1 2025:CGHC:19169 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR CRA No. 88 of 2016 Shriram Darro S/o Shri Rainu Ram Darro Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Koretha, Police Station Korar, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Korar, District North Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh. ---- Respondent ___________________________________________________________ For Appellant : Mr. C.R. Sahu, Advocate For State/Respondent : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer ___________________________________________________________ Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma Order On Board 28/04/2025 1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant/accused being aggrieved with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.01.2016 (Annexuer A-1) passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, North Bastar Kanker, District North 2 Bastar Kanker (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.25/2015, whereby the trial Court has convicted the appellant as under : Conviction Sentence In Default U/S 307 of the IPC RI for 07 years and fine amount of Rs.500/- In default of payment of fine amount additional RI for 01 month U/S 25(1-B)(B) of Arms Act RI for 01 year and fine amount of Rs.500/- In default of payment of fine amount additional RI for 01 month U/S 25(1) of Arms Act RI for 03 years and fine amount of Rs.500/- In default of payment of fine amount additional RI for 01 month All sentences shall run concurrently 2. Case of the prosecution in brief is that complainant - Kaliram Sori's daughter of Amila Bai had gone to the house of accused Shriram Daro four years before the incident and started living as his wife. Two years before the incident, they both got married as per social customs. Amila used to stay with the accused and do household and agricultural work. About 08 months before the incident, Amila came home alone and told him that the accused beats her after consuming alcohol. It has been four years and he has beaten her many times saying that she is not able to have a 3 child. Since then, her daughter Amila was living in her house. The accused came to take her 2-3 times, but Amila did not go with him. On the date of the incident, the accused came to his house on a motorcycle at 8:00 am. At that time, the complainant and her daughter Amila were in front of their house. The accused said that they are not sending Amila, today he will kill them. He took out a knife-like sword from the seat of the motorcycle and attacked the complainant with the intention of killing them, which the complainant held tightly and she got injured below the thumb and near the little finger due to the knife-like sword attack. Then the accused threw her on the ground due to which she got injured on his knee. His daughter Amila also tried to free her mother due to which Amila also got injured 3. On hearing the shouting to help, neighbours Sakhiram Chakdhari, Ranjita Chakdhari, Arjun Chakdhari and Jagdev Chakdhari reached there and freed the dagger-like sword from the accused. After that, the accused was caught and the complainant along with the villagers, sword and motorcycle came to Korar police station and registered the First Information Report (Ex.P-7) of the incident. 4. The statement of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. and after completion of investigation, charge-sheet 4 was filed. The trial Court framed the charge against the present appellant. 5. In order to prove the charges against the appellant/accused, prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses. Statement of appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he pleaded innocence and false implication. 6. After completion of trial, Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner as described above. Hence, this appeal. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that he is not pressing this appeal on merits and confining his arguments to the quantum of sentence only. He further submits that the learned trial Court has not properly evaluated the evidence of prosecution witnesses and wrongly convicted the appellant, which deserves to be quashed. He further submits that appellant has undergone about 05 months, hence, it is prayed that sentence awarded to appellant be reduced to the period already undergone by him. 8. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposing the prayer of learned counsel for appellant, would submit that the trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant and therefore, the impugned judgment does not call for any interference. 5 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court including the impugned judgment with utmost circumspection. 10. In the matter of State v. S. Selvi and another, 2018 (13) SCC 455, Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided the issue that while framing of charge in a case, the Court has power to sift and weigh the evidence for limited purpose of finding out whether or not, a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. In the case of S. Selvi (supra), at para 6 and 10 of its judgment, it has held that: “6. It is well settled by this Court in catena of judgments including the cases of Union of India v. Prafulla Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4; Dilawar Babu vs. State of Maharashtra (2002) 2 SCC 135; Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI (2010) 9 SCC 368; State v. A.Arun Kumar (2015) 2 SCC 417; Sonu Gupta vs. Deepak Gupta (2015) 3 SCC 424; State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2003) 2 SCC 711; Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi etc. vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjayya (1990) 4 SCC 76 and Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja (1979) 4 SCC 274 that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 of the Code in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 Cr. P.C. pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against 6 the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his rights to discharge the accused. The Judge cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouth piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the statements and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the materials as if he was conducting a trial. 