1 2025:CGHC:54036-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 3316 of 2025 Surendra Singh Chouhan S/o Ramdev Singh Chouhan Aged About 55 Years, General Manager (Mining), Sub-Area Manager, Saraipali Open Cast Coal Mines Korba Area, South Eastern Coalfields Limited, P.S. Pali, District Korba Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Pali, District Korba Chhattisgarh 2 - Anil Jaiswal S/o Ved Prakash Jaiswal Aged About 40 Years R/o Ward No. 15, Pali, District Korba Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manoj Paranjape, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Sourabh Sharma, Advocate For Respondent No.1-State For Respondent No.2 : : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Deputy Advocate General Mr.Jaydeep Singh Yadav, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR 2 06 .11 .2025 1. Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjape, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Sourabh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for respondent No.1 and Mr. Jaydeep Singh Yadav, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayers: “A. Order dated 08/10/2025 (ANNEXURE-P/1 Colly.) passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) in Criminal Revision No.31/2025 between 'Surendra Singh Chouhan vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another' arising out of order dated 04.08.2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali, District Korba (C.G.) in Criminal Case No.969/2025 (Annexure P/2 colly.) and for quashing of entire Sessions Trial/Case No. 71/2025 (Crime No. 114/2025 P.S. Pali, District Korba for offences 103(1), 61(2)(a), 190, 191(2) and 191(3) of BNS, and Section 25 and 27 of Arms Act) between State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Durgesh Singh Thakur @ Bala Thakur and others" pending against the petitioner before II Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) B. Order dated 04/08/2025 (ANNEXURE-P/2 Colly.) passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali, District Korba (C.G.) in Criminal Case No.969/2025 (Crime No. 114/2025 P.S. Pali, 3 District Korba for offences 103(1), 61(2)(a), 190, 191(2) and 191(3) of BNS, and Section 25 and 27 of Arms Act) between 'State of Chhattisgarh vs. Roushan Singh and others' i.e. Order taking cognizance (on an application filed by the Complainant u/s 193(3) and 193(9) of BNSS 2023), against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Sections 103(1), 61(2)(a), 190, 191(2) and 191(3) of BNS and has issued warrant of arrest against the petitioner and has also directed for filing of supplementary Chargesheet by recording evidence of named witnesses in application of complainant and also order dated 21/08/2025, whereby supplement challan against the petitioner filed in compliance of order dated 04/08/2025 taken on record and Permanent Arrest Warrant issued on 08/09/2025 against the petitioner. For quashing of entire proceeding in Criminal Case No.969/2025 against the petitioner. C. For quashing of FIR dated 29/03/2025 (ANNEXURE-P/4) registered at Police Station, Pali, District Korba in Crime No.114/2025 against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 103(1), 61(2)(a), 190, 191(2) and 191(3) of BNS, and Section 25 and 27 of Arms Act and Supplementary Charge-sheet dated 19.08.2025 (ANNEXURE-P/3) filed against the petitioner in Crime No.114/2025, registered at P.S. Pali, District- Korba (C.G.), in compliance of order dated 04/08/2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali, District Korba (C.G.) in criminal case no. 969/2025, for offences punishable under 4 Sections 103(1), 61(2)(a), 190, 191(2) and 191(3) of BNS, and Section 25 and 27 of Arms Act. D. Any other relief as deem fit, in the interest of justice” 3. The prosecution case reveals that two private transport groups, namely S.N. Group and M.T.C. Group, were engaged in coal transportation from Saraipali Mines and had longstanding rivalry. On the said night, a violent altercation took place between these two groups, resulting in the death of Rohit @ Anup Jaiswal. On the same night, another FIR, Crime No. 116/2025, was also registered at P.S. Pali for the offences under the same provisions of the BNS against certain other persons, on the complaint of Sandhya Singh Thakur, alleging house trespass, abuse, criminal intimidation, and arson by the rival group. The complainant in Crime No. 116/2025, namely Sandhya Singh Thakur, is the sister of accused persons Roshan Singh, Gaurav Singh, and mother of Sanskar Thakur, who are accused in Crime No. 114/2025 for committing the murder of the deceased. Thus, both incidents appear to be part of the same transaction arising out of the rivalry between the two transporter groups. 4. Although the petitioner’s name appeared in the FIR in Crime No. 114/2025, after due and detailed investigation including examination of witnesses, perusal of CCTV footage, and verification of the petitioner’s call records, the investigating agency found no material implicating the petitioner. Consequently, a final 5 report/charge-sheet dated 24.06.2025 was filed before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali, District Korba, under Section 193 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), exonerating the petitioner. The charge-sheet was filed on 24.06.2025, and a copy thereof was supplied to the complainant’s counsel. On 27.06.2025, the complainant filed an application under Sections 193(3) and 193(9) of the BNSS, supported by an affidavit, seeking (i) rejection of the final report, (ii) re-investigation by higher officials, and (iii) exercise of powers under Section 183 BNSS to record additional statements of witnesses. The complainant, in his said application, sought to introduce new facts by referring to Roopchand Dewangan, a Technical Inspector formerly posted at Saraipali Mines, alleging that he was harassed by accused Roshan Singh with the assistance of the petitioner, and that deceased Rohit Jaiswal’s support to Roopchand Dewangan led to enmity and the eventual murder. However, the said witness was admittedly not present at the scene of occurrence. 