1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 07TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION No.22894 OF 2024 (GM – RES) BETWEEN: 1 . MR. ABOOBAKKER SIDDIQUE AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS SON OF MR. MOHAMMAD RESIDING AT BOLUKATTE HOUSE BAYARU, UPPALA, KASARAGOD KERALA STATE – 671 348. 2 . MRS. ASMA @ SANA AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS W/O SAFWAN RESIDING AT D.NO.3-81 (1) VALACHIL, ADYAR POST KANA GUDDE, KANNUR MANGALORE – 574 143. 3 . MRS. ISAMMA @ KHATIJA W/O ABDUL KHADER AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS R/AT NEAR AYYAPPA TEMPLE KADAMBAR, HOSANGADI MANJESHWARA KASARAGOD DISTRICT- 671 323. R 2 4 . SMT. REHAMATH AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS W/O L.LATHIF RESIDING AT D.NO. 15-310 TALAPADY HOUSE BRAHMARAKUDLU NEAR JUMMA MASJID B.C.ROAD POST BANTWAL - 574 219 DAKSHINA KANNADA. 5 . MR. UMMER KUNHI S/O MOIDEEN KUNHI AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS R/AT MARIKKALA HOUSE MONTEPADAD NARINGANA VILLAGE AND POST BANTWALA TALUK – 575 018. ... PETITIONERS (BY SRI VIKRAM RAJ A., ADVOCATE A/W., SRI ASHWIN JOYSTON KUTINHA, ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY THE WOMENS POLICE STATION MANGALORE, DAKSHINA KANNADA REPRESENTED BY THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001. 2 . SRI ASHRAF FATHER AND THE GUARDIAN OF THE VICTIM GIRL R/AT ANAJURU VILLAGE 3 JANNAPURA, MUDIGERE TALUK CHIKKAMAGALUR – 577 132 PRESENTLY RESIDNG AT NEAR OMZOOR CHURCH ARKULA, FARANGIPETE MANGALORE - 574 143. 3 . SRI. ABDUL BASHEER FATHER AND THE GUARDIAN OF THE VICTIM GIRL D/O ABDUL BASHEER R/AT D.NO.1-11(3A) URUMANE MANJANADI, MANGALORE – 574 237. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R1) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO A) QUASHING THE FIR IN CRIME NO.12/2022 DATED 07-02-2022 WHICH IS PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE A3, PENDING IN THE FILE OF THE HON’BLE ADDL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, FTSC-2 (POCSO), D.K AT MANGALORE AS SPL.C.NO.108/2022 FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE U/S 363. THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- 4 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CAV ORDER The petitioner-accused 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are now knocking at the doors of this Court seeking quashment of various crimes registered in Crime Nos.8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 30, 31, 32, 33 registered on 07-02-2022 and 07-03-2022 respectively against different accused for offences punishable under Sections 120B, 363, 366A, 370A, 376, 109, 506 r/w Section 34 of the IPC, Sections 4, 6, 8, 12 and 14 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act. 2. Heard Sri Vikram Raj A and Sri Ashwin Joyston Kutinha, learned counsel appearing for petitioners and Sri B N Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1. 3. Facts in brief germane are as follows: It is the case of the prosecution that on 03-02-2022 the victim represented by the 2nd and 3rd respondents registers 5 complaint in Mangalore Women Police Station alleging that all the accused had made her get involved in prostitution and have forced the victim to get into sexual intercourse with several unknown men and therefore, the offences so alleged emerge. In all the complaints, accused were common and the allegation as afore- quoted was common and crimes come to be registered on an identical cause of action. The 2nd respondent registers 5 crimes and the 3rd respondent registers 5 different crimes. The allegation against these accused inter alia was that they have conspired together to procure women and minor girls for the purpose of prostitution and to make fortunes on such prostitution. In furtherance of the said object, the accused had procured an apartment and used the said SMR, West Gate Apartment for the purpose of prostitution. In all these crimes, police conduct investigation and register 10 special cases and the matter is now sought to be tried against these petitioners in those cases. It is the separate trial that is now sought to be conducted is what has driven these petitioners to this Court in the subject petition. 6 4. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners would contend that on the same cause of action, albeit the act of sexual intercourse by several men, the victim is the same. Therefore, all these accused could have been tried in a solitary trial or a joint trial should be conducted for the said purpose. The learned counsel would submit that accused No.1 to 6 are facing similar charges in all the 10 cases and as such, the same requires to be quashed. The submission of the learned counsel is that all the cases have to be tried together, failing which, registration of multiple FIRs, on similar transactions would be violative of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the cases of T.T.ANTONY v. STATE OF KERALA1 and AMITHBHAI ANILCHANDRA SHA V. CBI2 on the doctrine of same transaction or doctrine of sameness. He would seek to place to reliance upon several other judgments of the Apex Court, the consideration of which would be done, qua their relevance in the course of the order. 5. Per-contra, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would vehemently refute the submission contending that the victim 1 (2001)6 SCC 181 2 (2013)6 SCC 348 7 may be the same, but the acts of several persons indulging in sexual assault on the victim are different. Each instance of payment of money by the accused/customers 1 to 6 after having sex with the victim, the minor child cannot but be treated to be a separate transaction. He would contend that the petition deserves to be rejected. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record. 7. 10 complaints emerge on the act of these accused for having indulged in sex with a minor who was forced to come into the racket of prostitution. In one of the crimes in Crime No.12 of 2022, the police who have filed charge sheet in Special Case No.108 of 2022 bring out horrendous offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner along with others. The summary of the charge sheet in Column No.17 reads as follows: “ಈ ೋಾ ೋಪಾ ಪತದ ಅಂಕಣ ನಂಬ: 12 ರ ಾದ ಆ ೋತರ ರುದ! ಇರುವ ಆ ೋಪ ಏ%ೆಂದ ೆ, ಪಕರಣದ 1%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಶ'ೕ%ಾಳ ಮಗ ಮಹಮ,-ಸ/ಾ0 ಎಂ2ಾತನು 3ಾನಕ ಾ45ೆ4ಂದ ಬಳಲು78ದ9ವನನು: 2020%ೇ ಇಸಯ ಮಂಗಳ<=ನ ಕಂಕ%ಾ> /ಾದ? 8 ಮುಲ@A ಆಸBCೆDೆ ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು FೋG HICೆJ ೊ>ಸುವ ಸಮಯ 4%ೇ ಅ ೋ ಐಸಮ, @ ಖ7ಜ ಎಂಬವರ ಪ=ಚಯOಾG ಮಂಗಳ<ರು ನಗರದ ನಂPಗುQೆR, ಎಂಬರುವ ಎ@ ಎS ಆ? Oೆ@T DೇU Vಾನ ಅWಾUA Xಂಟ: /ಾU ನಂಬ?: 106 %ೇದ ಅಕಮOಾG OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ 3ಾಡು78ದು9, ಆ ಸಮಯ 1ಮತು8 4 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗ]Dೆ ೇರಳ ಾಜ[ದ ಉಪBಳ 2ಾVಾ=ನ Wೆ_ವ]ೆ `Oಾ 2%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಅಬೂಬಕa? P9ೕb ರವರ ಪ=ಚಯOಾG ಆ ನಂತರ 4%ೇ ಆ ೋಯು 5%ೇ ಆ ೋ cೕಮ7 ೆಹಮ0 ಮತು8 6%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಉಮ,? ಕುಂಞ ರವರನು: 1%ೇ ಆ ೋDೆ ಪ=ಚಯ 3ಾ>ೊಟುT, OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ 3ಾಡು78ದು9, ಆ ಸಮಯದ, 1%ೇ ಆ ೋಯು 3%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಸ%ಾಳ ಪ=ಚಯ 3ಾ>ೊಂಡು OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ ನQೆಸು78ದು9, ಆ ಸಮಯದ, 1%ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯ OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ ಬರುವ G ಾIVಾದ ಆ ೋ 7 ಮಹಮ,- ಶ=ೕe Wೆ_f3ಾ Fಾg ಎಂ2ಾತನ ಪ=ಚಯOಾGರುತ8ೆ, ಪಕರಣದ ಆ ೋಗhಾದ - A1-ಶ'ೕನ, A2- ಅಬೂಬಕa? P!b, A3-ಆiಾ, @ ಸನ A4- ಐಸಮ,, A5- ೆಹಮ0, A6- ಉಮ,? ಕುಂಞ ರವರುಗಳj iೇ=ೊಂಡು 2020 %ೇ iಾ`ಂದ A1 ಮತು8 A2 ರವರು Oಾಸದ9 ಮಂಗಳ<ರು ನಗರ ನಂPಗುQೆR, ಎಂಬರುವ ಎ@.ಎS ಆ? Oೆ@T DೇU Vಾನ ಅWಾUA XಂU ನ /ಾU ನಂಬ?: 106 %ೇದ ಅಕಮOಾG ಹಣ ಗ]ೆ 3ಾಡುವ ಸ3ಾನ ಉೆ9ೕಶPಂದ ಹುಡುGಯರನು: Fಾಗೂ ಮfhೆಯರನು: ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ಅಕಮOಾG 2ೆಂಗಳ<ರು, ೇರಳ ಾಜ[ದ kಾಗಗ]ಂದ OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ ಬDೆl ಹುಡುGಯರನು: ಕ ೆದು ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ ವ[ವFಾರವನು: 3ಾ>ೊಂ>ರುCಾ8 ೆ, ಆ ಬ]ಕ ಇನೂ: ಐZಾ ಾ'VಾG OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ 3ಾ> FೆHmನ ಹಣ ಗ]ಸುವ ಬDೆl ಆ ೋಗಳj 3ಾತುಕCೆ ನQೆ ಸಂಚು ರೂೊಂಡು ಮೂರು 2ೆnರೂಂ ಇರುವ ಮಂಗಳ<ರು ನಂPಗುQೆRಯ ಎ@.ಎಂ.ಆ? Oೆ@T DೇU, Vಾನ ೆQೆ`J ಅWಾUA Xಂ\ನ 4%ೇ ಮಹ>ಯ /ಾU ನಂಬ 402 %ೇಯದನು: ಅದರ 3ಾೕಕ ಾದ ಎ@ .ಎಂ. ರcೕ- ರವರ, ಆ ೋ-2 %ೇ ಅಬೂಬಕa? P9ೕb ನ Fೆಸ=ನ ಎGXಂU 3ಾ> 2ಾ>DೆDೆ Dೊತು8ಪ>ೊಂಡು P%ಾಂಕ 02-01- 2021 =ಂದ WಾU ನಂಬ 402 %ೇ ಮ%ೆಯ 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ ಸಣo ವಯJನ ಹುಡುGಯರನು: ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದು p7ವಂತ G ಾIಗ]Dೆ ಒದG ಹಣ 3ಾಡುವ ಬDೆl 3ಾತುಕCೆ ನQೆದು9, ಅಲೇ ಶ'ೕCಾಳ r2ೈt Dೆ 2ೇ ೆ 2ೇ ೆ ಯುವ7ಯ uೕvೋ ಕಳjf OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ 3ಾಡುವ ಬDೆl ಸಂಚು 3ಾ>ೊಂ>ರುCಾ8 ೆ. ಅಲೆ9 wಾ iಾ-1 ಮತು8 2%ೇಯವರು Oಾಸದ9 ಮ%ೆಯ, , ಅಳವ> Oೇಶ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಬರುವ ಹುಡುGಯರ ಮತು8 Dಾಹಕರ >ೕxೕವನು: ೆಾnA 3ಾ> ಅವ=Dೆ 2ೆದ=ಸುವ ಬDೆl, ಇಟುT ೊಂ>ರುCಾ8 ೆ, ಆ ೋ-3%ೇ: cೕಮ7 ಅiಾ, @, ಸ%ಾ ಎಂಬವರು ಆ ೋ-6%ೇ ಉಮ,? ಕುಂಞ ಮುzಾಂತರ ಆ ೋ-1%ೇ ಶ'ೕ%ಾಳ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬಂದು OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ 3ಾ>ೊಂ>ದ9ರು. ಆ ೋ 6 %ೇ rಹಮ,- ಕುಂಞ ಮತು8 ಆ ೋ- 5 %ೇ cೕಮ7 ೆಹಮ0 iೇ= ಮಂಗಳ<ರು ಬಲ,ಠದ ಸರಾ= ಮfhೆಯರ ಪದ ಪ|ವA ಾ5ೇgನ ಒಂದ%ೇ .ಯು. ಾ[~AVಾದ ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ wಾiಾ – 9 2%ೇ ಸು•ೈ%ಾ ಎಂ2ಾೆಯನು: 2021%ೇ iೆWೆTಂಬ? 7ಂಗ]ನ, ಪ=ಚಯ 3ಾ>ೊಂಡು ಅವಳ ಬಡತನದ f%ೆ:5ೆಯ ಬDೆl 7]ದು ಆೆDೆ ಹಣ ೊಟುT OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಬಳೊಳj€ವ ಬDೆl ಸಂಚು 3ಾ> ಆ ಸಂHನಂCೆ ಆ ೋ-5%ೇ ೆಹಮ0 ಮತು8 ಅ ೋ-6 %ೇ, ಉಮ,? ಕುಂಞ ರವರು iೇ= wಾiಾ 2%ೇ ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳನು:, 1, 2, 3%ೇ ಆ ೋಗ]Dೆ ಪ=ಚಯ 3ಾ> ೊಟT, ನಂತರ 1 =ಂದ 6%ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳ, ಮ%ೆಯ ಬಡತನ ಇರುವ•ದ=ಂದ ಒhೆ€ಯ ಹಣ ಸಂWಾದ%ೆ 3ಾಡುವ ೆಲಸ ೊ>ಸುವ•ಾG 7] ಪ•ಸ5ಾ4, 1, 2, ಮತು8 3 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= iೆWೆTಂಬ? 7ಂಗಳ ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳನು: ಮಂಗಳ<=ನ ‚ೕರಂ 3ಾt, kಾರ0 3ಾt, \ iೆಂಟ? 3ಾt ಗ]Dೆ 2%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಾರು ನಂಬ ೆಎt-14- ಎ -6969 %ೇ 3ಾರು7 ಎ\Aಗ ಾ=ನ ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು FೋG ಸುCಾ8>ೊಂಡು ಅಲೇ 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳ, %ಾವ• Fೇ]ದಂCೆ ಗಂಡಸ ೊಂPDೆ ಮಲGದ ೆ ಒhೆ€ಯ ಹಣ ಸಂWಾದ%ೆ 3ಾಡಬಹುದು ಎಂದು Fೇ] ಪ•ಸ5ಾ4 ಆೆDೆ 1%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಶ'ೕ%ಾಳj 2021 %ೇ iೆWೆTಂಬ? 7ಂಗ]ನ, ರೂ. 20,000/- ರೂWಾ4 `ೕ> OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಸಹಕ=ಸುವಂCೆ ಒCಾ8ಯಪ>ರುCಾ8 ೆ, ನಂತರ ಆ ೋಗhಾದ 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ wಾiಾ -2%ೇ ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳನು: OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಕ ೆ ತರಲು 7ೕ3ಾA`ೊಂಡು 1 =ಂದ 3 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj, ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳ ಮ%ೆDೆ FೋG wಾiಾ 2%ೇ ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳನು: 2%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಮಗ ಎ\Aಗ ಾ=ನ ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದು wಾiಾ 2%ೇ ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳನು: 2021 %ೇ iಾನ ಅೊTೕಬ? 7ಂಗಳ,, 15 Pನಗಳ ಾಲ 1%ೇ ಆ ೋCೆ ಶ'ೕ%ಾಳ ಮ%ೆಯ ಇ=ೊಂಡು ಆ ೋಗಳj ಹಲOಾರು ಗಂಡಸ=ಂದ ಹಣ ಪQೆದು ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳನು: OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಬಳೊಂ>ರುCಾ8 ೆ, ನಂತರ ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳ Cಾ4ಯ ಸಂಶಯ ಮತು8 ಒCಾ8ಯದ Xೕ ೆDೆ wಾiಾ 2%ೇ ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳj ಅವಳ ಮ%ೆDೆ FೋGದು9, ಆ ಬ]ಕ OಾWಾಸು 1%ೇ ಆ ೋCೆ ಶ'ೕ%ಾಳj ಸು•ೈ%ಾ]Dೆ r2ೈt‚ೕƒ ಕ ೆ 3ಾ> ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳj ಶ'ೕ%ಾಳ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬಂದ >xೕ ಾ[ಮ ಾದರುವ•ಾGಯೂ, ಬ ೆPದ9 ೆ ಆ >xೕವನು:, Oೈರt 3ಾಡುವ•ಾG 2ೆದ=ರುCಾ8 ೆ, wಾiಾ-2 %ೇ ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳj Fೆದ= 1%ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬಂದ ಸಮಯದ, 1=ಂದ 3%ೇ ವ ೆGನ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ=ೊಂಡು 1%ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯ ಮ%ೆಯದು9 ೊಂಡು OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ ನQೆಸುವಂCೆ ಒCಾ84ದ ಸಮಯದ, wಾiಾ-2 ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳj ಒಪBೇ ಇಾ9ಗ ಆ ೋತರು wಾiಾ-2 ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳ,, ಅವಳ 2ೇ ೆ ಾ@ XೕU ಗಳನು: ಪ=ಚಯ 3ಾ> ೊಡ2ೇಕು ಇಲOಾದ ೆ 1 %ೇ ಆ ೋfCೆಯು ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬಂದ >ೕxೕವನು:, Oೈರt 3ಾಡುವ•ಾG Fೆದ=ದ=ಂದ wಾiಾ-2 %ೇ ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳj ಅವಳ ಾ@ XೕU ಆದ ಬಲ,ಠ ಸರಾ= ಾ5ೇgನ ಒಂದ%ೇ ಯುಯ wಾiಾ-1%ೇ ಆ4ಾ ಎಂ2ಾೆಯನು: ಆ ೋಗhಾದ ಶ'ೕನ ಮತು8 ಸ%ಾ ರವ=Dೆ WಾಂQೇಶ…ರದ ‚ೕರಂ 3ಾt ನ ಪ=ಚಯ 3ಾ>ರುCಾ8hೆ. 1 =ಂದ 3 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ wಾiಾ-2 ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳ, ಆೆಯು 1%ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬಂದ >xೕವನು: Cೋ=, Oೈರt 3ಾಡುವ•ಾG Fೆದ=ದ ಾರಣ, wಾ-2 : ಸು•ೈ%ಾಳj P%ಾಂಕ 27-10-2021 ರಂದು ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ wಾiಾ-1 ಕು3ಾ= ಆ4Zಾಳನು:, 1%ೇ ಮತು8 2%ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj Oಾಸರುವ ಮಂಗಳ<ರು ನಗರ ನಂPಗುQೆRಯ ಎಂಬರುವ ಎ@.ಎಂ.ಆ? 10 Oೆ@T DೇU, Vಾನ ಅWಾUA Xಂಟ: /ಾU ನಂಬ? 402 %ೇ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು Fೋದ ಸಮಯದ, 3%ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯು ಆೆಯ r2ೈt ‚ೕನ:ದ9 iೆbJ >ೕxೕ ಮತು8 ಆcೕಲ ‚ೕvೋಗಳನು: wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ Cೋ= ಆೆಯನು: Oೇಶ[Oಾ\ೆ ನQೆಸುವ ಬDೆl ಉೇI G ಾIಗhೆ<ಂPDೆ | ಸಹಕ=ಸುವಂCೆ 7]ರುCಾ8 ೆ. 1 ಮತು8 3 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj wಾiಾ -1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ Oಾಟ†ಮೂಲಕ ಕ ೆ 3ಾ> 1%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಮ%ೆDೆ | OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಬರುವಂCೆ 7]ಾಗ wಾiಾ-1 ಯವಳj ಬರಲು ಒಪBೇ ಇಾ9ಗ ಆ ೋಗಳj 1 %ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬಂದ >xೕವನು: wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರ ತಂೆ Cಾ4 ಮತು8 iೆ:ೕfತ=Dೆ ಕಳjfಸುವ•ಾG 2ೆದ=ದ ಾರಣ wಾiಾ -1 %ೇಯವಳj ಭಯಪಟುT, 1%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಶ'ೕ%ಾಳ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬರುವ•ಾG 7]ರುCಾ8hೆ. 1%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಶ'ೕ%ಾಳ ಪ=ಚಯದ ಮಂ•ೇಶ…ರ ಉಾ[ವರ `OಾVಾದ 7%ೇ ಆ ೋVಾದ ಮಹಮ,- ಶ=ೕe @ Wೈfಮ Fಾg ಎಂ2ಾತನು 1%ೇ ಮತು8 4%ೇ ಆ ೋಗ]Dೆ ‚ೕƒ ಮೂಲಕ ಸಂಪIA, ಸಣ[ ವಯJನ ಹು>Gಯರು ಇದ9 ೆ 7]ಸುವಂCೆ 7]ಾಗ 1%ೇ ಮತು8 4 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= 7%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ, ಸಣo ವಯJನ | ಹು>G ಇಾhೆ ಅವ]Dೆ ರೂ: 30,000/- ರೂWಾ4 ೊಡುವಂCೆ 7]ಾಗ 7%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಮಹಮ,- ಶ=ೕ† @ Wೈfಮ | Fಾg ಒBೊಂಡಂCೆ 1%ೇ ಆ ೋಯು P%ಾಂಕ: 13-11-2021 ರಂದು 1 %ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯ ಮ%ೆVಾದ ನಂP ಗುQೆRಯ ಎ@. S ಅ? Oೆ@T DೇU Vಾನ ಅWಾUA XಂU Dೆ ಬರುವಂCೆ 7]ದಂCೆ 7%ೇ ಆ ೋಯು 1 %ೇ ಆ ೋCೆ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬಂದು wಾiಾ-1%ೇಯವ=Dೆ ಸಂkೋಗ ನQೆಸುವ ಬDೆ ಸಂಚು ರೂದು9, ಈ ಸಂHನಂCೆ ಆಗ 1%ೇ ಆ ೋಯು wಾiಾ-1%ೇಯವ=Dೆ ‚ೕƒ 3ಾ> 1%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬರುವಂCೆ 7]ದು9, ಆಗ wಾiಾ -1%ೇಯವರು ಬರುವ•Pಲ, ಎಂದು Fೇ]ಾಗ 1 %ೇ ಆ ೋಯು ಾ[ಮ ಾದ >ೕxೕ Oೈರt 3ಾಡುವ•ಾG 7] 2ೆದ=ಾಗ wಾiಾ -1 %ೇಯವರು ಬರುವ•ಾG 7]ರುCಾ8hೆ. ಆಗ 1 ಮತು8 2 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj P%ಾಂಕ 13-11-2021 ರಂದು 2%ೇ ಆ ೋDೆ iೇ=ದ ಾರು ನಂಬ ೆಎt 14-ಎಎ-6969%ೇ ಎ\ADಾ ಾ=ನ FೋG ಮಂಗಳ<ರು ನಗರದ ಬಲ,ಠ ಸರಾ= ಮfhೆಯ ಪದ ಪ|ವA ಾ5ೇˆ ಬ] ಮನ…` ಎಂಬ ಆಸBCೆಯ DೇU ಬ] `ಂತು ೊಂ>ದ9 wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವರನು: Vಾ=ಗೂ 7]ಸೇ ಬಲವಂತPಂದ ಾ=ನ ಕೂ= ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು 1%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಶ'ೕ%ಾಳ ಮಂಗಳ<ರು ನಗರದ ನಂPಗುQೆRಯರುವ ಎ@.ಎಂ.ಆ?.Oೆ@T DೇU Vಾನ ೆQೆƒJ ಅWಾUA Xಂ\ನ 4%ೇ ಮಹ>ಯ /ಾU ನಂಬ 402 %ೇದೆa ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದು, ಸP) ಮ%ೆಯದ9 4 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರ, G ಾIಗhೆ<ಂPDೆ ಸಹಕ=ದ ೆ ಒhೆ€ಯ ಹಣ 3ಾಡಬಹುದು, r2ೈt ಖ=ೕP 3ಾಡಬಹುದು •ಾ 3ಾಡಬಹುದು ಎಂದು 7] ತುಂ2ಾ ಹಣ ಗುತ8ೆ, ಚಂದ ಚಂದದ Dೆಳ7ಯರನು: ಕೂQಾ ಇDೆ ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು 2ಾ ಅವ=Dೆ ಕೂQಾ ಹಣ ೊಡುCೆ8ೕOೆ, ಕ'ಷƒ ೊಡುCೆ8ೕOೆ ಎಂದು Fೇ] 3 %ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯು Fೆದರ2ೇಡ ಒಂದು ಸಲ ರೂ'Dೆ FೋG ಗಂಡ%ೊಂPDೆ ಮಲGದ ೆ, iಾI ಅದು ಮCೆ8 ಅkಾ[ಸ ಆG Šಡುತ8ೆ ಎಂದು Fೇ] 3 %ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯು ಅವಳ r2ೈt ‚ೕƒ ನದ iೆbJ >ೕxೕಗಳನು: ಮತು8 ಆcೕಲ Hತಗಳನು: wಾiಾ1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ Cೋ= 5ೈಂGಕOಾG ಉೇI 11 1=ಂದ 6%ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ ಹಣ ೊಡುವ•ಾG ಆiೆ ಹು\T 1 %ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬಂPದ. 7%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಬ] wಾiಾ-1%ೇಯವನು: ಕಳjfದ ಸಮಯ 7 %ೇ ಆ ೋಯು 1%ೇ ಆ ೋಯು Oಾಸದ, Vಾನ 5ೆQೆ`Jಯ 402 %ೇ /ಾಟ: Fಾt ನದ9 iೋWಾದ, ಕು]ತು ೊಂಡು wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರ 3ಾತ%ಾ> ೊಂಡು wಾiಾ1 %ೇಯವರು ಅWಾಪBhೆಂದು 7]ದೂ ಕೂಡ wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ I@ ೊಟುT, wಾೊ5ೇU ೊಟುT ಪ•ಸ5ಾ4 ತŠ‹ f>Pದು9, ನಂತರ 1%ೇ ಆ ೋCೆ 7%ೇ ಆ ೋ4ಂದ ರೂ. 30,000/- ಹಣಪQೆದು 7%ೇ ಆ ೋDೆ ಒಂದು ಾಂQೋS ನು: `ೕ> ರೂS Dೆ FೋಗುವಂCೆ 7] 7 %ೇ ಆ ೋ ರೂS Dೆ Fೋದ ಸಮಯ ಆ ೋಗಳj ಎಲರೂ iೇ= 7%ೇ ಆ ೋxಂPDೆ ಮಲಗುವಂCೆ 7] wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರು ಒಪBೇ ಇಾ9ಗ ಆ ೋಗಳj ಎಲರೂ iೇ= wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರನು: ಬಲವಂತPಂದ 7%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಇದ9 ರೂS ಕಳjf 2ಾGಲು FಾIದು9, ಆಗ 7%ೇ ಆ ೋಯು ಒಳG`ಂದ Hಲಕ FಾI wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರು 2ೇಡ 2ೇಡ ಎಂದರೂ ಕೂಡ wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವರ \ ಶUA ಮತು8 Wಾ[ಂU ಮತು8 ಒಳ ಬvೆTಗಳನು: CೆDೆದು, 7%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಬvೆTಗಳನು: CೆDೆದು 1%ೇ ಆ ೋತಳj `ೕ>ದ9 ಾಂQೋS ನು: 7 ಅxೕಯು ಆತನ ಗುWಾ8ಂಗೆa, FಾI wಾiಾ 1%ೇಯವರು 2ೇಡ ಎಂದರೂ ಕೂಡ wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವರ Xೕ5ೆ ಮಲG 7%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಗುWಾ8ಂಗವನು: wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರ ಗುWಾ8ಂಗೆa FಾI wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ ಬಲವಂತPಂದ ಸಂkೋಗ ನQೆದು9, ಆ ಸಮಯ wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ ಬಹಳ ರಕ8iಾವOಾGದು9, 7%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಮತು8 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= ಈ wಾರ FೊರಗQೆ 7]ದ ೆ gೕವ ಸfತ Šಡುವ•Pಲ ಎಂದು 2ೆದ=ೆ FಾIರುCಾ8 ೆ. ಅಲೇ 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ವ ೆGನ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರನು: OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಬಳೊಂಡು zಾದ? ಉhಾ€ಲ, ಸಂP†, ರೕb ಉhಾ€ಲ @ ಾgb ಉhಾ€ಲ, ೈಕಂಬದ ಯƒ ರವ=ಂದ ಹಣ ಪQೆದು wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರನು: ಅವ=Dೆ ಒದG Oೇಶ[ Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಬಳೊಂಡು wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ ಸಂkೋಗ 3ಾ>ರುCಾ8 ೆ. 1=ಂದ 6 %ೇ ವ ೆGನ ಆ ೋಗಳj ಮಂಗಳ<ರು ನಗರದ CvÁÛªÀgÀ ನಂPಗುQೆRಯರುವ ಎ@.ಎಂ.ಆ? ಅWಾUA XಂU Vಾನ ೆQೆ`Jಯ /ಾU ನಂಬ 402 ರ ಅWಾಪ8 2ಾಲIಯರನು: ತ=ೊಂಡು OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ 3ಾ> ಸುಲಭOಾG ಹಣ 3ಾಡುವ ಸ3ಾನ ಉೆ9ೕಶವನು: ಇಟುTೊಂಡು /ಾ\ನ, 3ಾತ%ಾ>ೊಂಡು ಅಲೇ ಒಬ‹=Dೊಬ‹ರು ತಮ, r2ೈt ‚ೕƒ ನ, ಕೃತ[ದ ಬDೆl 3ಾತ%ಾ>ೊಂಡು ಪರಸBರ ಸಂಪಕA 3ಾ>ೊಂಡು ಒಳಸಂಚು ನQೆ, wಾiಾ 1 ಮತು8 wಾiಾ 2 ರವರನು: ಸಂkೋಗದ ಉೆ9ೕಶಾG ಆ ೋ 2 %ೇಯವನ ೆ.ಎt. 14.ಎ.ಎ, 6969 %ೇ ಎ\ADಾ ಾ=ನ wಾiಾ 1 ಮತು8 2 ರವರ ಮ%ೆಯವ=Dೆ Dೊ78ಲೇ ಅಪಹ=ೊಂಡು ತಮ, ಗು5ಾಮನ%ಾ:G 3ಾ>ೊಂಡು ಅWಾಪ8 ಹುಡುG, wಾiಾ 1%ೇಯವಳನು: G ಾIಗ]Dೆ OೇZಾOಾ\ೆDೆ ಒದG, 5ೈಂGಕ Iರುಕುಳ `ೕ>, ಅCಾ[wಾರ ಎಸಗುವಂCೆ 3ಾ>ದು9ದಲೇ, 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇವ ೆGನ ಆ ೋಗಳj wಾiಾ 1%ೇಯವಳನು:, OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ ನQೆಸುವಂCೆ ದುಷŽರೆ `ೕ>, gೕವ 2ೆದ=ೆ FಾIದು9, 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇವ ೆGನ ಆ ೋಗಳj ದುಷŽರೆ ಮತು8 ಸಂHನಂCೆ 7%ೇ ಆ ೋ wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ 5ೈಂGಕ ೌಜAನ[, ನQೆರುವ•ಾGೆ. 1 ಮತು8 2 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj wಾiಾ -1 %ೇವರನು: Oೇಶ[Oಾ\ೆ 12 3ಾ>ಸುವ ಉೆ9ೕಶPಂದ ಾ[2ಾ[ಸ 3ಾಡುವ ಾ[ಸಂiೆpಯ ಬ]4ಂದ ಅಪಹ= OೇಶOಾ\ೆಯ, 7%ೇ ಆ ೋDೆ ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ 2ಾಲIಯನು: ಅWಾಪ8 MದGರುvÁÛgÉ. 7 %ೇ ಆ ೋ ಮಹಮ,- ಶ=ೕe £ÀÄ 1 =ಂದ 2%ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj, 3, 4, 5, 6 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳ •ೊCೆ iೇ= ನQೆಸು78ದ9 Oೇಶ[ ಗೃಹದ, 1%ೇ ಆ ೋ `ೕ>ದ ಾಂQೋS ನು: ಬಳೊಂಡು 7 %ೇ ಆ ೋಯು ತನ: ಗುWಾ8ಂಗವನು: ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ wಾiಾ -1 %ೇಯವರ ಗುWಾ8ಂಗೆa, FಾI ಸಂkೋಗ 3ಾ>ರುCಾ8%ೆ, 3%ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯು ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರನು: 5ೈಂGಕOಾG ಉೇI ನಂತರ ಮುಂದುವ ೆದ Pನಗಳ, ಇತರ ೊಂPDೆ 5ೈಂGಕ I•ೕ Fಾಗು 5ೈಂGಕ ಸಂkೋಗ ನQೆಸುವ ಉೆ9ೕಶPಂದ ಪಕರಣದ, 3%ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯ ವಶPಂದ iಾ…‘ೕನ ಪ>ದ ನ F-1 ಎಂದು ಗುರುತು `ೕ>ದ r2ೈt ƒ ನ ದ, iೆbJ >ೕxೕ ಮತು8 ಪ•ರುಷರ ಮತು8 ಮfhೆಯರ ಆcೕಲ Hತಗಳನು:, wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ Cೋ= ಉೇIರುವ•ಾGೆ. 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ವ ೆGನ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ 2ಾಲIVಾದ wಾiಾ -1 %ೇಯವರನು:, 7 ಆ ೋDೆ ಸಂkೋಗ ನQೆಸಲು ಪwೋP wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರು OೇZಾ[ಗೃಹದ ಇರುವ ಾ[3ಾರದ, ಸಂಗfಸ5ಾಗುವ >ೕxೕ ‚ೕvೋಜನು: wಾiಾ -1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ Cೋ=, ಅದನು: wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರ ಮ%ೆಯವ=Dೆ Cೋ= 3ಾನ ನಷT 3ಾಡುವ 2ೆದ=ೆ FಾIರುವ•ದಲೇ wಾiಾ -1 %ೇಯವರನು: 1 ಮತು8 2 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= 2%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ 2ಾಬು8, ೆಎt-14-ಎಎ-6969%ೇ ಾ=ನ, ಮಂಗಳ<ರು 2ಾರ0 3ಾt ‚ೕರಂ 3ಾt \ iೆಂಟ? 3ಾt ಇCಾ[P ಮ%ೋರಂಜ%ೆ `ೕಡುವ Fೆಸ=ನ, ಸುCಾ8>, ಅವ=Dೆ ಐಾ ಾ' gೕವನದ ಆiೆ Cೋ= ಹಣದ ಆ'ಷ ಒ>R, ಹಣವನು: ಸFಾ `ೕ> ತಂೆ Cಾ4 ‘ ಸಂರ“ತ…Pಂದ Fಾಗು wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವರು ಾ[2ಾ[ಸ 3ಾಡಲು Fೋಗುವ ಾ[ ಸಂiೆpಯ ಮುಖ[ಸ8=Dೆ 7]ಯದಂCೆ wಾiಾ 1 %ೆಯರನು: ಅಪಹ= ೊಂಡು FೋG OೇZಾ[ಗಹೆa ಬಂದ ಟಪ•ರುಷ=Dೆ ಒBರುCಾ8 ೆ, 7 %ೇ ಆ ೋಯು 1 ಮತು8 2 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳ OೇZಾ[ಗೃಹದ.. wಾiಾ -1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ ಸಂkೋಗ 3ಾ> ಅCಾ[wಾರ ಎಸGರುCಾ8%ೆ. 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ವ ೆGನ ಆ ೋಗಳj OೇZಾ[ವೃ78 ನQೆಸುವ ಉೆ9ೕಶPಂದ wಾiಾ-1 iೇಯವರನು: 1 ಮತು8 2 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj 2 %ೇ ಆ ೋDೆ iೇ= ಾರು ನಂಬ? ನ ೆಎt-14-ಎ ಎ - 6969 %ೇದರ°è, ಮಂಗಳ<ರು ನಗರದ §®äoÀ ಪದ ಪ|ವA ಾ5ೇˆ ಬ]4ಂದ ಪ•ಸ5ಾ4 ಅಪಹ= ೊಂಡು ಬಂPದು9, 2%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ 2ಾ>Dೆ ಆ”ಾರದ Xೕ5ೆ ಅ‘kೋಗದರುವ ಮ%ೆಯನು: 2%ೇ ಆ ೋಯು 7]ದು 7]ದು 1%ೇ ಆ ೋxಂPDೆ iೇ=ೊಂಡು OೇZಾ[ಗೃಹವ%ಾ:G ಉಪxೕGರುCಾ8 ೆ. 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ವ ೆGನ ಆ ೋಗಳ WೈI 3=ಂದ 6 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj OೇZಾ[ ವೃ78 ನQೆಸಲು ಅನುಕೂಲOಾಗುವಂCೆ FೊರG`ಂದ G ಾIಗಳನು: ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದು 1 ಮತು8 2 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗ]Dೆ ಸFಾಯ 3ಾ>ರುCಾ8 ೆ. 13 2020%ೇ ಇಸಯ, OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ •ಾಲವನು: ನQೆಸುವ ಏೋೆ9ೕಶPಂದ ಆ ೋಗhೆಲ ರೂ ಒಮ,ನJ`ಂದ ಅವ ೊಳDೆ `ಧA=, ದೂರOಾಗಳ ಮುzಾಂತರ ಪರಸBರ ಸಂಪIAೊಂಡು ಸಣo ವಯJನ ಅOಾ¥ÀÛ ಹುಡುGಯರನು: Fೆಂಗಸರನು:, OೇZಾOಾ\ೆDೆ ಬಳೊಳj€ವ ೇ, ಸಮಯ ಸಂಧಭAಗುಣOಾG ಆ ೋಗಳj ಎಲರೂ iೇ= ಸಂಚನು: ರೂ ಸಂತiೆ8 ಹುಡುGಯರನು: OೇZಾOಾ\ೆDೆ ಒತ8ಡ Fೇ= ಕ ೆ4ೊಂಡು 1 ಮತು8 2 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= Oಾಸ8ವ[ಾaG 2ಾ>DೆDೆ ಪQೆದುೊಂಡ ಮಂಗಳ<ರು ನಗರದ ನಂPಗುQೆR ಎಂಬರುವ ಎ@ ಎS ಆ? Oೆ@T DೇU Vಾನ ಅWಾUA XಂU ನ WಾU ನಂಬ? 402 ಮ%ೆಯ, ಅWಾಪB ವಯJನ 2ಾಲIಯರನು:, ಮತು8 ಯುವ7ಯರನು: ಬಳೊಂಡು OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ ನQೆ ಅDೆ ಬರುವಂತಹ Dಾಹಕ=ಂದ FೆHmನ ಪ3ಾಣದ ಹಣವನು: ಪQೆದು wಾiಾ 1 ಮತು8 wಾiಾ 2 ರವ=Dೆ ಅಲB ಪ3ಾಣದ ಹಣವನು: `ೕ> ವ[ವpತ •ಾಲವನು: ನQೆೊಂಡು ಸಂಚು ರೂರುCಾ8 ೆ. ಆ ೋಗಳ ಈ ಸಂHನಂCೆ ಆ ೋ 5 ಮತು8 6 %ೇಯವರು ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ wಾiಾ 2 %ೇಯವಳನು: 1%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದು 1,2,3,4 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗ]Dೆ ಪ=ಚಯ 3ಾ>ೊಟುT OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಬಳೊಂಡು ಅWಾ‘ತರು %ಾ%ಾ ಸಮಯದ, 2ೇ ೆ 2ೇ ೆ ವ[I8ಗ]Dೆ OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ `ೕ>ದುದಲೇ wಾiಾ 2 %ೇ ಯವರು. 1%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಮ%ೆDೆ OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ 2ಾರೇ ಇದ9 ಸಮಯದ, wಾ iಾ 2%ೇ ಯವರು 1%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬಂದ >xೕವನು: Oೈರt 3ಾಡುವ•ಾG 2ೆದ= wಾiಾ 2 ರವರ ಮುzಾಂತರ wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವರನು: OೇZಾOಾ\ೆ ಬDೆl ಬರ3ಾ>ೊಂಡು wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವಳj ಅWಾಪ8¼ÉAzÀÄ 7]ದೂ ಸಹ ಅವರ ಇwೆ–Dೆ ರುದ!OಾG ಅವಳನು: ಪಸ5ಾ4 ಊಟ 7ಂ> Fಾಗೂ ವಸು8 ೊ>ಸುವ ಆ'ಷವನು: ಒ>R, OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ ನQೆಸುವ •ಾಲದ, ಲುIಸುವ ಉೆ9ೕಶPಂದ ಅಪಹರಣ 3ಾ> ಅವರ ಮುಗ!Cೆಯನು: Fಾಗೂ ಅಸFಾಯಕCೆಯನು: ಬಳೊಂಡು ಹಣದ ದು5ಾAಭವನು: ಪQೆದುೊಂ>ರುCಾ8 ೆ. 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ wಾiಾ 1 ಮತು8 2 %ೇಯವರನು: ದುರುೆ9ೕಶವನು: ಇಟುTೊಂಡು iೆ:ೕಹ 2ೆಳ. ೕ7ಸುವಂCೆ CೋಪA> ನಂŠೆಯನು: ಹು\T ಅವ ೊಂPDೆ ಸಲುDೆ4ಂದ ಇರುವಂCೆ %ೋ>ೊಂಡು OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ ನQೆಸುವ ದುರುೆ9ೕಶPಂದ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಕ ೆ4 ಹಣಾaG 2ೇ ೆ 2ೇ ೆ Pನಗಳ ಆ ೋ 7%ೇಯವ=Dೆ ಅCಾ[wಾರೆa ಅವಾಶ 3ಾ>ೊಟುT, 2ಾPತರ ಅಸFಾಯಕCೆಯನು: ದುಬAಳೆ 3ಾ> ೊಂ>ರುCಾ8 ೆ. ಅWಾಪ8 2ಾಲIVಾದ wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವರನು:, 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj ದುರುೆ9ೕಶPಂದ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಕ ೆ4 ಹಣಾaG ಆ ೋ 7 %ೇ ಯವ=ಂದ ಅCಾ[wಾರೆa, ಅವಾಶ ಕBೊಟುT 7 %ೇ ಆ ೋಯು wಾiಾ 1%ೇ ಯವ=Dೆ ಅCಾ[wಾರ ಎಸGದು9, ಅಲೇ 1=ಂದ 6%ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj ಅCಾ[wಾರದ ನಂತರ wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವಳj 1%ೇ ಆ ೋಯ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಬಂದು Fೋದ Fಾಗೂ OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆಯ ಾಲದ, ಪರ ಪ•ರುಷ ೊಂPDೆ ಇರುವ kಾವHತಗಳನು: wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವ=Dೆ ಅ=ಲದಂCೆ ಮ%ೆDೆ ಅಳವ>ದ ಾ[X ಾದ, iೆ ೆ f>ದು ಅವ•ಗಳನು: Oೈ/ೈ ಮೂಲಕ ೕ˜ a™ೕƒ ZಾU ಗಳನು: ೕ>xೕಗಳನು: ಸಂಗf ಆ a™ೕƒ ZಾU, ೕ>xೕಗಳನು: wಾiಾ 1 14 %ೇಯವರ r2ೈಲlಳ, ಕಳjf ಪರ ಪ•ರುಷ ೊಂPDೆ ಇರುವ `ಮ, Hತಗಳನು: ಮ%ೆಯವ=Dೆ, iೆ:ೕfತ=Dೆ, ಾ5ೇgDೆ Fಾಗೂ 3ಾಧ[ಮೆa `ೕ> Oೈರt 3ಾಡುCಾ8%ೆಂಬ 2ೆದ=ೆಯನು: ಒ>R ಒCಾ8ಯ ಪ|ವAಕOಾG Xೕಂದ Xೕ5ೆ ಈ OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆಯ ವ[78ಯ, kಾG 3ಾಡಲು ಮ%ೆDೆ ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ಹಲOಾರು 2ಾ= ಪ•ರುಷ=ಂದ wಾiಾ 1%ೇಯವರ ಇwೆ–Dೆ ರುದ!OಾG ಸಂkೋಗ 3ಾ>ರುCಾ8 ೆ. 1%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಶ'ೕ%ಾ ಎಂಬವಳj ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದಂತಹ wಾiಾ 1%ೇಯವ]Dೆ 3%ೇ ಆ ೋ ಅiಾ, @ ಸ%ಾ (4) 17, r2ೈt ನರುವ ಆcೕಲ ಸಂkೋಗದ ದೃಶ[ಗಳನು:, Fಾಗೂ 5ೈಂGಕCೆDೆ ಉೇIಸುವ ಉCೆ8ೕಜನಾ= ೕ>x Iಪlಳನು: wಾiಾ 1 %ೇಯವ]Dೆ Cೋ= ಗಂಡಸ ೊಂPDೆ ಮಲGೊಂಡು 5ೈಂGಕCೆDೆ ಸಹಕ=ದ, ತುಂ2ಾ ಹಣ ಗ]ಸಬಹುೆಂದು ಒಂೆರಡು 2ಾ= ಗಂಡಸ ೊಂPDೆ ಮಲGದ ನಂತರ ಆ2ಾ[ಸOಾG Fೋಗುತ8ೆ ಎಂದು ಅWಾಪ8ಯರ ಮನಸJನು: 5ೈಂGಕCೆDೆ ಕಲುšತDೊ] ಪರ ಪ•ರುಷ ೊಂPDೆ ಸಂkೋಗ 3ಾಡಲು ಒCಾ84 OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಇತರ ಆ ೋತ ೊಂPDೆ ಸಹಕ=ರುCಾ8 ೆ. wಾiಾ 1 %ೇ ಅWಾ8ಪ8 2ಾಲIಯನು: ಆೆಯ ಇwೆ–Dೆ ರುದ!OಾG, ಪಸ5ಾ4, 7ಂ> `ೕ>, 7ರುDಾಟ, Oಾಹನದನ ಓQಾಟದ Fೊಸ ಅ'ಷವನು: ಒ>R ೕ7ಸುವಂCೆ %ಾಟಕOಾ>, ಅವರ ಆತ, Zಾ…ಸವನು: ಗ] ಮ%ೆDೆ ಕ ೆದುೊಂಡು FೋG Oಾಸ8ವ[ದ ಮ%ೆಯ ಇವರನು: OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ ಬಳೊಳj€ವ ದುರುೆ9ೕಶPಂದ ಸಮಯ ಸಂಧಭAೆa ಅನುಗುಣOಾG ರHದ ಸಂHನ ಅನ…ಯ OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆ ನQೆಸಲು ಬಳೊಂ>ಾ9 ೆ. 1 ಮತು8 2 %ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj ಸಂಪ|ಣAOಾG OೇZಾ[ವೃ78ಯ ಗ]ೆ4ಂದ gೕವನವನು:, ನQೆಸು78ದು9, ಆ ೋಗಳ WೈI 3 =ಂದ 6 %ೇಯವರು OೇZಾ[ವೃ78ಯನು: ನQೆ gೕವನ ನQೆಸು78ದು, Fಾಗು 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇ ವ ೆGನ ಆ ೋಗಳj ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ 2ಾಲIVಾದ wಾiಾ -1%ೇ ಯವರನು: OೇZಾ[ವೃ78Dೆ ಇ] ಅದ=ಂದ ಗ] ಹಣPಂದ gೕವನ ನQೆಸು78ದ9ರು. 1 =ಂದ 6%ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj wಾiಾ -1 %ೇಯವರನು: 2ೆದ= ಅವಳ ಸಮ,7 ಇಲೆ wಾiಾ-1 %ೆಯವಳನು: OೇZಾ[ಗೃಹೆa, ಪೇಪೇ Fೋಗಲು Wೇ ೇರುವ•ದಲೇ wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರು ಅವರ ಾ[kಾ[ಸ 3ಾಡು78ದ, ಾ5ೇˆ ಬ]4ಂದ ಅಪಹ= OೇZಾ[ಗೃಹೆa ಕ ೆದು ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು wಾiಾ -1 %ೇಯವರನು: OೇZಾ[ವೃ78 ನQೆಸುವ ೇ Pಗ‹ಂಧನದರುCಾ8 ೆ, ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರನು: ಅವಳ ಇwೆ–Dೆ ರುದ!OಾG Oೇಶ[Oಾ\ೆ, ಉೆ9ೕಶPಂದ 1 ಮತು8 2%ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj ಅಕಮOಾG ನQೆಸು78ದ9 OೇZಾಗೃಹದ Pಗ‹ಂಧನದ=, 1 =ಂದ 6 %ೇವ ೆGನ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ=ೊಂಡು wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರನು: 7%ೇ ಆ ೋxಂPDೆ 5ೈಂGಕ ಸಂkೋಗ Fೊಂದ ಎಂಬ ಉೆ9ೕಶPಂದ `ಬAಂ‘ 7 %ೇ ಆ ೋ ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ 2ಾಲI wಾiಾ-1 %ೇಯವರನು:, ಅCಾ[wಾರ ಎಸಗಲು ಸಹಕ=ದು9, 7 %ೇ ಆ ೋತನು ಅWಾಪ8 ವಯJನ wಾಸ-1 %ೇ ಯವರನು: 1 ಮತು8 2 %ೇ ಆ ೋCೆಯವರು ನQೆಸು78ದ9 OೇZಾ[ಗೃಹದ, ಅCಾ[wಾರ ಎಸGರುCಾ8%ೆ. 1 =ಂದ 6%ೇ ಆ ೋಗಳj iೇ= ದೂರOಾ ಮುzಾಂತರ OೇZಾ[Oಾ\ೆDೆ G ಾIಗಳನು: ಸಂಪIA OೇZಾ[ಗೃಹೆa ಬರುವಂCೆ ಪwೋPರುCಾ8 ೆ. 15 ಆದುದ=ಂದ ಆ ೋಗಳj 120(©), 354(J), 354(). 363, 366(J) 370(J) 370(4), 376, 109,506, dvÉUÉ 34 L¦¹ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀ®A: 4, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19 ¥ÉÆÃPÉÆìÃ PÁAiÉÄÝ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀ®A 3, 4, 5, 8 Ln¦ DPïÖ, ºÁUÀÆ 67(©) Information Technology Act ರಂCೆ ಅಪ ಾಧ ಎಸGರುCಾ8 ೆ ಎಂಬುಾG ಸದ ೋಾ ೋಪಾ ಪತ.” It is then the complainant come out of clutches of accused No.1 and generates courage to register complaints. 8. The issue now is not with regard to the claim of innocence of these petitioners or the defence of allegation by the prosecution. The issue that is brought before the Court is, that since the accused are common and the victim is the same, all the cases should be tried as one solitary case. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that all the crimes are registered against common accused and regarding the same transaction, though they happen at different intervals/different dates. The factum of the victim being forced into prostitution is no doubt common, but the persons who have indulged in sex with the minor are all different, they are of different transaction and at different times. As observed hereinabove, every bout of forced sex on the minor by the accused, in the considered view of the Court, would be a separate incident 16 and in each incident the accused who had forced the victim to prostitution have made money separately. The men who indulged in the gory acts on the victim girl are not the same, they are different at different times. Therefore, doctrine of sameness cannot, in the considered view of this Court, be pressed to contend that multiple FIRs cannot be registered. The Apex Court in the case of T.T.ANTONY has held as follows: “19. The scheme of CrPC is that an officer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 CrPC on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) CrPC. However, even after filing such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to make further investigation, normally with the leave of the court, and where during further investigation he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports; this is the import of sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC. 20. From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 CrPC only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 CrPC. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of 17 information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 CrPC.” The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment holds that on a solitary incident if multiple FIRs are registered, it would become an abuse of the process and violate the rights of an accused. The Apex Court in the case of AMITBHAI ANILCHANDRA SHAH has held as follows: “Summary 58.1. This Court accepting the plea of CBI in Narmada Bai [(2011) 5 SCC 79 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 526] that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR directed CBI to “take over” the investigation and did not grant the relief prayed for i.e. registration of a fresh FIR. Accordingly, filing of a fresh FIR by CBI is contrary to various decisions of this Court. 58.2. The various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officer-in-charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 of the Code on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, the investigating officer has to form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 of the Code and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) of the Code. 58.3. Even after filing of such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further 18 investigation normally with the leave of the court and where during further investigation, he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the Code, only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. 58.4. Further, on receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of the police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 of the Code. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report(s) to the Magistrate. A case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs not being a counter- case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is underway or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, is liable to be interfered with by the High Court by exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 58.5. The first information report is a report which gives first information with regard to any offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first FIR. 19 58.6. In the case on hand, as explained in the earlier paragraphs, in our opinion, the second FIR was nothing but a consequence of the event which had taken place on 25-11- 2005/26-11-2005. We have already concluded that this Court having reposed faith in CBI accepted their contention that Tulsiram Prajapati encounter is a part of the same chain of events in which Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi were killed and directed CBI to “take up” the investigation. 58.7. For vivid understanding, let us consider a situation in which Mr A having killed B with the aid of C, informs the police that unknown persons killed B. During investigation, it revealed that A was the real culprit and D abetted A to commit the murder. As a result, the police officer files the charge-sheet under Section 173(2) of the Code with the Magistrate. Although, in due course, it was discovered through further investigation that the person who abetted Mr A was C and not D as mentioned in the charge-sheet filed under Section 173 of the Code. In such a scenario, uncovering of the later fact that C is the real abettor will not demand a second FIR rather a supplementary charge-sheet under Section 173(8) of the Code will serve the purpose. 58.8. Likewise, in the case on hand, initially CBI took a stand that the third person accompanying Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi was Kalimuddin. However, with the aid of further investigation, it unveiled that the third person was Tulsiram Prajapati. Therefore, only as a result of further investigation, CBI has gathered the information that the third person was Tulsiram Prajapati. Thus a second FIR in the given facts and circumstances is unwarranted : instead filing of a supplementary charge-sheet in this regard will suffice the issue. 58.9. Administering criminal justice is a two-end process, where guarding the ensured rights of the accused under the Constitution is as imperative as ensuring justice to the victim. It is definitely a daunting task but equally a compelling responsibility vested on the court of law to protect and shield the rights of both. Thus, a just balance between the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed under the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. Accordingly, the sweeping power of investigation does not 20 warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. As a consequence, in our view this is a fit case for quashing the second FIR to meet the ends of justice. 58.10. The investigating officers are the kingpins in the criminal justice system. Their reliable investigation is the leading step towards affirming complete justice to the victims of the case. Hence they are bestowed with dual duties i.e. to investigate the matter exhaustively and subsequently collect reliable evidences to establish the same. Conclusion 59. In the light of the specific stand taken by CBI before this Court in the earlier proceedings by way of assertion in the form of counter-affidavit, status reports, etc. we are of the view that filing of the second FIR and fresh charge-sheet is violative of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution since the same relate to alleged offence in respect of which an FIR had already been filed and the court has taken cognizance. This Court categorically accepted CBI's plea that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is a part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR and in spite of the fact that this Court directed CBI to “take over” the investigation and did not grant the relief as prayed, namely, registration of fresh FIR, the present action of CBI filing fresh FIR is contrary to various judicial pronouncements which is demonstrated in the earlier part of our judgment. 