1 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 100 of 2016 Judgment Reserved on 01.09.2025 Judgment Delivered on 15.09.2025 1 - Abhaynarayan Pandey S/o Aditya Narayan Pandey Aged About 55 Years R/o Khijrupath, Minj Niwas Namnakala, Ward No. 11, P.S. And Tahsil Ambikapur, District Surguja Chhattisgarh ---Applicant versus 1 - Laliteshwar Shrivastava (Deleted) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 01-09-2025 2 - Pramod Ojha S/o Baikunth Ojha Aged About 50 Years Occupation Friend Of Respondent No. 1, R/o Fundurdihari Mahuwapara P.S. And Tahsil Ambikapur District Surguja Chhattisgarh 3 - Mahendra Yadav S/o Shri Vishwanath Yadav Aged About 50 Years Occupation - Man Friend Of Respondent No. 1 Present R/o Dipadihkala, P.S. And Tahsil Shankargarh, District Balrampur, Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh 4 - Santosh Das S/o Shri Keshav Prasad Das Aged About 38 Years Occupation - Secretary, Sakshi Samaj Sevi Sanstha, Namnakala In Front Of Power House Ambikapur, P.S. Ambikapur Surguja Chhattisgarh 5 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station City Kotwali Ambikapur, District Surguja Chhattisgarh. VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 ---Non-applicants/Respondents For Applicant : Mr. Manharan Lal Sahu, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Durgesh Goyal, Advocate For State : Mrs. Sunita Sahu, P.L. For Respondents No. 1 to 3 : Ms. Seema Verma, Advocate on behalf of Mrs. Uttra Shrivastava, Advocate Division Bench Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. & Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. CAV Judgment Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. This revision petition under Section 397/401 of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the complainant against the order dated 24.08.2015 passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1988, (for short, ‘the Act, 1988’) Surguja at Ambikapur in Miscellaneous Case No. unregistered/2015, whereby the complaint filed by the applicant under Section 200 Cr.P.C. for offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Act, 1988 and Sections 409, 417, 420, 423, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B of Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’) was dismissed. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the complainant/applicant alleged that the respondents/non- applicants, under the guise of running social service organizations, committed a serious criminal offence by embezzling more than Rs.1,44,20,000/- of government funds allocated under the Setu Curriculum/Alternative and Innovative Education Scheme during the years 2004–05 to 2006–07, by preparing and submitting fake documents. According to the 3 complainant, the said scheme was intended to identify children aged between 6 and 14 years who had either never attended school due to financial constraints or had dropped out, and to run residential centres for them that would provide both education and food. It was alleged that the respondents falsely claimed to have operated such centres, fabricated records of staff and enrolled children, and misappropriated the funds received from the government. The complaint further states that institutions headed by Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 4 were sanctioned substantial amounts by the Rajiv Gandhi Shiksha Mission, Ambikapur, for operating centres in various development blocks. However, upon verification by concerned Block Education Officers, Gram Panchayats, and even affected teachers, it was revealed that no such centres had actually been run and that the documentation submitted was fabricated. Despite lodging complaints with higher authorities, including the Collector and the Inspector General of Police, no criminal action was initiated against the respondents. Consequently, the complainant was compelled to file the present private complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. 3. The trial Court, upon consideration of the complaint and the documents available on record held that the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, are attracted only against “public servants” as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act. The respondents, being functionaries of private NGOs/institutions, do 4 not fall within the ambit of “public servant.” Moreover, no sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Act had been obtained. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the complaint was not maintainable under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. The complaint was, therefore, dismissed. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant/complainant submits that the trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint at the threshold. He further submits that the allegations made in the complaint clearly disclose the commission of serious offences such as misappropriation, cheating, forgery, and criminal conspiracy, punishable under the Indian Penal Code. He also submits that, since government funds were entrusted to the respondents under a public welfare scheme, the respondents were discharging public duties akin to those of public servants. Therefore, the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ought to be applicable to them. He also submits that the trial Court adopted a hyper-technical approach by rejecting the complaint outright, without even directing an inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., which was warranted in the facts of the case. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned order be set aside. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents supports the impugned order and submits that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 applies only to “public servants” as defined under Section 2(c) thereof, and the respondents, being members of private societies, do not fall within that definition. In absence of 5 prior sanction under Section 19 of the Act, 1988, no prosecution could be validly initiated under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act, 1988. He further submits that the complaint itself was based on allegations already inquired into by administrative authorities, and in any case, the trial Court was justified in rejecting the complaint as not maintainable. 6. Learned State counsel also supported the reasoning of the trial Court and submitted that no illegality has been committed warranting interference in revision. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manish Trivedi vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 14 SCC 420, has held vide paras 7 & 8 as under:- “7. In support of the submission Mr. Adhiyaru has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay1. He has drawn our attention to the following passage from the said judgment: (SCC pp. 221-23. paras 41 & 42) "41.... Whatever that may be the conclusion is inescapable that till 1964 at any rate MLA was not comprehended in the definition of b 'public servant' in Section 21. And the Santhanam Committee did not recommend its inclusion in the definition of 'public servant' in Section 21. 1 (1984) 2 SCC 183 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 172 6 42. ... Now if prior to the enactment of Act 40 of 1964 MLA was not comprehended as a public servant in Section 21, the next question is: did the amendment make any difference in his position. The amendment keeps the law virtually unaltered. Last part of clause (9) was enacted as clause (12)(a). If MLA was not comprehended in clause (9) before its amendment and dissection, it would make no difference in the meaning of law if a portion of clause (9) is re-enacted as clause (12)(a). It must follow as a necessary corollary that the amendment of clauses (9) and d (12) by Amending Act 40 of 1964 did not bring about any change in the interpretation of clause (9) and clause (12)(a) after the amendment of 1964.... Therefore, apart from anything else, on historical evolution of Section 21, adopted as an external aid to construction, one can confidently say that MLA was not and is not a 'public servant' within the meaning of the expression in any of the clauses of Section 21 IPC." (emphasis supplied) 8. Another decision on which the counsel has placed reliance is the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Balkrishna Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra2 and he has drawn our attention to para 5 from the said judgment which reads as follows: (SCC p. 608) "5. In view of this decision, therefore, we need not go to the other authorities on the 2 (1985) 3 SCC 606 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 407 7 subject. Even so, we are of the opinion that the concept of a 'public servant' is quite different from that of a Municipal Councillor. A 'public servant' is an authority who must be appointed by Government or a semi- governmental body and should be in the pay or barsalary of the same. Secondly, a 'public servant' is to discharge his duties g in accordance with the rules and regulations made by the Government. On the other hand, a Municipal Councillor does not owe his appointment to any governmental authority. Such a person is elected by the people and functions undeterred by the commands or edicts of a governmental authority. The mere fact that an MLA gets allowance by way of honorarium does not convert his status into that of a 'public servant'. In R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay the learned Judges of the Constitution Bench have referred to the entire history and evolution of the concept of a 'public servant' as contemplated by Section 21 IPC." 9. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & Others, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111 has defined the term ‘public servant’. It has held that Not all recipients of government funds or those performing public functions are automatically considered "public servants." The determining factor is whether 8 the body is "State" under Article 12 or exercises public duty with substantial government control. 10. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay reported in (1984) 2 SCC 183 has clearly held that Only those covered under the definition in Section 2(c) are amenable to prosecution under the PC Act. The Act does not extend to private individuals unless they are shown to be public servants. 11. Likewise, in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sheetla Sahai , reported in (2009) 8 SCC 617, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated that Sanction under Section 19 is a precondition for prosecution under the PC Act. Its absence is a fatal defect unless the accused is not a public servant at the time of taking cognizance. 12. In respect of scope of revisional jurisdiction under sections 397/401 Cr.P.C., the revisional court cannot reappreciate evidence or act as an appellate court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander , reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has dealt with the same issue and has reiterated that Interference in revisional jurisdiction is justified only when the trial court’s order is perverse, manifestly illegal, or causes miscarriage of justice. 13. Reverting back to the present case at hand, from the aforementioned dictums of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397/401 of 9 the Cr.P.C. is limited. The revisional Court cannot act as an appellate Court or re-appreciate evidence, unless the findings suffer from patent illegality, manifest perversity, or result in a miscarriage of justice. In the present case, the learned trial Court has correctly interpreted Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and rightly concluded that the respondents, being members of private institutions/NGOs, do not fall within the definition of “public servant.” Consequently, the provisions of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, 1988 cannot be invoked. Furthermore, sanction under Section 19 of the said Act is a condition precedent for taking cognizance against public servants. No such sanction exists in the present case. Therefore, the trial Court was justified in holding that the complaint under the Act, 1988, was not maintainable. 14. As regards the offences under the Indian Penal Code, the trial Court has examined the allegations and the supporting documents. Upon appreciation of the same, it found no sufficient material to proceed further. This view, being a plausible and legally tenable one, cannot be interfered with in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction unless it is shown to be perverse or grossly erroneous. No such perversity or illegality has been demonstrated by the applicant. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no illegality, irregularity, or impropriety in the impugned order dated 24.08.2015 passed by the trial Court. 10 16. Accordingly, the criminal revision petition stands dismissed. SD/- SD/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Vishakha