1 2025:CGHC:47239 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 1373 of 2016  Anand Kumar Jain S/o Shri Hukumchand Jain, Aged About 58 Years Occupation Clerk - Cum- Cashier, Posted As State Bank Of India, Branch Rajhara, Civil And Revenue District Durg Chhattisgarh, Presently R/o 21 Vikash Nagar, Lokholi, Rajnandgaon, Tahsil And District Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. The Chairman, State Bank Of India Mumbai, Maharashtra, Maharashtra 2. Regional Manager, State Bank Of India, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3. Disciplinary Authority And Regional Manager, Zonal Office, State Bank Of India, Byron Bazaar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4. The Branch Manager, State Bank Of India, Branch Rajhara, District Balod, Chhattisgarh, District : Balod, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Nitesh Jain, Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Ghanshyam Patel, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order On Board 15-09-2025 1) Facts of the present case are that at the relevant time, petitioner was working on the post of Clerk-cum-Cashier under the 2 respondents-Bank. The petitioner was charged for criminal offence punishable U/s 294, 506-B, 323 read with Section 34 of IPC on the ground that he abused and assaulted a security guard of the Bank on 19.09.1996. A criminal case was launched against petitioner and he was convicted for commission of offence punishable U/s 323 of IPC and was sentenced to undergo R.I. for a period of three months. Thereafter, petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 72/2001 before the High Court, whereby conviction of the petitioner was affirmed but sentence was reduced to fine amounting Rs. 1,000/- vide judgment dated 24.12.2001. Thereafter, petitioner preferred Criminal Revision No. 95/2002 before the High Court which was dismissed vide judgment dated 30.08.2012. A show-cause notice was issued to petitioner by the Bank on 18.02.2003 on account of his conviction for offence punishable U/s 323 of IPC, which amounts to moral turpitude according to the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 [hereinafter to be referred as “Act, 1949”]. The petitioner filed reply to the said notice and thereafter, respondent No. 3 vide order dated 29.04.2005, passed an order of dismissal from service. 2) The petitioner challenged the said order by filing WP/3539/2005, which was dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 09.07.2013, wherein the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority with regard to moral turpitude were upheld. The petitioner preferred writ appeal i.e. WA/500/2013 assailing the 3 order dated 9.7.2013 and the Hon’ble Division Bench vide its order dated 24.07.2015 upheld the findings with regard to moral turpitude but as reasons were not assigned by the respondent No. 3 in its order dated 29.04.2005, matter was remitted back to the authority concerned to pass a well-reasoned order. On 30.12.2015, respondent No. 3 after dealing with the provisions of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Act, 1949 and further considering conviction recorded by the competent criminal Court affirmed the penalty of dismissal from services. 3) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that services of petitioner were terminated by respondent No. 3 without conducting any inquiry and without affording any opportunity of hearing which is in utter violation to the principles of natural justice. He further submits that the penalty inflicted by respondent No. 3 is disproportionate and harsh looking to the misconduct of petitioner. He contends that petitioner was posted as Senior Assistant and therefore respondent No. 3 ought to have taken a lenient view while inflicting the penalty. He further contends that though the findings with regard to moral turpitude were affirmed by the learned Writ Court and Hon’ble Division Bench, but the disciplinary authority could have inflicted any of the penalties enumerated in the Clause 6 of Sastry Award. He has placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Karam Singh Versus State of Punjab & 4 Another1, Union of India Versus Sri. Sankar Prosad Ghosh2 and Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited & Another Versus Mukul Kumar Choudhari & Ors3. He has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by Punjab & Haryana High Court in the matter of Hari Singh Versus State of Haryana & Ors. 4) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents-Bank submits that the findings with regard to conviction under Section 323 of IPC and moral turpitude have been affirmed in the first round of litigation by the Writ Court as well as Hon’ble Division Bench. He further submits that matter was remitted back to respondent No. 3 by the Hon’ble Division Bench as reasons were not assigned in the order of dismissal from service. He contends that if a bank employee has been convicted by the competent criminal Court, it would amount moral turpitude and only penalty prescribed is dismissal from services, therefore respondent No. 3 rightly inflicted the penalty of dismissal from services against the petitioner by way of a well reasoned order dated 30.12.2015. 5) Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6) In the matter of Karam Singh (supra), the delinquent employee was convicted for commission of offence punishable under 1. (1996) 7 SCC 748 2. (2008) 5 SLR 170 3. (2009) 15 SCC 620 5 Section 323 of IPC and was released on probation. He was an employee of Punjab Police and penalty of dismissal from services was passed against him. The Ho’ble Supreme Court modified the penalty from dismissal from services to removal. The working conditions as well as service rules of a police department and a bank employee are completely distinct. Further, in the present case, petitioner has not been extended benefit of probation, therefore, facts of the present case are entirely different from facts of Karam Singh (supra). 7) In the matter of Mukul Kumar Choudhari (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of proportionality of penalty/ punishment and held that where delinquent upon being charged of the misconduct fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence, punishment of removal was not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to allegations, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters, before imposing punishment. Relevant paras 19 and 20 are reproduced hereinbelow:- 19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well-recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in 6 excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 8) In the case on hand, the petitioner assaulted a Security Guard of the Bank and he was convicted by the competent criminal court. The conviction amounts to moral turpitude and penalty for such misconduct may be dismissal from services. The findings with regard to moral turpitude have been affirmed in the Writ Petition [WP/3539/2005] and Writ Appeal [WA/500/2013] therefore said issue cannot be reconsidered. With regard to proportionality, the Rule 6 of the Sastry Award and section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Act, 1949 provide for such penalty and scope of interference in this regard while exercising power under article 226 of Constitution of India, is limited therefore in my considered opinion the penalty cannot be termed as disproportionate particularly when the petitioner was holding a reputed position in the Bank. 9) In the matter of Sri Sankar Prosad Ghosh (supra), it is held that livelihood is a part of part of right to life and dismissal from services takes away the livelihood of a person at an advanced stage and it becomes impossible for such person to get employment at this stage. Relevant paras 12 and 13 are 7 reproduced hereinbelow :- "12. It would be naive to say as on today that livelihood is not a part of right to life. By this time, by a large number of decisions, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as High Courts in this country that livelihood is an integral facet of right to life. In this connection, a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raja Mahendra, (1999) 4 SCC 43: AIR 1999 SC 1786 may be remembered. 13. Dismissal from services undoubtedly is taking away the livelihood of a person at an advanced stage because at that stage, it is impossible for a person to get any employment elsewhere as the order of dismissal will be treated as a disqualification. Loosing a job in an establishment amounts to a civil death, as the concerned person will not be in a position to earn livelihood at the advanced stage, when all his energies and endeavours have almost come to a diminishing stage." 10) Admittedly , penalty of dismissal from services takes away the livelihood of a person at an advance stage but the principle of ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court should be read alongwith the allegations made against the delinquent employee and his misconduct. 11) Punjab & Haryana High Court in the matter of Hari Singh (supra), converted the penalty of dismissal from services to compulsory retirement considering the length of service and past conduct of an employee. Relevant para 5 is reproduced hereinbelow :- 5. I have perused the order of dismissal. It has not considered the past conduct of the petitioner. Petitioner had rendered uninterrupted service of 33 years on the 8 date when he was awarded the punishment. It was the first instance of misconduct committed by him. The Punishing Authority had neither taken into consideration the antecedents of the petitioner nor length of service rendered by him and the fact that he will be deprived of his pension. Accordingly, while upholding the misconduct on the part of the petitioner, this Court is of the view that in case punishment of dismissal from service is converted into compulsory retirement, it will serve the ends of justice. 12) In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to firstly notice the Memorandum of Settlement on Disciplinary Action Procedure for Workmen issued on 10-4-2002. Clause 1 of Terms of Settlement prescribes Disciplinary Action and Procedure therefor. Clauses 1, 2 and 3(b) of the Memorandum of Settlement provide as under :- "1. A person against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall in the first instance, be informed of the particulars of the charge against him and he shall have a proper opportunity to give his explanation as to such particulars. Final orders shall be passed after due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances. With this object in view, the following shall apply. 2. By the expression "offence" shall be meant any offence involving moral turpitude for which an employee is liable to conviction and sentence under any provision of Law. 3. (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) If he be convicted, he may be dismissed with effect from the date of his conviction or be given any lesser form of punishment as mentioned in 9 Clause 6 below." 13) Similarly, "gross misconduct has been defined in clause 5 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10-4-2002, sub-clause (s) of which reads as follows:- 5. By the expression "gross misconduct" shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee: (a) to (r) xxx xxx xxx (s) Conviction by a criminal Court of Law for an offence involving moral turpitude." 14) Clause 6 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10-4-2002 prescribes punishment for gross misconduct. It provides as under : - "6. An employee found guilty of gross misconduct may: (a) be dismissed without notice; or (b) be removed from service with superannuation benefits i.e. Pension and/or Provident Fund and Gratuity as would be due otherwise under the Rules or Regulations prevailing at the relevant time and without disqualification from future employment; or (c) be compulsorily retired with superannuation benefits i.e. Pension and / or Provident Fund and Gratuity as would be due otherwise under the Rules or Regulations prevailing at the relevant time and without disqualification from future employment; or (d) be discharged from service with 10 superannuation benefits i.e. Pension and / or Provident Fund and Gratuity as would be due otherwise under the Rules or Regulations prevailing at the relevant time and without disqualification from future employment; or (e) be brought down to lower stage in the scale of pay up to a maximum of two stages; or (f) have his increments stopped with or without cumulative effect; or (g) have his special pay withdrawn; or (h) be warned or censured, or have an adverse remark entered against him; or (i) be fined." 15) As such, it is apparent from the aforesaid provision that if a workman of the Bank is convicted by a criminal court of law for an offence involving moral turpitude, under clause 5(s) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10-4-2002 and by virtue of clause 6(a) he can be dismissed without notice, however, clause 3(b) prescribes that he may be dismissed with effect from the date of his conviction or be given any lesser form of punishment as mentioned in clause 6. 16) On the basis of clause 3(b) of the Memorandum of Settlement, Mr. Jain, counsel appearing for the petitioner, contends that award of dismissal from service on criminal charge or even for the offence involving moral turpitude is concerned, it is not necessary or 11 imperative that the petitioner should be dismissed from service, he may be given any lesser form of punishment as mentioned in clause 6, which has been opposed by Mr. Patel, counsel for the respondents-Bank, and he submits that the provisions of Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, would apply by virtue of circular dated 2-12-2008 and if an employee has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, his services are mandatorily required to terminated and the Bank is under obligation to terminate him and he cannot be allowed to continue in service by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 10(1)(b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. 17) In order to resolve the dispute, it would be appropriate to notice Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which states as under: - "10. Prohibition of employment of managing agents and restrictions on certain forms of employment.–(1) No banking company– (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) shall employ or continue the employment of any person- (i) who is, or at any time has been, adjudicated insolvent, or has suspended payment or has compounded with his creditors, or who is, or has been, convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude;" 18) A focused perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that Section 10 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, prohibits employment of management agents and puts restrictions on 12 certain forms of employment. Section 10 (1) (b) (i) mandates that banking company shall not employ or continue the employment of any person who is, or at any time has been, convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude. The expression 'shall employ a person' in Section 10 means and includes 'shall have in employment' and in this respect the amendment of 1956 merely makes clear what was already meant by the section. (See The Central Bank of India v. Their workmen. etc.4) 19) Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the matter of Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank5 in which their Lordships have clearly held that management is under obligation under Section 10 (1) (b) (i) to discontinue the services of an employee who is or has been convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude. 20) The Supreme Court in the matter of State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim6 has clearly held that the provisions contained in Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 imposes clear ban on banking company from employing or continuing to employ a person who has been convicted by criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude. 21) In the considered opinion of this Court, the provision of Section 10 4 . AIR 1960 SC 12 5 . (2010) 8 SCC 573 6 . (2013) 11 SCC 67 13 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is mandatory and once a person has been convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude, he has to be discontinued mandatorily by the banking company / bank and it is a clear bar for a banking company to continue a convicted person for an offence involving moral turpitude. Now, in order to attract Section 10 (1) (b) (i), the banking company taking the plea that the employee has been convicted for the offence involving moral turpitude, the offence has to be proved that it is the offence involving moral turpitude. 22) "Moral turpitude" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edn..,2004) as under: - "Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. In the area of legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude-such as fraud or breach of trust. … Also termed moral depravity. … “Moral turpitude means, in general, shameful wickedness-so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest, good morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of the community. It has also been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which one person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people.” 23) In the matter of Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana7, the 7 . (1996) 4 SCC 17 14 Supreme Court has observed as under:- 12. Moral turpitude' is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity. 24) The aforesaid decision in Pawan Kumar (supra) has been considered by the Supreme Court again in the matter of Allahabad Bank and another v. Deepak Kumar Bhola8 and reliance has been placed upon the matter of Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector9 in which it has been held by the Allahabad High Court as under: - "The expression moral turpitude' is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellow men or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man. 25) Admittedly clause 3(b) of the Terms of Settlement of the Memorandum of Settlement provides that if a person has been 8 . (1997) 4 SCC 1 9 . AIR 1959 AII 71 15 convicted, he may be dismissed with effect from the date of his conviction or be given any lesser form of punishment as mentioned in clause & of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10-4-2002. As held herein above, the provision contained in Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is mandatory. In any case, if a person is convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, it would be a misconduct within the meaning of clause 5(s) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10-4-2002 and in that case, by virtue of the mandate contained in the aforesaid provision, the respondent Bank is under legal obligation to discontinue the services of the employee who has been convicted by the criminal court for the offence involving moral turpitude. Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 will prevail over the provisions of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10-4-2002. Merely because clause 3(b) of the Memorandum of Settlement provides that any lesser form of punishment be given, even if the person has been convicted for the offence involving moral turpitude, the provision contained in Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 cannot be given a go-by, it has to be followed mandatorily, otherwise, it will lead to non-compliance of the mandatory provisions. The Bank has to follow the provision contained in Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 in its true letter and spirit. Once an employee is convicted by a criminal court of law for the offence involving moral turpitude, the Bank is under legal 16 obligation to take appropriate steps for his dismissal/removal from service. 26) As such, in the instant case, the petitioner having been convicted by the criminal court for the offence involving moral turpitude, the Bank has rightly dismissed him from service in exercise of power under clause 5(s) read with clause 6(a) of the memorandum of settlement dated 10-4-2002 read with Section 10 (1) (b) (i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. I do not find any merit in the petition. The writ petition is liable to be and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE A j i n k y a Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2025.09.16 16:03:29 +0530