10. If on the basis of the material on record, the Court would form prima facie opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame charge, though for conviction it is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of charges, the probative value of the material on record has to be gone into and the Court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant conviction. The Court is required to evaluate the material on record at the stage of Sections 227 or 7 239 of the Code, as the case may be, only with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at the face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the Court has to proceed with the presumption that material brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate such material with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose existence of the ingredients of the offence.” 11. At the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence on record and not to conduct mini trial. The court would only consider whether prima facie material is there or not to proceed with the trial. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak, 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record to find out that if facts emerging therefrom are taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing of charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on 8 merits and to find out on the basis of evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for “presuming” that the accused had committed the offence : (Chitresh Kumar Chopra case [Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] , SCC p. 613, para 25) “25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction.” 12. Further in the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence 9 for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case has been made out against the accused. The probative value of evidence cannot be looked into, at the stage of framing of charge. 13. The question for consideration of this Court is whether the appellant assaulted the victim – Kaliram (PW-3) and her daughter Smt. Amila (PW-4). 14. Kaliram (PW-3) who is mother-in-law of the appellant has deposed that her daughter Amila was married to the accused Shriram Darra about 4 years ago. The accused had a Paithu marriage with her daughter Amila. Amila lived with the accused in village Koretha. The accused had been fighting with her daughter for the last two years. Amila, suffering from the beatings and fights of the accused, ran away to me 2-3 times and came to her house about 04 months before the incident. After this, the accused came to her house 2-3 times to take Amila back, but Amila refused to go with the accused. On the date of the incident, at 8:00 am, the accused Shriram Darra came to house on a motorcycle. Amila was at home. At that time, accused came and said, "If you are not sending Amila, he will kill her." Saying this, he took out a sword from the seat of his motorcycle and attacked her. Then she stopped the attack of the sword with her hand. She was injured below the thumb and above the little finger of her right hand and blood was coming out. When she caught the sword with her hand, 10 the accused threw her on the ground. If she had not stopped the attack of the sword by the accused with her hand, he would have killed me. I started shouting for help, due to which her daughter Amila came to rescue her. Amila's hand was also injured by the accused's sword. Hearing the noise, Sukhiram, Jagdev, Ranjita, Arjun etc. from the neighbourhood came to the scene of the incident and snatched the sword from accused Shriram Dar. 15. In her cross-examination (Para-9), this witness has deposed that after she stopped the attack of the sword with her hand to defend herself, the accused did not attack her again with the sword. When her daughter Amila came to rescue her, the accused did not attack her with the sword. 16. Smt. Amila (PW-4), who is wife of the appellant has stated that also supported the version of her mother, i.e., victim - Kaliram (PW-3). 17. From perusal of the FIR as well as the MLC report, Dr. A.K. Jaina (PW-1) who examined the injured person which is as follows- 1. There was a cut wound at the root of little finger of right hand, measuring 2.5 X 0.2 X 0.1. 2. There was a cut wound at the root of thumb of right hand measuring 2.5 X.02 X 0.1. 3. There was a severed runt on the little finger of left hand measuring 1 X 0.1 X 0.1 cm. 11 4. There was a lacerated wound on the knee of left leg measuring 3 X 0.2 X 0.1 mm. The nature of the injury was simple. Cause of injury : The injuries mentioned in numbers 1,2 and 3 could have been caused by hard and sharp objects. 04- The injury mentioned in number 4 could have been caused by hard and blunt objects which could have happened 5-10 hours before my examination. The above medical report of Kaliram is Ex.P-1. 18. The injured Amila Bai was examined by him and the details are as follows- 1. There was a cut wound on the inner side of the right hand measuring 1.5 X 0.1 X 0.1 cm. 2. There was a circular shaped lacerated wound on the inner side of right hand measuring 0.5 X 0.1 X 0.1 cm. 3. There was a lacerated wound at the root of index finger of right hand measuring 0.1 X 0.1 X 0.1 cm. 4. There was a cut wound at the base of the thumb of the right hand measuring 0.5 cm X 0.1 X 0.1 cm. The nature of the injury was simple. 19. This witness has deposed in his cross-examination that the injuries sustained by the injured are of simple in nature. He further stated that the injuries sustained by the injured are not on the sensitive vital organs of the body. In Para-20, he stated that the injury on Kaliram's knee could have been caused by a fall. 12 20. Now, the question for consideration, would be whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 307 of the IPC? 21. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 307 of the IPC which states as under: - “307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life-convicts.—When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.” 22. The essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an offence under Section 307 of the IPC are:- (i) that the death of a human being was attempted; 13 (ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the accused; and (iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as: (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excused for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury. 23. From perusal of the definition of Section 307 IPC, it is quite vivid that if “hurt” is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable to be punished. The word used in the definition is “hurt” and not the “grievous hurt”. In the present case, the injuries have been found on the body of the injured at the time of his medical examination are simple in nature. 24. Reading of the aforesaid would show that the second limb of the section refers to causing of hurt whereas the first part does not refer to hurt as such. It means that an 'act' may amount to an attempt to murder even if the 'act' causes no hurt to any one and if hurt is caused, the assailant is liable to a heavier punishment as provided in the section. If an accused without causing any bodily injury attempts to 14 commit murder by administering poison as illustrated in (d) of Section 307 of IPC, the same would be a case coming under the first limb of the Section. 25. The scope of Section 307 of IPC and its applicability came up for consideration in Om Prakash Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1961) 2 Cri LJ 848. After taking note of apparent divergent views expressed by the Bombay High Court in the matter, the Supreme Court in paragraph 9 of the judgment observed as follows: "...On a parity of reasoning, a person commits an offence under Section 307 of IPC when he has an intention to commit murder and, in pursuance of that intention, does an act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether that act is the penultimate act or not. It is to be clearly understood, however, that the intention to commit the offence of murder means that the person concerned has the intention to do certain act with the necessary intention or knowledge mentioned in Section 100. The intention to commit an offence is different from the intention or knowledge requisite for constituting the act as that offence. The expression 'whoever attempts to commit an offence' in Section 511, can 15 only mean 'whoever intends to do a certain act with the intent or knowledge necessary for the commission of that offence'. The same is meant by the expression 'whoever does an act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder' in Section 307. This simply means that the act must be done with the intent or knowledge requisite for the commission of the offence of murder. The expression 'by that act' does not mean that the immediate effect of the act committed must be death. Such a result must be the result of that act whether immediately or after a lapse of time." 26. In that case the accused starved his wife and denied food to her for days together and did not allow her to leave his house. On account of the maltreatment and under-nourishment her health deteriorated to a great extent, she, however, managed to escape from the house to reach the hospital. The Supreme Court held that the course of conduct adopted by the accused in regularly starving his wife in order to accelerate her death case within the purview of Section 307 of IPC though it was not the last act which if effective would cause the death. 16 Om Prakash (supra) was a case in which the accused was found guilty under Section 207 of IPC although he did not cause any bodily hurt to the victim. 27. In Sarju Prasad Vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1965 SC 843, a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court relying on the ratio of Om Prakash (supra) held that the mere fact that the injury inflicted by the assailant did not cut any vital organ of the injured is not by itself sufficient to take the act out of the purview of Section 307 IPC. Their Lordships hastened to observe that the burden is still upon the prosecution to establish that the intention or knowledge of the assailant in causing the particular injury to the injured was of any of the three kinds referred to in Section 300 of IPC. For, unless the prosecution discharges the burden, the offence under Section 307, IPC cannot possibly be brought home to the assailant. The State of assailant's mind has to be deduced from the surrounding circumstances and the existence of motive to cause the death may be a relevant circumstance. 28. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Balram Bama Patil (1983 Cri LJ 331), it has been held that the charge under Section 307 IPC does not fail merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim are in the nature of simple hurt. The High Court had acquitted the accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC solely because the injuries inflicted on the 17 victim were in the nature of simple hurt. In reversing the said finding, the Supreme Court in paragraph 9 of the judgment has observed as follows: "...To justify a conviction under this Section 307 IPC it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often be considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof." 29. Kaliram (PW-3), the complainant, in the FIR (Ex.P-7) has narrated the incident in detail. She has stated that appellant and daughter of the 18 victim namely Amila both got married as per social customs. Amila used to stay with the accused and do household and agricultural work. About 08 months before the incident, Amila came home alone and told him that the accused beats her after consuming alcohol. It has been four years and he has beaten her many times saying that she is not able to have a child. Since then, her daughter Amila was living in her parental house. On the date of the incident, the accused came to Amila’s parental house. At that time, the complainant and her daughter Amila were in front of their house. The accused said that they are not sending Amila, today he will kill them. He took out a knife-like sword from the seat of the motorcycle and attacked the complainant with the intention of killing them, which the complainant held tightly and she got injured below the thumb and near the little finger due to the knife-like sword attack. Then the accused threw her on the ground due to which she got injured on his knee. His daughter Amila also tried to free her mother due to which Amila also got injured. 30. In view of the above, it cannot be held that the prosecution has been able to establish that the appellant had intended to kill Kaliram (PW- 3) & Smt. Amila (PW-4) can it be next said that the appellant committed the ‘act’ with knowledge that the said 'act' would have amounted to injury. The evidence in the case falls short of this proof 19 also. In order to constitute an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish that the accused did an 'act' with such guilty intention or knowledge and in such circumstances, that but for some intervening reason the 'act' would have amounted to injury. In other words, the intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute the murder. In a case dealing with causing of hurt, the intention or knowledge of the accused can be gathered from the nature of the weapon used, the intention expressed by them at the time of the act, the motive for commission of the offence, the nature and the size of injuries, the parts of the body of the victim where injuries were caused, the severity of the blow or blows and other important circumstances. A case cannot be taken out of the purview of Section 307 IPC merely on the basis that the injuries on the victim are found to be simple in nature. Each case has to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. No two cases can be or are in all respects alike. What is the proper inference to be drawn from proved facts and circumstances is a totally different matter. In the present case as the prosecution has failed to establish the intention or knowledge of the appellant that by their 'act' an offence of injury of PW-3 & PW-4 could have been committed and having regard to the circumstances in which PW-3 & PW-4 were assaulted, the injury sustained by them and other circumstances, I extend the benefit of doubt in respect of 20 the offence under Section 307 IPC. 31. Section 324 of IPC, 1860 provides as under : “324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.—Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” 32. Upon considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court gathered that there were no allegations of repeated or severe blows having been inflicted upon the complainant and her daughter. The Court also noted that even the injuries on the complainant/victim- Kaliram (PW-3) and Smt. Amila (PW-4) were found to be simple in nature. Therefore, the Court held that the conviction for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is unsustainable and that only the offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC is made out. Thus, the Court interfered with the impugned judgment only to the extent of 21 Section 307 of IPC and the same is diluted to Section 324 of IPC, therefore, the appellant is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC instead of Section 307 of IPC. 33. Since the appellant has caused injuries to the injured persons, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 25(1-B)(B) & 25(1) of the Arms Act and the same is maintained/affirmed. Accordingly, the appellant is convicted under Sections 324 of IPC and Sections 25(1- B)(B) & 25(1) of the Arms Act. 34. Now coming to the sentence part, the maximum sentence for the offence under Section 324 of IPC is three years of imprisomment and since the appellant has undergone more than 14 months in this case as submitted by counsel for the appellant, this Court is of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would be met if, the jail sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 35. Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under Section 307 of the IPC is altered to the offence under Section 324 of IPC and convicted under Sections 25(1-B)(B) & 25(1) of the Arms Act. However, jail sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him and the fine sentence shall remain intact. 22 36. In the result, the instant criminal appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated herein-above. 37. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds shall remain operative for a period of six months in view of Section 481 of BNSS. 38. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for information and necessary action, if any. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge Vasant