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2025 DAILYLAW 49176 (CHH)

SHRIKRISHNA PRASAD v. CHHATTISGARH RAJYA GRAMIN BANK HEAD OFFICE

WA/799/2025 · 2025-11-03

Shri Bibhu Datta Guru

body2025

Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:53746-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 799 of 2025 Shrikrishna Prasad S/o Late Ramcharitra Sao Aged About 66 Years R/o Bhagat Singh Ward, Kedarpur, Ambikapur, Civil And Revenue Distt. Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, ...Appellant(s) versus 1. Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank Head Office Sunder Nagar, Mahadev Ghat Road, Raipur District Colony, Raipur C.G., Current Address- Sector 24, Plot No. 47, Village Tuta, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2. Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank Controlling Officer 1st Floor, Vivek Complex, Sangam Gali, Ambikapur, Distt. Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. 3. Sarguja Kshetriya Gramin Bank Respondent Regional Office, Distt. Korea, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Vipin Punjabi, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. N. Naha Roy, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2025.11.06 10:47:06 +0530 2 04.11.2025 1. The appellant/ writ petitioner has filed this writ appeal assailing the part of the order dated 23.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in WPS No. 6565 of 2014, whereby liberty was granted to the respondent bank herein to proceed in the enquiry from the stage of issuance of show cause notice after the enquiry report is received, if so desired. 2. The writ appeal has been filed by the writ petitioner with the following prayer:- “It is therefore humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the instant appeal and set aside the relevant portion of the judgment and order dated 23.07.2025 passed in W.P.(S) No.: 6565/2014 for liberty granted to the respondent bank herein to proceed in the enquiry from the stage of issuance of show cause notice after the enquiry report is received, if so desired, in the larger interest of justice.” 3. The brief facts of the case as reflected by the appellant/ writ petitioner is that the appellant, at the relevant point of time, was working as Officer Grade I with the respondents and was posted as Assistant Manager/Branch Manager with respondents at District Surguja. A charge sheet was issued against the appellant by respondent No.3 leveling 5 charges with regard to his functioning 3 being the Branch Manager of respondent No.3. The charge sheet was issued by Chairman of respondent No.3, Thereafter, the charge sheet was replied by the appellant. As reply was not found satisfactory, a departmental enquiry was initiated against the appellant. In the meantime, respondent No.3 merged with respondent No.2. After conclusion of the departmental enquiry, a show cause notice along with copy of the departmental enquiry was sent to the appellant by the General Manager of respondent No.2 to show cause as to why he should not be punished with reduction of 3 lower pay scale with cumulative effect till his retirement in the light of Regulation 39 (1) (ख) of erstwhile Surguja Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Officers and Workers) Seva Viniyam, 2010 (for short 'Regulation 2010'). The said show cause notice was replied by the appellant and ultimately, the General Manager of respondent No.2 imposed the abovestated punishment upon the appellant vide Ex.P/1 dated 01/01/2014 which was communicated to him vide letter dated 03/01/2014. It appears that an appeal was preferred by the appellant before the Chairman /appellate officer of respondent No.1 and the said appeal was also dismissed. Thereafter, writ petition was preferred by the appellant which was allowed and the order of punishment was set aside but liberty was granted in favour of the respondent to proceed from the stage of issuance of show cause notice against the appellant after departmental enquiry report is received, if so desired. Thus, 4 the present appeal. 4. The learned Single Judge has passed the impugned order dated 23.07.2025 and the operative part of the order is reproduced as under:- “ XXX 6. From the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, it is quite apparent that the petitioner was an officer of Grade-I initially with respondent No.3 and subsequently with respondent No.2. It has not been agitated by any of the parties that Regulations, 2010 deals with the service condition of the petitioner and according to Clause 2 (g) of Definitions, "Competent Authority" means the Chairman, in respect of officer and General Manager, in respect of employee. Meaning thereby that the General Manager was not the competent authority to impose penalty upon the petitioner which in the case in hand has been done by him. Though, an appeal was preferred before the Chairman which should have been the competent authority to pass any punishment order against the petitioner. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error and therefore, liable to be set aside. Both the orders are hereby set aside. As a result, the punishment imposed 5 upon the petitioner is also set aside, however, the respondent (sic petitioner) would be at liberty to proceed from the stage of issuance of show cause notice against the petitioner after departmental enquiry report is received, if so desired. Consequence to follow including any monetary monetary benefits. 7. The petition is accordingly allowed.” 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in law and on facts by granting liberty to the respondent bank to reinitiate or proceed with the departmental enquiry against the appellant even after his retirement from service on 28.02.2019. It is contended that such a direction is contrary to the settled legal position and to the governing service rules which do not permit initiation or continuation of disciplinary proceedings after an employee has demitted office, except in cases specifically provided under the applicable regulations, which is not the case herein. The learned Single Judge failed to take into consideration the binding precedent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India and Others v. Navin Kumar Sinha, Civil Appeal No. 1279 of 2024, decided on 19.11.2024, wherein it was categorically held that a departmental enquiry cannot be initiated or pursued against an employee after his retirement unless there exists an express rule or statutory provision authorizing such action. In the absence 6 of any such enabling provision in the present case, the direction to proceed with the enquiry post-retirement is illegal, unsustainable, and contrary to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the impugned order to that extent deserves to be set aside. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent bank, per contra, submits that the contention of the appellant regarding the impermissibility of continuing departmental proceedings after retirement is misconceived and untenable in the present factual context. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly granted liberty to the respondent bank to proceed with the enquiry from the stage of issuance of show-cause notice, since the entire enquiry process had already been completed prior to the appellant’s retirement and only the final decision remained pending. The liberty so granted is not for initiation of a fresh enquiry but merely for its lawful continuation from the stage where it had been vitiated on account of jurisdictional irregularity. The respondent further contends that the ratio laid down in State Bank of India & Ors. v. Navin Kumar Sinha (Civil Appeal No. 1279/2024) is distinguishable on facts, as in that case the disciplinary proceedings were sought to be initiated afresh after the employee’s retirement, whereas in the present case the enquiry had already culminated in a report prior to retirement. Moreover, the service regulations governing the respondent bank do not bar continuation or finalization of such 7 proceedings where the misconduct was committed during service and the enquiry was validly commenced. Therefore, the order of the learned Single Judge granting liberty to proceed cannot be said to be illegal or perverse and deserves to be sustained. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available in the record. 8. After hearing learned counsel for both sides and upon perusal of the record, this Court finds no substance in the present appeal. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting interference. The learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the order of punishment on the ground of jurisdictional defect, as the General Manager, being not the competent authority under Regulation, 2010, could not have imposed the penalty upon the appellant. However, the liberty granted to the respondent bank to proceed from the stage of issuance of show-cause notice after receipt of the enquiry report is a logical and legally sound consequence flowing from the said finding, as it merely restores the proceedings to the competent authority for decision in accordance with law. The contention of the appellant that such continuation is impermissible post-retirement is misconceived, since in the present case, the disciplinary enquiry was validly initiated and concluded during the appellant’s tenure in service and only the final order of 8 punishment remained pending. The direction does not amount to initiation of a fresh enquiry but is limited to rectifying a procedural irregularity and completing an existing proceeding. The reliance placed by the appellant on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India & Ors. v. Navin Kumar Sinha (Civil Appeal No. 1279/2024) is misplaced, as the factual matrix therein involved initiation of disciplinary proceedings after retirement, which is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Therefore, the liberty granted by the learned Single Judge is in consonance with law and principles of natural justice. 9. Further, the scope of interference in an intra-court appeal is limited to cases where the order of the learned Single Judge suffers from patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error. In the present case, we find that the learned Single Judge has rightly granted the liberty. 10. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself. SD/- SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Jyoti