1 2025:CGHC:19198 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 111 of 2020 1 - Kishore Kumar S/o Late R. L. Dev, Aged About 49 Years, R/o HIGC-46, Shailendra Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh --- Petitioner/Applicant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Economic Office Wing and Anti Corruption Bureau, Raipur Chhattisgarh (Now Anti Corruption Bureau Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh Through its Inspector, Anti Corruption Bureau Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ), District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRR No. 387 of 2020 1 - Ashish Dubey S/o Late Vijay Nath Dubey, Aged About 55 Years, than Assistant Director, Awpcharikettr Education Director Ambikapur, R/o Pratappur Naka Ambikapur District Surguja Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh --- Petitioner/Applicant Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Economic Office Wing and Anti Corruption Bureau, Raipur (Now Anti Corruption Bureau Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh Through its Inspector, Anti Corruption Bureau Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh), District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent CRR No. 396 of 2020 1 - Vijay Shankar Prasad S/o Late Awadh Kishore Prasad, Aged About 62 Years, Assistant Director, Aupchariketar Siksha Sanchalak, Ramanujganj (Now Retired) R/o Pratappur Naka Ambikapur District Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh --- Petitioner/Applicant Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through Economic Office Wing and Anti Corruption Bureau, Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Now Anti Corruption Bureau, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh), Digitally signed by MOHAMMAD AADIL KHAN 2 Through Inspector, Anti Corruption Bureau Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners/Applicants : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate (in CRR No.111/2020), Mr. Nishi Kant Sinha, Advocate (in CRR No.396/2020), Mr. Sunil Tripathi, Advocate (in CRR No.387/2020). For State/Respondent : Mr. Neeraj Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board 28-04-2025 1. These three criminal revisions have been filed by the respective petitioners/applicants, which arise out of the same crime number and the same criminal case, and therefore, all three criminal revisions are heard and decided together. 2. These three criminal revisions have been filed by the respective petitioners/applicants, who are the accused persons in the Special Criminal Case No. 04/2018, pending before the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Surguja (Ambikapur), against the impugned order dated 16- 12-2019 passed by learned trial court whereby the charge under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 120-B of IPC have been framed against them. 3. The Criminal Revision No.111/2020 is filed by the petitioner Kishore Kumar, who is an accused in Crime No. 115/1998, registered at Economic Offence Wing, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Raipur, for the offence under Section 120-B of IPC and Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After investigation, charge-sheet has been filed and he is an accused in the Special Criminal Case No. 04/2018, pending before the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Surguja (Ambikapur). The petitioner Kishore Kumar was the then Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, Surguja, at the time of commission of the alleged offence. 4. The Criminal Revision No.396/2020 is filed by the petitioner Vijay Shankar Prasad, who is an accused in Crime No. 115/1998, registered at Economic 3 Offence Wing, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Raipur, for the offence under Section 120-B of IPC and Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After investigation, charge-sheet has been filed and he is an accused in the Special Criminal Case No. 04/2018, pending before the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Surguja (Ambikapur). The petitioner, Vijay Shankar Prasad, was the then Assistant Director, Aupacharikettar Shiksha, Ramanujganj, at the time of commission of the alleged offence. 5. The Criminal Revision No.387/2020 is filed by the petitioner Ashish Dubey, who is an accused in Crime No. 115/1998, registered at Economic Offence Wing, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Raipur, for the offence under Section 120-B of IPC and Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After investigation, charge-sheet has been filed and he is an accused in the Special Criminal Case No. 04/2018, pending before the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Surguja (Ambikapur). The petitioner Ashish Dubey was the then Assistant Director, Aupacharikettar Shiksha, Ambikapur (Surguja), at the time of commission of the alleged offence. 6. The allegation against the present petitioners/applicants is that there was a recruitment process for Shiksha Karmi Grade-I and Grade-II, initiated at Jila Panchayat, Surguja, in the year 1998 vide advertisement dated 06-05-1998 for total 100 posts in various disciplines of Shiksha Karmi Grade-I. It is alleged that in the said recruitment process of Shiksha Karmi Grade-I and II, irregularities have been committed by the authorities to appoint their blue- eyed candidate by giving them the advantage without there being any merit position, and they have been illegally selected for extraneous consideration. The authorities have not prepared the merit list as per their educational qualification, no marks have been allotted to the candidates as per their training certificate, the benefit of marks of training have been given to those candidates who have not obtained any training, there was manipulation in the 4 tabulation sheet of allotment of the marks, as per the rules the marks ought to be allotted by all the members of the interview board but only one member fills up the same, and thus the matter has been enquired on the complaint received against the selection process and after due verification of the documents, and the selection rules have not been followed and there is no fair selection process by which the accused persons have committed the offence and the FIR has been registered. After investigation, due permission for the prosecution was obtained, and after completion of the investigation, the final report has been filed against the total of 03 accused persons before the learned Trial Court for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120-B of the I.P.C. the another accused Tryambak Sharan has died during the pendency of the investigation on 01-11-2015. 