5. The transfer order of Roopchand Dewangan was issued by the Chief General Manager, SECL, Korba Area, and not by the petitioner, who was then posted as Sub-Area Manager, SECL, Saraipali Sub-Area, Korba. The said transfer order dated 18.10.2024 was challenged by Roopchand Dewangan before this Court in WPS No. 7034/2024, which was dismissed on 18.03.2025, and his subsequent Writ Appeal No. 276/2025 was 6 also dismissed on 28.04.2025. 6. The complainant’s application, consisting of 14 paragraphs and supported by an affidavit, was in the nature of a complaint under Section 223 of the BNSS, seeking multiple reliefs including rejection of the charge-sheet and further investigation. In the complaint, the respondent alleged that the petitioner’s exoneration was improper as he was named in the FIR, and that certain witnesses had allegedly stated about his presence at the spot. However, the prosecution filed a detailed reply, asserting that the CCTV footage conclusively showed the petitioner was in his office at the relevant time, and that no eye-witness had implicated him. 7. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali, without due application of judicial mind, allowed the said application, took cognizance of offences against the petitioner, and issued arrest warrant vide order dated 04.08.2025. The JMFC directed the recording of statements of Roopchand Dewangan and Surfaraj Memon under Section 180 of BNSS, ordered the filing of a supplementary charge-sheet, and simultaneously held that no ground existed for reinvestigation. An arrest warrant was also issued against the petitioner. 8. In compliance with the said order, the police filed a supplementary charge-sheet dated 19.08.2025 against the petitioner for offences under Sections 103(1), 61(2)(a), 190, 191(2), 191(3) of the BNS and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. The statement of 7 Roopchand Dewangan recorded thereafter categorically stated that he was not present at the scene and had no knowledge of the petitioner’s involvement. 9. The petitioner preferred a Criminal Revision under Sections 438 and 440 of the BNSS, 2023 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, challenging the order dated 04.08.2025. During pendency of the revision, the supplementary charge-sheet was filed. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, vide order dated 08.10.2025, dismissed the revision and affirmed the Magistrate’s order, giving additional reasons. 10.Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders dated 04.08.2025 and 08.10.2025, and the consequential filing of the supplementary charge-sheet dated 19.08.2025, the petitioner has preferred the present petition. 11.Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order dated 24.06.2025 clearly reflects that the final report was submitted before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali and a copy thereof was supplied to the complainant’s counsel. The case was thereafter fixed for committal proceedings under Section 232 of the BNSS, 2023. It was urged that at this committal stage, the Magistrate’s role is limited to verifying whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and, upon such satisfaction, to commit the case. The Magistrate has no jurisdiction to entertain or decide any application filed by the 8 complainant or to take cognizance of offences at this stage, as the process is administrative in nature and not a judicial adjudication. It was further contended that learned JMFC exceeded his jurisdiction by entertaining the protest petition/complaint filed by the respondent/complainant, and by taking cognizance on that basis while the matter was still at the pre-trial committal stage. Reliance placed by the Magistrate on the decision in Shiv Shankar Ojha v. State of U.P. (2017 SCC OnLine All 2895) is misplaced, as the said decision stands overruled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishnu Kumar Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 8 SCC 27. Learned counsel emphasized that once the investigating agency, after detailed investigation including examination of witnesses, CCTV footage, and call detail records filed a final report dated 24.06.2025 exonerating the petitioner, the JMFC could have adopted only one of the three well-settled courses of action, namely: (i) accept the report and close the proceedings; (ii) take cognizance on the final report itself; or (iii) order further investigation. However, the JMFC committed a jurisdictional error by taking cognizance merely on a private complaint, directing further investigation, and issuing non-bailable and permanent arrest warrant, thereby violating the petitioner’s personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was also submitted that the prosecution had duly informed the complainant 9 about the progress of investigation through electronic communication in compliance with Section 193(3)(ii) of the BNSS. Despite this, the complainant directly filed a protest petition before the Magistrate without any formal notice, and the JMFC, without examining the charge-sheet or the investigation material, reproduced the contents of the protest petition and took cognizance, which is impermissible in law. It was urged that both the JMFC and the Third Additional Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that under Section 232 BNSS, the Magistrate had no power to add or summon any new accused, particularly when the offences were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The direction for recording statements of Roopchand Dewangan and Surfaraj Memon and for filing a supplementary charge-sheet is contrary to law, especially when Roopchand Dewangan himself stated that he was not present at the scene. Lastly, it was submitted that learned Third Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora while dismissing the revision on 08.10.2025, failed to exercise its revisional jurisdiction and recorded perverse findings ignoring the investigation material. The entire proceedings initiated against the petitioner, including the order of cognizance dated 04.08.2025, the issuance of arrest warrant, and the supplementary charge-sheet dated 19.08.2025, are thus illegal, without jurisdiction, and liable to be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Vishnu Kumari Tiwari (supra) and the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Ramswaroop 10 Soni v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1606. 12. On the the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 opposes the submissions made by learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner and supports the order dated 4.8.2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali, which has been affirmed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Katghroa in Criminal Revision No.31/2025. 13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with petition. 14. From perusal of the documents, it transpires that the present petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 04.08.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali, District Korba, whereby cognizance has been taken against the petitioner on a protest petition filed by respondent No.2/complainant and warrant of arrest has been issued; as well as the order dated 08.10.2025 passed by the learned Third Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, dismissing Criminal Revision No.31/2025 preferred by the petitioner. Crime No.114/2025 was registered at Police Station Pali for offences punishable under Sections 103(1), 61(2)(a), 190, 191(2), 191(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 25, 27 of the Arms Act. The petitioner, though initially named in the FIR, was exonerated after detailed investigation, and a final 11 report under Section 193 BNSS was submitted before the JMFC on 24.06.2025, specifically recording that no material was found against him. Copy of the final report was supplied to the counsel for the complainant, and the matter was fixed for committal under Section 232 BNSS on 27.06.2025, as the offences were triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions. On that date, the complainant filed an application under Sections 193(3) and 193(9) BNSS, supported by an affidavit, styled as a complaint/protest petition, praying inter alia (i) for rejection of the final report, (ii) for reinvestigation by higher officials, and (iii) for recording of certain witnesses’ statements, including one Roopchand Dewangan, who was admittedly not an eyewitness. 15.The JMFC, without applying its judicial mind, treated the protest petition as a complaint, directed for recording of statements of Surfaraz Memon and Roopchand Dewangan under Section 180 BNSS, ordered for a supplementary charge-sheet, and issued arrest warrant against the petitioner. The prosecution thereafter filed a supplementary charge-sheet dated 19.08.2025, and even therein, witness Roopchand Dewangan stated that he was not present at the place of incident and did not know whether the petitioner was involved. 16. It is a settled principle of law that upon submission of a final report/closure report by the police, the Magistrate has only three options: 12 (a) Accept the report and close the proceedings; (b) Disagree and take cognizance on the materials in the police report; or (c) Direct further investigation under Section 193(8) BNSS (analogous to Section 173(8) CrPC). 17.The Magistrate cannot, at the stage of committal under Section 232 BNSS, assume jurisdiction to take cognizance afresh, direct reinvestigation, or add new accused, since the stage is administrative and not adjudicatory. The Magistrate’s duty is limited to verifying whether the offence is triable by the Court of Sessions and committing the case accordingly. The power to take cognizance of offences triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions lies only with the Sessions Court under Section 225 BNSS, not with the Magistrate. 18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Abhinandan Jha and others v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117 has held as under:- “14.In these two appeals, which are from the State of Bihar, the reports, under Section 169, are referred to as 'final report'. Now, the question as to what exactly is to be done by a Magistrate, on receiving a report, under Section 173, will have to be considered. That report may be in respect of a case, coming under Section 170, or one coming under Section 169. We have already referred to Section 190, which is the first section in the group of sections headed 'Conditions requisite for Initiation of Proceedings.' Sub-section (1), of this section, will cover a report sent, under Section 173. The use of the words 'may take cognizance of any offence', in sub-section (1) of 13 section 190, in our opinion, imports the exercise of a 'judicial discretion', and the Magistrate, who receives the report, under section 173, will have to consider the said report and judicially take a decision, whether or not to take cognizance of the offence. From this it follows, that it is not as if, that the Magistrate is bound to accept the opinion of the police that there is a case for placing the accused, on trial. It is open to the Magistrate to take the view that the facts disclosed in the report do not make out an offence for taking cognizance or he may take the view that there is no sufficient evidence to justify an accused being put on trial. On either of these grounds, the Magistrate will be perfectly justified in declining to take cognizance of an offence, irrespective of the opinion of the police. On the other hand, if the Magistrate agrees with the report, which is a charge-sheet submitted by the police, no difficulty whatsoever is caused, because he will have full jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code. This will be the position, when the report under Section 173, is a charge-sheet. 15. Then the question is, what is the position, when the Magistrate is dealing with a report submitted by the police, under Section 173, that no case is made out for sending up an accused for trial, which report, as we have already indicated, is called, in the area in question, as a 'final report'? Even in those cases, if the Magistrate agrees with the said report, he may accept the final report and close the proceedings. But there may be instances when the Magistrate may take the view, on a consideration of the final report, that the opinion formed by the police is not based on 14 a full and complete investigation, in which case, in our opinion, the Magistrate will have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police, under S. 156(3), to make a further investigation. That is, if the Magistrate feels, after considering the final report, that the investigation is unsatisfactory, or incomplete, or that there is scope for further investigation, it will be open to the Magistrate to decline to accept the final report and direct the police to make further investigation, under Section 156(3). The police, after such further investigation, may submit a charge-sheet, or, again submit a final report, depending upon the further investigation made by them. If, ultimately, the Magistrate forms the opinion that the facts, set out in the final report, constitute an offence, he, can take cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(c), notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police, expressed in the final report.” 19. The Supreme Court in H.S. Bains v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (1980) 4 SCC 631), held as follows: “6. It is seen from the provisions to which we have referred in the preceding paras that on receipt of a complaint a Magistrate has several courses open to him. He may take cognizance of the offence and proceed to record the statements of the complainant and the witnesses present under Section 200. Thereafter, if in his opinion there is no sufficient ground for proceeding he may dismiss the complaint under Section 203. If in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding he may issue process under Section 204. However, if he thinks fit, he may postpone the issue of process and either enquire into the case 15 himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. He may then issue process if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding or dismiss the complaint if there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. On the other hand, in the first instance, on receipt of a complaint, the Magistrate may, instead of taking cognizance of the offence, order an investigation under Section 156(3). The police will then investigate and submit a report under Section 173(1). On receiving the police report the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) and straight away issue process. This he may do irrespective of the view expressed by the police in their report whether an offence has been made out or not. The police report under Section 173 will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by the police and the conclusions drawn by the police therefrom. The Magistrate is not bound by the conclusions drawn by the police and he may decide to issue process even if the police recommend that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further. The Magistrate after receiving the police report, may, without issuing process or dropping the proceeding decide to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint originally submitted to him and proceed to record the statements upon oath of the complainant and the witnesses present under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code and thereafter decide whether to dismiss the complaint or issue process. The mere fact that he had earlier ordered an investigation under Section 156 (3) and received a report under Section 173 will not have the effect of total effacement of the 16 complaint and therefore the Magistrate will not be barred from proceeding under Sections 200, 203 and 204. Thus, a Magistrate who on receipt of a complaint, orders an investigation under Section 156(3) and receives a police report under Section 173(1), may, thereafter, do one of three things: (1) he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action; (2) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1)(b) on the basis of the police report and issue process; this he may do without being bound in any manner by the conclusion arrived at by the police in their report; (3) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) on the basis of the original complaint and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200. If he adopts the third alternative, he may hold or direct an inquiry under Section 202 if he thinks fit. Thereafter he may dismiss the complaint or issue process, as the case may be.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. The Supreme Court in the matter of Vishnu Kumar Tiwari (supra) relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abhinandan Jha (supra) held as under:- “18. Thus, when he proceeds to take action by way of cognizance by disagreeing with the conclusions arrived at in the police report, he would be taking cognizance on the basis of the police report and not on the complaint. And, therefore, the question of examining the complainant or his witnesses under Section 200 of the Code would not arise. This was the view clearly enunciated.” 17 21. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Ramswaroop Soni (supra) has observed as under:- “9. It is relevant to mention here that a Magistrate after calling an opinion on the police report which states that no case was made out against the accused, may take cognizance even on such report and the Magistrate can disagree and differ with the police report. He can take cognizance of the case and that cognizance will be deemed to be appropriate and as per law. The Magistrate has only to ascertain on the allegations in the complaint or police report whether there is a primafacle case to proceed against the accused and not to go into the details and come to the conclusion whether those allegations are sufficient to convict the accused, but in such matters application of judicial mind is essential for taking cognizance. 10. In Jogendra Nath Gharel v. State of Orissa [2003 CrL) 3953 (3957)), it is observed that in a case triable by Court of Session, the Magistrate on the receipt of the complaint instead of conducting the inquiry himself under S. 202, CrPC may order for investigation by the police under S.156(3) CrPC. 11. It is true that there is clear demarcation of function between Judiciary and police department, and such the power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is not to be interfered with by the Judiciary. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of the investigation. Normally, the Court does not interfere with investigation being carried out by the 18 police, but it may interfere where there is any violation of fundamental rights of an accused and/or the investigation is done contrary to the procedural safeguards and by violation of the rights of an accused or where the investigation by the police is not done properly.” 22. The JMFC at that stage had no jurisdiction to take cognizance on a private complaint or to issue arrest warrant, as the matter was pending for committal under Section 232 BNSS. The order dated 04.08.2025 clearly shows that the Magistrate reproduced the averments of the protest petition and failed to record any independent satisfaction or reasons. The direction for recording statements of Roopchand Dewangan and Surfaraj Memon and filing a supplementary charge-sheet was beyond the Magistrate’s power. The revisional Court, while affirming the Magistrate’s order, failed to appreciate that the JMFC had acted without jurisdiction and did not apply its own judicial mind. The findings of the revisional Court are therefore perverse and unsustainable. 23. The learned JMFC, on one hand, observed that there is no provision empowering a Magistrate to order a re-investigation in any case. It was further noted that there are no facts available in the present case to justify a direction to the Investigating Officer to conduct further investigation, nor is there any basis shown for conducting any additional inquiry in the matter. However, on the other hand, learned Magistrate partly allowed the application filed by the complainant/respondent No. 2, took cognizance against 19 petitioner Surendra Singh Chauhan for offence punishable under Sections 103(1), 61(2)(a), 190, 191(2), and 191(3) of the BNS, issued a warrant of arrest for his appearance, and further directed the Police Station Pali to record the statements of Surfaraz Memon & Roopchand Dewangan, son of Bajrang Lal Dewangan, under Section 180 of the BNSS, and to submit the same before the Court by way of a supplementary charge-sheet, which the learned Magistrate was not empowered to do. 24. Learned Magistrate failed to consider the proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abhinandan Jha (supra), Vishnu Kumar Tiwari (supra) and H.S. Bains (supra), wherein learned Magistrate had three options available on the protest petition filed by the complainant/respondent No.2 against the closure report filed by the police. At the most, if learned Magistrate was not satisfied with the investigation and intended to allow the protest petition, the proper course was to direct further investigation under Section 193(8) of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 173(8) of the CrPC). However, learned Magistrate failed to adopt the said course, thereby acting contrary to the settled legal position. 25. In view of above, the petition is allowed. The order dated 04.08.2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali in Criminal Case No.969/2025 including the filing of supplementary charge-sheet dated 19.08.2025 and issuance of arrest 20 warrant/non-bailable warrant against the petitioner and the order dated 08.10.2025 passed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora in Criminal Revision No.31/2025 affirming the order of the JMFC are hereby quashed/set-aside. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pali is directed to pass a fresh order on the protest petition filed by the complainant / respondent No.2 within a period of two weeks from today in accordance with law. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu