1 2025:CGHC:49549 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 217 of 2017 1. Milap Ram (Died) Through Lrs As Per Honb'le Court Order Dated 05-11-2024 1.1 - Smt. Shashikiran Sahu W/o Late Milapram Sahu Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Nawagaon, Tahsil - Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh 1.2 - Bhojpal Sahu S/o Late Milapram Sahu Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Nawagaon, Tahsil - Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh 1.3 - Famendra Kumar Sahu S/o Late Milapram Sahu Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Nawagaon, Tahsil - Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh 1.4 - Rani Padmavati D/o Late Milapram Sahu Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Nawagaon, Tahsil - Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus 1. Sampatlal S/o Ratanchand Marwadi (Dead) Through Lrs Nil 1.1 - Shantibai Wd/o Sampat Lal Jain Aged About 55 Years R/o Kisora, Tahsil - Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh 1.2 - Vimla Bai W/o Mulchand Jain, D/o Sampat Lal Jain R/o Kharra, Tahsil - Bemetara, District - Durg (Now District - Bemetara) SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI Digitally signed by SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI 2 1.3 - Inda Bai W/o Rajendra Jain, D/o Late Sampat Lal Jain R/o Jindal Greel House, Dallirajhara, Tahsil Balod, District Durg (Now District Balod) Chhattisgarh 1.4 - Chandrakumar Jain S/o Late Sampat Lal Jain R/o Khisora, Tahsil - Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh 1.5 - Sitara Bai Jain W/o Ashok Jain, D/o Late Sampatlal Jain R/o Kaliya Nagar, Kawardha, District Kawardha (Kabirdham) Chhattisgarh 2. Suryakumar S/o Sampatlal, Aged About 25 Years R/o Hasda, Tahsil Kurud, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh 3. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For appellants : Mr. D.N. Prajapati, Advocate For Respondent No.1A to 1E & 2 : Mr. Sameer Oraon, Advocate for For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Neeraj Nigam, Dy. Adv.General SB: Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu Judgment on Board 15/9/2025 1. Heard on admission. 2. This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity “CPC”) is filed against the judgment and decree dated 4.3.2017 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Dhamtari in Civil Appeal No.26A/2014 affirming the judgment and decree dated 14.5.2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-I Kurud in Civil Suit No.347A/2012 whereby 3 learned trial Judge dismissed suit of original plaintiff filed for declaration of title and permanent injunction. 3. During pendency of this second appeal, original plaintiff and present appellants have been substituted as his legal heirs. 4. Facts of the case, in brief, are that original plaintiff filed a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of land bearing Khasra No.632 (New No.293) area 0.761 acre 0.761 hectare situated in village Dhaurabhatha, Tehsil Kurud, District Dhamtari (for short ‘the suit land’), stating that the suit land was purchased by Ghasiram, father of original plaintiff, from one Ramdayal in the year 1972 and since the date of purchase, he was in occupation and possession of the same and after his death, original plaintiff came into possession. It was pleaded that instead of making payment towards purchase of suit land, father of plaintiff got the land of one Nirbhay Patel purchased and registered in the name of said Ramdayal. Father of original plaintiff had borrowed some money from one Devichand, therefore, father of plaintiff got executed sale deed in respect of suit land in favour of son-in-law (defendant No.1) of said Devichand as a security towards borrowed amount, but physical possession of 4 suit land remains with father of original plaintiff. It is also pleaded that in the year 1987 a borewell was installed by plaintiff over the suit land and also obtained electricity connection for motor pump which is still operational. After the death of Ghasiram, in the year 1993 a family partition took place between plaintiff and his brothers, suit land fallen in share of plaintiff. Borrowed amount was repaid in the year 1987 and when defendant No.1 was asked to execute sale deed in favour of original plaintiff, he started avoiding registration of sale deed on one pretext or other. Suddenly, son of defendant No.1 started threatening to cut the crop, dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land also lodged false report in police station Magarload. 5. Defendants No.1 to 3 filed written statement to suit denying the averments made therein. It was pleaded that father of defendants No.1 to 3 had purchased the suit land from Ramdayal vide registered sale deed dated 14.3.1972 for Rs.4,000/- and came into possession. Suit land is continuously recorded in land records in the name of defendants since 1972. As the plaintiff was trying to encroach upon their land, the police after inquiry restrained him from interfering with possession of defendants over suit land. Plaintiff kept 5 silence for some time and thereafter he again entered into suit land and cut the standing crop with the help of labourer and when son of defendant No.1 tried to stop them, they threatened him for life. 6. Defendants No.1 to 3 have also filed counter claim to the effect that plaintiff has no right and title over the suit land, it was not purchased by father of original plaintiff, Ramdayal had sold the suit land to father of defendants vide registered sale deed dated 14.3.1972 and after the death of their father, they have derived title. On the basis of permanent injunction granted by the Court, plaintiff is in possession of suit land since 1997, due to which defendants are suffering loss of Rs.5000/- p.a. Hence, it was prayed that possession of suit land be delivered to defendants and they be also granted damages at the rate of Rs.5000/- p.a.. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Judge framed as many as nine issues and given opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence, both oral and documentary, in support of their respective claim and after a full fledged trial rendered a decision non-suiting original plaintiff and decreeing counter claim of defendants, on the ground that plaintiff has not been able to bring on record any oral or documentary 6 evidence indicating that the sale deed (Ex.D-1) in respect of suit land executed in favour of defendant No.1 was for the purpose of security of amount borrowed by father of plaintiff. Sale deed (Ex.D-1) does not recite that it was executed as security towards the loan received from defendant No.1 and that a nominal sale deed was executed. Plaintiff failed to examine the deed writer or attesting witness to the sale deed to substantiate his plea that the sale deed was executed for safety of loan amount. It was also recorded that the plaintiff may be in possession of suit land for several years, the relief of declaration of title on the ground of adverse possession cannot be granted because the same has not been specifically claimed by plaintiff in his plaint. From the revenue documents and sale deed produced on behalf of defendants it is clear that the suit land belongs to defendants. 8. Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court the original plaintiff has preferred first appeal before the lower appellate Court which has also been dismissed by the first appellate Court vide judgment and decree impugned herein affirming findings of the trial Court. 7 9. This second appeal against concurrent finding has been filed by appellants on following proposed substantial questions :- “I. Whether the judgments and decrees passed by Courts and liable to be below are erroneous perverse, quashed/set-aside ? II. Whether both the courts below have justified in holding that the father of plaintiff was not purchased the suit land from Ramdayal by replacing the land of Nirbhay Patel ? III. Whether both the courts below have justified in holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the sale deed dated 14.03.1972 was executed only for the purposes of security of loan amount? IV. Whether both the learned courts below have justified in holding that the defendant no. 1 was purchased the suit land by sale deed dated 14.03.1972 and therefore the defendants (legal heirs of Sampat) are entitled to suit land? V. Any other question of law, which may deem fit by this Hon'ble Court, may kindly be framed.” 10. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 11. Learned counsel for appellants would submit that sale deed dated 14.3.1972 (Ex.D-1) is a sham document which was never intended to be acted upon because it was nothing but a collateral security to a money lending transaction between father of original plaintiff and father of defendant No.1 and in the said transaction there was 8 no passing of sale consideration. Plaintiff had repaid the loan in the year 1987 but instead of cancelling the sale deed, defendants, in connivance with revenue authorities, got their names mutated in the land records. He submits that both the Courts failed to appreciate the evidence, oral and documentary, brought on record by plaintiff in proper perspective, which clearly establishes the factum of purchase of suit land coupled with the delivery of possession to the father of original plaintiff and thereafter continuous possession. He next contended that plaintiff was in possession of suit land since 1972 without any interruption from any corner whatsoever, which is also evident from the documents filed by plaintiff, the defendants were well aware of the exclusive possession of father of plaintiff and thereafter of plaintiff over the suit property and in such a situation, the trial court should have declared the plaintiff to be owner of suit property on the basis of adverse possession. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No.1A to 1E and 2, opposing submissions made by learned counsel for appellants, would submit that unless the condition for resell is embodied in the document of sale, it cannot be said that 9 sale deed was executed for security of loan. The sale deed in question does not disclose that it was a mortgage transaction. As the plaintiff failed to prove their stand that sale deed was executed towards security of loan amount advanced by defendant to plaintiff, on the basis of alleged registered sale deed Ex. D/1, it can easily be held that the defendants are actual owner of the suit property. Hence, finding of the learned trial Court that the sale deed does not appear to be executed as a security to the loan, cannot be said to be erroneous. He further argued that the plea of adverse possession, as per settled law, is to be specifically averred and proved, however, in the instant case the pleadings as well as evidence led on behalf of plaintiff nowhere suggests that plaintiff proved all the ingredients required to claim adverse possession, therefore, learned trial Court has rightly denied the said relief. 13. I have heard learned counsel for respective parties and perused the record 14. From the material available on record it is apparent that after due appreciation of evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the parties the trial Court has recorded the findings against the plaintiff that it does 10 not establish from the documents exhibited by plaintiff, particularly sale deed Ex.D-1, that he is recorded owner of the suit land, rather it shows that it is defendant No.1 who is owner of the suit land. Evidence on record also does not corroborate that sale deed was executed towards security of loan. Plaintiff has not produced sale deed showing that Ghasiram, father of original plaintiff, had purchased suit land from said Ramdayal and even he failed to produce any document showing advancement of loan and payment thereof. 15. Findings recorded by learned trial Court have been affirmed by the lower appellate Court upon re- appreciation of the entire evidence on record. The concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts are based on meticulous appreciation of evidence, oral and documentary, on record which by no stretch of imagination can be said either to be perverse or based on no evidence requiring interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. 16. Fortifying its earlier decision being Vidyadhar v Manikrao (1999) 3 SCC 573 and Abdul Raheem v. Karnataka Electricity Board (2007) 14 SCC 138, the Apex Court in the matter of Vishwanath Agrawal S/o 11 Sitaram Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal reported in (2012) 7 SCC 288 has held that concurrent findings recorded by Courts below cannot be disturbed until and unless they are perverse or contrary to law. Relevant portion of the said judicial pronouncement reads as under:- “37....High Court in a second appeal should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion. We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 17. That apart, it is well settled that second appeal is maintainable only if it involves a substantial question of law and not merely a question of fact. A substantial question of law must be debatable, not previously settled and must materially affect the outcome of the case. Factual disputes do not constitute substantial question of law. A bare perusal of substantial questions of law as proposed by appellant, which are extracted above, shows that they are all factual in nature 12 requiring only re-appreciation of evidence already adjudicated by trial Court and first appellate Court. 18. Thus, in view of above factual and legal background, there appears to be no perversity in the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below and being so this second appeal does not involve any question of law much less the substantial question of law. 19. In the result, this second appeal being devoid of any substance is liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed as such at the admission stage itself. No order as to costs. 20. Decree be drawn up accordingly. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge roshan