2025:HHC:23331 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 18 of 2024 Reserved on: 20.6.2025 Date of Decision: 18.7.2025. Sanjeev Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : M/s Govind Arora, Vidushi Sharma and Imran Mohammad, Advocates. For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Prikshit Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 45 of 2016, dated 2.6.2016, registered at Police Station Paddar, District Mandi, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:23331 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police, asserting that he was working as a contractor. He required labour for the extraction of resin in the forest. The accused introduced himself as a contractor and promised to provide the labour to the informant. The informant paid ₹2.00 lacs in cash to the accused. An agreement was executed between the parties. The accused promised to provide the labour on or before 23.3.2016 and complete the work on or before 30.11.2016. The informant also paid ₹25,000/- to the accused. The accused did not send any person. The complainant tried to contact the accused, but he did not respond. He obtained ₹2,25,000/- from the complainant, to which he was not entitled. The police registered the FIR, conducted the investigation and filed a charge sheet before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of FIR, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR and consequential proceedings, asserting that the Court has ample power to quash the FIR when the continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. The petitioner did not commit any offence. The present proceedings are 3 2025:HHC:23331 manifestly attended with an ulterior motive against the petitioner. A civil dispute is being given the colour of criminal nature. The allegations in the FIR are also absurd and inherently improbable. The learned Magistrate erred in summoning the petitioner. The procedure for registration of the FIR was not followed by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent-State by filing a reply reproducing the contents of the FIR. It is asserted that police conducted the investigation and found that the accused had received an amount of ₹2,25,000/- for the supply of labour. The matter was thoroughly investigated, and a charge sheet was filed before the learned Trial Court. The matter was listed on 5.3.2024 for recording the statements of witnesses. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. No reply was filed on behalf of respondent No.2. 6. I have heard M/s Govind Arora, Vidushi Sharma and Imran Mohammad, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent 4 2025:HHC:23331 No.1-State and Mr. Parikshit Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 7. Mr. Govind Arora, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations made in the FIR disclose a civil transaction between the parties, and the informant tried to give it a criminal colour by filing the FIR. It is impermissible to convert a civil dispute into a criminal case. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. He also read the judgments mentioned by him in the petition during the hearing without referring to any law report. 8. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State, submitted that the FIR was registered in the year 2016. The Court has framed charges against the petitioner. The petitioner has an alternative remedy of assailing the order framing the charges. He did not file any petition for quashing the charges, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, and the learned 5 2025:HHC:23331 Trial Court should be left to adjudicate the same. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Mr. Parikshit Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2-informant, adopted the submissions of Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State and submitted that the petitioner/accused made a false representation regarding the supply of the labour without any intention to fulfil it. This constitutes the commission of a cognizable offence. Learned Trial Court had rightly summoned the petitioner/accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which 6 2025:HHC:23331 FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a 7 2025:HHC:23331 police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. 8 2025:HHC:23331 Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 13. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 9 2025:HHC:23331 14. It was specifically mentioned in the FIR that the accused promised to supply labour to the informant. He obtained ₹2,25,000/- based on this promise. He failed to supply even a single labourer, and when the informant contacted the petitioner, he did not respond. All these allegations show that the promise was made by the petitioner to the informant without an intention to fulfil it. Therefore, prima facie, a case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC is made out. 15. The ingredients of cheating were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 636, and it was observed at page 176: 13. Cheating is defined in Section 415 of the Code as: “415. Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” The section requires— (1) deception of any person; 10 2025:HHC:23331 (2)(a) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person (i) to deliver any property to any person, or (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. 14. On a reading of the section, it is manifest that in the definition, there are set forth two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first place, he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to any person. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducement must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but not fraudulent or dishonest. 15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent conduct, but for this, subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up his promise, subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise, cannot be presumed. 11 2025:HHC:23331 16. This position was reiterated in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241, wherein it was observed as under: “10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. 11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench, in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] on facts of that case, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15) “15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement, which may be judged by his subsequent conduct, but this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up a promise, subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when 12 2025:HHC:23331 he made the promise, cannot be presumed.” (emphasis supplied) 12. Finding that the ingredients of the offence of cheating and its allied offences had not been made out, this Court interfered with the order of the High Court and quashed the criminal proceedings. 13. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693: 2000 SCC (Cri) 733], this Court in para 7 has stated thus: (SCC pp. 696-97) “7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must ‘dishonestly’ or ‘fraudulently’ induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, ‘mens rea’ on the part of that person must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.”(emphasis supplied) 14. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8 SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing of FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482 CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception; merely 13 2025:HHC:23331 because an act has a civil profile is not enough to stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal offence. 17. A similar view was taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 as under: “4. Cheating” is defined in Section 415 of the Penal Code, 1860, which provides as under: “415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” 5. The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on the ground that Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, 1860 deals with the offences against properties and, therefore, Section 415 must also necessarily relate to the property which, in the instant case, is not involved and, consequently, the FIR was liable to be quashed. The broad proposition on which the High Court proceeded is not correct. While the first part of the definition relates to property, the second part does not necessarily relate to property. The second part is reproduced below: “415. … intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or 14 2025:HHC:23331 omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’.” 6. This part speaks of intentional deception, which must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The intentional deception presupposes the existence of a dominant motive of the person making the inducement. Such inducement should have led the person deceived or induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do if he were not deceived. The further requirement is that such an act or omission should have caused damage or harm to the body, mind, reputation or property. 7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or “fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part of that person must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered. 8. Thus, so far as the second part of Section 415 is concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here, it is 15 2025:HHC:23331 the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the complainant as a result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is material. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court in Empress v. Sheoram [(1882) 2 AWN 237], it was held by Mahmood, J.: “That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a caste different to the one to which she really belongs, with the object of obtaining money, amounts to the offence of cheating by personation as defined in Section 416 of the Penal Code, 1860, which must be read in the light of the preceding Section 415.” 18. In the present case, all the above ingredients are prima facie satisfied. Hence, the submission that the contents of the FIR do not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence is not acceptable. 19. It was submitted that the dispute between the parties was civil, and the registration of the FIR was impermissible. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law that the civil dispute cannot be turned into criminal proceedings; however, it does not mean that no civil action can give rise to a criminal action. Professor Glanville Williams explained in his celebrated book Learning the Law (Tenth Edition, Stevens and Sons) that the facts by themselves cannot determine civil or criminal liability. 16 2025:HHC:23331 The same set of facts may give rise to criminal or civil liability. The distinction between the two is not the nature of the act but the nature of the proceedings that are taken to seek redressal. It was observed: “The distinction between a crime and a civil wrong, though capable of giving rise to some difficult legal problems, is in essence quite simple. The first thing to understand is that the distinction does not reside in the nature of the wrongful act itself. This can quite simply be proved by pointing out that the same act may be both a crime and a civil wrong. Occasionally, at a bus station, there is someone who makes a living by looking after people’s impedimenta while they are shopping. If I entrust my bag to such a person, and he runs off with it, he commits the crime of theft and also two civil wrongs—the tort of conversion and a breach of his contract with me to keep the bag safe. The result is that two sorts of legal proceedings can be taken against him: a prosecution for the crime, and a civil action for the tort and the breach of contract. (Of course, the plaintiff in the latter action will not get damages twice over merely because he has two causes of action; he will get only one set of damages.) To take another illustration, if a railway signalman, to dumb forgetfulness a prey, fails to pull the lever at the right moment, and a fatal accident occurs on the line, his carelessness may be regarded as sufficiently gross to amount to the crime of manslaughter, and it is also the tort of negligence towards the victims of the accident and their dependents and a breach of his contract with the Railway Executive to take due care in his work. It will be noticed that this time, the right of action in tort and the right of action in a contract are vested in different persons. These examples show that the distinction between a crime and civil wrong cannot be stated as depending upon what is 17 2025:HHC:23331 done, because what is done may be the same in each case. The true distinction resides, therefore, not in the nature of the wrongful act but in the legal consequences that may follow. If the wrongful act is capable of being followed by what are called criminal proceedings, that means that it is regarded as a crime (otherwise called an offence). If it is capable of being followed by civil proceedings, that means that it is regarded as a civil wrong. If it is capable of being followed by both, it is both a crime and a civil wrong. Criminal and civil proceedings are (in the normal case) easily distinguishable: the procedure is different, the outcome is different, and the terminology is different.” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 942, that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong, as well as a criminal offence and mere availability of civil remedies is no ground to quash the criminal proceedings. It was observed: “34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as well as a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is available may not be a ground to quash criminal proceedings. But as observed above, in this case, no criminal offence has been made out in the FIR read with the chargesheet so far as this appellant is concerned. The other accused, Rajan Kumar, has died.” 21. A similar view was taken in V.R. Dalal v. Yougendra Naranji Thakkar, (2008) 15 SCC 625, wherein it was observed: - “13. It may be true that in the event the court finds that the dispute between the parties is civil in nature, it may not allow the criminal proceedings to go on. But, no law, in our opinion, as such can be laid down as in a given case both civil suit and criminal complaint would be maintainable 18 2025:HHC:23331 although the cause of action for both the proceedings is the same.” 22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Puneet Beriwala Vs. State 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 that simply because a remedy is provided under the civil law cannot lead to an inference that resort cannot be had to the criminal law or that the civil law remedy is the only remedy available to the parties. It was observed: 28. It is trite law that the mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court, in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court. This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant a further investigation and, if necessary, a trial. [See: Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.), (2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee Kun Hee v. State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 and Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686] 23. It was specifically mentioned in the status report that the charges have been framed and the matter is listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, 19 2025:HHC:23331 the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed at page 145: - “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 24. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been 20 2025:HHC:23331 filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 25. No other point was urged. 26. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 27. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th July, 2025 (Chander)