1 2025:CGHC:51620 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 209 of 2014 1 - D.Surya Prakash S/o D.G. Deora Aged About 48 Years R/o Itwari Bazar Ward, Jagdalpur C.G., Chhattisgarh ... Appellant Versus 1 - Teksingh And Ors. S/o Sada Singh Aged About 53 Years R/o Aadavaal, Tah. Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar C.G., Chhattisgarh 2 - Birbal Singh S/o Sada Singh Aged About 45 Years R/o Aadavaal, Tah. Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar C.G., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3 - Rup Singh S/o Sada Singh Aged About 57 Years R/o Aadavaal, Tah. Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar C.G., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 4 - Budhram S/o Sada Singh Aged About 55 Years R/o Aadavaal, Tah. Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar C.G., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 5 - Narayan Singh S/o Sada Singh Aged About 50 Years R/o Aadavaal, Tah. Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar C.G., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 6 - Shankar S/o Cherga Aged About 28 Years R/o Aadavaal, Tah. Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar C.G., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 7 - Smt. Chalambati W/o Cherga Aged About 60 Years R/o Aadavaal, Tah. Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar C.G., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 8 - Smt. Turmani D/o Mukund Aged About 58 Years R/o Pandaripani, Beeringpaal, Tah. Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar C.G., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh SHUBHAM DEY Digitally signed by SHUBHAM DEY 2 9 - State Of Chhattisgarh D/o Thru- Collector, Bastar, Jagdalpur C.G., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Raja Sharma, Advocate For Respondents No. 7 & 8 : Mr. Vimlesh Bajpai, Advocate For Respondent No. 9 : Mr. Kishan Sahu, Dy. Government Advocate B: Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge ORDER ON BOARD 17/09/2025 1. Heard on I.A. No. 01/2014 which is an application under Section 05 of the Limitation Act, 1963 r/w. Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Order 42 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that delay in filing of the appeal cannot be attributed to the appellant as he acted in accordance with the advice given to him by the counsel practicing at Trial Court. He contended that after passing of the judgment by the First Appellate Court, the appellant was assured by the local counsel that he will get the appeal filed and obtained the documents and other requisites. Appellant under belief that his appeal has been filed got relaxed. In the proceedings before the Tehsildar of mutation also, he made statement that the appeal has been filed before the High Court which is recorded in order-sheet. Copy of the order- sheet dated 29.06.2012 is enclosed in support thereof. When again, he met with the local counsel and came to know that appeal has not been filed, appellant rushed to High Court, approached him and thereafter, immediately appeal is filed. 3. Learned counsel for the respective respondents would oppose the submissions fo counsel for the appellant and would submit that the reasons assigned in the application cannot be said to be sufficient cause 3 for condoning the inordinate delay of more than 1231 days in filing of this appeal. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the memo of appeal and document enclosed along with it. 5. Perusal of the judgment of Trial Court enclosed at Page No. 16 would show that the Respondents No. 1 & 2 have filed a suit for declaration of title, possession, confirmation of possession and declaring the sale deed dated 19.10.2004 to be null and void and not binding upon the plaintiffs and Defendants No. 4 to 6 and also for permanent injunction against the other defendants. Further, sought declaration that the order passed in Revenue Case No. 37-A-6/2002-03 to be void. The Defendants No. 1 to 3 & 7 have submitted written statement along with the counter claim and sought that the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 5-A/69 is not binding upon them and to declare it to be void. 6. 6. Learned Trial Court held the sale-deed dated 19.10.2004 to be null and void and not binding upon the plaintiff and have also declared the order dated 20.10.2005 passed by Tehsildar in Revenue Case No. 37-A- 6/2002-03 to be void and not binding upon the plaintiff along with other reliefs. The status of the Defendant No. 7/Appellant herein was purchaser of the land from the Defendants No. 1 to 3. The Defendants No. 1 to 3 & 7 (seller and purchaser of land) filed a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 before 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Baster (Jagdalpur) which came to be dismissed on 27.10.2010. 7. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, appellant pleaded that he relied upon the assurance of counsel of the Trial Court, who assured the appellant that appeal will be filed in the High Court, he gave Vakalatnama to the concerned Advocate and further that the 4 appellant took a stand in revenue proceedings that the appeal is filed in the High Court. 8. Perusal of the copy of revenue proceedings filed along with the application for condonation of delay would show that it is dated 29.06.2012 and by that order, the Tehsildar has ordered for deleting the name of the appellant herein from revenue records. The order was passed in presence of the appellant, he was aware that there was an order of deleting his name from revenue records which was entered based on the sale-deed subject matter of civil suit. In application seeking condonation of delay, there is no mention that when he approached again to the Trial Court Advocate and thereafter, when he approached to the Advocate at High Court, for taking back the records of the civil case and when he approached to another Advocate of High Court for filing of the appeal. The order of Tehsildar deleting the name of the appellant is dated 29.06.2012 whereas, the appeal is filed on 16.06.2014 i.e. after 01 year and 11 months from the date of said order. The delay caused in filing of this appeal is about 03 years and 04 months, however, no satisfactory explanation is offered by the appellant to show sufficient cause for condoning inordinate delay. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors. reported in (2010) 8 SCC 685 has observed thus: “25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles 5 should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu Vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 has observed thus: “19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107]. 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of 6 mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.” 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of LN. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 has observed thus: “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that 7 parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 12.In the case at hand, there is delay of 1233 days in filing of the appeal. Impugned judgment is dated 27.10.2010 against which, second appeal is filed. It is not the case of the appellant that he was not aware of the 8 judgment passed by the First Appellate Court. In fact, he pleaded that file and judgment in first appeal was handed over to local counsel for filing of an appeal in High Court. In the proceedings before Tehsildar, appellant made statement that against judgment of first appeal, he preferred second appeal in High Court. The Tehsildar considering the facts before him, allowed the application of respondent, passed an order on 29.06.2012 for deleting name of the appellant. 13.The order of Tehsildar had affected the right of the appellant, however, even after the order of Tehsildar, second appeal is not filed within reasonable time. The appellant has not named the counsel, nor any date is mentioned as to when, he approached the local counsel, when to counsel at High Court for withdrawing file and when, he again, approached the present counsel who filed appeal. Even from the date of adverse order, appellant did not become vigilant to file appeal in reasonable time. 14.The appellant has not given proper facts to show sufficient cause to condone the delay of 1233 days. Justice oriented approach in considering application for condonation of delay means, justice to both the sides. 15.In view of the above discussion and the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the opinion of this Court, the appellant failed to make out a case that there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 1233 days in filing of the appeal. 16.Accordingly, the second appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed being barred by limitation. 17.Certified copy as per rules. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge Dey