Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Karnataka · body

2025 DAILYLAW 49330 (KAR)

SMT CHANNAMMA v. THE AIRCRAFTS EMLOYEES CO OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD

RFA/671/2017 · 2025-10-16

K S Hemalekha

Original Suitbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.671 OF 2017 (INJ) BETWEEN: SMT. CHANNAMMA W/O LATE CHOWDAPPA, SINCE DEAD BY L.R’s. 1. SRI GOPALA S/O LATE CHOWDAPPA, AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS, 2. SRI T.C. RAMACHANDRA S/O LATE CHOWDAPPA, AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, 3. SRI T.C. NARAYANASWAMY S/O LATE CHOWDAPPA, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, 4. SMT. SHREEMANJU W/O T.C. NARAYANASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, 5. SMT. PREMA D/O LATE CHOWDAPPA, W/O RAMESH, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, ALL RESIDING AT THUBARAHALLI VILLAGE, RAMAGONDANAHALLI POST, MARATHAHALLI-VARTHUR MAIN ROAD, BANGALORE-560 066. …APPELLANTS (BY SRI SUBASH REDDY V., ADVOCATE) Digitally signed by MAHALAKSHMI B M Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 AND: THE AIRCRAFTS EMPLOYEES CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD., REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO.15 1ST CROSS, C.K.C. GARDEN, OPPOSITE BANGALORE INSTITUTE OF ONCOLOGY HOSPITAL, K.H. ROAD (DOUBLE ROAD), BANGALORE-560 027. …RESPONDENT (BY SRI NISHANTH A.V., ADVOCATE) THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 03.02.2017 PASSED IN O.S.NO.4597/2010 ON THE FILE OF THE XXXI ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU CITY, (CCH 14), DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA ORAL JUDGMENT The present Regular First Appeal is preferred by the plaintiffs assailing the judgment and decree dated 03.02.2017 in O.S. No. 4597/2010 on the file of the XXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City (CCH-14) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Trial Court’ for short). By the impugned judgment and decree, the Trial - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 Court, dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs for permanent injunction. Brief facts: 2. Suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession of Survey No.73 measuring 30 guntas situated at Thubarahalli Village, Varthur Holbi, Bengaluru South Taluk (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit schedule property’ for short). The case of the plaintiffs is that late Chowdappa purchased 35 guntas in Survey No.73 by a registered sale deed dated 18.01.1947. Out of this, 05 guntas were sold to one Sri Paji C. Lurke. After Chowdappa’s death on 08.03.2001, the land was partitioned among the legal heirs, i.e., the plaintiffs. The defendant-Aircrafts Employees Cooperative Society Limited (‘society’ for short), which had developed nearby lands for its members, are attempting to trespass and encroach the plaintiffs’ property and hence, the suit for permanent injunction. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 Written statement: 3. Suit is not maintainable and is barred under Section 125 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (‘the KCS Act’ for short). Further, it is contended that the land including Survey No.73 was acquired by the State Government for the benefit of the society. Notification was issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘LA Act,’ for short) dated 24.09.1981 and under Section 6 (1) final notification dated 14.10.1982 was issued under the LA Act . The award was passed, compensation was paid to the land owners and possession was taken and handed over to the society. It is averred that the layout is formed and approved by the BDA. Civic amenity site is reserved for park. Relinquishment deeds have been executed in favour of BDA and the plaintiffs have no subsisting right or possession. 4. The trial Court, upon considering the oral and documentary evidence, arrived at a conclusion that the - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 gazette notification Ex.D1 proved acquisition under the LA Act and PW.1 admitted that the Government had issued notification for Survey No.73 and handed over the land to the society. The Trial Court further noted the Award (Ex.D4) and possession notices (Ex.D5 and Ex.D6) confirmed acquisition and transfer to the defendant. The Trial Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove possession or any interference by the defendant. While answering issue No.3, the Trial Court held that the suit is not barred under the LA Act or under Section 125 of the KCS Act. The Civil Court had jurisdiction, but the plaintiffs failed to prove their entitlement for injunction on merits and dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by which, the plaintiffs are before this Court. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that although the preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) of - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 the LA Act dated 24.09.1981 (Ex.D1) mentioned acquisition of 04 acres 20 guntas in Survey No.73, while the final notification under Section 6 (1) (Ex.D2) confines only to 03 acres 25 guntas and thus, it is contended that the difference in extent between the preliminary and the final notification itself, shows that not the entire land claimed by the plaintiffs was notified or acquired. The remaining extent approximately 35 guntas continued to vest with the original owner, late Chowdappa, and consequently, devolved upon the plaintiffs. It is contented that the Trial Court erred in treating the entire Survey No.73 was acquired and vested in the society, without verifying the exact extent covered under the final notification and award. It is contended that the discrepancy in the measurement raises a factual dispute, which could not have been brushed aside merely on the strength of acquisition notification. It is further contended that even assuming that a preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) and a final notification under Section 6 (1) - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 were issued in respect of Survey No.73, the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by operation of law. Under Section 11A of the LA Act, the Collector is mandatorily required to make an award within two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 (1) of the LA Act. The statutory consequence of failure to make such an award within the prescribed time is that the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse, the limitation is mandatory and there is no relaxation. It is submitted that the respondents have not produced any authentic award covering the appellants’ land or showing payment of compensation to late Chowdappa, the predecessor in title. The document relied upon by the respondent at Ex.D4 does not disclose that any award was made in respect of 30 guntas forming the appellants' property. It is contended that, therefore, the impugned judgment suffers from substantial error of law in ignoring the statutory mandate of Section 11A of the L.A Act and presuming acquisition without proof of award or - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 compensation. The finding of the Trial Court that the entire Survey No.73 vested in the respondent-society is perverse and contrary to the record, warranting interference by this Court. It is submitted that the remaining extent of 30 guntas in Survey No.73 continued to be in possession of the appellants and was never the subject matter of acquisition or lawful possession proceedings. It is submitted that the findings of the Trial Court that this ‘30 guntas portion was kept as a civic amenity site for park purpose’, is stated to be factually baseless and unsupported by evidence. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits at the outset that the suit filed by the appellants for bare injunction was not maintainable in law particularly in view of the respondent's categorical defence that the land in question had already been acquired by the State and vested in the respondent-society. It is contended that it is well settled that when a defendant asserts ownership and title based on statutory acquisition, the plaintiffs - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 cannot maintain a mere suit without seeking a declaration of title and consequential relief. The ratio in Anathulla Sudhakar vs P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by L.Rs and Others1 (Anathula Sudhakar) squarely applies, the proper remedy would have been to seek a declaration of ownership and not a simple injunction. The primary contention of the respondent is that the acquisition proceedings were duly completed, the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 24.09.1981, and the final declaration under Section 6(1) was issued on 14.10.1982, as evidenced by Exs. D1 and D2. Thereafter, the award in LAC.CR.No. 20/1981-982 was passed- Ex.D4, compensation disbursed and possession was handed over to the society under mahazars Ex.D5 and D6. Once such possession is taken, Section 16 of the LA Act operates and the land absolutely vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, and Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in regard to acquisition. Reliance is 1 (2008) 4 SCC 594 - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority and another Vs. Brijesh Reddy and another2 (Brijesh Reddy), wherein it was categorically held that once acquisition is complete and possession is taken, Civil Courts cannot entertain suits for declaration or injunction touching the acquired land, the only remedy being under the LA Act or before the Writ Court. The learned counsel for the respondent has urged that, though the trial Court has held that the suit is maintainable both on the ground that it does not attract the bar under Section 125 of the KCS Act and that the plaintiffs have not challenged the acquisition notifications, such a finding is erroneous in law. The learned counsel submits that the trial Court while answering issue No.3 has failed to consider the settled legal proposition that once the acquisition proceedings are concluded, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit either for declaration or for bare injunction in respect of the acquired land. 2 (2013) 3 SCC 66 - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 8. Learned counsel for the appellants in reply submits that the reliance placed by the respondent in the case of Brijesh Reddy is misconceived and inapplicable to the facts of the present case. It is contended that the said judgment applies only where the entire extent of land has been validly acquired, compensation determined and possession lawfully taken by the State or beneficiary body. In the present case, however, the appellants consistent case is that only a portion of Sy. No.73 was acquired, and the remaining extent of 30 guntas was neither included in the final notification nor subject of possession or award. It is contended that the trial Court has rightly held the suit to be maintainable. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the point that arises for consideration is, Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court warrants interference in the facts and circumstances of the case? - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 10. It is not in dispute that the preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) and final notification under Section 6(1) of the LA Act were issued in the years 1981 and 1982 respectively, and that award in LAC CR. No. 20/1981-82 (Ex.D4) was thereafter passed and followed by possession under Exs.D5 and D6 recording delivery of suit land to the respondent-society. The trial Court proceeded on the footing that the suit was maintainable since the plaintiffs had not challenged the acquisition proceedings and since the bar under Section 125 of the KCS Act did not arise. This Court, however, is of the view that the Trial Court failed to expressly apply the settled position of law declared by the Apex Court in Brijesh Reddy wherein the Apex Court held at para Nos. 8, 14, 18 and 19 as under: “8. The only point for consideration in this appeal is: whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit when the schedule lands were acquired under the land acquisition proceedings and whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter to the trial court without examining the - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 question with regard to the maintainability of the suit? x x x 14. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting those that are expressly or impliedly barred which reads as under: “9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.—The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” From the above provision, it is clear that courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The jurisdiction of civil court with regard to a particular matter can be said to be excluded if there is an express provision or by implication it can be inferred that the jurisdiction is taken away. An objection as to the exclusion of civil court's jurisdiction for availability of alternative forum should be taken before the trial court and at the earliest failing which the higher court may refuse to entertain the plea in the absence of proof of prejudice. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 x x x 18. It is clear that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. By necessary implication, the power of the civil court to take cognizance of the case under Section 9 CPC stands excluded and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Section 4, declaration under Section 6 and subsequent proceedings except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is thus clear that the civil court is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration or even bare injunction being granted on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right available for the aggrieved person is to approach the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 136 with self-imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary power. 19. No doubt, in the case on hand, the plaintiffs approached the civil court with a prayer only for permanent injunction restraining Defendants 1 and 2 i.e. BDA, their agents, servants and anyone claiming through them from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. It is true that there is no challenge to the acquisition proceedings. However, - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 in view of the assertion of BDA, in their written statements, about the initiation of acquisition proceedings ending with the passing of award, handing over possession and subsequent action, etc. the said suit is not maintainable. This was rightly concluded by the trial court. For proper compensation, the aggrieved parties are free to avail the statutory provisions and approach the court concerned. All these aspects have been clearly noted by the trial court and ultimately it rightly dismissed the suit as not maintainable. On the other hand, the learned Single Judge of the High Court though adverted to the principles laid down by this Court with reference to acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act and Section 9 CPC committed an error in remanding the matter to the trial court on the ground that the plaintiffs were not given opportunity to adduce evidence to show that their vendor was in possession which entitles them for grant of permanent injunction from evicting them from the scheduled property without due process of law by the defendants. In the light of the specific assertion coupled with materials in the written statement about the acquisition of land long ago and subsequent events, suit of any nature including bare injunction is not maintainable, hence, we are of the view that the High Court is not right in remitting the matter to the trial court for fresh disposal.” - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 11. The appellants contention that the present suit relates only to an extent of 30 guntas allegedly left unacquired cannot be accepted as Ex.D4-the award expressly refers to 4 acres 20 guntas in Sy. No. 73 and the possession mahazars-Exs.D5 and D6 together account for 35 guntas + 1 acre 10 guntas, evidencing lawful possession taken and handed over to the society. Thus, there is no document establishing that 30 gunta portion was excluded from acquisition or remained with the appellants. In these circumstances, the present suit, being one for bare injunction over land already acquired and vested in the State, is not maintainable in law. While the Trial Court ultimately dismissed the suit on merits, this Court affirms that dismissal albeit on the additional and independent ground of non-maintainability. Accordingly, the finding of the trial Court on issue No.3 is modified to hold that suit itself is not maintainable once the acquisition is concluded and possession is taken. The findings of the Trial Court on issue Nos. 1 and 2 holding that the - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 appellants have failed to prove possession or interference are based on sound appreciation of evidence and requires no interference. 12. From the material on record and the settled law declared in Brijesh Reddy, this Court holds that the suit itself was not maintainable once the acquisition proceedings were concluded and possession was handed over. 13. In so far as the contention of the appellants regarding plea of lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 11A of the LA Act, the respondent contended that the plea of lapse was never raised before the Trial Court and it is introduced for the first time in this appeal which is not permissible. The perusal of the record indicates that the plaint is silent on the question of lapse and it is well settled that a new plea involving disputed facts cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal. Assuming such contention is accepted, the very plea pleaded before this Court would clearly indicate that the - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:41242 RFA No. 671 of 2017 suit property has been acquired and such a contention fortifies the fact that after the conclusion of the acquisition proceedings, the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction. The point raised for consideration is answered accordingly and this Court pass the following : ORDER (i) The Regular First Appeal is dismissed. (ii) The judgment and decree of the trial Court stands confirmed. Sd/- ____________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA MBM/CKL List No.: 1 Sl No.: 32