1 / 8 2025:CGHC:48784 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 713 of 2018 1. Smt. Maya Devi W/o Late Late Laxmi Narayan Agrawal Aged About 72 Years R/o Chhunabhatti Gudiyari Road, Raipur, Tahsil And District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2. Radhamohan Agrawal S/o Late Laxminarayan Agrawal Aged About 53 Years R/o Chhunabhatti Gudiyari Road, Raipur, Tahsil And District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh --- Appellants/ Plaintiffs VERSUS 1. Smt. Santra Bai W/o Late Jhabbulal Satnami Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Saloni, Tahsil- Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2. The State of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh.. --- Respondents/ Defendants For Appellants : Mr. J.N. Nande, Advocate with Mr. Mohd. Naqeeb, Advocate For Respondent-State : Mr. Ajay Kumrani, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge ORDER ON BOARD 23/09/2025 1. This is plaintiffs second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 challenging the legality and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.08.2018 passed by learned 8th Additional District Judge, Raipur, District Raipur, C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 04-A/2018, whereby learned first appellate court dismissed the appeal affirming the judgment and decree passed by learned Trial Court whereby learned Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by appellants-plaintiffs observing that the suit is not maintainable in view of provisions of Section 14 of Chhattisgarh Land Grabbing and Liberation from the Wrongs of Lenders of Weaker PAWAN KUMAR JHA Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR JHA 2 / 8 Sections of the Society for Agricultural Land Holders Act, 1976 (for short “Act of 1976”). 2. Facts of the case relevant for disposal of this appeal are that:- (i) An application under Section 5 of the Act of 1976 was filed by Jhabbulal against Laxminarayan Agrawal before the Sub-Divisional Officer (R.) mentioning that a sale deed was got executed against loan of Rs. 200 of land measuring 1.57 acres situated at village Abhanpur, District Raipur. The SDO(R.) in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Act of 1976 had passed an order of cancelling of sale deed, subject matter of proceedings and thereafter the land was reverted back to the original owner. It is also the claim of plaintiffs that Laxminarayan was not noticed, however, at the time of taking possession of land, subject matter of sale deed, legal heirs came to know about proceedings initiated by the SDO(R.) under the Act of 1976 and its order and thereafter appeal was preferred before the Collector. The Collector observing that opportunity of hearing was not granted has remitted back the case to the SDO(R.), however, no order has been passed thereafter. (ii) Pleadings made in the plaint was replied by defendant No. 1 denying the pleadings made therein. It is mentioned that the property, subject matter of the suit, was mortgaged in lieu of loan granted by Laxminarayan to Jhabbulal. The owner of the land, being an illiterate person sale deed got executed, however, even after execution of sale deed Jhabbulal, owner of the land, remained in possession. After getting knowledge that some sale deed got executed by the Laxminarayan, application was filed before the SDO(R.) under the Act of 1976. Objection was also raised with regard to bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the Act of 1976 to entertain the suit when it is filed after initiating proceedings under the Act of 1976. (iii) Learned Trial Court after framing of the issues has decided the issue of jurisdiction along with other issues and held that the jurisdiction 3 / 8 of the Civil Court is barred under Section 14 of the Act of 1976 and accordingly dismissed the suit. In the appeal filed by the appellants- plaintiffs before the first appellate court, learned appellate court also taking note of the provisions under Section 7(e) and Section 14 of the Act of 1976 has dismissed the appeal affirming the order of judgment and decree passed by learned Trial Court. 3. Learned counsel for appellants-plaintiffs would submit that case of plaintiffs is that Jhabbulal executed two sale deeds in the year 1964-65. He contended that earlier owner of land in greed moved an application before the revenue authority under the Act of 1976. At the time of passing of order under Section 7 of the Act of 1976, the competent authority under the Act of 1976, recorded owner of the land, Laxminarayan, was not heard against which an appeal was preferred before Collector as provided under Section 8 of the Act of 1976 which was allowed and the matter was remitted back to competent authority for hearing the matter afresh after providing opportunity to beneficiary of sale deed. It is contention of learned counsel for appellant that the competent authority thereafter has not passed any order and therefore suit was filed. He also pointed out that as per the papers available in his file, earlier civil revision was filed bearing CRR No. 46/2014 was filed by defendant challenging the order of trial court, rejecting the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, wherein this Court has allowed the revision in part and disposed off the revision directing the Trial Court to frame issue about jurisdiction based on Section 14 of the Act of 1976, however, both the Courts below fell into error in dismissing the suit taking note of Section 14 of the Act of 1976. He contended that in the facts of the case, wherein the registered sale deed was executed, provisions of the Act of 1976 would not apply and it is for the civil court to decide the claim of title based on the sale deed. He contended that the sale deed was executed much earlier to coming into force of Act of 1976 and therefore 4 / 8 also the Act of 1976 would not apply to the sale deed executed in favour of Laxminarayan, ancestor of appellant. 4. Learned State counsel opposes the submission of learned counsel for petitioner and would submit that both the courts have taken into consideration the provisions under Act of 1976 and have correctly passed order. Referring the provisions under Section 14 of the Act of 1976, he would submit that when once proceedings under the Act of 1976 has been registered then the Civil Courts are not having jurisdiction to entertain the civil suit which are subject matter of the proceedings under Act of 1976. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record of trial court as well as appellate court. 6. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff in the suit has pleaded that Jhabbulal, original owner of land, has executed sale deed of part of khasra No. 1103/5 and part of khasra No. 1103/11 measuring 01 acre in the year 1964 and land bearing khasra no. 598/2 measuring 0.17 acres on 29.05.1965. In the pleading it is also mentioned that the plaintiffs in the year 2007 when approached concerned Patwari for obtaining revenue records like B-1 khasra panchshala of the land subject matter of the two sale deeds, at that time they came to know that the land which was recorded earlier in the name of father of plaintiff no. 2 is now recorded in the name of defendant no. 1. When they enquired about the fact of order by which the name of defendant No. 1 was mutated it came to their knowledge that in revenue proceedings case No. 263/24(A)/85(3) year 1976-77 the order was passed by the competent authority ie., SDO(R.), Raipur under the Act of 1976 without hearing Laxminarayan Agrawal. It is also pleaded that Laxminarayan Agrawal was not made a party. In support of pleadings, plaintiffs have filed copy of sale deed as Ext. P-1, revenue record mentioning name of Laxminarayan Agrawal of the disputed khasra number as Ext. P-2, proceedings of SDO(R.) under the Act of 1976 as Ext. P-4 and 5 / 8 the final order as Ext. P-3. The order of Collector is filed as Ext. P-7 dated 30.06.1998 in which Anand Prasad is shown to be appellant and the widow of Jhabbulal Satnami, original owner of land, is shown to be respondent/non-applicant. The appeal was allowed on the ground that Anand Prasad was not being heard and the case was remitted back. 7. From the aforementioned proceedings, it is apparent that before filing of the suit competent authority under the Act of 1976 has already taken cognizance of the application filed by the borrower of the money on an application under Section 5 of the Act of 1976. The order was also passed exercising jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Act cancelling the sale deed already executed in favour of Laxminarayan Agrawal. Appeal was not filed by Laxminarayan nor any objection was filed against the order passed by the SDO(R.) by Laxminarayan or his legal heirs, they have directly filed Civil Suit. It is an observation made by learned Trial Court that Laxminarayan Agrawal has not preferred any appeal against the order of competent authority under the Act of 1976 and further that the suit was filed with much delay from the date of order of SDO(R.) ie., 16.10.1979. 8. Be that as it may, consideration before the Court is whether the civil court could have entertained the suit filed after initiating proceedings under the Act of 1976 and the order passed by learned Trial Court and affirmed by the appellate court dismissing the civil suit on the ground of jurisdiction taking note of Section 14 of the Act of 1976 to be correct or not? 9. High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Bane Singh (deceased) through L.Rs. Smt. Kalabai and Others v. Basanti Bai (deceased) through Lrs Devilal and Others reported in 2004 (2) M.P.H.T. 28 has considered almost identical issue in which it is observed thus: “5. It is after this dismissal, three sons of Mangusingh filed a suit out of which this appeal arises against Basantibai for a declaration that the order passed by SDO, dated 6-5-1985 is not 6 / 8 binding on them because they were not parties to the original application filed by Basantibai before SDO. It was their case that since the sale deed stood in their name and they were not noticed of the proceedings, the order passed by SDO declaring the sale in question is bad in law and is not thus, binding on them. This was denied by defendant. The Trial Court dismissed the suit and First Appellate Court upheld the dismissal giving rise to filing of this second appeal by the plaintiffs. 7. In my considered opinion, the appellants (plaintiffs) has no case much less even triable to file a suit out of which this appeal arises. Indeed, filing of the suit was yet another attempt on the part of appellants to avoid execution of the orders affirmed by the High Court in writ petition under the Adhiniyam. It is not in dispute being a matter of judicial record that these very appellants had challenged the order of SDO alongwith their own father in appeal before the Collector and having failed in appeal, filed the writ in this Court unsuc- cessfully. The remedy of appellants was then in filing SLP to Supreme Court against the order of this Court in writ rather than to file civil suit. Indeed, filing of the suit was barred under the Adhiniyam whose provisions gives overriding powers on the orders of Civil Court. In other words, no suit can be filed to challenge the orders of competent authority passed under the Adhiniyam. But that apart, the grounds on which the suit was founded were raised by the appellants in appeal filed before the Collector and perused further in writ but those grounds were repelled. No suit then could be filed on the same grounds to challenge the sale deed in Civil Court.” 10. This Court in case of Narendra and another vs. Sahebin and others reported in 2006 (4) M.P.H.T. 93 (CG) has considered the jurisdiction of Civil Court after initiating proceedings under the Act of 1976 and has held thus: “15. Even otherwise also, when the civil jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred, the Civil Courts are not left to sit as bare spectators. The possible jurisdiction which the Civil Courts can exercise in such matters has been dealt with by various High Courts and the Apex Court including Privy Council. It has been held in the 7 / 8 matter of Secretary of State v. Mask and Company AIR 1940 Privy Coucil 105, that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 16. While dealing with a matter under the M.B. Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951, in which, a prayer was made in the suit to declare the order of Tehsildar, confirmed by the Collector, holding that the Defendant was a "pacca Krishak" was invalid, the Apex Court held in the said matter Raghunath (dead) by Lrs. Vs. Kanhiya (dead) by Lrs. , reported in AIR 1979 SC 1936, that such suits are barred and the order of Tehsildar can be challenged only on the ground of nullity. The Apex Court confirmed the finding recorded by the High Court saying that the High Court on a consideration of the language of Section 34 of the aforesaid Act held that the suit was barred and the order of the Tehsildar could not be challenged in the Civil Court except on the ground that it was a nullity. 17. In the present case, even after visiting Revenue Courts and dismissal of the prayer before the said Courts, no allegations of such nature have been incorporated in the plaint and the plaint remains in its original form. That is to say that the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities have not been challenged by the Plaintiff either on the ground of it being a nullity or an order violating fundamental principles of judicial procedure or an order in which the provisions of the Act (Special Act) have not been complied with.” 11. In the aforementioned facts of the case, when the proceedings have been initiated on the application filed by the original owner of land under Section 5 of the Act of 1976 which is a Special Act and the competent authority under the Act of 1976 in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 7 has passed an order cancelling the registered sale deed executed in favour of Laxminarayan Agrawal of the land, subject matter of the suit, and also the 8 / 8 provisions under Section 14 of the Act of 1976 which clearly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in entertaining the Civil Suit of the same subject matter which is in issue in the proceedings filed under Section 5, decided under Section 7 of the Act of 1976, learned courts below have rightly held that civil suit is not maintainable. 12. The second appeal is to be admitted on substantial question of law. In view of the aforementioned discussion, I do not find any substantial question of law involved in this appeal and accordingly the appeal is dismissed at motion stage. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) pwn JUDGE