7. The learned trial court has framed charge against the petitioners for the offence under Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120-B of the IPC vide order dated 16-12-2019, which is under challenge in the present three criminal revision by the respective petitioners. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner Kishore Kumar (CRR No. 111/2020) would submit that the petitioner has falsely been implicated in the offence only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. The petitioner Kishore Kumar was holding the substantive post of Joint Director (Education) at the relevant time of the incident and was posted as District Adult Education Officer, Surguja (Ambikapur) and also holding additional charge of Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, Surguja (Ambikapur). Under the Panchayat Shiksha Karmi (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997, the selection committee was constituted and consists of (1) President, Jila Panchayat, (2) Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, (3) Deputy Director (Education), (4) Assistant Commissioner, Tribal Welfare Department (5) One member of 5 Shiksha Sthai Samiti, (6) One member of Subject Specialist and (7) One member from each community of SC/ST/OBC. The present petitioner was neither holding the post of Additional Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, nor did he play any role in the entire selection process. He neither scrutinised the documents nor took part in the minutes of the selection committee. After the selection process, the appointment orders were issued and the selected candidates have been joined to their respective posts, and they are still working. No one has challenged the selection of the candidates, and the employees are regularised in their services. In the entire charge sheet, no material against the present petitioner that he in any manner has committed the offence or was a part of the selection process. Therefore, he may be discharged from the alleged offence. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Ashish Dubey (CRR No. 387/2020), adopting the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner in CRR No. 111/2020, and would further submit that the petitioner Ashish Dubey neither holds the post of Additional Chief Executive Officer nor has participated in the selection process. He also has no role in scrutinising the documents of the candidates, nor take part in the minutes of the selection committee, and no marks have been allotted by him to the candidates. After the entire process of selection, the Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, has issued the appointment orders, and the selected candidates have joined their respective posts. Even if any irregularities have been found in the selection process, that itself will not constitute any criminal liability under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner was a lecturer under the District Education Officer, Surguja (Ambikapur), and his services have been utilised by the Jila Panchayat to maintain the records of the forms submitted by the candidates. Therefore, there is no prima facie evidence against the petitioner that incriminates him in the offence, and therefore, he may also be discharged from the alleged offence. 6 10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Vijay Shankar Prasad (CRR No. 396/2020) also adopted the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners in CRR No. 111/2020 and CRR No. 387/2020 and would submit that the under the Panchayat Shiksha Karmi (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997, the competent authority for selection was the selection committee constituted under the Rules. The petitioner was not a member of the selection committee, nor did he take any part in the selection process. On 08-06-1998. A circular was issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, Surguja, stating that for any irregularities in the selection process, the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, and Sthai Samiti would be responsible for the same. He would further submit that the petitioner was also not a member of the selection committee or the interview board. He was posted as Assistant Director, Aupcharikettar Shiksha Sanchalak, Ramanujganj, and by the order date, he was assigned the work of scrutiny of application forms of the candidates with original mark-sheet before the interview was held. He has not been awarded any marks or any role in the interview board. He would also submit that his services were under the control of the Education department, and in the first instance, the competent authority had refused to grant sanction for his prosecution, but subsequently granted sanction, which also cannot be done by the authorities. Therefore, there is sufficient ground to discharge the petitioner, and he may be discharged from the offence. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State vehemently opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective petitioners and submitted that the Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, Surguja, has issued a list of officers who were the members of the selection committee for the appointment of the Shiksha Karmi Grade-I and Grade-II at Jila Panchayat, Surguja, for the year 1998. He would further submit that in CRR No. 111/2020, the relevant document is annexed at page No. 61, in CRR No. 7 387/2020, the relevant document is annexed at page No. 260, and in CRR No. 396/2020, the relevant document is annexed at page No. 251. In the said documents, the engagement of the petitioners in the selection process and interview has been duly established, and the present petitioners were part of the selection process. The petitioner Ashish Dubey is a member of the interview board for the interview of the candidates of Shiksha Karmi Grade-I for 12-06-1998, 13-06-1998 and 14-06-1998, as per the order dated 11-06- 1998 issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Jila Panchayat, Surguja. The allegation against the petitioners is that they, being the members of the selection process, hatched conspiracy and committed irregularities and selected the ineligible candidates, by giving marks for their experiences, which the candidates are not entitled to, and not giving marks for which they are entitled. While referring to the complaints made by the aggrieved persons, he would submit that there is sufficient prima facie material available in the charge sheet to frame charge against the petitioners and to proceed with the trial of the case. Further, there may not be any direct evidence of conspiracy or meeting of the minds, but it can be inferred from the conduct of the accused persons. Looking to the entire episode of the selection process and the position of the present petitioners, the allegation levelled against them are evident that there is sufficient material available on record that the present petitioners conspired with each other and committed the offence. 12. Learned counsel for the state also submits that at the time of framing the charge, the trial court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence on record and only to consider whether the prima facie evidence is there or not to proceed with the trial, irrespective of the fact that whether the outcome would be acquittal or conviction. He would also rely upon the judgment of “State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others” 2020 (2) SCC 8 290 and “State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294”. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the documents annexed with the petitions. 14. At the stage of framing of charge, the court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence on record and nor conduct a mini-trial. The court would only consider whether prima facie material is there or not to proceed with the trial. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record to find out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “14. It is of relevance to refer to certain judgments of this Court. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367], the appellant and two other individuals were charged under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. It had been alleged that the appellant and the other accused persons had forcibly compelled the deceased to sign a settlement giving up a part of his share in the profits from the sale of certain land. This led to a dispute and as a result of the mental harassment suffered by the deceased, he committed suicide. The Court affirmed the framing of charges by the trial court. The two-Judge Bench of this Court laid down the ingredients of the 9 offence of abetment of suicide. D.K. Jain, J. held thus: (SCC p. 611, para 19) “19. As observed in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, [(2001) 9 SCC 618], where the accused by his acts or by a continued course of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an “instigation” may be inferred. In other words, in order to prove that the accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to be established that: (i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or willful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and (ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation.” (emphasis supplied) 15. After due consideration of the facts and circumstances, the Court noted that prima facie, the offence of abetment of suicide was made out: (Chitresh Kumar Chopra case (supra) SCC p.612, para 22) “22. In the present case, apart from the suicide note, extracted above, statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation, tend to show that on account of business transactions with the accused, including the appellant herein, the deceased was put under tremendous pressure to do something which he was perhaps not willing to do. Prima facie, it appears that the conduct of the appellant and his accomplices was such that the deceased was 10 left with no other option except to end his life and therefore, clause Firstly of Section 107 IPC was attracted.” (emphasis supplied) 16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for “presuming” that the accused had committed the offence : (Chitresh Kumar Chopra case [Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] , SCC p. 613, para 25) “25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction.” 17. A two-udge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v State of U.P. [(2006) 4 SCC 51: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 209] noted that in accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is “sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” or there is ground for “presuming” that the offence has been committed. G.P. Mathur, J. held thus: (SCC p. 56, paras 9-10) “9. In Stree Atyachar Viodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia [(1989) 1 SCC 715 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 285] the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under:- 11 ‘14. ..... Secton 227 ittself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that “the Judge shall discharge when he considres that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”. The “ground” in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accsed on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime.’ 10. The High Court did not at all apply the relevant test, namely, whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. If the answere is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that ‘as the firing was aimed at the other persons and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit’ and further observing that ‘the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste’ set aside the order by which he charges had been framed agaisnt Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant critaria for judging the 12 validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside.” 15. In the matter of Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgment that:- “12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap [State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 286] . Relevant paras are extracted below : (SCC pp. 197-98, para 11) “11. … 11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] , this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind 13 to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380] , one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) “25. The High Court [Hiremath v. State of Karnataka, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] , adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (N. Suresh Rajan case [State of T.N. v. N. 14 Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] , SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) “29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.” 16. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgment that:- “21. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao [CBI v. K. Narayana Rao, (2012) 9 SCC 512 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 737 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1183] this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarised the principles in the following terms : (SCC pp. 520-23, paras 12-14) “12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh [State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is pressed into service which reads as under : (SCC pp. 41-42) 15 ‘4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If “the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing”, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, “the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which — … (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused”, as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied 16 at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to 17 end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.’ 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] wherein it was held as under : (SCC pp. 401-402, paras 10-11) ‘10. … If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the 18 documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.’ 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , this Court held thus : (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) ‘19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If 19 there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a 20 roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.’ ” 21 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held in para 12 of its judgment in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294, that:- “10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. 11. This Court in State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a 22 conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.” 12. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression “the record of the case” used in Section 227CrPC is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. 13. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 820] and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record 23 and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.” 18. In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused to proceed with the trial. 19. 19. In view of the above principles, on examining the material available in the charge sheet, which is filed along with the petition, it prima facie gives sufficient material that the present petitioners, being the members of the selection committee for selection of Shiksha Karmi Grade-I and Grade-II at Jila Panchayat, Surguja, in the year 1998, committed irregularities and gave the benefit to the ineligible candidates by giving them the marks of their experience which they have not gained, the marks have not been given to the candidates who were entitled for marks towards their experience, the qualified candidates have been allotted less marks, there are manipulation in the tabulation filled up at the time of interview in the marks allotted to the candidates who appeared in the interview, the marks in the sheet at the time of the interview of the candidate have been filed up by a common authorship, etc. and thereby they have committed the offence. During the investigation, the documents seized in the case related to the subject selection process clearly reveal that there are intentional irregularities committed by the members of the selection committee, including the present petitioners. There are so many other allegations also that make the entire selection process tainted, for which the present petitioners are prima facie liable. 24 20. From the perusal of the charge sheet, this court finds that there is sufficient material in the charge sheet of the offence of conspiracy and criminal misconduct and allegation against the present petitioners that they, being the members of the selection committee, had selected the ineligible candidate and has committed the offence in violation of Rules of CG Panchayat Shiksha Karmi (recruitment and service condition) Rules, 1997. The allegation against the petitioners requires evidence for which the charge has been framed, and the learned trial court proceeded with the trial. In the matter of “K. Ravi vs. State of Tamilnadu” 2024 SCC Online SC 2283, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in para 11 and 12, has held that:- “11. It is trite to say that Section 216 is an enabling provision which enables the court to alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced, and if any alternation or addition to a charge is made, the court has to follow the procedure as contained therein. Section 216 does not give any right to the Accused to file a fresh application seeking his discharge after the charge is framed by the court, more particularly when his application seeking discharge Under Section 227 has already been dismissed. Unfortunately, such applications are being filed in the trial courts sometimes in ignorance of law and sometimes deliberately to delay the proceedings. Once such applications though untenable are filed, the trial courts have no alternative but to decide them, and then again such orders would be challenged before the higher courts, and the whole criminal trial would get derailed. Suffice it to say that such practice is highly deplorable, and if followed, should be dealt with sternly by the courts. 12. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, as stated hereinabove the Respondent No. 2 had miserably failed to get himself discharged from the case in the first round of litigation, when he had filed the application Under Section 227 Code of Criminal Procedure, still 25 however he filed another vexatious application seeking modification of charge Under Section 216 of Code of Criminal Procedure to derail the criminal proceedings. The said Application also having been dismissed by the Sessions Court, the order was challenged before the High Court by filing Revision Application Under Section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court, on an absolutely extraneous consideration and in utter disregard of the settled legal position, allowed the Revision Application filed by the Respondent No. 2, though legally untenable, and set aside the charge framed by the Sessions Court against the Respondent No. 2. The said order being ex facie illegal, untenable and dehors the material on record, the same deserves to be set aside.” 21. It is a settled legal position that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial judge has to examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to prima facie satisfy as to whether or not the evidence is sufficient to proceed with the trial against the accused. The nature of the evidence collected during the investigation and the documents produced with it, which prima facie disclosed that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused persons, would suffice to frame the charge and to proceed with the trial. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage of framing of the charge. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of the material on record need not be gone into. 22. So far as the conspiracy is concerned, in the case of “State of Karnataka vs. J. Jayalalitha” 2017 (6) SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that to establish the offence, it is not required to be of a single agreement. Each conspirator plays his separate part, and he may not know all its secrets. It is difficult to establish a conspiracy by direct evidence. In para 168 to 180, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- 26 “168. While dwelling on the concept of conspiracy, this Court in Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra v. K.S. Dalipsinghji [Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra v. K.S. Dalipsinghji, (1969) 3 SCC 429 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 99] (SCC pp. 435- 36, para 15) held that in conspiracy, agreement is the gist of the offence and a common design and common intention in furtherance of the common scheme is necessary. Each conspirator plays his separate part in one integrated and united effort to achieve the common purpose. It was enounced that conspiracy may develop in successive stages and new techniques may be invented and new means may be devised, and a general conspiracy may be a sum up of separate conspiracies having a similar general purpose, the essential elements being collaboration, connivance, jointness in severalty and coordination. (emphasis supplied) 169.Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin [Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra, (1970) 1 SCC 696 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 274] (SCC pp. 699-700, para 7), encountered a fact situation witnessing a clash between the neighbours on a very trivial incident of a cow blocking a passage. Murderous assaults followed in which the appellant along with 4/5 associates were involved. The appellant along with others were found guilty under Sections 302/34 IPC. This Court held that participation is the gravamen of common intention but under Section 109, abetment can be attracted even if the abettor is not present. Qua conspiracy, it was exposited that it postulates an agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means. It was elucidated that conspiracy is of wider amplitude than abetment though there is a close association between the two. It was ruled that conspiracy can be proved by circumstantial evidence and proof thereof is largely inferential, founded on facts and this 27 is because of the difficulty in securing direct evidence of criminal conspiracy. It was explicated that once a reasonable ground is shown to suggest that two or more persons have conspired, then anything done by one of them in reference to their common intention becomes relevant in proving the conspiracy and the offences committed pursuant thereto. (emphasis supplied) 170. In Saju v. State of Kerala [Saju v. State of Kerala, (2001) 1 SCC 378 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 160] (SCC p. 383, para 7), it was propounded that to attract Section 120-B IPC, it is to be proved that all the accused had the intention and they had agreed to commit the crime. It was assumed that conspiracy is hatched in private and in secrecy, for which direct evidence would not be readily available. It was ruled that it is not necessary that each member to a conspiracy must know all the details of all the conspiracy. (emphasis supplied) 171. This Court recalled its observations in Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab [Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 540 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 5] (SCC p. 543, para 9) that there may be so many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy, and there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end, of which every collaborator need not be aware but in which each one of them would be interested. There must be a unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means, sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators. The only relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be to fulfil the object of the conspiracy. Even if some steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge of the others, it 28 will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated with the object of the conspiracy. 172. It was noted that as an exception to the settled position of law, an act or action of one of the accused cannot be used as evidence against another, Section 10 of the Evidence Act provided otherwise. To attract the applicability of Section 10, the Court must have reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons had conspired together for committing an offence and then the evidence of action or statement made by one of the accused could be used as evidence against the other. (emphasis supplied) 173. In Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI [Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 869] , the executives of Maruti Udyog Ltd. were charged with criminal conspiracy to siphon off its funds in favour of A-5 and were prosecuted under Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(2) of the 1988 Act along with Sections 120-B, 420, 409, 467 and 471 IPC. This Court reiterated (SCC pp. 778-79, paras 342 & 343) that the essence of a criminal conspiracy, is unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is framed and that the law making conspiracy a crime, is designed to curb the immoderate power to do mischief which is gained by combination of the means. It was held that the offence of criminal conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. The agreement which is the quintessence of criminal conspiracy can be proved either by direct or by circumstantial evidence or by both and it is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. 29 174. The following excerpt from Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 11, p. 44, para 58 was relied upon : (Ram Narayan case [Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 869] , SCC p. 779, para 344) “344. … ‘58. Meaning of conspiracy.— … The conspiracy arises and the offence is committed as soon as the agreement is made; and the offence continues to be committed so long as the combination persists, that is, until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however, it may be. The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal conduct, not the execution of it. It is not enough that two or more persons pursued the same unlawful object at the same time or at the same place. It is necessary to show the meeting of minds, a consensus to effect an unlawful purpose. It is not, however, necessary that each conspirator should have been in communication with each other.’ ” (emphasis supplied) 175. Reference was made to R. v. Murphy [R. v. Murphy, (1837) 8 Car & P 297 : 173 ER 502] , where Coleridge, J., was of the view (ER p. 508) that although common design is the root of the charge, it is not necessary to prove that these two parties had come together and actually agreed in terms to have the common design and to pursue it by common means and so to carry it into execution, as in many cases of established conspiracy, there are no ways of proving any such thing. If it is found that these two persons pursued by their acts, the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part of an act and the other another part of the same act so as to complete it, with a view to attain the object 30 which they are pursuing, you will be at liberty to draw the conclusion that they have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. (emphasis supplied) 176. The overwhelming judicial opinion thus is that a conspiracy can be proved by circumstantial evidence as mostly having regard to the nature of the offending act, no direct evidence can be expected. 177. In Firozuddin Basheeruddin v. State of Kerala [Firozuddin Basheeruddin v. State of Kerala, (2001) 7 SCC 596 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1341] (SCC pp. 607-08, paras 26 & 27), it was ruled that loosened standards prevail in a conspiracy trial regarding admissibility of evidence. Contrary to the usual rule, in conspiracy prosecution, any declaration by one conspirator, made in furtherance of a conspiracy and during its pendency, is admissible against each co-conspirator. Despite the unreliability of hearsay evidence, it is admissible in conspiracy prosecutions. It was observed that thus the conspirators are liable on an agency theory for statements of co-conspirators just as they are for the overt acts and crimes committed in their confederates. (emphasis supplied) 178. In Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI [Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 718] (SCC pp. 665-66, para 62), it was enounced that courts in deciding on the existence or otherwise, of an offence of conspiracy must bear in mind that it is hatched in secrecy and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain direct evidence to establish the same. The manner and circumstances in which the offences have been committed and the accused persons had taken part are relevant. To prove that the propounders had expressly agreed to commit the illegal act or had caused it to be done, may be proved by adducing 31 circumstantial evidence and/or by necessary implications. (emphasis supplied) 179. The following extract from Russell on Crimes, 12th Edn., Vol. 1 was quoted with approval : (Mir Nagvi case [Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 718] , SCC p. 666, para 63) “63. … ‘The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between the parties. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se, enough.’ ” (emphasis in original) 180. It recalled its conclusions in Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1988) 3 SCC 609 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 711] , that to establish the offence of criminal conspiracy, it is not required that a single agreement should be entered into by all the conspirators at one time. Each conspirator plays his separate part in one integrated and united effort to achieve the common purpose. Each one is aware that he has a part to play in a general conspiracy though he may not know all its secrets or means by which the common purpose is to be accomplished. On the touchstone of the above adumbrated legal postulations, the evidence on records would have to be assayed to derive the deduction as logically permissible. (emphasis supplied)” 23. In view of the aforementioned legal position and the facts of the case, it is clear that the submissions made by the petitioners that they were not there in the selection process or interview committee are the matter of evidence, and the allegation levelled against the petitioners are to be adjudicated after 32 recording evidence of the witnesses. There is prima facie material against the petitioners available in the charge sheet to frame the charge and to proceed with the trial of the case. further, even after firstly refusing for sanction of prosecution, the department has given the sanction of prosecution vide order dated 28-04-2015 and the said order granting sanction for prosecution has not been challenged by any of the accused persons, therefore, it would not help the petitioners in their case. 24. This court, therefore, is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court has rightly framed the charge against the petitioners, and there is sufficient prima facie material available in the charge sheet to frame the charge and to proceed with the trial of the case. There is no ground to quash the charge framed by the learned trial court, and no illegality or irregularity is found warranting interference in the impugned order of framing the charge against the petitioners/applicants, as such, all the criminal revisions (CRR No. 111/2020, CRR No. 387/2020 and CRR No. 396/2020) deserve to be and are hereby dismissed. 25 Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 26. A copy of this order shall be forwarded to the learned trial court for information and further proceedings in the case. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil