1 2025:CGHC:19571-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 870 of 2017 1 - Nikhil Masih S/o Late Dheeru Masih Aged About 18 Years By Caste Isai, R/o F /379 Kranti Shanti Nagar, C.S.E.B. Darri, Tahsil Katghora, District Korba Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh through the District Magistrate, Korba, District.Korba Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent For the appellant : Mrs. Indira Tripathi, Advocate For the State : Mr. Afroj Khan, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay K.Agrawal Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal Judgment on Board (30/04/2025) Per Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, J 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant herein under A ANNAJEE RAO Digitally signed by A ANNAJEE RAO 2 Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of Sentence dated 11.05.2017 passed in Sessions Trial No.7/2015 by the Additional sessions Judge Katghora, District Korba, Chhattisgarh, by which the appellant herein has been convicted and sentenced as under : U/s 307 IPC : Life Imprisonment and fine of Rs.5000/-, in default, additional RI for 3 months. U/s 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act : RI for one year and fine of Rs.2000/-, in default, additional RI for 1 month. U/s 27 of the Arms Act RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in default, additional RI for 1 month. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 21.10.2014 Sheetal Kumar Gupta went to Sujit Jaiswal’s shop in SADA Colony Darri at 7 o’ clock, where he had a dispute with the accused Nikhil Masih over writing a letter which led to a fight between them. Sheetal Gupta told this incident to his elder brother Shubham Gupta, on which, Shubham went to the place of accused and asked him the reason for the fight, then the accused got angry and pushed Shubham Gupta and with the intention of killing him, stabbed him on the left side of the neck with a dagger like knife he had with him, causing injury to him. On the report filed by complainant, the Police registered a crime and during the investigation, the scene of the incident was inspected and statements of witnesses were recorded. The accused was arrested and on taking his memorandum statement, the knife was seized . The blood stained 3 clothes worn on the date of incident were seized and after obtaining the query report and bed head ticket, the blood stained clothes were sent to the FSL for chemical examination. After due investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant. 3. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence, examined in all 10 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 15 documents. Statement of the accused/appellant was recorded under Section 313 CrPC in which he abjured the guilt and pleaded innocence and false implication and claimed to be tried. In defence, the accused neither examined any witness in his support nor exhibited any document. 4. The trial Court after completion of the trial and upon appreciation of evidence, by its impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment against which he has preferred the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC. 5.1 Mrs. Indira Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, would submit that the injuries sustained by the injured are simple in nature and no offence except u/s 324 IPC would be made out against the appellant, the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the offence in question, as such, the conviction and sentence u/s 307 of the IPC is liable to be set aside. 5.2 She further submits that the alleged knife seized from the accused vide Ex.P-4 was not of the specified size needing a licence, described in the State Government Notification issued under Section 4 of the Arms Act, 1959. It is contended by her that since the length of 4 the knife used in the offence was less than 6” and its width was less than 2", the knife in question did not come within the category of arms of specified description and therefore, the provisions of section 4 and sections 25(1-B)(b) & 27 of the Arms Act are not attracted and as such, the conviction of the appellant is liable to be set aside. 6. Mr. Afroj Khan, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has brought home the offences and there is motive behind the crime by which it can be said that the appellant has intention to commit the offence. He would further submit that the manner in which the sharp- edged knife has been used to cause injuries, it can be inferred that there was intention to cause death and thus the appellant has rightly been convicted under Section 307 of IPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 8. In order to appreciate argument of the learned counsel for the appellant as regards the size of knife used in the offence in the light of the notification dated 22.11.1974, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of Section 4, Section 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act, 1959 which read thus : "Section 4. Licence for acquisition and possession of arms of specified description in certain cases.-- If the Central Government is of the opinion that having regard to the circumstances prevailing in any area it is necessary or 5 expedient in the public interest that the acquisition, possession or carrying of arms other than firearms should also be regulated, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that this section shall apply to the area specified in the notification, and thereupon no person shall acquire, have in his possession, or carry in that area arms of such class or description as may be specified in that notification unless he holds in this behalf a licence issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder." "25(1-B). Whoever- (a) *** *** *** *** *** (b) acquires, has in his possession or carries in any place specified by notification under Section 4 any arms of such class or description as had been specified in that notification in contravention of that section; or 9. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 4 and Section 25(1-B)(b) of the Arms Act read with Central Government’s notification Notification No. G.S.R. 1309, dated the 1st October, 1962, the State of Madhya Pradesh had issued notification dated 22nd November, 1974 directing that section 4 of the Act shall apply to the whole of the State of Madhya Pradesh. For the sake of convenience, the contents of notification dated 22.11.1974 are reproduced hereinbelow: "Notification No. 6312-6552-II-B (i) dated the 22nd November, 1974.-- Whereas the State Government is of the opinion that having regard to the prevailing conditions in the State of Madhya Pradesh, it is necessary and expedient in the public interest that the acquisition, possession and carrying of sharp-edged weapons with a blade more than 6 inches long 2 6 inches wide and spring actuated knives with a blade of any size in public places should also be regulated. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4 of the Arms Act, 1959 (No. 54 of 1959) read with the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Notification No. G.S.R. 1309, dated the 1st October, 1962, the State Government hereby directs that the said section shall apply with effect from the date of publication of this Notification in the "Madhya Pradesh Gazette" to the whole of the State of Madhya Pradesh in respect of acquisition, possession or carrying of sharp edged weapons with a blade more than 6 inches long or 2 inches wide and spring actuated knives with a blade of any size in public places only." 10. A conjoint reading of Section 4 of the Arms Act and the notification dated 22.11.1974 clearly goes to show that it prohibits the acquisition, possession, or carrying of sharp-edged weapons with blades exceeding 6 inches in length or 2 inches in width, as well as spring-actuated knives of any size, in public places. This regulation aims to ensure public safety and order. It is further clear from the said notification that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4 of the Arms Act, 1959 read with the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Notification No. G.S.R. 1309 dated 1-10-1962, the State Government issued the notification dated 22.11.1974 directing that Section 4 shall apply to whole of the Madhya Pradesh with immediate effect. 7 11. Here in the instant case, the alleged weapon seized from accused by Ex.P-4 shows that it was a knife without any spring measuring 5.3” (13.5 cms) in length and 1.67” (4.25 cms) in width and the said weapon was not of the specified size described in the said Notification issued under Section 4 of the Arms Act, 1959. Since the length of the knife used in the offence was less than 6” and its width was less than 2", the knife in question did not come within the category of arms of specified description and therefore, did not require any licence. Hence, we are of the considered view that the ingredients of sections 25(1B)(b) and 27 of the Arms Act are not attracted in this case. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed against the appellant under Section 25(1B)(b) & section 27 of the Arms Act is set aside. 12. Now the question is whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for the offence under section 307 of the IPC ? 13. The Supreme Court has consistently held that to establish a conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the core element is the intention to cause death. This intent is often inferred from the facts and evidence as also circumstances surrounding the incident, including the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted. 14. On examination by Dr. M. Singh (P.W. 10), the victim suffered the following injuries and his MLC report is Ex.P-8 : (i) Incised wound on the left side upper part of the neck measuring 15 x 2.5 x 2 cm which could have been 8 caused by hard and sharp edged weapon. (ii) Superficial incised wound on the left side of shoulder measuring 2.5 x 5 x 1 cm According to the doctor, both the injuries are simple in nature and he gave the report (Ex.P-16) which bears his signatures at A to A. 15. From the statements of P.W. 1 the complainant, P.W.3 Sheetal Gupta and the independent witness P.W.7 Raja Kesharwani which further stood firm by the evidence Doctor (P.W.10) it is clearly established that the appellant had inflicted incised wounds to Shubham Gupta (P.W.1). According to the Doctor, the injuries inflicted on complainant are simple in nature. 16. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 307 of the IPC which states as under: - "307. Attempt to murder. Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life-convicts--When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death." 17. The essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an offence under Section 307 of the IPC are: 9 (i) that the death of a human being was attempted; (ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the accused; and (iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as: (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excused for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury. 18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh (1988) 4 SCC 551 has held that under Section 307 of the IPC what the court has to see is, whether the act irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the provision. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. Without this ingredient being established, there can be no offence of "attempt to murder". Under Section 307 the intention precedes the act attributed to accused. Therefore, the intention is to be gathered from all circumstances, and not merely from the consequences that ensue. It has been further held that the nature of the weapon used, manner in which it is used, motive for the crime, severity of the blow, the part of the body where consideration the injury is inflicted are some of the factors that may be taken into consideration to determine the intention. 10 19. Similarly, in the matter of State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao and others (2003) 10 SCC 434 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that for the application of Section 307 of the IPC, it is not necessary that the injury capable of causing death should have been actually inflicted. The injuries sustained, the manner of assaults and the weapons used clearly make out a case of Section 307 of the IPC. It has been observed by their Lordships in para 21 of the report as under: - "21. In offence under Section 307 all the ingredients of the offence of murder are present except the death of the victim. For the application of Section 307, it is not necessary that the injury capable of causing death should have been actually inflicted. The injuries sustained, the manner of assaults and the weapons used clearly make out a case of Section 307 IPC. But since sentence and fine have been maintained, alteration of conviction notwithstanding no modification of sentence need be made.” 20. The Supreme Court in the matter of Parsuram Pandey and others v. State of Bihar (2004) 13 SCC 189 has also held that to constitute an offence under Section 307 of the IPC, two ingredients of the offence must be present: (a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (b) the doing of an act towards it. It has been held in paragraph 15 of the report as under: - "15. To constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence must be present: (a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (b) the doing of an act towards it. 11 For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of causing death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence "of attempt to murder". Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors. ..." 21. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 366 has laid down the ingredients of the offence under Section 307 of the IPC and held as under: - "12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder, and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc. 14. Having regard to the weapon used for causing the 12 head injuries to Sukhbir, nature of injures, situs of the injury and the severity of the blows, the courts below recorded concurrent findings convicting the second appellant under Section 307 IPC. In our considered view, the conviction of the second appellant Rajbir @ Raju under Section 307 IPC is unassailable." 22. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jai Narain Mishra and others v. State of Bihar 1971 (3) SCC 762 where four to five persons attacked a man with deadly weapons but causing only three simple and one grievous hurt to the injured by farsa, their Lordships held that offence under 326 of the IPC would be made out and held as under in paragraph 11 of the report: - “11. Taking the case of appellant Suraj Mishra, we find that he has been convicted under Section 307 I.P.C. and sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment. According to the evidence Suraj was responsible for the chest injury which is described by Dr. Mishra P.W. 6 as a penetrating wound 1½" x 12" x chest wall deep (wound not probed) on the right side of the chest. Margins were clean cut. Suraj, according to the evidence, had thrust a bhala into the chest when Shyamdutt had fallen as a result of the blow given by Mandeo with the farsa on his head. According to the Doctor the wound in the chest was of a grievous nature as the patient developed surgical emphysema on the right side of the chest. There was profuse bleeding and, according to the Medical Officer the condition of the patient at the time of the admission was low and serious and the injury was dangerous to life. Out of the four injuries which the Medical Officer noted, this injury was of a grievous nature while the other three injuries were simple in nature. Where four or five persons attack a man with deadly weapons it may well be presumed that the intention is to cause death. In the present case, however, three injuries are of a simple nature though deadly weapons were used and the 13 fourth injury caused by Suraj, though endangering life could not be deemed to be an injury which would have necessarily caused death but for timely medical aid. The benefit of doubt must, therefore, be given to Suraj with regard to the injury intended to be caused and, in our opinion, the offence is not one under Section 307, I.P.C., but Section 326, I.P.C. His conviction, therefore, under Section 307, I.P.C. is set aside and we convict him under Section 326, I.P.C. His sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment will have to be reduced accordingly to 3 years rigorous imprisonment." 23. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC, it is quite vivid that in this case, the appellant has used the knife and caused two incised wounds to the injured and motive of the offence for causing hurt has been established, but in the instant case the Medical report (Ex.P-16) and the evidence of Doctor (P.W.11) clearly go to show that the injuries sustained by the appellant are simple in nature. Therefore, the nature of injuries sustained by the appellant and the facts and circumstances of the case do not indicate that the appellant had intention to kill the injured. Thus having regard to the manner in which the offence is committed and other attending circumstances as noticed herein above, we are of the considered opinion that the offence under Section 307 of the IPC is not made out and the learned Additional Sessions Judge is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC, it is the offence under Section 324 of the IPC that is made out against the appellant. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant under Section 307 of IPC are set 14 aside and instead thereof, he is convicted under section 324 of the IPC and sentenced him to the period already undergone by him. It is stated that the appellant has already under gone the custody period of 5 months and 22 days. 24. In the result, the instant appeal is partly allowed. The accused- appellant is sentenced to imprisonment already undergone. 25. The appellant is on bail. He need not surrender in this case. His bail bonds shall remain in force for a period of six months in view the provisions contained in Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. 26. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be sent to the trial court concerned for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Judge Rao