60. In view of the above discussion and conclusion, the second FIR dated 29-4-2011 being RC No. 3(S)/2011/Mumbai filed by CBI is contrary to the directions issued in judgment and order dated 8-4-2011 by this Court in Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat [(2011) 5 SCC 79: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 526] and accordingly the same is quashed. As a consequence, the charge- sheet filed on 4-9-2012, in pursuance of the second FIR, be treated as a supplementary charge-sheet in the first FIR. It is made clear that we have not gone into the merits of the claim of both the parties and it is for the trial court to decide the same in accordance with law. Consequently, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 149 of 2012 is allowed. Since the said relief is applicable to all the 21 persons arrayed as accused in the second FIR, no further direction is required in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 5 of 2013.” The issue before the Apex Court was concerning killing of one Tulsiram Prajapati. The Apex Court holds that in a situation of A having killed B with the aid of C, informs the Police that unknown killed B. During investigation it was revealed that A was the real culprit and D abetted A to commit the murder. They were all a part of solitary conspiracy. The Apex Court holds in such a scenario of later fact that C is the real abettor will not demand a second FIR rather a supplementary charge sheet under Section 173(8) of the Code would serve the purpose. Drawing these illustrations from paragraphs 55 to 58 the Apex Court at paragraphs 59 and 60 holds that multiple FIRs on that solitary incident was unwarranted as the incident was killing of one Tulsiram Prajapati. 9. The Apex Court in the case of BABUBHAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT3 was again considering an identical issue whether two FIRs could be registered by one Sub-Inspector of Police on the occurrence of the incident at village Dhedhal near the pond and 3 2010(12) SCC 254 22 later found the motor cycle somewhere else which was used for the crime and some persons had been locked inside their houses which were also set on fire. Though it was a solitary incident, this is in two parts. It is in that light the Apex Court holds that multiple FIRs could not be registered. 10. In the case of SMT. VISHALAKSHI BHAT v. STATE OF KARNATAKA4 the coordinate bench of this Court has held as follows: “6. The present cases are clearly of that nature in which a common charge sheet ought to have been filed. Similarly, in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah’s case the Supreme Court has reiterated the procedure that should be followed and has cautioned the courts as regards the examination of the facts and circumstances giving rise to multiple first information reports and the test of sameness to find out whether the multiple cases relate to the same incident in respect of the same transactions. In T T Anthony’s case it is also laid down as follows: “However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.PC. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C. may, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in 4 Crl.P.No.8703/2016 dated 11.01.2017 23 a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.” And the Court has indicated the correct course of action as being that the note ought to have been taken on the findings and contents for the courts to streamline the investigation to ascertain true and correct facts, collect the evidence in support thereof form an opinion under Section 169 and 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the case may be and forward the report under Section 173(2) or Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Magistrate concerned. 7. 7. In the light of the fact that these cases have been filed over a period of time and are pending at various stages and that in some cases charge sheets have been filed, the proper course to be adopted as laid down in Amith Shah’s case would be that it is the first charge sheet which would prevail and the subsequent charge sheets in respect of the similar transactions involving the same petitioner ought to be treated as supplementary charge sheets and the FIRs to be treated as additional statements. 8. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the earliest of the case launched against the petitioner which is now registered in C.C. No.7358/2016 and that all the other cases which are the subject matter of these petitions are subsequent matters. Therefore, it would be prudent to allow the petitions and quash the charge sheets filed and the respective FIRs in each of these cases shall be treated as additional information and the statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the charge sheets that would have 24 necessarily filed in the independent cases shall be submitted as supplementary charge sheets and all these cases shall be tried together in C.C. No.7358/2016. 9. It is necessary that a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs not being a counter case filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or vital report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. is forwarded to the Magistrate, it is necessary for this Court to quash the same in exercise of power under Section 482 as laid down by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the respective FIRs and the charge sheets in the above cases stand quashed. 10. It would also be necessary for the respective Investigating Officer involved in each of the cases to approach the court below which shall return the charge sheets to the concerned Investigating Officer who in turn shall hand over the same to the Investigating Officer in the case that was instituted against the petitioner namely, C.C. No.7358/2016 on the file of the I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who shall in turn proceed in terms of the directions issued herein above and the charge sheets laid before the court. The original records pertaining to each of the cases shall also stand transferred to the aforesaid court which shall try the case as one.” 11. In the case of PRANABJYOTI BARMAN v. UNION OF INDIA5 the Gujarat High Court has held as follows: “17. In the light of aforesaid settled propositions of law and applying the best of sameness, if we read the two FIRS together it becomes clear that both the FIRS have been filed referring to the same incident of the year 2010. In Anju 5 Crl.P.No.1516 of 2019 dd. 22-02-2021 25 Chaudhury (supra), it has been held that where several offences are a part of same transaction, the "test of sameness" has to be applied, whether they are so related to one another on the point of purpose or cause and effect, so as to result in a one continuous action. It has been held that second FIR in respect of same offence forming part of same transaction as complained in the first FIR is not permissible. Commencement of the re- investigation after completion of previous investigation, pursuant to the first FIR and filing of report based on such investigation before the Court is not permissible. Further, it has been held that inbuilt safeguards provided under the CrPC are principles akin to double jeopardy, fair investigation and prevention of abuse of power by investigating agency …. …. …. 19. In view of the findings and discussions above, this Court is of the opinion that instead of quashing the second FIR, it would be suffice if the second FIR is treated as statement under Section 162 CrPC. Accordingly, it is directed that learned trial Court will proceed with the matter by clubbing both the cases together by the same Court, by treating the second FIR as statement under Section 162 CrPC.” 12. The learned counsel for petitioners has also placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of SHAPURJI SORABJI v. EMPEROR reported in 1935 SCC OnLine Bom 57. The said judgment is distinguishable, as the mere existence of a common purpose would not by itself by enough to convert the series of acts into one transaction. 26 13. It now becomes germane to notice the judgment relied on by the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for the 1st respondent. He would place reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE6 wherein it is held as follows: “10. The application for amalgamation of cases is under Section 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code which reads as under: “223. What persons may be charged jointly.—The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely— (a) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction; (b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence; (c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of Section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months; (d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction; (e) persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion, cheating, or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first-named persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last- named offence; (f) persons accused of offences under Sections 411 and 414 of the Penal Code, 1860 or either of those 6 (2003) 11 SCC 786 27 sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence; (g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Penal Code, 1860 relating to counterfeit coin and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such offence; and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply in all such charges: Provided that where a number of persons are charged with separate offences and such persons do not fall within any of the categories specified in this section, the Magistrate may, if such persons by an application in writing, so desire, and if he is satisfied that such persons would not be prejudicially affected thereby, and it is expedient so to do, try all such persons together.” It is thus to be seen that irrespective of the applicability of clauses (a) to (g), Section 223 gives to the Magistrate a discretion to amalgamate cases. The Magistrate has to be satisfied that persons would not be prejudicially affected and that it is expedient to amalgamate cases. As has been set out hereinabove, on a prior occasion the application for amalgamation has been rejected by the Special Judge. The High Court has also rejected the appeal. Under the circumstances, a fresh application for the same relief would not normally lie. Faced with this situation it had been submitted that the present application for amalgamation had been made as the High Court had already held that there was a single conspiracy and had given liberty to apply for amalgamation at a later stage. It is thus necessary to see what the High Court held in the case of Lalu Prasad v. State of Bihar [(2000) 3 Pat LJR 357] . Paragraphs 28 to 32 read as follows: “28. The fact that separate cases have been registered and are being investigated separately and also the fact that this Court during investigation while considering the question as to whether remand in one case will mean the remand in all other cases, has held that some of the cases form different transactions, are not decisive to the question involved in the case. This Court made observations during the course of 28 investigation while deciding the question of remand only. The separate investigation by itself is not decisive of the fact that all the cases are separate. It is only after investigation that the question has to be decided as to whether they are part of the same transaction or not. Similarly, the fact that the accused persons in both the cases are not common is also not an important fact as even in the cases of single transaction, different offences are committed by different sets of the accused persons. The relevant question that was to be considered by the trial court was whether the series of the acts committed by the accused persons forming different offences at different times and at different places were with a view to fulfil one common purpose and there was a community of criminal intent so as to form a single transaction or different offences were committed independently with a view to fulfil different purpose or object though there was similarity between the purpose and object in the cases. Even if the trial court would have found that the offences alleged to have been committed did not form one transaction, it should have also considered the cases of the petitioners in terms of the proviso to Section 223 of the Code whether it was expedient in the ends of justice to hold a joint trial on such prayer being made in writing by the accused persons and the same was not causing any prejudice to any of the accused persons. The trial court has also not made any effort to find out as to what is the view of the other accused persons facing the trial. For all these reasons, the order passed by the trial court suffers from legal infirmity. 29.*** 30. The next question is as to what order should be passed in this case after having came to the conclusion that the order passed by the Special Judge suffers from legal infirmity. Whether the matter is to be remanded for fresh consideration at this stage or some other direction is to be given taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. 29 31. During the course of argument and in the written argument filed on behalf of one set of the accused, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the offences committed in these two cases and other cases are the part of the same transaction, but they have not given the details of other cases. In other cases either charge-sheets have been submitted or the same are still to be submitted. In that circumstance, this question cannot be decided by taking into consideration the allegation made in these two cases only. If this question is decided only after taking into consideration the allegations in these two cases then that matter will not come to an end as this question will be reagitated time and again by the petitioners and other accused persons as and when the other cases will be ripe for framing of the charges and the result would be that the trial will not proceed in any case. 32. Taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case arising out of the Animal Husbandry Scam, I am of the view that the said question is to be decided only when other cases are also ready and reach the stage of framing of the charges. At that stage, if a proper application is filed by the accused persons or by some of the accused persons, the trial court will consider the said question. While considering the question if some of the accused persons have not prayed for joint trial, then the trial court will also consider their stand in the light of the legal positions indicated above. The trial court will also consider whether it will be possible or practicable to dispose of all the cases or some of the cases jointly or they should be tried separately. It is to be clarified that the paramount consideration should be the cause of justice.” It is thus to be seen that the High Court has not concluded that there was a single conspiracy. The High Court has correctly held that this question can be decided only when the other cases are also ready and reach the stage of framing of the charges. As has been indicated above, all the cases have not reached the stage of framing of the charges. Three of the cases are still at the appearance stage. Two of the cases are at the stage of framing 30 of charge. Thus in any case, the application was premature. Moreover, the present attempt is likely to result in delay in trial of Case No. RC 20(A)/96-Patna which has progressed considerably. The High Court has also correctly held that it is the trial court which would have to consider the stand of other accused persons who have not prayed for joint trial. It is to be seen that apart from the appellants there are a large number of other accused persons. Most of the other accused persons have not applied for joint trial. This Court does not know what their stand is. When this was pointed out to the counsel for the appellants, it was stated that affidavit of consent, for joint trial, by all the accused in all the cases would be filed before this Court. In our view this is not the stage when such affidavits could be filed. The consent had to be obtained before the application for amalgamation was made. It was for the Special Judge to consider whether it was expedient and in the interest of justice that all accused persons, in all the cases, be tried jointly. It is neither expedient nor proper that the appellants be permitted to bypass the trial court in this manner. 11. There is another more important reason why these appeals cannot be allowed. This Court, in the case of CBI v. Braj Bhushan Prasad [(2001) 9 SCC 432 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 576] considered the question whether these cases stood transferred to the State of Jharkhand by virtue of the Bihar Reorganisation Act. Opposing a transfer it was submitted that the cases related to an alleged single conspiracy which had taken place in Patna. It was submitted that the trials thus had to continue in Patna. This Court considered what were the main offences in those cases. Admittedly these six cases are part of the cases considered by this Court. Paragraphs 34 to 37 read as follows: (SCC pp. 444-45) “34. What is the main offence in the charges involved in all these 36 cases? It is undisputed that the main offence is under Section 13(1)(c) and also Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The first among them is described thus: ‘13. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,— *** 31 (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do;’ The next offence is described like this: ‘13. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,— *** (d) if he,— (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest;’ 35. We have no doubt in our mind that the hub of the act envisaged in the first of those two offences is ‘dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates’. Similarly the hinge of the act envisaged in the second section is ‘obtains’ for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means. 36. The above acts were completed in the present cases when the money has gone out of the public treasuries and reached the hands of any one of the persons involved. Hence, so far as the offences under Section 13(1)(c) and Section 13(1)(d) are concerned the place where the offences were committed could easily be identified as the place where the treasury concerned was situated. It is an undisputed fact that in all these cases the treasuries were situated within the territories of Jharkhand State. 37. Thus, when it is certain where exactly the offence under Section 13 of the PC Act was committed it is an unnecessary exercise to ponder over the other areas 32 wherein certain allied activities, such as conspiracy or preparation, or even the prefatory or incidental acts were done, including the consequences that ensued.” Thus it has already been held, by a three-Judge Bench of this Court, that the main offences were under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It has been held that the offence of conspiracy is an allied offence to the main offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The cases are before the Special Judges because the main offences are under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The main offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act in each case is in respect of the alleged transaction in that case. As conspiracy is only an allied offence, it cannot be said that the alleged overt acts are in the course of the same transaction. We are bound by this decision. In any case we see no reason to take a different view. As it has already been held that the charge of conspiracy is only an allied charge and that the main charges (under the Prevention of Corruption Act) are in respect of separate and distinct acts i.e. monies siphoned out of different treasuries at different times, we fail to see as to how these cases could be amalgamated.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. Apart from the afore-quoted judgment relied on by the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor, it is germane to notice the other set of judgments which considered multiple FIRs being registered in cases of rioting. The Apex Court in the case of ANJU CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH7 has held as follows: 7 (2013) 6 SCC 384 33 “A cardinal question of public importance and one that is likely to arise more often than not in relation to the lodging of the first information report (FIR) with the aid of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) or otherwise independently within the ambit of Section 154 of the Code is as to whether there can be more than one FIR in relation to the same incident or different incidents arising from the same occurrence. … … … 14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced into writing by the officer-in-charge of a police station. This implies that there has to be the first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the investigating agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains a 34 kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, re-examination by the investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it would not only further the object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, reinvestigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code. (Ref. Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. [(2009) 9 SCC 129 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1051] and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali [(2013) 5 SCC 762] of the same date.) 15. It has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR about the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be appropriate for the court to lay down one straitjacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and facts depending upon the merits of a given case. 16. In Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] the Court was concerned with the registration of a second FIR in relation to the same facts but constituting different offences and where ambit and scope of the investigation was entirely different. Firstly, an FIR was registered and even the charge-sheet filed was primarily concerned with the offence of conspiracy to cheat and misappropriation by the two accused. At that stage, the investigating agency was not aware of any conspiracy to send 35 the pillars (case property) out of the country. It was also not known that some other accused persons were parties to the conspiracy to obtain possession of the pillars from the court, which subsequently surfaced in London. Earlier, it was only known to the police that the pillars were stolen as the property within the meaning of Section 410 IPC and were in possession of the accused person (Narang brothers) in London. 17. The Court in Ram Lal Narang [(1979) 2 SCC 322: 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] declined to grant relief of discharge to the petitioner in that case where the contention raised was that entire investigation in the FIR subsequently instituted was illegal as the case on same facts was already pending before the courts at Ambala and courts in Delhi were acting without jurisdiction. The fresh facts came to light and the scope of investigation broadened by the facts which came to be disclosed subsequently during the investigation of the first FIR. The comparison of the two FIRs has shown that the conspiracies were different. They were not identical and the subject-matter was different. The Court observed that there was a statutory duty upon the police to register every information relating to cognizable offence and the second FIR was not hit by the principle that it is impermissible to register a second FIR of the same offence. 18. The Court held as under : (Ram Lal Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] , SCC pp. 337- 38, paras 20-22) “20. Anyone acquainted with the day-to-day working of the criminal courts will be alive to the practical necessity of the police possessing the power to make further investigation and submit a supplemental report. It is in the interests of both the prosecution and the defence that the police should have such power. It is easy to visualise a case where fresh material may come to light which would implicate persons not previously accused or absolve persons already accused. When it comes to the notice of the investigating agency that a person already accused of an offence has a good alibi, is it not the duty of that agency to investigate the genuineness of the plea of alibi and submit a report to the Magistrate? After all the investigating agency has greater resources at its 36 command than a private individual. Similarly, where the involvement of persons who are not already accused comes to the notice of the investigating agency, the investigating agency cannot keep quiet and refuse to investigate the fresh information. It is their duty to investigate and submit a report to the Magistrate upon the involvement of the other persons. In either case, it is for the Magistrate to decide upon his future course of action depending upon the stage at which the case is before him. If he has already taken cognizance of the offence, but has not proceeded with the enquiry or trial, he may direct the issue of process to persons freshly discovered to be involved and deal with all the accused in a single enquiry or trial. If the case of which he has previously taken cognizance has already proceeded to some extent, he may take fresh cognizance of the offence disclosed against the newly involved accused and proceed with the case as a separate case. What action a Magistrate is to take in accordance with the provisions of CrPC in such situations is a matter best left to the discretion of the Magistrate. The criticism that a further investigation by the police would trench upon the proceeding before the court is really not of very great substance, since whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate. That the final word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation. We should not, however, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by the court of any offence. We think that in the interests of the independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light. 37 21. As observed by us earlier, there was no provision in CrPC, 1898 which, expressly or by necessary implication, barred the right of the police to further investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate. Neither Section 173 nor Section 190 lead us to hold that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under Section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as necessary when fresh information came to light. Where the police desired to make a further investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation. 22. As in the present case, occasions may arise when a second investigation started independently of the first may disclose a wide range of offences including those covered by the first investigation. Where the report of the second investigation is submitted to a Magistrate other than the Magistrate who has already taken cognizance of the first case, it is up to the prosecuting agency or the accused concerned to take necessary action by moving the appropriate superior court to have the two cases tried together. The Magistrates themselves may take action suo motu. In the present case, there is no problem since the earlier case has since been withdrawn by the prosecuting agency. It was submitted to us that the submission of a charge-sheet to the Delhi Court and the withdrawal of the case in the Ambala Court amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. We do not think that the prosecution acted with any oblique motive. In the charge-sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that Mehra was already facing trial in the Ambala Court and he was, therefore, not being sent for trial. In the 38 application made to the Ambala Court under Section 494 CrPC, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against Mehra and others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court. The Court granted its permission for the withdrawal of the case. Though the investigating agency would have done better if it had informed the Ambala Magistrate and sought his formal permission for the second investigation, we are satisfied that the investigating agency did not act out of any malice. We are also satisfied that there has been no illegality. Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed.” 19. In M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka [(1999) 3 SCC 247 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 397] , this Court took the view that even where the article of charge was similar but for a different period, there was nothing in the Code to debar registration of the second FIR. The Court opined that the FIR was registered for an offence under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act related to the period 1-8-1978 to 1-4-1989 and the investigation culminated into filing of a report which was accepted by the Court. The second FIR and subsequent proceedings related to a later period which was 1-8-1978 to 25- 7-1978 under similar charges. It was held that there was no provision which debar the filing of a subsequent FIR. 20. In T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] , the Court explained that an information given under sub-section (1) of Section 154 of the Code is commonly known as the first information report (FIR). Though this term is not used in the Code, it is a very important document. The Court concluded that second FIR for the same offence or occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences was not permissible. In this case, the Court discussed the judgments in Ram Lal Narang [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] and M. Krishna [(1999) 3 SCC 247 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 397] in some detail, and while quashing the subsequent FIR held as under : (T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] , SCC pp. 198-99 & 204, paras 23-25 & 35) 39 “23. The right of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is a statutory right over which the court does not possess any supervisory jurisdiction under CrPC. In King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [(1943- 44) 71 IA 203] the Privy Council spelt out the power of the investigation of the police, as follows : (IA p. 212) ‘… In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as Their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court.’ 24. This plenary power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is, however, not unlimited. It is subject to certain well-recognised limitations. One of them, is pointed out by the Privy Council, thus : (Khwaja Nazir case [(1943-44) 71 IA 203] , IA p. 213) ‘… if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more, if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation….’ 25. Where the police transgresses its statutory power of investigation the High Court under Section 482 CrPC or Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and this Court in an appropriate case can interdict the investigation to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. *** 35. For the aforementioned reasons, the registration of the second FIR under Section 154 CrPC on the basis of the letter of the Director General of Police as Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station is not valid and consequently the investigation made pursuant thereto is of no legal consequence, they are accordingly quashed. We hasten to add that this does not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the Court in Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 for making further investigations and filing a further report or reports under Section 173(8) CrPC before the competent 40 Magistrate in the said cases. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under challenge insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station against the ASP (R.A. Chandrasekhar); in all other aspects the impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand set aside.” 21. The judgment of this Court in T.T. Antony [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] came to be further explained and clarified by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash [(2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] , wherein the Court stated as under : (Upkar Singh case [(2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] , SCC pp. 297- 300, paras 17-18 & 23-25) “17. It is clear from the words emphasised hereinabove in the above quotation, this Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] has not excluded the registration of a complaint in the nature of a counter-case from the purview of the Code. In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code. This prohibition noticed by this Court, in our opinion, does not apply to counter-complaint by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident. 18. This Court in Kari Choudhary v. Sita Devi [(2002) 1 SCC 714 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 269] discussing this aspect of law held : (SCC p. 717, para 11) ‘11. The learned counsel adopted an alternative contention that once the proceedings initiated under FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the police had no authority to register a second FIR and number it as FIR No. 208. Of 41 course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency. Even that apart, the report submitted to the court styling it as FIR No. 208 of 1998 need be considered as an information submitted to the court regarding the new discovery made by the police during investigation that persons not named in FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To quash the said proceedings merely on the ground that final report had been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The ultimate object of every investigation is to find out whether the offences alleged have been committed and, if so, who have committed it.’ *** 23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] is to be accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code. 24. We have already noticed that in T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] this Court did not consider the legal right of an aggrieved person to file counterclaim, on the contrary from the observations found in the said judgment it clearly indicates that filing a counter-complaint is permissible. 25. In the instant case, it is seen in regard to the incident which took place on 20-5-1995, the appellant 42 and the first respondent herein have lodged separate complaints giving different versions but while the complaint of the respondent was registered by the police concerned, the complaint of the appellant was not so registered, hence on his prayer the learned Magistrate was justified in directing the police concerned to register a case and investigate the same and report back. In our opinion, both the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the same is hit by Section 161 or 162 of the Code which, in our considered opinion, has absolutely no bearing on the question involved. Section 161 or 162 of the Code does not refer to registration of a case, it only speaks of a statement to be recorded by the police in the course of the investigation and its evidentiary value.” (emphasis in original) 22. Somewhat similar view was taken by a Bench of this Court in Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat [(2006) 1 SCC 732 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 481] , wherein the Court held that the subsequent FIRs cannot be prohibited on the ground that some other FIR has been filed against the petitioner in respect of other allegations filed against the petitioner. 23. This Court also had the occasion to deal with the situation where the first FIR was a cryptic one and later on, upon receipt of a proper information, another FIR came to be recorded which was a detailed one. In this case, the Court took the view that no exception could be taken to the same being treated as an FIR. In Vikram v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 12 SCC 332 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 362] , the Court held that it was not impermissible in law to treat the subsequent information report as the first information report and act thereupon. In Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(1970) 2 SCC 113 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 328] also, this Court examined the question as to whether cryptic, anonymous and oral messages, which do not clearly specify the cognizable offence, can be treated as FIR, and answered the question in the negative. 24. In matters of complaints, the Court in Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar [(2012) 1 SCC 130 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 513] expressed the view that the law does not prohibit filing or 43 entertaining of a second complaint even on the same facts, provided that the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or where the complete facts could not be placed before the court and the applicant came to know of certain facts after the disposal of the first complaint. The Court applied the test of full consideration of the complaints on merits. In para 18, the Court held as under: (SCC p. 136) “18. Thus, it is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts could not be placed before the court or where the complainant came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, the second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the case of the complainant on merit.” 25. The first information report is a very important document, besides that it sets the machinery of criminal law in motion. It is a very material document on which the entire case of the prosecution is built. Upon registration of FIR, beginning of investigation in a case, collection of evidence during investigation and formation of the final opinion is the sequence which results in filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code. The possibility that more than one piece of information is given to the police officer-in-charge of a police station, in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences, cannot be ruled out. Other materials and information given to or received otherwise by the investigating officer would be statements covered under Section 162 of the Code. The court in order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of “sameness” to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second FIR may be 44 liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, whether the version of the second FIR is different and they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible, this is the view expressed by this Court in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 12 SCC 254 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 336] . This judgment clearly spells out the distinction between two FIRs relating to the same incident and two FIRs relating to different incidents or occurrences of the same incident, etc. 26. To illustrate such a situation, one can give an example of the same group of people committing theft in a similar manner in different localities falling under different jurisdictions. Even if the incidents were committed in close proximity of time, there could be separate FIRs and institution of even one stating that a number of thefts had been committed, would not debar the registration of another FIR. Similarly, riots may break out because of the same event but in different areas and between different people. The registration of a primary FIR which triggered the riots would not debar registration of subsequent FIRs in different areas. However, to the contra, for the same event and offences against the same people, there cannot be a second FIR. This Court has consistently taken this view and even in Chirra Shivraj v. State of A.P.[(2010) 14 SCC 444: s(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 757] , the Court took the view that : (SCC p. 448, para 14) “14. … There cannot be a second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first information report.” 27. Now, we should examine the facts of the present case in the light of the principles stated supra. The complaint/application under Section 156(3) filed by Respondent 2 was founded on the condolence meeting which was attended by a large number of persons including the persons named in the complaint. According to Respondent 2, named persons had given speeches which were communal, provoking and were creating disharmony between the communities, and encouraging people to commit criminal offences rather than to follow the due 45 process of law. The complaint of Respondent 2 did not relate to any event prior to the holding of the meeting and participation of the stated persons. This complaint was of a general nature and related to various communal riots that occurred subsequent to and as a result of the meeting. Thus, it related to a different case, grievance and alleged commission of offences at the time and subsequent to the holding of the meeting. 28. First Information Report No. 145 of 2007 lodged by Hazrat, son of Bismillah related to the burning of a shop prior to holding of a meeting. He categorically stated that he did not know the persons or names of the perpetrators who attacked the shop where he was working. This incident occurred at 6 p.m. as per the records while the meeting itself, as per Respondent 2 was held after 8 p.m., though on the same date. His report clearly states that when he was going back to his house at about 8.30 p.m., he stopped at the place where the meeting was being held. The FIR registered by Hazrat was against unknown persons and related to a particular event and commission of a particular crime. There was no question of any provocation, conspiracy or attempt by the persons premeditatedly committing the offences which they committed. As per the FIR, it was an offence committed at random by some unknown persons. The registration of such FIR was neither intended to be nor was it in fact in relation to a matter of larger investigation, or commission of offences, as alleged by Respondent 2. 29. Even the offences which are stated to have been committed, and for which the two FIRs were registered in these respective cases were different and distinct. In the complaint filed by Parvez Parwaz, which was registered as a FIR, names of the persons were mentioned and a general investigation was called for, while FIR No. 145 of 2007 registered by Hazrat, was against unknown persons for damage of his property, which was for a specific offence, without any other complaint or allegation of any communal instigation or riot. In other words, these were two different FIRs relatable to different occurrences, investigation of one was in no way dependent upon the other and they are neither interlinked nor 46 interdependent. They were lodged by different persons in relation to occurrences which are alleged to have occurred at different points of time against different people and for different offences. Requirement of proof in both cases was completely distinct and different. Thus, there was no similarity and the test of similarity would not be satisfied in the present case. Thus, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that lodging of the subsequent FIR was not a second FIR for the same occurrence as stated in FIR No. 145 of 2007, and thus, could be treated as a first information report for all purposes including investigation in terms of the provisions of the Code. It was not in the form of a statement under Section 162 of the Code” (Emphasis supplied) The question posed before the Apex Court was that whether there can be more than one FIR in relation to the same incident or different incidents arising from the same occurrence. Answering the said issue the Apex Court considers the entire spectrum of law right from RAM LAL NARANG, T.T. ANTONY and all other cases on identical issues and holds that in certain situations multiple FIRs registered will not be hit by the doctrine of sameness. The Apex Court at paragraph 14 elaborates Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Cr.P.C. and considers whether the incident is separate; offences are similar or different or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the 47 FIR recorded first and then the second FIR could be registered. It also considers that if the FIR is about the same incident or offence or is based on distinct and different facts and the scope of enquiry is different, it will not be appropriate for any Court to lay down one strait-jacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This would become a matter of trial. The Apex Court further holds that any other material and information given or received otherwise would become statement under Section 162 of the Code but that does not mean that FIR should not be registered. The Apex Court also considers certain illustrations and at paragraph 29 on the facts of the case holds that two FIRs could be registered on the same incident. The Apex Court considers that FIRs registered were different and distinct. That was also a case of rioting. Therefore, in a case of rioting it is not the case that multiple FIRs should not be registered. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners were all cases where one solitary incident had led to multiple FIRs against one accused. The facts in the case at hand are not akin to what led to the Apex Court in rendering those judgments. 48 15. Reference is being made to a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh rendered in the case of JAKIR HUSSAIN KASANGI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH8. The question before the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court can be gathered from the first paragraph and it reads as follows: “The petitioners in all these writ petitions seek the issue of writs of mandamus to declare the action of the respondents in allowing the registration of multiple FIRs and conducting an investigation into all of them, in relation to the same set of facts, as unconstitutional. They also pray as a consequence, a direction to the respondents to tag all subsequently registered FIRs to the first FIR and also to set aside all the Prisoner Transit warrants issued against them.” The Division Bench considers the issue and holds as follows: 17. The main thrust of the argument before the Supreme Court was that a balance had to be struck between the sweeping power of investigation available to the police and the fundamental rights of citizens guaranteed under the Constitution. Accepting the said argument, the Supreme Court held in para-27 of the report as follows: A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further 8 2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 240 49 investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C., nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 18. 18. A careful look at all the observations of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony would show that the bar to the registration of a second FIR was read into the Code of Criminal Procedure, whenever the second or subsequent information related to the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or same incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. The emphasis laid by the Supreme Court was on the sameness of the truth and substance of the gravamen of the charges. 19. As we have pointed out earlier, an important aspect to be noted in the decision of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony is that the Supreme Court did not quash the two FIRs in Crime Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 registered at two different places on the very date of the occurrence, but quashed only the FIR filed after 3 years pursuant to the recommendation of the commission of inquiry. Therefore, it follows that the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court was not applied to the second FIR filed on the same date. 50 20. In Narinderjit Singh Sahni v. Union of India, a 3- member Bench of the Supreme Court was concerned with a batch of writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking bail in the nature as prescribed under Section 438 of the Code. The petitioners in Narinderjit Singh Sahni were inspired by the earlier orders passed by the Supreme Court, one in V.K. Sharma v. Union of India (2000) 9 SCC 449 and another in P.K. Sharma dated 05-5-2000. Actually the petitioners in Narinderjit Singh Sahni sought the very same reliefs as granted to the petitioners in V.K. Sharma which was followed in another case P.K. Sharma v. Union of India, but a Two Member bench of the Supreme Court found it difficult to accept the orders passed in V.K. Sharma and P.K. Sharma. Therefore, the Two Member bench referred the petitions in Narinderjit Singh Sahni to a larger bench. The main thrust of the argument before the 3- member bench in Narinderjit Singh Sahni was that the chase given to the very same accused by different police for the same set of offences was an infraction of Article 21. It is relevant to note at this stage that the petitioners before the Supreme Court in Narinderjit Singh Sahni included the Chairman and Managing Director of a group of companies (about 40 companies) having 50 branches all over the country, which accepted deposits from the public. When the companies failed to repay the deposits and the cheques issued by them bounced, criminal proceedings came to be initiated at various places including Delhi, Mumbai, Pune, Chandigarh, Udaipur, Gurhgam, Ghaziabad, Ludhiana, Dehradun and Ambala. 21. Interestingly, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the batch of cases before us are nothing but a repetition of the very same arguments advanced before the Supreme Court in Narinderjit Singh Sahni. In brief, two contentions were raised before the Supreme Court, namely, (a) that due to the production warrants issued by various Courts in various States, a situation had arisen whereby the accused can never be released, but had to be shuttled from one place to another on a Bharat Darshan (probably at the cost of the State) and (b) that when all the cases registered against the accused are basically under Section 420 read with Section 120B of the IPC, there cannot be several cases jeopardising the fundamental rights of the accused. 51 22. Dealing with the alleged infraction of Article 21, the Supreme Court opined in para-54 of its judgment that a deprivation of personal liberty in accordance with the procedure established by law would not amount to an infraction of Article 21. In para-61 of the judgment, the Supreme Court pointed out in Narinderjit Singh Sahni that the proposition that an accused being involved in a large number of criminal cases in different parts of the country, if not able to be released from custody even on getting bail orders in some cases would tantamount to a violation of the right under Article 21 cannot be accepted. 23. The Supreme Court went on to point out in para-61 that it would be a misplaced sympathy of the Court on white- collared accused persons whose acts of commission and omission had ruined a vast majority of poor citizens of the country. After pointing this out, the Supreme Court recorded its disapproval of the orders passed in V.K. Sharma and P.K. Sharma. 24. More importantly the Supreme Court dealt with the question of consolidation, though not in so many words, in para- 64 of the judgment and held as follows: As regards the issue of a single offence, we are afraid that the fact situation of the matters under consideration would not permit to lend any credence to such a submission. Each individual deposit agreement shall have to be treated as separate and individual transaction brought about by the allurement of the financial companies, since the parties are different, the amount of deposit is different and also the period for which the deposit was effected. It has all the characteristics of independent transactions and we do not see any compelling reason to hold it otherwise. 25. Having said so in para-64 of the judgment, the Supreme Court held in para-67 of the judgment in Narinderjit Singh Sahni that in regard to the prayer for consolidation the petitioner would be at liberty to approach the High Court in accordance with law. 26. In Kari Choudhary v. Most. Sitadevi, the mother-in- law of a lady lodged a FIR claiming that a few persons from 52 outside sneaked into the bedroom of her daughter-in-law and murdered her. In the course of investigation into the FIR so lodged, the police found that it was the mother-in-law and her other daughters-in-law, who had conspired to kill the victim. Therefore after sending a closure report in respect of the FIR lodged by the mother-in-law, the police registered a second FIR against the mother-in-law and others. The validity of the second FIR was challenged and when the matter landed up before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court observed as a general proposition that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But the Court nevertheless pointed out in paragraph-11 of the judgment that when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same agency. 27. In State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal another 3-member bench of the Supreme Court was confronted with yet another case of similar nature. In that case, a company by name Golden Forest (India) Limited and its Directors faced prosecution in different Courts for offences under Sections 406, 420, 468, 471 and 120B of the IPC read with Section 7(2) of the Punjab Reforms Act, 1972, on the allegation that the company collected deposits from thousands of members of the public promising to repay the same, but failed to repay on the maturity date. The Director of the Company filed 2 petitions under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court, praying under one for the dropping of the charges and praying in another for the trial of all cases in one Court. The High Court followed the order passed by the Supreme Court in V.K. Sharma and transferred all cases pending in different Courts in the State of Punjab to the Court of a Special Judicial Magistrate. It was this order of the High Court that was challenged by the State of Punjab before the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal. While pointing out that the orders passed in V.K. Sharma were not to be treated as a precedent, even as per its own terms, the Supreme Court held in para-7 as follows: In the present case, different people have alleged to have been defrauded by the respondent and the company and therefore each offence is of distinct one and cannot be regarded as constituting a single series of facts/transaction. 53 28. Having said so in para-7, the Supreme Court probably opened a small leverage in para-8 by making an observation that in that case the High Court did not invoke its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to transfer the cases to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. It must be pointed out at this stage that the decision of the Two Member Bench of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court either in Narinderjit Singh Sahni or in State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal. 29. In Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, a three Member Bench of the Supreme Court had to consider the correctness of the decision in T.T. Antony, upon a reference made to it by a Two Member Bench. In Upkar Singh, there were two FIRs by rival groups, one group making allegations against the other. What was argued before the Supreme Court in Upkar Singh was that as per the decision in T.T. Antony, a second FIR in the nature of a counter case is not registerable, once a FIR is already registered on the complaint of one party. But the Supreme Court pointed out in Upkar Singh that such a conclusion did not flow out of the decision in T.T. Antony. Therefore in effect, the Supreme Court was concerned in Upkar Singh only with the validity of a counter complaint to a complaint. Upkar Singh was also not a case of successive FIRs by different persons against the same accused. 30. In Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, a Multi State Cooperative Bank failed to repay its depositors. Alleging that the Managing Director and other officers of the Bank had defalcated the funds of the Bank, a criminal complaint was first registered with the local police at the instance of the Bank for the offences under Sections 405, 406, 408, 409 and 120B of the I.P.C. But within a few days, the High Court of Gujarat passed an order in a Public Interest Litigation directing the CBI to conduct an investigation into the deeds and misdeeds of the very same set of officers. Therefore, the CBI registered another FIR within a month of the registration of the first FIR by the local police. Later the CBI also took over the investigation into the first complaint. 54 31. Thereafter, the Multi State Cooperative Bank filed a series of party-wise complaints for offences under Sections 406, 409, 420, 467 and 471 read with 120B of the IPC. On all these complaints, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate ordered an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. The accused filed an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to recall its order on the ground that the CBI is already investigating into the very same set of offences. But the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate rejected the application on the ground that what was investigated by the CBI was with respect to specific offences of fraud and misappropriation pertaining to Mumbai Branch and that the offences for which complaints were filed before the Magistrate pertained to the Ahmadabad Branch. The accused challenged those orders before the High Court unsuccessfully and the matter landed up in the Supreme Court. The accused placed heavy reliance upon the decision in T.T. Antony but the Supreme Court held that the case of the accused in Rameshchandra did not fall within the principles enunciated in T.T. Antony. The Court pointed out that the complaints of malfeasance and misfeasance registered later, were not in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences nor were they alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence. 32. In Vikram v. State of Maharashtra, one FIR came to be registered on the basis of an oral message received on telephone and the second FIR was registered after receipt of grater details. The trial Court convicted a group of persons and the High Court upheld the same. When the matter landed up in Supreme Court, it was argued that the second FIR was unlawful. But the said contention was rejected by the Supreme Court by pointing out that a cryptic and anonymous oral message, which did not in terms clearly specify the commission of a cognizable offence, cannot be treated as First Information Report. In other words the argument relating to the validity of the second FIR was rejected on the reasoning that there was virtually one clear FIR and the other was cryptic and vague. 33. In Pramod Kumar Saxena v. Union of India, what was before the Supreme Court was a writ petition under Article 32 55 praying for (i) the release of the petitioner on bail in connection with all the cases listed in the annexure, (ii) a direction to all concerned to release the petitioner on bail, in the event of his arrest pursuant to any other criminal case with respect to the same offence and (iii) a direction to the State to evolve a mechanism to ensure the presence of the petitioner in all the cases as well as the speedy disposal of all cases. The grievance of the petitioner in Pramod Kumar Saxena was that he was implicated as an accused in as many as 48 cases in 6 different States for alleged offences under Sections 406, 409 and 420 read with Section 120B of IPC and also under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and that, therefore, he is not able to come out of the jail despite securing bail. 34. Though the Supreme Court held in Pramod Kumar Saxena that the petitioner deserved some relief, the Court categorically ruled in para-34 of its judgment as follows: So far as consolidation of cases and trial of all the cases in one Court is concerned, as observed hereinabove, such relief cannot be granted. V.K. Sharma, wherein such relief was granted, has been expressly overruled by Rajesh Syal. 35. It is to be noted that even in Pramod Kumar Saxena, the Supreme Court did not take note of T.T. Antony, but took note of the order passed in V.K. Sharma and the decisions in State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal and Narinderjit Singh Sahni v. Union of India. 36. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, the validity of the fresh investigation undertaken by the Central Bureau of Investigation after the filing of the charge sheet before the Criminal Court by the local police for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 120 B of I.P.C. r/w Sections 13(1)(d)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in connection with a scam relating to the appointment of Panchayat Secretaries, was in question. The Supreme Court held that the second FIR lodged by the CBI was on a wider canvass and that it was lodged after holding a detailed preliminary enquiry. Pointing out the distinction between an offence committed by an individual or two and an offence disclosed in a scandal involving a large number of officers, the Supreme Court cited with the 56 approval, the decision in Ram Lal Narang. In Nirmal Singh, the Supreme Court took note of the distinction made in T.T. Antony to the decision in Ram Lal Narang and thereafter held in paragraph 50 of its decision as follows: We must also bear in mind the distinction between crime committed by an individual or a group of persons vis-a-vis a scam which means “to get money or property from, another, under false pretences, by gaining the confidence of the victim, also includes; swindle; defraud”. 37. In C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, which came to be known popularly as Dharmapuri bus burning case, two FIRs, one lodged with regard to the attack on a road transport corporation bus and another lodged with regard to the burning of a bus carrying college students on a tour, were taken up together and a consolidated charge sheet was filed. The most interesting aspect of this case is that in all other cases where there were multiple FIRs, the accused sought consolidation or at least challenged the investigation into the second complaint. But in this case, the accused assailed the consolidation of the investigation into two different FIRs on the ground that the crimes under both the FIRs formed part of the same incident in which a mob destroyed the property and indulged in crime. In order to repel the contention of the accused that consolidation was illegal, the Supreme Court invoked the ratio decidendi in T.T. Antony. 38. In Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, the Supreme Court took note of (1) Ram Lal Narang; (2) TT Antony; (3) Upkar Singh; (4) Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh; and (5) Nirmal Singh Kahlon and eventually held in paragraph-17 that it is quite possible that more than one piece of information be given to the police officer-in- charge of the police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more cognizable offences and that in such a case, he need not enter each piece of information in the diary. After saying so, the Supreme Court summed up the law as follows: In such a case the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out 57 whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different version or counter claim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted. 39. In Chirra Shivraj v. State of A.P., the first FIR was registered for an offence under Section 307 I.P.C., immediately after the victim was taken to the hospital with burn injuries. After her death a second FIR came to be registered for an offence under Section 302 IPC. The trial Court convicted the accused for an offence under Section 304 Part-II IPC and the same was confirmed by the Supreme Court. On a further appeal, to the Supreme Court, the validity of the second FIR was questioned on the basis of T.T. Antony. While rejecting the said contention, the Supreme court observed in paragraph-14 of the decision in Chirra Shivraj that there cannot be a second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the First Information Report. But since in Chirra Shivraj, the first FIR was registered on the basis of the information provided by the victim herself and the second FIR (though unnecessary) was registered after her death, the Supreme court pointed out that no prejudice was caused to the accused. 40. In Shiv Shanker Singh v. State of Bihar, two FIRs came to be registered, in relation to a dacoity, allegedly committed in the house of two brothers. The first was at the instance of one brother and another was at the instance of other brother, whose son was killed during the dacoity. The police closed the first FIR as false on the ground that there were property disputes between the brothers. The investigation into the second FIR resulted in the filing of the charge sheet against the brother, who filed the first FIR. The charge sheet filed pursuant to the second FIR was for offences under Sections 302 58 and 506 IPC etc. The accused filed a protest petition, but the same was rejected. When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the first contention of the accused was based upon the decision in T.T. Antony that there cannot be two FIRs in respect of the same incident. But the Supreme Court held in paragraph- 6 its decision that the law does not prohibit registration and investigation of two FIRs in respect of the same incident in case the versions are different and that the test of sameness has to be applied. 41. In Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P., one of the two issues before the Supreme Court was whether a second FIR could have been lodged and entertained, when on similar and identical cause of action and allegations, one FIR had already been registered. After taking note of the decisions in Ram Lal Narang, T.T. Antony, Upkar Singh, Kari choudhary and Babu Bai, the Supreme Court summed up the position in paragraph- 24 of its judgment as follows: From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite luminous that the lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in respect of one and the same incident. The concept of sameness has been given a restricted meaning. It does not encompass filing of a counter FIR relating to the same or connected cognizable offence. What is prohibited is any further complaint by the same complainant and others against the same accused subsequent to the registration of the case under the Code, for an investigation in that regard would have already commenced and allowing registration of further complaint would amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint. 42. In Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle laid down in TT Antony that a second FIR in respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction is not only impermissible but it violates Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the subsequent decisions in Upkar Singh, Babubai, Chirra Shivraj and C. Muniappan, reaffirmed the principle laid down in TT Antony. After referring the ratio laid down in TT Antony, the Supreme Court took up for consideration the second question as to what would constitute 59 the same transaction. The Supreme Court, in Amitbhai, quoted with approval a passage from the decision of the Privy Council in Babulal v. Emperor (AIR 1938 PC 130) to the effect that if several persons conspire to commit offences, and commit overt acts in pursuance of the conspiracy (a circumstance which makes the act of one, the act of each and all the conspirators), these acts are committed in the course of the same transaction, which embraces the conspiracy and the acts done under it. The common concert and agreement which constitute the conspiracy, serve to unify the acts done in pursuance of it. 43. In Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P., the vexed question as to whether a second FIR is permissible, arose out of the breaking out of the communal violence in Gorakhpur on 27.01.2007. A criminal complaint was registered and a charge sheet was also filed later. But after 10 months, a private complaint came to be lodged by an individual before the Chief Judicial Magistrate alleging that those who instigated the communal violence on 27.01.2007 conducted a public meeting and made hate speeches spreading fear amongst the members of a particular community. The Magistrate refused to refer the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code, on the ground that a FIR had already been registered into the incidence that followed the meeting. The complainant took the matter to the High Court by way of a revision, and the High Court remanded the matter to the Magistrate to reconsider the matter. The order of remand passed by the High Court was challenged by way of Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. One of the grounds raised before the Supreme Court was that there cannot be two FIRs registered in relation to the same occurrence or different events or incidents two or more but forming part of the same transactions. While dealing with the said issue, the Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph-15 that it is a settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. But the Supreme Court added a note of caution as follows: However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does 60 not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. 44. Again in paragraph-16 the Supreme Court held in Anju Chaudhary that the question has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR about the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. The Court indicated that no straightjacket formula, uniformly applicable to all cases can be laid down and that it will always be a mixed question of law and facts. 45. After taking note of the previous decisions in Ramlal Narang, M. Krishna, TT Antony, Rameshchanra Nandlal Parikh, Vikram and Shiv Shankar Singh, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph-23 of its decision in Anju Chaudhury as follows: The Court in order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of sameness to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, or in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second FIR may be liable to be quashed. 46. In fact in paragraph-24 of the decision in Anju Chaudhury, the Supreme Court took the example of the same group of people committing theft in a similar manner in different localities falling under different jurisdictions and held that even if the incidents were committed in close proximity of time, there could be separate FIRs and institution of even one stating that a number of thefts had been committed, would not debar the registration of another FIR. 47. Dealing with the rule enunciated in Section 220 of the Code, the Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph- 40 of its decision in Anju Chaudary that though the law recognizes common trial or a common FIR for one series of acts, so connected together as to form the same 61 transaction, the expression same transaction from its very nature, is incapable of exact definition. The Court left it to the common sense and not artificial or technical sense to decide whether or not in the very facts of a case, it can be held to be one transaction. Finally the Court pointed out that for determining whether several offences form part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. The Court went on to state that where there is commonality or purpose or design, where there is continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction. 48. In Yanab Sheikh @ Gagu v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles enunciated in Anju Chaudhary and held that a second FIR about the same occurrence between the same persons and with similarity of scope of investigation cannot be registered and by applying the test of similarity it may be hit by the proviso to Section 162 of the Code. Analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court: 49. Our research has taken us to the above 21 decisions of the Supreme Court where this vexed question came up for consideration again and again. The summary that we have given above under the caption Evolution of the Law, can also be given in a capsule in the form of a tabular column so that the distinction that the Supreme Court drew between different types/categories of case could be easily appreciated. S.NO Decision The dispute arose out of Whether the Second (2nd) FIR or Multiple FIRs filed are Valid or Invalid 1. Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) and Om Prakash Narang v. State (Delhi Administration), (1979) 2 SCC 322 Arose out of theft of two sandstone pillars of great antiquity. Valid 62 2. M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka, (1999) 3 SCC 247 Arose out of amassing wealth disproportionate to ones source of income. Valid 3. V.K. Sharma v. Union of India, (2000) 9 SCC 449 Arose out of swindling a large number of depositors on the false pretext that their deposits would be returned with interest on a subsequent date. (White-Collar Crime) Valid (Multiple FIRs) 4. Mohan Bhaitha v. State of Bihar, (2001) 4 SCC 350 Arose out of a dowry death. Note : - The question involved here is not concerned about whether there can be more FIRs than one but whether there can be more trials than one. Held : - Offences more than one committed by the same persons could be tried at one trial, if they can be held to be in one series of facts so as to form the same transaction. 5. T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181 Arose out of police firing resulting into deaths of few people and injuries to a large number of people. Third (3rd) FIR Invalid. 6. Narinderjit Singh Shani v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 210 Arose out of swindling of a large number of depositors on the false pretext that their deposits would be returned with interest on a subsequent date. Valid (Multiple FIRs) 7. Kari Chaudhary v. Most. Sita Devi, (2002) 1 SCC 714 Arose out of a murder case. Valid 8. State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal, (2002) 8 SCC 158 Arose out of swindling of a large number of depositors on the false pretext that their deposits would be returned with interest on a subsequent date. (White-Collar Crime) Valid (Multiple FIRs) 9. Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 Arose out of an attempt to murder and house-trespass cases Valid 10. Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat (2006) 1 SCC 732 Arose out of swindling of a large number of depositors on the false pretext that their deposits Valid (Multiple FIRs) 63 would be returned with interest on a subsequent date. 11. Vikram v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 332 Arose out of a murder case. Valid 12. Pramod Kumar Saxena v. Union of India, (2008) 9 SCC 685 Arose out of swindling of a large number of depositors on the false pretext that their deposits would be returned with interest on a subsequent date. Valid (Multiple FIRs) 13. Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, (2009) 1 SCC 441 Arose out of scandal involving selection of Panchayat Secretaries. Valid 14. C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 Arose out of setting fire to a university bus and several public buses. Investigation of the Second FIR was clubbed with the investigation of the First FIR. In essence, two complaints/FIRs are clubbed together and investigated jointly. 15. Bahubhai v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC 254 Arose out of altercation that took place between members of the two communities. Invalid 16. Chirra Shivraj v. Sate of AP, (2010) 14 SCC 444 Arose out of an attempt to murder case. Second F.I.R. held Valid because SHO made a mistake by recording information as a fresh F.I.R. and that this mistake should not make the case of prosecution weak especially when no prejudice had been caused. 17. Shiv Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 1 SCC 130 Arose out of dacoity and murder. Valid 18. Surender Kaushik v. State of UP, (2013) 5 SCC 148 Arose out of fake and fraudulent documents prepared by the accused persons. Invalid 19. Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI, (2013) 6 SCC 348 Arose out of murder cases Invalid 20. Anju Chowdry v. State of UP, (2013) 6 SCC 384 Arose out of a hate speech. Valid 21. Yanab Sheikh@gagu v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 6 SCC 428 Arose out of a Invalid 64 murder case. Conclusion to be drawn: 50. From the above table, it could be seen that the cases in which the validity of multiple FIRs was raised, fell at lease into six categories, such as (1) murder/attempt to murder; (2) mob violence leading to destruction of property, murder and/or encounter; (3) theft/dacoity; (4) abuse of official position, adoption of corrupt practices and amassing of wealth; (5) hate speech; and (6) companies receiving deposits from innumerable persons and there after defaulting in repayment. Out of the 21 cases listed above, 5 cases alone relate to non-repayment of deposit money by finance companies. In all these five cases where innumerable complaints were lodged by depositors, the Supreme Court did not choose to interfere. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony on which heavy reliance is placed by the counsel for the petitioners cannot go to the rescue of the petitioners. 51. Despite the fact that the decision of the Two Member bench in T.T. Antony was not taken note of in (i) Narinderjit Singh Sahni, (ii) State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal and (iii) Pramod Kumar Saxena, it is clear that in all those 3 decisions, the Supreme Court was concerned with the cases of persons who collected money from innumerable persons but failed to repay the same. The decision in T.T. Antony arose out of offences relating to Law and Order, Public Order and the Police Firing. 52. When the offences alleged against the writ petitioners in the present batch of cases relate to collection of deposits and failure to repay, the ratio decidendi in (i) Narinderjit Singh Sahni, (ii) Rajesh Syal and (iii) Pramod Kumar Saxena alone would apply and not the ratio in T.T. Antony. Two High Court Decisions. 53. Having disposed of the contention revolving around T.T. Antony, let us now take up for consideration, the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Akbaruddin Owaisi v. Government of Andhra Pradesh. The said decision arose out of two hate speeches allegedly delivered by the writ 65 petitioner, one at Nizamabad on 08-12-2012 and another at Nirmal on 22-12-2012. Interestingly, two FIRs came to be registered in respect of the speech delivered at Nizamabad on 08-12-2012, one by the Police themselves at Nizamabad and another in the Osmania University Police Station in Hyderabad on a private complaint lodged by an individual which was referred to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Code. The petitioner before the learned single Judge in Akbaruddin Owaisi did not attack the FIR registered in Nirmal, but confined his attack only to the registration of two FIRs one at Nizamabad and another at Hyderabad in respect of the very same speech delivered at Nizamabad. 54. While allowing the writ petition in part and directing the transfer of investigation in both the FIRs to the CID, the learned Judge took note of two decisions, relating to hate speeches, one of the Delhi High Court in Maqbool Fida Husain v. Raj Kumar Pandey of the Supreme Court in S. Khushbu v. Kanniammal. While the case before the Delhi High Court related to a famous painter against whom several criminal complaints came to be registered on the ground that his paintings denigrated Hindu Gods, the case in S. Khushbu related to a speech made by an actor which was taken exception to by chauvinists in several parts of the State of Tamil Nadu leading to the registration of multiple FIRs. 55. The decision in Akbaruddin Owaisi arose out of a single cause of action, if we may borrow the said expression from the Civil Law. A single speech propagated or published or televised or publicised in different places cannot result in the prosecution of the individual in different Courts since the transmission of a single message cannot tantamount to different acts of crime. We must also point out at this stage that while the learned Judge, in his decision in Akbaruddin Owaisi, took note of T.T. Antony, S. Khushbu and M.F. Hussein, he did not take note of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Narinderjit Singh Sahni, Rajesh Syal and Pramod Kumar Saxena. Therefore, we do not think that the decision rendered in a case relating to a single act of crime committed by an individual, which, when propagated or publicised, is taken advantage of by several individuals to witch-hunt the person, cannot apply to a case where innumerable persons are alleged to have been cheated at 66 different places at different points of time. To say that the offences committed against all those persons are punishable under the very same provisions and that therefore there cannot be multiple FIRs would be equivalent to saying that a person committing a series of thefts in several places cannot be made to face separate prosecutions in respect of each act of theft committed against different individuals at different points of time. 56. Unfortunately, the decisions of the Supreme Court in (1) Narinderjit Singh Sahani (2) Rajesh Syal and (3) Promod Kumar Saxena were not cited before the learned Judge in Akbaruddin Owaisi. As a consequence, the learned Judge opined in Paragraph-21 of his decision in Akbaruddin Owaisi that the declaration of law in TT Antony had not been diluted in any subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court even though exceptions were carved out. 57. But, nevertheless the learned Judge enlisted in Akbaruddin Owaisi at least 12 different types of cases where the rule that any further complaint against the same accused for the same incident, subsequent to the registration of a case is prohibited under the Code, will not apply. It will be useful to extract the relevant paragraph-21 of the decision in Akbaruddin Owaisi as follows : The declaration of law, in T.T. Antony, has not been diluted in any subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court even though exceptions have been carved out. (Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah). The rule, that any further complaint against the same accused for the same incident, subsequent to the registration of a case is prohibited under the Cr.P.C, will not apply:— (i). in case the FIRs are not in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences nor are they alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence as the one alleged in the first FIR. (Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, 2006 (3) SCJ 242 - (2006) 1 SCC 732). (ii). where the incident is separate and the offences are similar or different, or where the subsequent crime 67 is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first. (Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 2013 (5) SCJ 825 : (2013) Cri.L.J. 776 (SC). (iii). where several distinct offences/incidents have been reported. In such a case the investigating agency should issue separate FIRs under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. (Jagathi Publications Ltd. Rep. by Y. Eshwara Prasad Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation : 2012 (2) ALT (Crl) 285 (A.P.) : 2012 (2) ALD (Cri) 762). (iv). to cryptic, anonymous or oral messages which do not clearly specify a cognizable offence and cannot be treated as an FIR. No exception can be taken if, upon receipt of proper information, another detailed FIR is recorded, and the detailed FIR is treated as the FIR. (Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1970) 2 SCC 113; Vikram v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 (1) ALT (crl.) 179 (SC) : 2008 (1) SCJ 227 = (2007) 12 SCC 332). (v). where, for an earlier period, there was an FIR which was duly investigated into and culminated in a final report which was accepted by a Competent Court. (M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka ((1999) 3 SCC 247 : AIR 1999 SC 1765). (vi). where the earlier complaint was decided on insufficient material or was passed without understanding the nature of the complaint, or where complete facts could not be placed before the court and the applicant came to know of certain facts after the disposal of the first complaint. In such cases the test of full consideration of the complaints on merits must be applied. (Shiv Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2012 (1) ALT (crl.) 383 (SC) : 2012 (2) SCJ 291 = (2012) 1 SCC 130). (vii). in cases where there are different versions, they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes, and when new discovery is made on factual 68 foundations. Discoveries may be made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage and can also surface in another proceeding. (Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab : (2009) 1 SCC 441; Babubhai v. State of Gujarat : (2010) 12 SCC 254). (viii). even in cases where the first complaint is registered and investigation initiated, it is possible to file a further complaint based on the material gathered during the course of investigation. (Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash ((2004) 13 SCC 292 : AIR 2004 SC 4320 : 2005 (1) ALT 22 (DN SC); Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration) (1979 CriLJ 1346) : (1979) 2 SCC 322). (ix). where two FIRs are lodged in respect of the same incident having materially different allegations of commission of different cognizable offences. (T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001 Cri LJ 3329 : (2001) 6 SCC 181; Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash ((2004) 13 SCC 292 : AIR 2004 SC 4320) = 2005 (1) ALT 22 (DN SC). (x). to a counter claim by the accused in the first complaint, or on his behalf, alleging a different version of the said incident. In case there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, it would be treated as two different FIRs and investigation can be carried under both of them by the same investigating agency. (Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash (2004) 13 SCC 292; Kari Choudhary v. Most. Sita Devi : 2002 (1) ALT (Crl.) 198 (SC) = (2002) 1 SCC 714 : AIR 2002 SC 441); Ashok Kumar Tiwari v. State of U.P (2008 Cri LJ 4668 (Allahabad High Court)). (xi). where the FIRs are regarding independent and distinct offences, registration of a subsequent FIR cannot be prohibited on the ground that some other FIR had been filed against the petitioner in respect of other allegations made against him. (Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 1 SCC 732). 69 (xii). in cases where the same group of people commit offences in a similar manner in different localities falling under different jurisdictions. Even if these incidents are committed in close proximity of time, there can be separate FIRs. (Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 2013 (5) SCJ 825 : (2013) Cri.L.J. 776). 58. It may be of interest to note that in Akbaruddin Owaisi a forceful argument was made against the prohibition of a second FIR on the ground that if the information provided by the de facto complainants in the second or subsequent FIRs are treated only as a statements under Section 162 of the Code, it may be possible for the State to withdraw the prosecution without the knowledge or objection from the victim, leaving the victim in the lurch. But, the said argument was rejected by the learned Judge in Akbaruddin Owaisi in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the report on the ground that there is no prohibition in the law even for an informant or complainant or an initiator of criminal prosecution to object to the withdrawal of a complaint by the State.” (Emphasis supplied) The Division Bench considers the entire spectrum of the law right from RAM LAL NARANG, T.T. ANTONY, AMITBHAI ANILCHANDRA SHAH and all other judgments on the issue and at paragraph 57 while drawing up certain conclusions at sub-para (xii) supra holds that in cases where the same group of people commit offences in a similar manner in different localities falling under different jurisdictions, even if the incidents are committed in close proximity of time, there can be separate FIRs. 70 16. It further becomes germane to notice the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of PREM SHANKAR SINGH v. STATE OF U.P.9 wherein the Allahabad High Court holds as follows: “…. …. …. 