1 2025:CGHC:19778 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 93 of 2024 Hayden Lal S/o Shri Shilvant Lal Aged About 19 Years R/o Near High School, Pali, Thana- Pali,, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Civil Line, Bilaspur,, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Abdul Wahab Khan, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mrs. Sunita Sahu, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice R avindra Kumar Agrawal Judgement on Board 30/04/2025 1. The present appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘CRPC) has been filed by the appellant against impugned judgement of conviction and sentence dated 20.12.2023 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/First FTSC Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.), in Special Sessions Case (POCSO VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2025.05.09 19:36:49 +0530 2 Act) No. 124 of 2023, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:- Conviction Sentence U/s. 354 of IPC R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional imprisonment of 50 days. U/s. 9(m)/10 of POCSO Act R.I. for 07 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional imprisonment of 50 days. U/s. 9(n)/10 of POCSO Act R.I. for 07 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional imprisonment of 50 days. All the sentences are directed to be run concurrently 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 29.08.2022, the mother of the victim/PW-1 lodged a written complaint (exhibit P-1) to the police with the allegation that on 13.08.2022, she left her minor daughter to her mother’s house and had gone to Durg for her work. On 16.08.2022, when she returned back, her daughter informed her that on 13.08.2022, the appellant, who is the maternal uncle of the victim outraged her modesty by pressing her breasts. Despite her protest, he was not releasing her. The incident was also confirmed by her brother and then, she lodged the report. The FIR (exhibit P-2) was registered against the appellant for the offence under Section 354 of IPC and Section 8 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’). Spot map (exhibit P-4) was prepared by the police. With respect to the age of the victim, her birth certificate has 3 been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-5). The school register from Bachpan, a play school, has been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-10) and after retaining its attested true copy (exhibit P-11C), the original register was returned back to the school. Statement of the victim and other witnesses under Section 161 of CRPC and statement of victim under Section 164 of CRPC has been recorded. The appellant was arrested on 30.08.2022 and after completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed before the learned trial Court against the appellant for the offence under Section 354 of IPC and Section 8 of POCSO Act. 3. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellant on 23.09.2022 for the offence under Section 354 of IPC and Section 9(n)/10 of POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. On 20.12.2023, additional charge of Section 9(m)/10 of POCSO Act have been added and the parties were given opportunity to re- examination and/or re-cross-examination of the witnesses were provided, but they have not re-examined or re-cross-examined the witnesses on the additional charge. 4. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 09 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the CRPC has also been recorded, in which he denied the circumstances appears against him, plead innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the case. He further submitted that there was a land dispute between his father and mother 4 of the victim, for which he has been falsely implicated in the offence. Two defence witnesses have been examined by the appellant. 5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence, led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment, hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and their evidence cannot be made basis to convict the appellant in the offence in question. There is no legally admissible evidence with respect to age and date of birth of the victim. The school register has not been proved by the prosecution in accordance with law. The appellant is the maternal uncle of the victim and due to natural affection, he was playing with her. There was a land dispute between the father of the appellant and mother of the victim and the quarrel took place for the same just a few days before the present date of incident. The incident is alleged to have been occurred on 13.08.2022, whereas the report has been lodged on 29.08.2022, which is highly belated and there is no explanation of delayed report. The victim is tutored witness and has been made instrumental by her mother in view of the land dispute. The evidence of the victim is not sufficient to hold the conviction of the appellant and there are various omissions and contradictions, which makes the prosecution’s case 5 doubtful. There is lack of cogent and clinching evidence, yet the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced him, which needs interference by this Court and the appellant is entitled for acquittal. 7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are sufficient evidence against the appellant to convict him in the offence in question. The age of the victim has been proved by the prosecution by leading cogent evidence and the school record as well as her birth certificate is available in the case, from which the date of birth of the victim has been proved as 07.11.2015 and she was minor on the date of incident. The nature of allegation against the appellant and the manner in which the victim was subjected to outrage her modesty that to by her maternal uncle is serious in nature, and further from the evidence of other witnesses, the guilt of the appellant has duly been proved that the victim was subjected to outrage her modesty by the appellant and the learned trial Court has rightly considered the evidence available on record and has convicted and sentenced him, which needs no interference. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case with utmost circumspections. 9. The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be the age of the victim, as to whether on the date of incident, the victim was minor and less than 12 years of age or not. 6 10. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the birth certificate of the victim (Article-A) and school register (exhibit P-11C). The birth certificate of the victim has been proved by her mother/PW-1 that the police has seized the birth certificate of the victim vide seizure memo (exhibit P-5) and its attested true copy is Article-A. As per the birth certificate of the victim, her date of birth is 07.11.2015. PW-1 has not been cross-examined on the point of the date of birth of the victim or her age. Except the suggestion given by the defence that the birth certificate of the victim has not been seized from her. It is not the case of the defence that, the victim was major on the date of incident. Further, the birth certificate has clearly established the date of birth and age of the victim that she was aged about 07 years on the date of incident. The birth certificate (Article-A) has been issued by the Registrar, Birth and Deaths, Bilaspur, which is admissible under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and can be relied upon without any corroboration, as the entries made in it as correct entry and extract of the official record maintained by the officers in discharge of their official duty. 11. Another piece of evidence is the school register (exhibit P-11C), which is sought to be proved by PW-4, who is the Principal of the school. He stated in his evidence that the police have seized the school register with respect to the date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo (exhibit P-10) and after retaining its attested true copy, the original register was returned back to him and the attested true copy is exhibit P-11C. As per the school register, the date of birth of the victim is 7 07.11.2015. In cross-examination, he admitted that he is not the author of the register, but he firmly said that her date of birth was recorded in the school register on the basis of her birth certificate. It has not been asked from this witness that a wrong date of birth of the victim has been recorded in the said school register. 12. PW-5 is the Vice Principal of the school, who has proved the seizure of the school register vide exhibit P-10 and she witnessed the seizure of the school register. 13. Since the age of the victim has not been specifically challenged by the appellant and from the birth certificate of the victim (Article-A) and school register (exhibit P-11C), the age of the victim has duly been proved by the prosecution that her date of birth is 07.11.2015 and on the date of incident, she was less than 07 years of age and the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence to that effect and hold the victim minor child. 14. 14. So far as the offence of outraging the modesty of the victim is concerned, I again examined the evidence available on record. PW-2 is the victim in the case, who is about 07 years old child. After testing her IQ, the learned trial Court has recorded her evidence on 02.11.2022. She stated in her evidence that on 13th August, her mother had gone to her work and she was at her maternal grandmother’s house. In the evening, her maternal uncle caught her hold tightly and has not left her despite her protest. He inserted his hand under her T- shirt and when she shouted, he left her. In the night, her maternal 8 uncle again called her in his room and again caught her hold and she again shouted for help and then he left her. On 16th, when her mother came back, she disclosed the incident to her mother. Thereafter, in a family function, her mother asked from the appellant and then they had gone to police station and till that time, her father had not come from Bangalore. Her statement was recorded by the police and Judge Madam. In cross-examination, she admitted that she used to go to her maternal grandmother’s house, but she could not tell, as to on last occasion when she had gone there. Her maternal grandfather, maternal uncle and maternal aunt were also residing in the house of her maternal grandmother. She used to sleep with her maternal grandmother. She denied the suggestion that when her statement was recorded by the police, her mother has disclosed the incident to the police. Although she admitted that, her mother has instructed her, what is to be tell before the police and the Judge Madam and today also her mother has instructed, what is to be tell before the Court. She denied the suggestion that, her maternal uncle has not committed any offence with her. She firmly stated about good touch and bad touch and stated that her maternal uncle had badly touched her. From the evidence of this witness, it nowhere reflects that she deposed the incorrect fact or she was not subjected to outraging her modesty by the appellant. Though, she has admitted that her mother has instructed, what is to be tell before the police and Judge Madam, but that itself is not sufficient to hold that she was the tutored witness. In such a tender age of 07 years, when she firmly stated about good 9 touch and bad touch, it cannot be said that she deposed against the appellant on being tutored by her mother. Though, there may be some land dispute between her mother and father of the appellant, but it cannot be expected that the victim is to be made instrumental in the land dispute between them. Had the land dispute was so grave, she would not have been left in her maternal grandmother’s house. When the victim is saying that, she used to stay at her maternal grandmother’s house, it cannot be considered that their dispute was so serious in nature, even if there is some dispute with respect to the land. 15. In the matter of “Attorney General for India v. Satish And Another” 2022(5) SCC 545, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 75 to 84 has held as under:- “75. A plain reading of Section 7 would show that the expression “assault” has a meaning entirely removed from the definition of “assault” in Section 351 of IPC. The latter involves an overt gesture, or preparation by one person, that causes another to apprehend that the former would use criminal force upon the intended victim. The emphasis of Section 7 is to address the felt social need of outlawing behaviour driven by sexual intent. 76. The structure of Section 7 can be conveniently parsed in the following manner: “Whoever, 10 i. with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or; makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, ii. or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault.” 77. A close analysis of Section 7 reveals that it is broadly divided into two limbs. Sexual assault, under the first limb is defined as the touching by a person - with sexual intent - of four specific body parts (vagina, penis, anus or breast) of a child, or making a child touch any of those body parts of “such person” (i.e. a clear reference to the offender) or of “any other person” (i.e. other than the child, or the offender). In the second limb, sexual assault is the doing of “any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration”. 78. The use of the expression "touch" appears to be common, to the first and second parts, of the first limb. “Touch” says the Cambridge Dictionary is “to put your hand or another part of your body lightly onto and off something or someone.” 79. Collins Dictionary, likewise, states that: 11 “Your sense of touch is your ability to tell what something is like when you feel it with your hands.” 80. “Contact” on the other hand, which is used in the second limb, has a wider connotation; it encompasses - but is not always limited to – ‘touch’. While it is not immediately apparent why the term ‘physical contact’ has been used in the second limb, its use in conjunction with “any other act” (controlled by the overarching expression “with sexual intent”), indicates that ‘physical contact’ means something which is of wider import than ‘touching’. Viewed so, physical contact without penetration, may not necessarily involve touch. The "other act" involving "physical contact" may involve: direct physical contact by the offender, with any other body part (not mentioned in the first limb) of the victim; other acts, such as use of an object by the offender, engaging physical contact with the victim; or in the given circumstances of the case, even no contact by the offender (the expression "any other act" is sufficiently wide to connote, for instance, the victim being coerced to touch oneself). 81. Parliamentary intent and emphasis, however, is that the offending behavior (whether the touch or other act involving physical contact), should be motivated with sexual intent. Parliament moved beyond the four sexual body parts, and covered acts of a general nature, which when done with sexual 12 intent, are criminalized by the second limb of Section 7. The specific mention of the four body parts of the child in the first limb, and the use of the controlling expression “sexual intent” mean that every touch of those four body parts is prima facie suspect. 82. The circumstances in which touch or physical contact occurs would be determinative of whether it is motivated by ‘sexual intent’. There could be a good explanation for such physical contact which include the nature of the relationship between the child and the offender, the length of the contact, its purposefulness; also, if there was a legitimate non- sexual purpose for the contact. Also relevant is where it takes place and the conduct of the offender before and after such contact. In this regard, it would be useful to always keep in mind that “sexual intent” is not defined, but fact-dependent – as the explanation to Section 11 specifies. 83. The inference by the High Court that “touch” cannot necessarily involve contact with a child’s sexual body parts (in one of these cases, the breast) through clothes, is based on a disingenuous argument. Unsurprisingly, that argument had its roots in other jurisdictions. In Regina v H the UK Court of Appeal, whilst interpreting the words “touching includes (a) with any part of the body; (b) with anything else or (c) through anything, and in particular, includes touching amounts to penetration” per Section 79 (8) of the UK Sexual Offences Act, 13 repelled an argument on that the individual accused of an act in relation to a victim, that involved grabbing “her track-bottoms by the area of the right pocket” was not “touching”. It was observed by the court, that “26…….The opening words of section 79 (8) are “Touching includes touching” and in particular “through anything”. Subsection (8) is not a definition section. We have no doubt that it was not Parliament’s intention by the use of that language to make it impossible to regard as a sexual assault touching which took place by touching what the victim was wearing at that time.” 84. Likewise, in State v. Phipps as well as State v. Pearson, the court had to consider whether a “sex act” or “sexual activity” (criminalised by Section 709.1, 709.3 and 709.17) meant only sexual contact between two or more persons, i.e., through penetration, mouth and genitalia or by contact between genitalia of one person and that of another. In both the judgments, the argument that contact or touch through clothing did not amount to an offence, was decisively rejected. The test indicated (per Pearson) was that prohibited contact occurs when: (i) specified body parts or substitutes touch and (ii) intervening material would not prevent participants, viewed objectively, from perceiving that they had touched. Interestingly, in these decisions one comes across the argument that what is an offence is one 14 that involves direct or “skin to skin” touch or contact.” 16. In the matter of “State of Karnataka v. Shantappa Madivalappa Galapuji and Ors.” 2009(12) SCC 731, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 15 has held as under:- “15. “6….. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act") does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease -- whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. This position was concisely stated by Brewer, J. in Wheeler v. United States (159 US 523). The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se, but the court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. [See Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka (2001 (9) SCC 129)] 15 7. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra [(1997) 5 SCC 341] it was held as follows: (SCC p. 343, para 5): "5. ….. A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the questions and able to give rational answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored." The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and the said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher court if from what is preserved in the 16 records, it is clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make-believe. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaken and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness. The above position was highlighted in Ratansingh Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat (2004(1) SCC 64).” 17. PW-1, is the mother of the victim, who stated in her evidence that, the appellant is her cousin brother and the victim is her daughter, aged about 07 years. On 13.08.2022, she had gone to Durg for her work and left her minor daughter to her mother’s house. When she returned back on 16.08.2022, her daughter informed her that, the appellant had outraged her modesty by inserting his hand under her T-shirt. The appellant is the resident of Pali and at the time of incident, he came to Bilaspur in her mother’s house. Her husband was at Bangalore in his employment. She informed the incident to him through phone and after repeatedly verifying the incident from the victim, she firmly disclosed about the offence. The victim had also informed her elder brother on the date of incident itself, who is a doctor there. On 27.08.2022, she 17 again informed the incident to her husband through phone and he asked her to take action against the appellant. When she disclosed the incident to her family, there was a scene created at about 11:00 PM, on 27.08.2022 itself. On 28.08.2022, she called the Child Helplines and on 29.08.2022, she had gone to Civil Lines, Police Station and with the help of Child Helplines, the report has been lodged. In cross- examination, she stated that she is working in the marketing field under the Civil Engineer. Whenever, she was required to go outside, she used to leave her minor daughter to her mother’s house. She denied the suggestion given by the defence that she demanded share in the property situated at Pali and there was a dispute with respect to the same. She admitted in her cross-examination that, on the day when she had gone to Durg, she had a telephonic call with her daughter, but she has not disclosed about any incident. She voluntarily stated that she was feeling sick. She denied the suggestion that due to the property dispute, she has lodged report against the appellant. From the evidence of this witness, though it appears that there was some property dispute between the parties, but there is no effective cross-examination with respect to substantive allegation of outraging the modesty of the victim and lodging of the report by her. The cross-examination from this witness revolved around the property dispute. 18. PW-3 is the father of the victim. He stated in his evidence that on 16.08.2022, he had gone to Delhi for his work and then his wife and 18 daughter had informed about the incident that had been occurred on 13.08.2022. After two days, when he returned to Bilaspur, he collected the information and his wife informed the incident to Child Helplines and he returned back to his work place at Bangalore. On 29.08.2022, his wife has lodged report against the appellant. In cross-examination, he admitted that when he came to know about the incident, he has not lodged the report immediately. He explained that since the incident is occurred with a minor child that to by her maternal uncle, therefore, no report has been lodged immediately. He also denied the suggestion given by the defence that report has been lodged against the property dispute with family of the appellant. He also denied the suggestion given by the defence that the appellant hugged the victim due to the natural affection. 19. PW-8 is the maternal uncle of the victim, who stated in his evidence that on the date of incident, he had gone to Raipur and he did not know about the incident, but subsequently came to know about the same. He turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution’s case. 20. DW-1 is the aunt of the appellant, who stated in her evidence that the mother of the victim is pressurizing her for partition of her family property and she raised quarrel with them 2-3 times. On 13.08.2022, her sister and nephew had come to her house. Again on 15.08.2022, the mother of the victim pressurized her for partition of the family property. She was not being informed by the victim or her mother about the incident. In her cross-examination, she stated that if the 19 appellant had committed any offence with the victim, she did not know. She further stated that she first time deposed before the Court and her statement has not been recorded anywhere. 21. DW-2 is the father of the appellant. He stated in his evidence that the mother of the victim is raising quarrel with respect to share in the family property and she threatened him to rope in any false case. On 03.08.2022, when she threatened him, he made a written complaint (exhibit D-1) to Pali Police Station. He admitted in his cross- examination that, in the written complaint (exhibit D-1) there is no mention of any family property. 22. From all these evidences, it is find proved by the learned trial Court that the appellant has committed the offence of outraging the modesty of the victim on 13.08.2022. The consideration of the learned trial Court in its judgment are based on the proper appreciation of the evidence available on record as well as law applicable to it. 23. Minute examination of the evidence makes it clear that on 13.08.2022, the appellant has committed the offence with the minor victim and outraged her modesty, for which he has rightly been convicted by the learned trial Court and this Court finds no reason to upset the well- reasoned findings of the learned trial Court and this Court hereby affirmed the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 354 of IPC and Sections 9(m)/10 and 9(n)/10 of POCSO Act. 20 24. So far as the sentence awarded to the appellant is concerned, Section 354 of IPC is provided the minimum sentence of 03 years imprisonment. Section 9 of the POCSO Act defined the aggravated sexual assault and Sections 9(m) and (n) covers the act of the present appellant that he committed aggravated sexual assault upon the minor victim. Sexual assault is defined under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. It is necessary to quote here the definition of Section 7, 9(m) and (n) and also Section 10 of the POCSO Act, which reads as under:- “7. Sexual assault.—Whoever, with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault. 9. Aggravated sexual assault.— (m) whoever commits sexual assault on a child below twelve years; or (n) whoever, being a relative of the child through blood or adoption or marriage or guardianship or in foster care, or having domestic relationship with a parent of the child, or who is living in the same or shared household with the child, commits sexual assault on such child; or 10. Punishment for aggravated sexual assault.— Whoever, commits aggravated sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a 21 term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 25. The learned trial Court has sentenced the appellant for the offence under Section 9(m)/10 and 9(n)/10 of POCSO Act for R.I. for 07 years. The minimum sentence as provided under Section 10 of the POCSO Act is for 05 years, which may extend to 07 years. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, looking to the age of the appellant and the relationship between the parties, it would meet the ends of justice that the sentence awarded to the appellant for the offence under Section 354 of IPC and Section 9(m)/10 and 9(n)/10 of the POCSO Act are to be reduced for the minimum sentence as provided under Section 10 of the POCSO Act. 26. Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 354 of IPC and Sections 9(m)/10 and 9(n)/10 of the POCSO Act, his sentence is reduced as below:- Conviction Sentence U/s. 354 of IPC R.I. for 03 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional imprisonment of 50 days. U/s. 9(m)/10 of POCSO Act R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional imprisonment of 50 days. U/s. 9(n)/10 of POCSO Act R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional imprisonment of 50 days. All the sentences are directed to be run concurrently 22 27. With the aforesaid modification/alteration of the sentence, the appeal is partly allowed. 28. The appellant was remained in jail from 30.08.2022 to 20.09.2022 and after conviction, he is in jail since 20.12.2023 till date. He is entitled for set-off of his undergone period during the trial as well as during the present appeal. 29. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail, where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 30. Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved