emphasis supplied) 15. After due consideration of the facts and circumstances, the Court noted that prima facie, the offence of abetment of suicide was made out (Chitresh Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 612, para 22) "22. In the present case, apart from the suicide note, extracted above, statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation, tend to show that on account of business transactions with the accused, including the appellant herein, the deceased was put under tremendous pressure to do something which he was perhaps not willing to do. Prima facie, it appears that the conduct of the appellant and his 6 accomplices was such that the deceased was left with no other option except to end his life and therefore. clause Firstly of Section 107 IPC was attracted." (emphasis supplied) 16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for "presuming" that the accused had committed the offence: (Chitreth Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 613, para 25) "25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction" 17. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P noted that in accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is "sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused of there is ground for "presuming that the offence has been committed. G.P. Mathur. J. held thus: (SCC p. 56, paras 9-10) "9. In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under: '14. Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquity in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evadentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime." 10. The High Court, did not at all apply the relevant text, namely whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed as offence. If the answer is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that 'as the firing was aimed at the other persons and 7 accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit and further observing that the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste set aside the order by which the charges had been framed against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant criteria for judging the validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside." (emphasis supplied) 9. In the matter of Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgement that:- 12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap³ Relevant paras are extracted below: (SCC pp. 197-98, para 11) "11....11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to f sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if g the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed. he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter s the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2 to the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. MR. Memah, one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: (SCC p. 526) '25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 219 CPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. 8 It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (N. Suresh Rajan case, SCC 721-22, para 20) "29....... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have the offence on t committed the the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge, though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage." 10. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgement that:- 21. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarised the principles in the following terms: (SCC pp. 520-23, paras 12-14) "12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is pressed into service which reads as under: (SCC pp. 41-42) '4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which.... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of 9 the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.' 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan wherein it was held as under. (SCC pp. 401-402, paras 10-11) '10... ..If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact. It is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter of into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the 9 evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that 10 there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him." 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar, this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) '19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. 11 (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face valuc disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal." 11. In the case of N. Sundaram Vs. P.K. Pounraj and Another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 616, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 13, has held that: “13. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any court and to secure the ends of justice. [See State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal6] The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. Taking the allegations and the complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in the exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC. [See MCD Vs. Ram Kishann Rohtagi7] An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance.” [See Vinod Raghuvanshi Vs. Ajay Arora8] 12. In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether 12 or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused to proceed with the trial. 13. 13. In the present case, the allegation against the petitioner is that she was working as an accountant with the bank and an amount of Rs. 5,900/- has been deposited with her as the process fee. Though she claimed that she was a temporary employee of the bank and her duty was to collect the process fee and issue a receipt to him, she was not responsible for any documentation of the loan process, but all that are to be considered at the time of trial whether, she was a temporary employee of the bank or not, what was her duty assigned by the bank authorities, what was her role in the alleged offence and extent of her involvement in the alleged offences along with other accused persons. Presently, there is sufficient material in the charge sheet that a loan was sanctioned, the builder had stopped the construction work, and the bank has paid the amount to the builder despite the payment being stopped by the complainant. In the FIR, it has been alleged against the petitioner that the petitioner was an account officer and her work was to verify the facts available on the documents. It has also come that before the mortgage of the property, the amount has already been paid to the builder from the loan account of the complainant. All these episodes would clearly demonstrate a prima facie case to frame a charge and to proceed with the trial of the case. 14. In view of the aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also under the facts and circumstances of the present case, it appears that there are prima facie allegations against the petitioner that she, along with other co-accused persons involved in the offence, and by their act and conduct, cheated the complainant, and for that charge has been framed. 15. In the present case, after considering the material annexed with the charge sheet and evidence available on record, the trial court rightly comes to the conclusion that there are sufficient grounds for framing the charge and to 13 proceed with the trial and has framed the charge of Section 420 of the IPC. The learned revisional court has also considered the case of the petitioner from every angle and dismissed the criminal revision filed by her, which cannot be said to be either perverse or contrary to the facts of the case, calling for an interference invoking jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, conferred upon this court. 16. Accordingly, this Court does not find any merit in the criminal miscellaneous petition that warrants interference. There is no illegality or irregularity in the order impugned and framing of the charge against the petitioner. The criminal miscellaneous petition is liable to be and hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok