1 2025:CGHC:51875-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA(MAT) No. 370 of 2025 1 - Chonhas Xaxa S/o Isaiah Xaxa Aged About 52 Years Caste Uraon, R/o Lipik ( Clerk ), Office Of Development Block Education Officer Kansabel Tehsil- Kunkuri, District- Jashpur ( C.G. ). ... Appellant versus 1 - Sheelwanti Bada W/o Chonhas Xaxa Aged About 50 Years Caste Uraon R/o Mission Compound Baikunthpur, District- Koriya (C.G.). 2 - Vivek Xaxa S/o Chonhas Xaxa Aged About 30 Years Caste Uraon R/o Mission Compound Baikunthpur, District- Koriya ( C.G. ). ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title is taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Nishikant Sinha, Advocate (Division Bench) (Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Order on Board Per ; Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge 17.10.2025 1. The present appeal is filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984 arising out of the impugned order dated 30.08.2025, passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Baikunthpur, District Koriya (C.G.) in Declaration Suit No. 70-A/2024, whereby the learned Family Court has been pleased to allow the application preferred by the respondents for conducting a DNA test of the appellant/defendant and respondent No. Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI 2 2, for the purpose of determining paternity. Being dissatisfied and aggrieved by the said order, the appellant prefers this appeal before this Court. 2. Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the respondents herein instituted a civil suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, before the Family Court, Baikunthpur, seeking a declaration to the effect that respondent No. 1 is the legally wedded wife of the appellant/defendant, and that respondent No. 2 is the son born out of the said alleged wedlock. The respondents prayed that such relationship be formally declared by way of a declaratory decree. It has been averred in the plaint that during the years 1991–1992, the appellant/defendant was posted as a Clerk in the Office of the Block Education Officer, Baikunthpur, District Koriya, and at the relevant time, both the appellant and respondent No. 1 resided in the same locality. It is further alleged that the appellant, representing himself as an unmarried man, developed a romantic relationship with respondent No. 1, and that this relationship eventually led to physical intimacy, resulting in pregnancy of respondent No. 1. The respondents have further alleged that the appellant subsequently entered into a marital relationship with respondent No. 1 and that respondent No. 2, Vivek, was born from the said union. According to the respondents, after the transfer of appellant to Jashpur, he allegedly started neglecting respondent No. 1 and the child and refused to maintain or cohabit with them. It is also alleged that the appellant began residing with another woman at Jashpur, treating her as his wife, and completely disowned the respondents. On the strength of these averments, the respondents have sought a declaration regarding their marital and filial status, 3 asserting legal recognition of the relationship between respondent No. 1 and the appellant, and between respondent No. 2 and the appellant as his father. The appellant/defendant, upon being served with notice of the suit, entered appearance and filed a detailed written statement, specifically denying each and every allegation contained in the plaint. The appellant categorically denied having any acquaintance, relationship, or marriage with respondent No. 1, and expressly refuted the claim that he had ever cohabited with her or fathered any child. It has been further contended that the entire case of the respondents is a fabricated and malicious attempt to harass, defame, and extort the appellant, who is a Government servant with an unblemished record of service. The appellant further clarified in his written statement that he is already legally married and has been residing peacefully with his lawful wife and children at Jashpur. The so-called complaints or inquiries referred to by the respondents are wholly unfounded and concocted, as no such complaint was ever lodged or processed in his Department, nor was any official inquiry initiated by any competent authority. It was further pleaded that the entire claim of the respondents rests solely upon bald allegations, unsupported by any documentary or oral evidence. 3. During the pendency of the said declaration suit, the respondents moved an application under Section 75(e) read with Order XXVI Rule 10-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking a direction from the learned Family Court to conduct a DNA test of the appellant and respondent No. 2, purportedly to establish the paternity of respondent No. 2. The appellant filed a detailed objection and reply to the said application, inter alia contending that such a direction would amount to 4 a gross violation of his right to privacy, personal liberty, and bodily autonomy, and that no prima facie case had been made out warranting such an intrusive order. Despite the objections raised by the appellant, the learned Family Court, by the impugned order dated 30.08.2025, allowed the respondents’ application and directed that a DNA test be conducted through the Director, Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics (CDFD), Hyderabad, or alternatively through the Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, for determining the paternity of respondent No. 2. The appellant submits that the impugned order suffers from serious infirmities of law and fact. The learned Court below failed to consider that directing a DNA test in a case based purely on disputed marital status, without any substantive evidence or prima facie satisfaction, amounts to an unwarranted intrusion into the fundamental right to privacy and bodily integrity to appellant, as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The present appeal is, therefore, being preferred by the appellant/defendant who is highly aggrieved, dissatisfied, and prejudiced by the impugned order dated 30.08.2025. The said order is illegal, arbitrary, unjust, and contrary to the settled principles of law, and if allowed to stand, will cause irreparable injury to the reputation, dignity, and personal liberty of appellant. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside in the interest of justice, equity, and fair play. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submits that the the impugned order dated 30.08.2025, passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Baikunthpur, District Koriya (C.G.), is contrary to the facts, the governing law, and the well-settled judicial principles regulating the issuance of directions for DNA testing in civil proceedings. The 5 impugned order has been passed mechanically, without due consideration of the pleadings, absence of prima facie evidence, and without recording any satisfaction that such a direction was indispensable to the just adjudication of the case. The learned trial Court has thereby erred in law and fact, resulting in serious prejudice to the appellant. It is submitted that the learned trial Court gravely erred in allowing the application of the respondents for conducting a DNA test of the appellant and respondent No. 2 without any cogent, sufficient, or prima facie reason to justify such an intrusive procedure. The direction for DNA testing has been granted merely on the asking of the respondents, overlooking the settled principle that such tests cannot be ordered in a routine or casual manner. The order under challenge is thus devoid of any legal foundation and reflects a complete misappreciation of judicial discretion. The appellant further submits that the direction to undergo DNA testing amounts to a serious invasion upon the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which safeguards the right to privacy, bodily integrity, and personal liberty. He placed reliance upn the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, reported in (2017) 10 SCC 1, recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right implicit in the guarantee of life and personal liberty. Likewise, in Selvi v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2010) 7 SCC 263, it was held that no person can be compelled to provide bodily samples or undergo scientific tests without consent, except under express statutory authority. The impugned order, by compelling the appellant to submit to a DNA test, infringes these constitutional protections and is, therefore, 6 unsustainable. It is submitted that the learned Family Court failed to appreciate that the respondents had not produced any documentary or reliable oral evidence to even prima facie establish the existence of a marital relationship between the appellant and respondent No. 1. No marriage certificate, no photographs, no witnesses to any alleged ceremony, nor any credible material suggesting cohabitation as husband and wife was brought on record. In the absence of such foundational facts, directing a DNA test is wholly unjustified and tantamounts to allowing a fishing and roving inquiry, which is impermissible in law. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gautam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 418, held in unequivocal terms that a Court cannot order a DNA test as a matter of course and must first be satisfied that such a test is absolutely necessary for resolving the dispute. The learned Court below further fell in error in observing that “if the appellant is not the biological father of respondent No. 2, he should not shy away from the DNA test.” Such a finding is legally untenable, as it effectively reverses the settled burden of proof. It is for the respondents, as plaintiffs in the declaratory suit, to first establish their claim of marriage and paternity through legally admissible evidence. The appellant cannot be compelled to undergo a test to disprove a claim which has not even been prima facie established. The law does not require a person to prove a negative assertion. The learned trial Court has, therefore, erred in misapplying the fundamental rules of evidence. 7 5. The learned counsel for appellant further submits that compelling a person to undergo DNA testing without consent amounts to forcible extraction of bodily material, which is impermissible in civil proceedings. In Selvi v. State of Karnataka (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically held that involuntary administration of scientific techniques violates Article 20(3) and Article 21 of the Constitution. The Family Court, being a Civil Court, has no jurisdiction or statutory power to compel a party to undergo DNA testing against his will. The impugned order, therefore, travels far beyond the scope of its lawful authority and violates the fundamental safeguards of human dignity and bodily autonomy. The learned trial Court also failed to appreciate that the principles of personal autonomy and bodily privacy apply equally across all legal contexts, whether criminal, civil, or matrimonial. The right to control one’s own body and to refuse medical or scientific examination is intrinsic to personal liberty under Article 21. The impugned order disregards this cardinal constitutional value and reduces the appellant to an object of scientific scrutiny without lawful justification. Such an approach not only undermines judicial fairness but also risks grave consequences for the dignity and reputation of the individual concerned. It is further submitted that the learned Court below did not record any judicial satisfaction that the respondents had made out a prima facie case to justify the extraordinary direction of DNA testing. In Banarsi Dass v. Teeku Dutta, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 449, the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that Courts must exercise great restraint before directing a DNA test, particularly where such direction may have the effect of branding an individual or family in a socially stigmatizing manner. In the present case, no such 8 satisfaction or reasoning is discernible from the impugned order. The direction was issued mechanically, without balancing the competing rights of the parties or considering the consequences of such an order. It is further submitted that the impugned order, being contrary to the settled principles of law, has been passed mechanically and without due application of mind to the pleadings, evidence, or constitutional safeguards. The learned Family Court overlooked the settled ratio in Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Convenor, Secretary, Orissa State Commission for Women, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 633, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that DNA testing should not be ordered as a matter of course and should be directed only when it becomes indispensable to reach a just conclusion and when no other evidence is available. The present case does not meet this threshold by any measure. It is further submitted that the respondents’ application for DNA testing was not maintainable, being frivolous, vexatious, and clearly intended to harass, humiliate, and malign the appellant’s reputation. The respondents, having failed to produce any material evidence of marriage or relationship, have sought to use the process of DNA testing as a tool of coercion and public embarrassment. The learned court below failed to appreciate that such misuse of judicial process must be curbed at the threshold to protect the sanctity of individual rights and prevent abuse of the jurisdiction of Court. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is contended that the impugned order dated 30.08.2025 is wholly unsustainable in law, arbitrary in reasoning, and violative of the fundamental rights of appellant guaranteed under the Constitution of India. The direction for DNA testing, having been issued without legal basis, without satisfaction of necessity, and without 9 consideration of the constitutional protections of appellant, deserves to be quashed and set aside. The appellant prays that this Court be pleased to allow the present appeal, set aside the impugned order, and protect the dignity, privacy, and liberty of appellant as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and also perused the documents enclosed along with the appeal. 7. The trial Court allowed the application for a DNA test, holding that since plaintiffs have filed a suit for declaration of paternity and the defendant denies that plaintiff No. 2 is his son, the question of paternity arises. The Court observed that establishing biological parentage is necessary, and in the absence of such proof, social stigma may persist. Therefore, a DNA test is essential to determine the biological father of plaintiff No. 2. 8. The primary issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the learned Family Court was justified in allowing the respondents’ application under Section 75(e) read with Order 24 Rule 10-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, directing the conduct of a DNA test for the purpose of determining the paternity of respondent No. 2. 9. It is not in dispute that the respondents have instituted a declaration suit seeking a declaration of the marital status between respondent No. 1 and the appellant and further seeking a declaration of paternity of respondent No. 2. The appellant has, in categorical terms, denied the very existence of any relationship, acquaintance, or marriage with respondent No. 1, and consequently denied being the father of respondent No. 2. Thus, the paternity of respondent No. 2 is a direct, central, and material issue in controversy. The resolution of this core 10 issue necessarily requires the Court to reach a finding based upon cogent and reliable evidence, for which scientific assistance may legitimately be sought when ordinary documentary or oral evidence is either unavailable or insufficient to establish the truth. 10. The question of directing a DNA test has been considered in several landmark pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the matter of Gautam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 418, the Apex Court held that Courts must not order blood tests or DNA tests as a matter of course and should exercise discretion cautiously, balancing the interests of privacy and dignity with the need for truth. However, the Court did not lay down an absolute prohibition but rather emphasized that such tests may be ordered when they are absolutely necessary to achieve justice. Relevant paragraph is quoted below for ready reference : “26. From the above discussion it emerges- (1) that courts in India cannot order blood test as a matter of course; (2) wherever applications are made for such prayers in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test cannot be entertained. (3) There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act. (4) The court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effect of 11 branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman. (5) No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.” 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sharda vs. Dharmpal, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 493 has held as under : “80. So viewed, the implicit power of a court to direct medical examination of a party to a matrimonial litigation in a case of this nature cannot be held to be violative of one's right of privacy. 81. To sum up, our conclusions are: 1. A matrimonial court has the power to order a person to undergo medical test. 2. Passing of such an order by the court would not be in violation of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 3. However, the court should exercise such a power if the applicant has a strong prima facie case and there is sufficient material before the court. If despite the order of the court, the respondent refuses to submit himself to medical examination, the court will be entitled to draw an adverse inference against him.” 12. The above principles was further elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Convenor, Secretary, Orissa State Commission for Women, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 633, wherein it was observed that while no individual can be compelled to undergo such a test lightly, the Court has the inherent power to direct the same when it becomes indispensable to reach a just and fair conclusion. The Apex Court further held that when a conflict arises 12 between the right to privacy and the quest for truth in judicial proceedings, the Court must balance these competing interests, giving due precedence to the demands of justice if the facts so warrant. Relevant paragraph is quoted below for ready reference : “21. In a matter where paternity of a child is in issue before the court, the use of DNA test is an extremely delicate and sensitive aspect. One view is that when modern science gives the means of ascertaining the paternity of a child, there should not be any hesitation to use those means whenever the occasion requires. The other view is that the court must be reluctant in the use of such scientific advances and tools which result in invasion of right to privacy of an individual and may not only be prejudicial to the rights of the parties but may have devastating effect on the child. Sometimes the result of such scientific test may bastardise an innocent child even though his mother and her spouse were living together during the time of conception. 22. In our view, when there is apparent conflict between the right to privacy of a person not to submit himself forcibly to medical examination and duty of the court to reach the truth, the court must exercise its discretion only after balancing the interests of the parties and on due consideration whether for a just decision in the matter, DNA test is eminently needed. DNA test in a matter relating to paternity of a child should not be directed by the court as a matter of course or in a routine manner, whenever such a request is made. The court has to consider diverse aspects including presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act; pros and cons of such order and the test of “eminent need” whether it is not possible for the court to reach the truth without use of such test. 13 23. There is no conflict in the two decisions of this Court, namely, Goutam Kundu [(1993) 3 SCC 418 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 928] and Sharda [(2003) 4 SCC 493] . In Goutam Kundu [(1993) 3 SCC 418 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 928] it has been laid down that courts in India cannot order blood test as a matter of course and such prayers cannot be granted to have roving inquiry; there must be strong prima facie case and the court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test. In Sharda [(2003) 4 SCC 493] while concluding that a matrimonial court has power to order a person to undergo a medical test, it was reiterated that the court should exercise such a power if the applicant has a strong prima facie case and there is sufficient material before the court. Obviously, therefore, any order for DNA test can be given by the court only if a strong prima facie case is made out for such a course.” 13. In Rohit Shekhar v. Narayan Dutt Tiwari, reported in (2011) 4 RCR (Civ) 459, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that where there is a dispute over, whether a person was biological father of a child or not, the Court has a right to order DNA test of the person. Also, it was observed that birth of a child, during the subsistence of valid marriage, is conclusive of legitimacy of a child under Section 112 of the Indian evidence Act. It was also held that however, it is not conclusive proof of paternity, which ought to be established by scientific test. 14. The aforesaid order passed by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court was subsequently challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (C) No. 17622 of 2012. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while affirming the order of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Narayan Dutt Tiwari v. Rohit Shekhar and Another, reported in (2012) 12 SCC 554 held as under : 14 “1. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and after perusal of the record, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order [Rohit Shekhar v. Narayan Dutt Tiwari, FAO (OS) No. 547 of 2011, decided on 27-4-2012 (Del).] . The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed. However, we still feel that certain protection with regard to confidentiality of the whole matter has to be granted to the petitioner. xxx xxx xxx 17. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment [Rohit Shekhar v. Narayan Dutt Tiwari, IA No. 10394 of 2011 in CS (OS) No. 700 of 2008, decided on 23-9-2011 (Del)] , has framed the following question: “Whether a person can be physically compelled to give a blood sample for DNA profiling in compliance with a civil court order in a paternity action? If it were held that the same was permissible, how is the Court to mould its order and what would be the modalities for drawing the involuntary sample?” xxx xxx xxx 22. In our view, to say that the exercise earlier undertaken by the Court, was an empty one and in futility—that though the Court could issue a direction for DNA testing but not implement or enforce the same, has the tendency of making the law and the Court, a laughing stock. The perception of “the law” as Mr Bumble (in Oliver Twist [ Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist, Ch 51 (1838)] ) said “is an ass—an idiot” will be cemented, if the courts themselves hold their own orders to be unimplementable and unenforceable. It is the duty of every court to prevent its machinery from being made a sham, thereby running down the rule of law and rendering itself an object of public ridicule. xxx xxx xxx 23. The House of Lords, in Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. 15 [(1987) 1 WLR 1248 : (1987) 3 All ER 316 (HL)] observed that public interest requires that we have a legal system and courts which command public respect and if the courts were to make orders manifestly incapable of achieving their avowed purpose, law would indeed be an ass. It was further held that the court should not make orders which would be ineffective to achieve what they set out to do. xxx xxx xxx 28. It cannot also be lost sight of that the order directing Respondent 1 to undergo DNA testing was an order in exercise of powers by the Court under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and not in exercise of powers as under Order 12 Rule 8 or under Order 11 or Order 16 CPC, for non-compliance whereof adverse inference is permitted to be drawn. A court of law cannot sit still with folded hands and countenance its injunction being treated with indifference or scant courtesy by the party against whom it is directed and who is bound to obey its terms. This is particularly so when such injunction has been confirmed in appeal and stay thereof been rejected by the Supreme Court. xxx xxx xxx 34. It cannot also be lost sight of that at the time the civil procedure was codified in the year 1908, the tests such as of DNA were not even comprehensible much less available. However now that such tests, which are an aid in adjudication are available, the courts cannot allow such advancements to bypass the courts.” 15. Further, while deciding IA No. 10394 of 2011, in C.S. (OS) No. 700 of 2008, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court had further held that the Court can direct a person to give blood sample for DNA test to ascertain the paternity and on refusal of such person to give sample, the Court has no power to compel him to give sample. But however, the Court may 16 draw adverse inference, in the facts of the case, but not in all cases. Therein, the Hon'ble Court had also collated the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Cout as well as by the High Court, in several judicial pronouncements and observed as herein given:— “216. In this background, it would be appropriate to collate the principles laid down by the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts in the several judicial pronouncements noticed hereinabove which are to the following effect:— (i) A matrimonial court and the civil court have the implicit and inherent power to order a person to submit himself for medical examination (Re : Sharda) (ii) The court under section 75(e) of the CPC and Order XXVI, Rule 10A has the requisite power to issue a direction to hold a scientific, technical or expert investigation. (Re : Sharda; Selvi) (iii) Passing of an order for medical examination would not be in violation of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution (Re : Goutam Kundu) (iv) The direction for the medical examination can be issued suo motto by the court or upon an application filed by a party (Re : Sharda) The principles of natural justice would require to be complied with. (v) The court would examine that the proportionality of the legitimate aims being pursued are not arbitrary, discriminatory or pointless or which may adversely impact the best interest of the child (for instance, bastradise a child) and that they justify the restrictions on privacy and personal autonomy concerns of the 17 person directed to be subjected to medical examination. (vi) The court should not exercise such power as matter of course or in order to have a roving inquiry (Re : Goutam Kundu) Such power would be exercised if the applicant has a strong prima facie case and there is sufficient material before the court (Re : Sharda) The court would consider the age; physical and mental health of the persons involved. (vii) No one can be compelled to give a sample of blood for analysis (Re : Goutam Kundu). If despite the order of the court, the respondent refuses to submit himself to medical examination, the court will be entitled take the refusal on record and to draw an adverse inference against him (Re : Sharda) (viii) A direction to a person to undergo a medical examination could be made to enable the court to leading the truth; in matrimonial cases also for removal of misunderstanding, bringing a party to terms; for judging competency of a person to be a witness; whether a person/party needs treatment or protection; the capacity of a person/party to protect his interest or defence in litigation; whether the person needs legal aid (Re;Sharda) (ix) In a case involving a paternity claim/denial issue, the conclusive proof standard mandated by Section 112 of the Evidence Act, read with Section 4, admits an extremely limited choice before the Court, to allow evidence of “non access” to a wife by the husband, who alleges that the child begotten by her is not his offspring; it is designed to protect the best interests of the child, and his legitimacy” (Re : Goutam Kundu; 18 Rohit Shekhar (Bhat, J - DOJ 23rd December, 2010) (x) A “paternity” action by the son or daughter of one, claiming the defendant to be his or her biological father, filed in a civil court by an adult plaintiff, or claims paternity, for other reasons, (such as non- consensual sexual relationship the basis of facts, and on the basis of the child's rights/either under Section 125 Cr. P.C., or in a suit for declaration or for maintenance) cannot be jettisoned by shutting out evidence, particularly based on DNA test reports, on the threshold application of Section 112; the Court has to weigh all pros and cons, and, on being satisfied about existence of “eminent need” make appropriate orders; (Re : Goutam Kundu; Bhabhani Jena; Rohit Shekhar (Bhat, J-DOJ 23rd December, 2010) (xi) In a case involving a parentage issue, the child's best interest shall dominate the consideration by the court. The court may refrain from ordering a test if it considers that this may not be in the child's best interest.” The court would also consider the reasons for refusal of the examination of the child by the party having custody and make appropriate orders based on the best interest principle.” (xii) XXXX XX XX XXXX (xiii) XXXX XX XX XXXX (xiv) XXXX XX XX XXXX (xv) XXXX XX XX XXXX (xvi) XXXX XX XX XXXX (xvii) XXXX XX XX XXXX (xviii)XXXX XX XX XXXX (xix) XXXX XX XX XXXX (xx) XXXX XX XX XXXX Also, it was observed that these guidelines, would guide consideration of 19 an application for medical examination, before a civil court and matrimonial court. 16. In the present case, the Family Court has rightly taken note of the fact that the respondents have made serious assertions of marital and filial relationship, which, if true, confer substantial civil and legal consequences upon all parties. The complete denial on the part of appellant of any relationship leaves no other effective mode of verification except through scientific examination. The Court below, therefore, in its wisdom, deemed it appropriate to direct a DNA test, not as a matter of routine, but as a measure indispensable to discovering the truth of the relationship in dispute. 17. Upon a careful appraisal of the facts and the legal principles settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court finds that the impugned order is based upon sound reasoning and judicial prudence. It is a settled proposition that the right to privacy and bodily integrity, though constitutionally protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is not absolute and may be subjected to reasonable restrictions in the interest of justice. The Constitution does not elevate privacy above truth; rather, it requires the Courts to maintain a delicate balance between individual rights and societal interest in the fair administration of justice. 18. In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, reported in (2017) 10 SCC 1, the Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right intrinsic to life and personal liberty. However, the judgment itself clarified that the right is subject to the principle of proportionality and can be curtailed when the interference serves a legitimate aim, is 20 necessary for achieving that aim, and is the least intrusive measure available. 19. The present case squarely satisfies this test. The direction for DNA testing serves the legitimate aim of determining the truth in a matter directly involving issues of marriage and paternity. The test is necessary for just adjudication, as no other evidence is available that could conclusively determine the disputed fact. Further, the direction has been issued under judicial supervision, ensuring minimal intrusion into the appellant’s privacy. 20. In view of the above, the Family Court, therefore, rightly invoked its powers under Section 75(e) CPC read with Order XXVI Rule 10-A CPC, which authorizes the Court to issue directions for scientific investigation when the same is necessary for proper adjudication. The discretion exercised by the learned Judge is judicious, reasoned, and founded upon legal precedent. There is no indication of arbitrariness or mechanical application of mind. Furthermore, the contention of the appellant that the direction infringes his right against self-incrimination is wholly misconceived. Article 20(3) of the Constitution applies only to criminal proceedings, whereas the present case arises out of a civil declaratory suit. 21. This Court is conscious of the delicate nature of the relief sought and the potential social and personal implications of a DNA test. It is, however, equally mindful of the judicial duty to ascertain truth. The truth-seeking function of the Court is paramount, and every procedural power vested in it must be exercised to advance that objective. 22. In light of the above judicial pronouncements, the order passed by learned Family Court directing a DNA test through an authorized and 21 credible laboratory such as the CDFD, Hyderabad, or the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, appears not only justified but also necessary for achieving substantive justice. Adequate safeguards can and shall be implemented to ensure confidentiality, dignity, and fairness in the process. The apprehension of appellant of public humiliation or misuse of the results is unfounded, as the Family Court remains bound by strict procedural and ethical obligations to maintain the privacy of the parties and to utilize the results solely for the purpose of adjudicating the pending dispute. It must also be borne in mind that the refusal of the appellant to undergo such testing, when directed by a competent court, may invite an adverse inference under Section 114, Illustration (h) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as held by the Supreme Court in Sharda (supra), where it was held that the Court has the power to order a person to undergo a medical test in matrimonial matters, and refusal to comply may justify drawing an adverse inference. The present direction of the Family Court, therefore, stands on firm legal footing, being consistent with both statutory and constitutional parameters. 23. For all the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the order passed by the learned Family Court is well-reasoned, legally sustainable, and does not call for interference in appellate jurisdiction. The Family Court has exercised its discretion judiciously, balancing the competing interests of privacy and truth, and has issued a direction that is necessary for the effective adjudication of the core dispute between the parties. The apprehensions raised by the appellant regarding violation of privacy and bodily integrity are adequately addressed by the constitutional doctrine of proportionality and by the 22 procedural safeguards that accompany judicially supervised DNA testing. This Court, therefore, holds that the right to privacy, though fundamental, cannot be elevated to an absolute barrier against the search for truth in judicial proceedings, especially when the issue of paternity forms the foundation of the parties’ civil rights and obligations. The DNA test is not an instrument of humiliation but a means of securing clarity in the administration of justice. The learned Family Court has acted within its jurisdiction, with due circumspection, and in conformity with the binding precedents of the Supreme Court. 24. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant at considerable length and having carefully perused the entire record of the case, this Court is of the view that the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal is found to be breft of merit and is hereby dismissed. 25. The impugned order dated 30.08.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Baikunthpur, District Koriya (C.G.), is affirmed. The Family Court is directed to proceed expeditiously with the conduct of the DNA test through the Director, CDFD, Hyderabad, or the Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, as ordered, ensuring strict confidentiality and adherence to due process. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Shayna