9. From the facts stated above, it is clear that the accused had entered into separate conspiracies having similar purpose. Modus operandi of the commission of the offence would not make it a single offence when the offences have been committed for separate block by same or different group of people. If in pursuance of the conspiracy, the accused have committed distinct offences, there have to be separate trials. The CBI after investigation of the one FIR, has found that the accused have committed series of offences in furtherance of the conspiracy and, therefore, it has filed separate charge sheets on which the trial court has taken cognizance. 10. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Jharkhand through S.P., CBI v. Lalu Prasad Yadav alias Lalu Prasad, (2017) 8 SCC 1 in paragraphs 40, 41, 42, 49 and 50 which summarising the law on the point has held as under:— “40. In the instant case, offences are not the same offence. There can be different trials for the same offence if tried under two different enactments altogether and comprised of two different offences under different Acts/statutes without violation of the provisions of Article 20(2) or Section 300 CrPC. This Court has decided the issue in various cases: 40.1. In Kharkan v. State of U.P. [Kharkan v. State of U.P., (1964) 4 SCR 673 : AIR 1965 SC 83 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 116] this Court has laid down thus: (AIR p. 86, para 10) “10. … Even if the two incidents could be viewed as connected so as to form parts of one transaction it is 9 2019 SCC OnLine All 4743 71 obvious that the offences were distinct and required different charges. The assault on Tikam in fulfilment of the common object of the unlawful assembly was over when the unlawful assembly proceeded to the house of Tikam to loot it. The new common object to beat Puran was formed at a time when the common object in respect of Tikam had been fully worked out and even if the two incidents could be taken to be connected by unity of time and place (which they were not), the offences were distinct and required separate charges. The learned Sessions Judge was right in breaking up the single charge framed by the Magistrate and ordering separate trials. In this view the prior acquittal cannot create a bar in respect of the conviction herein reached.” 40.2. In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay [Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, 1953 SCR 730 : AIR 1953 SC 325 : 1953 Cri LJ 1432] this Court has laid down thus:“The appellant had smuggled gold into India and was booked under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and subsequently when no one came to claim the gold, he was charged under Section 8 of FERA. He challenged this as violation of Article 20(2). The Court analysed the scope of Article 20(2) and held that the “prosecution” must be before a court of law or judicial tribunal. The plea of double jeopardy was discarded as it was held that the Customs Authorities were not a judicial tribunal or court. For double jeopardy, the test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other and not that the facts relied on by the prosecution are the same in the two trials.” 40.3. In State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte [State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, (1961) 3 SCR 107 : AIR 1961 SC 578 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 725] a Constitution Bench of this Court has laid down as to the issue regarding conviction under Section 409 IPC and Section 105 of the Insurance Act. The submission of double jeopardy was repelled with respect to offences under Section 11 IPC and Section 105 of the Insurance Act. It was held that the offences under both the Acts are distinct due to their ingredients. So as to constitute double jeopardy two offences should be identical. 72 40.4. In T.S. Baliah v. ITO [T.S. Baliah v. ITO, (1969) 3 SCR 65 : AIR 1969 SC 701], the appellant was sought to be prosecuted under Section 177 IPC and Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 for furnishing wrong information in his tax returns. On consideration of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, this Court held that the provision did not provide a bar on trial and conviction for the same offence under more than one enactment in case ingredients of offences are distinct. It only barred double punishment and not double conviction. 40.5. In Collector of Customs v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia [Collector of Customs v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia, (1988) 3 SCC 467 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 679] the question arose whether acquittal of an accused charged with having committed the offence punishable under Section 111 read with Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1969 created a legal bar to the accused, subsequently being prosecuted under Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. It was held that the ingredients of the offence under each of the enactments were quite different. The Court applied the test developed in Maqbool Hussain [Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, 1953 SCR 730 : AIR 1953 SC 325 : 1953 Cri LJ 1432] and held the two offences to be different in scope and contents of their ingredients. The Court also relied upon S.L. Apte [State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, (1961) 3 SCR 107 : AIR 1961 SC 578 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 725] decision and observed that what is necessary is to analyse the ingredients of the two offences and not the allegations made in two complaints. No doubt about it that there can be separate offences but ingredients would remain same under penal provision but that would also not make out a case of violating the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 300 CrPC. 40.6. In case ingredients of the offences to be tried separately arise out of the same offence, there can be separate trials under two enactments, if the ingredients constituting two offences are different under different Acts, there is no bar for separate trials. In State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan [State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 27] it was held: (SCC pp. 665, 667 & 668, paras 24, 28 & 31) The expression “any act or omission which constitutes any offence under this Act” in Section 56 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, merely imports the idea that the same act or 73 omission might constitute an offence under another law and could be tried under such other law or laws also. Further held that, if there are two distinct and separate offences with different ingredients under two different enactments, a double punishment is not barred. The same set of facts can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under IPC and at the same time constitute an offence under any other law. 40.7. In State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh [State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 152 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 451] this Court was dealing with vires of the Rajasthan Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987. It was urged that Sections 5 and 6 of the new Sati Act were overlapping. It was held that with regard to Article 20(2) that subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment are not barred if the ingredients of two offences are distinct. There can be separate offences from same set of facts and hence no double jeopardy. 40.8. In Monica Bedi v. State of A.P. [Monica Bedi v. State of A.P., (2011) 1 SCC 284 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 22] this Court considered the meaning of the expression “same offence” employed in Article 20(2) and observed that second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. This Court has observed thus: (SCC pp. 293 & 295, paras 26 & 29)“26. What is the meaning of the expression used in Article 20(2) “for the same offence”? What is prohibited under Article 20(2) is, that the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. *** 29. It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20(2) is not available. It is settled law that a person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence.” 74 40.9. In Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 7 SCC 621 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 305 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 445], with respect to double jeopardy, this Court has laid down thus: (SCC pp. 633-34, para 33) “33. In view of the above, the law is well settled that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution i.e. doctrine of autrefois acquit or Section 300 CrPC or Section 71 IPC or Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, ingredients of the offences in the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same is not the identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offence. Motive for committing offence cannot be termed as the ingredients of offences to determine the issue. The plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the judgment of acquittal in the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter charge.” 40.10. In State of Rajasthan v. Bhagwan Das Agrawal [State of Rajasthan v. Bhagwan Das Agrawal, (2013) 16 SCC 574 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 319] there were 3 FIRs registered with respect to illegal supply of explosives. Charge was under the Explosives Act. This Court held that the nature and manner of the offences committed by the accused persons were not identical but were different, and as such FIRs were not relating to the same offence as different acts happened in different places. As such the provisions contained in Section 186 CrPC would not apply. 40.11. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 437] this Court considered the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa i.e. no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. In case ingredients are different there can be separate trial for the same offence also. This Court has laid down thus: (SCC pp. 805-06, para 52) “52. It is well-known principle that the rule against double jeopardy is based on a maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, which means no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. 75 Article 20 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the offence more than once. However, it is also settled that a subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment has no bar if the ingredients of the two offences are distinct.” 41. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is appropriate to consider the submissions raised by Shri Surendra Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Lalu Prasad Yadav. It was submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that since the conspiracy was between 1988 and 1996 which included the period of 1994-1995, the conviction has been made on the charge of conspiracy from 1988 to 1996 which included all the treasuries of the erstwhile State of Bihar. There was no charge of separate conspiracy. Charges being similar in the cases which have been quashed. No case is made out for trial under Section 120-B. Same and identical circumstances are being relied upon by the prosecution. There are no new or additional circumstances in the cases which have been quashed. The conspiracies referred to are one and the same and not different conspiracies. Thus, in view of the trial which had concluded, there cannot be further trial on the charge of conspiracy. 42. We are unable to accept the submissions raised by the learned Senior Counsel. Though there was one general charge of conspiracy, which was allied in nature, the charge was qualified with the substantive charge of defalcation of a particular sum from a particular treasury in particular time period. The charge has to be taken in substance for the purpose of defalcation from a particular treasury in a particular financial year exceeding the allocation made for the purpose of animal husbandry on the basis of fake vouchers, fake supply orders, etc. The sanctions made in Budget were separate for each and every year. This Court has already dealt with this matter when the prayers for amalgamation and joint trial had been made and in view of the position of law and various provisions discussed above, we are of the opinion that separate trials which are being made are in accordance with the provisions of law otherwise it would have prejudiced the accused persons considering the different defalcations from different treasuries at different times with different documents. Whatever could be combined has already been done. Each defalcation would constitute an independent offence. Thus, by no stretch, it can be 76 held to be in violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 CrPC. Separate trials in such cases is the very intendment of law. There is no room to raise such a grievance. Though evidence of general conspiracy has been adduced in cases which have been concluded, it may be common to all the cases but at the same time offences are different at different places, by different accused persons. As and when a separate offence is committed, it becomes punishable and the substantive charge which has to be taken is that of the offence under the PC Act, etc. There was conspiracy hatched which was a continuing one and has resulted into various offences. It was joined from time to time by different accused persons, so whenever an offence is committed in continuation of the conspiracy, it would be punishable separately for different periods as envisaged in Section 212(2), obviously, there have to be separate trials. Thus it cannot be said to be a case of double jeopardy at all. It cannot be said that for the same offence the accused persons are being tried again. x x x x 49. This Court has distinguished general conspiracy from a number of separate conspiracies having a similar general purpose. Where different groups of persons cooperate towards their separate ends without any privity with each other, each combination constitutes a separate conspiracy. It was held that in the case there was single general conspiracy to smuggle gold into India from foreign countries. The contention raised was that separate conspiracies were raised by the accused in the facts of the said case. The facts are quite different in the instant case. The question which has come up for consideration did not arise in the aforesaid decision and this Court has held that there was no prejudice caused to the accused persons by not making separate trials. 50. The modus operandi being the same would not make it a single offence when the offences are separate. Commission of offence pursuant to a conspiracy has to be punished. If conspiracy is furthered into several distinct offences there have to be separate trials. There may be a situation where in furtherance of general conspiracy, offences take place in various parts of India and several persons are killed at different times. Each trial has to be separately held and the accused to be punished separately 77 for the offence committed in furtherance of conspiracy. In case there is only one trial for such conspiracy for separate offences, it would enable the accused person to go scot-free and commit a number of offences which is not the intendment of law. The concept is of “same offence” under Article 20(2) and Section 300 CrPC. In case distinct offences are being committed there has to be independent trial for each of such offence based on such conspiracy and in the case of misappropriation as statutorily mandated, there should not be joinder of charges in one trial for more than one year except as provided in Section 219. One general conspiracy from 1988 to 1996 has led to various offences as such there have to be different trials for each of such offence based upon conspiracy in which different persons have participated at different times at different places for completion of the offence. Whatever could be combined has already been done. Thus we find no merit in the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused persons.” 11. Thus, when the accused have entered into separate conspiracies for committing the offences in each block, the filing of separate charge sheet in pursuance of one FIR, is neither illegal nor improper and the trial court has rightly taken cognizance in each charge sheet.” 17. On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court and that of other High Courts as quoted hereinabove, what would unmistakably emerge is that it is not a law that there can never be multiple FIRs. Multiple FIRs cannot be registered against individual accused by the very same complainant or different accused on the very same incident. The impugned proceedings 78 cannot be termed to be a solitary incident for a solitary trial, they are different incidents with different men against the hapless victim. 18. In the light of the afore-quoted facts and the law as laid down in the judgments noted hereinabove, the separate charge sheets filed in separate transactions which had resulted in separate crimes will not render any illegality in the conduct of trial. The petition lacking in merit stands rejected. SD/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE bkp CT:SS

MR ABOOBAKKER SIDDIQUE v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

Judgment text