- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 ® IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ASHOK S.KINAGI REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 1026 OF 2016 (POS) BETWEEN: 1. D SHIVA RAO SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS VASANTH KUMAR. D S/O D.SHIVA RAO AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS R/AT SKANDA NILAYA, ATHOOR KOILA VILLAGE, PUTTUR TALUK, D.K.-574 201 2. DINESH KUMAR.D S/O D. SHIVA RAO SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS 2(A) SMT. D. SHALINI RAO W/O LATE DINESH KUMAR RAO AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS R/AT SHIVASADANA ADI SUBRAMANYA ROAD SUBRAMANYA SULLIA TALUK (PRESENTLY KADABA TALUK) DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT – 574 238 2(B) SHREYAS RAO D S/O LATE DINESH KUMAR RAO AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS Digitally signed by SHILPABAI S Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 R/AT SHIVASADANA ADI SUBRAMANYA ROAD SUBRAMANYA SULLIA TALUK (PRESENTLY KADABA TALUK) DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT – 574 238 2(C) VISHWA RAO S/O LATE DINESH KUMAR RAO AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS R/AT SHIVASADANA ADI SUBRAMANYA ROAD SUBRAMANYA SULLIA TALUK (PRESENTLY KADABA TALUK) DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT – 574 238 …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. G BALAKRISHNA SHASTRY, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. M V MANJUNATHA S/O M.K.VISHNU MURTHY AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, 2. M.V.SHRIVASTA S/O M.K.VISHNU MURTHY AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS, HINDU BRAHMIN BOTH ARE RESIDING AT KANJI HOUSE, BALPA VILLAGE SULLIA TALUK BALPA POST, D.K.-574 239 3. RAJESHWARI S.N.RAO D/O D.SHIVA RAO W/O SHANKAR NARAYANA RAO AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS, R/AT IBARJE HOUSE, KANIYOOR VILLAGE, PUTTUR TALUK D.K.DISTRICT-574 201 - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 4. VEENA. R. RAO D/O D. SHIVA RAO W/O RAMAKRISHNA RAO AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS, R/AT ASHRIVADA, PERUVAJE VILLAGE, SULLIA TALUK, D.K. - 574 239 11. SANDHYA CHITHARANJAN RAO D/O D. SHIVA RAO W/O CHITHARANJAN RAO AGED ABUT 46 YEARS, R/AT BADENJA HOUSE, RAMAKUNDA VILLAGE & POST, PUTTUR TALUK, D.K.-574 201 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. K CHANDRANATH ARIGA, ADVOCATE FOR R1 & R2 R3 TO R5 ARE SERVED) THIS RSA IS FILED UNDER SEC.100 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 29.02.2016 PASSED IN R.A NO.92/2011 ON THE FILE OF THE V ADDL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, D.K., MANGALURU SITTING AT PUTTUR, D.K., ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 08.06.2011 PASSED IN O.S NO.48/2006 ON THE FILE OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC., PUTTUR, D.K., THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ASHOK S.KINAGI ORAL JUDGMENT This Regular second appeal is filed by the appellants, challenging the judgment and decree dated 29.02.2016, - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 passed in R.A.No.92/2011 by the learned V Additional District and Sessions Judge, D.K. Mangaluru sitting at Puttur, D.K. 2. For convenience, the parties are referred to, based on their ranking before the trial Court. The appellants were the sons of the deceased defendant, respondent Nos.1 and 2 were the plaintiffs, and the other respondents were the daughters of the deceased defendant. 3. Brief facts, leading rise to the filing of this appeal are as follows: The plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendants for possession and mesne profits. It is contended that they are the absolute owners of the suit property. It was originally belonged to the late Sri N.S.Krishna Rao, who acquired the rights by a registered sale deed dated 01.07.1932 executed by then owner Sri Krishnayya Bhat. After purchase, N.S.Krishna Rao entered possession and - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 continued thereon. During his lifetime, mutation was effected in his name. The defendants’ father, by name Ishwarappayya, was a relative of N.S.Krishna Rao, he approached for temporary accommodation on the ground that his near by Devaragadde properties had gone out of his hands, and wanted a place for residence. The plaintiffs father permitted him to enjoy the property as a tenant on a nominal rent in the building. Some improvements were effectived by Ishwarappayya as per the directions of N.S.Krishna Rao, and the expenses were paid by N.S.Krishna Rao. N.S.Krishna Rao died, leaving behind his sons and daughters. The plaintiffs’ purchased the said property for a valuable consideration under the registered sale deeds dated 24.09.1992 and 03.04.1993 for Rs.50,000/- and Rs.12,000/-, respectively. The plaintiffs became the absolute owners of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property under registered sale deeds dated 24.09.1992 and 03.04.1993. The defendants’ father Ishwarappayya started asserting imaginary rights in the revenue - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 proceedings. The defendant filed a writ petition in W.P.No.21348/1996. The said writ petition was dismissed confirming the order of Tahasildar Sullia for mutation in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendants filed a frivolous suit based on adverse possession in O.S.No.107/1994. The defendant has no right, title or interest over the suit property. The plaintiffs requested the defendants to vacate, and hand over the possession of the suit schedule property. The defendants refused to vacate, and hand over the suit schedule property. Hence, this suit. Accordingly, the plaintiffs prays to decree the suit. 3.1. The defendant filed a written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and also denied the ownership of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property. It is contended that since the dispute is pending in O.S.No.107/1994, his application filed under Form No.7A of the K.L.R.Act was rejected. It is stated that the defendant may be awarded with value of improvements if the suit is decreed. It is also contended that the suit is bad - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 for want of proper prior notice. It is contended that the defendants acquired the title through adverse possession. Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable, and barred by law. Accordingly, prays to dismiss the suit. 3.2. The defendant in O.S.No.48/2006 filed a suit in O.S.No.107/1994 against the plaintiffs in O.S.No.107/1994 for a declaration of title based on adverse possession, and injunction on the file of the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Puttur, D.K. The Trial Court clubbed both the suits in O.S.Nos.107/1994 and 48/2006, and framed the issues separately, and however, the common evidence was recorded. 3.3. The Trial Court, based on the above said pleadings, framed the following issues: In O.S.No.107/1994: 1) Whether the plaintiff has proved his possession of plaint ‘A’ schedule property is in his own right to the knowledge of the defendants and their predecessor in title - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 and adverse to their interest thereon, for over 12 years continuously and uninterruptedly and thus has acquired title by Law of Adverse Possession? 2) Whether the allegation of interference is true? 3) Whether the suit is barred by Law of Estoppel and Acquiescence as contended by the defendants? 4) Whehter the valuation of the suit for the purpose of payment of Court fee and jurisdiction is proper and correct? 5) What order and what decree? In O.S.No.48/2006: 1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the Sale Deed dated 01.07.1932 is acted upon and has come into effect? 2) Whehter the plaintiff proves that by virtue of the Sale deed dated 01.07.1932 late N.S.Krishna Rao entered possession of suit schedule property? 3) Whehter the plaintiffs prove that Late N.S.Krishna Rao permitted the defendants father to enjoy the property as a tenant as contended in the plaint? 4) Whether the plaintiffs prove that they have purchased the plaint ‘A’ schedule property as per the Sale deed dated 24.09.1992 and the Sale Deed dated 03.04.1993 for valid and lawful consideration paid and that they have become absolute owners and acquired valid title to the same? - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 5) Whether the defendant proves that the Sale Deed dated 24.09.1992 and 03.04.1993 are void documents and that the plaintiff did not acquire any rights as contended in para 7 and 8 of the written statement? 6) Whether the defendant proves that the plaintiff’s claim in this suit is barred under law? 7) Whether the defendant proves that he has acquired title to the plaint ‘A’ schedule property by adverse possession? 8) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 9) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 10) Whether the valuation made is proper? 11) Whether the suit is not maintainable for not claiming declaratory relief? 12) Whether the suit is bad under law for want of proper notice? 13) What reliefs the plaintiffs are entitled to? 14) What order or decree? 3.4. The plaintiff in OS.No.107/1994 i.e., the defendant in O.S.No.48/2006 was examined as PW.1, and marked 132 documents as Exs.P.1 to P.132. On the other hand, defendant No.2 in O.S.No.107/1994 being plaintiff No.2 in O.S.No.48/2006, was examined as DW.1, and - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 marked 35 documents as Exs.D1 to D35. The trial Court, after recording the evidence, hearing both sides, and on assessing the verbal and documentary evidence, answered issues in O.S.No.107/1994, as issue No.1 and 2 in the negative, issue Nos.3 and 4 in the affirmative, and issue No.5 as per the final order, and answered issues in O.S.No.48/2006 as issue Nos.1 to 4, 10 and 12 in the affirmative, issue Nos.5 to 9 and 11 in the negative, and issue No.13 and 14 as per the final order. Both the suits were dismissed vide common judgment dated 08.06.2011. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.107/1994, and OS.No.48/2006, preferred the appeals in R.A.No.84/2011, 92/2011 and 85/2011 on the file of the learned V Additional District and sessions Judge, D.K. Mangaluru, sitting at Puttur, D.K, and all the appeals were clubbed together. 3.5. The First Appellate Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, framed the following points for consideration: - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 1) Whether the appellant in R.A.No.84/2011 proves that judgment and decree in O.S.No.107/1994 is opposed to law, as lower Court has ignored established principles of law, pleadings, evidence and mislead itself and wrongly answered issues and ought to have decreed the suit in OS.No.107/1994? 2) Whether appellant in R.A.No.85/2011 proves that the lower Court ought to have answered issues in O.S.No.48/2006 in his favour? 3) Whether appellant in R.A.No.84/2011 and 85/2011 made out just and reasonable grounds for interference of his Court in the judgment of lower Court in O.S.107/1994? 4) Whether appellant in R.A.No.92/2011 proves that lower Court ought to have answered issues No.12 to 14 in his favour and ought to have decreed the suit in O.S.48/2006, but wrongly referred the tenancy matter to Land Tribunal Sullia for adjudication on Form No.7A filed by defendant? 5) Whether appellant in RA.92/2011 has made out just and reasonable grounds for interference of this Court in judgment of lower Court in OS.48/2006? 6) What order? 3.6. The First Appellate Court, after re-assessing the verbal and documentary evidence, answered point Nos.1 to 3 in the negative, point Nos.4 and 5 in the affirmative, - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 and point No.6 as per the final order. The appeals in R.A.Nos.84/2011 and 85/2011 were dismissed, and the appeal in R.A.No.92/2011 was allowed vide judgment dated 29.02.2016. The suit of the plaintiffs in O.S.No.48/2006 was decreed and directed the defendant to hand over the possession of ‘A’ schedule property, including structures thereon, to the plaintiffs within three months from the date of decree, failing which, the plaintiffs at liberty to take possession by filing execution in accordance with law. The legal representatives of the defendant in O.S.No.48/2006 preferred a Regular Second Appeal in RSA.No.1026/2016 against the judgment and decree passed in R.A.No.92/2011. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.107/1994 preferred the Regular Second Appeal in RSA.No.1041/2016. RSA.No.1041/2016 was dismissed for non-compliance of the office objections on 25.07.2017. 4. This Court, on 01.12.2016, admitted the appeal to consider the following substantial questions of law : - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 1) Whether the First Appellate Court has committed any serious legal error in holding that the defendant has not taken any plea of tenancy, though such plea has been taken by the plaintiffs, therefore, the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act is not applicable and thereby it further erred in holding that the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to decide the said issue raised in the said suit? 2) Whether the First Appellate Court has committed any serious legal error in holding that, when the plaintiffs have admitted that since the defendant is the tenant, they are entitled for recovery of possession without giving any notice as contemplated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act? 5. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the legal representatives of the defendant in O.S.No.48/2006, and the learned counsel for the plaintiffs. 6. Learned counsel for the defendant submits that the plaintiffs are not the absolute owners of the suit schedule property. He submits that the defendant is in possession of the suit schedule property for more than 70 years, and perfected the title by way of an adverse possession. He submits that the defendant has also filed a - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 suit in O.S.No.107/1994 for the relief of a declaration of ownership based on adverse possession and injunction. He submits that the First Appellate Court has committed an error in decreeing the suit in O.S.No.48/2006 and he also submits that the defendant had filed form No.7 for the grant of occupancy rights, and the said aspect was not considered by the First Appellate Court. He submits that the plaintiffs have not terminated the tenancy of the defendant. Hence, the First Appellate Court, without considering the same, has passed the impugned judgment. The impugned judgment passed by the First Appellate Court is arbitrary, and erroneous. Hence, on these grounds, he prays to allow the appeal. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs submits that the defendant in O.S.No.48/2006 had filed a suit for a declaration of ownership based on adverse possession and the said suit was dismissed. He submits that the defendant, without admitting the title of the plaintiff in O.S.No.48/2006, cannot seek a declaration of - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 title based on adverse possession, and he has denied the title of the plaintiff. Hence, the defendant has not acquired the title by an adverse possession. He also submits that mere possession of the defendant would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. He also submits that the pleading of adverse possession has no equities in his favour, since his time to defeat the rights of the true owner. Hence, he submits that the defendant’s father was a tenant under Sri N.S.Krishna Rao and the defendant has no right to continue in possession of the suit schedule property. He also submits that the suit for declaration of title based on adverse possession filed by the defendant was dismissed, and he has filed an appeal before the First Appellate Court. The said appeal was dismissed, and he had preferred a second appeal in RSA.No.1041/2016. The said appeal was dismissed for non-compliance of the office objections on 25.07.2017. He submits that the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.107/1994 has attained finality. Hence, he submits that the First Appellate Court, - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 considering the entire evidence on record, has rightly passed the impugned judgment. Hence, on these grounds, he prays to dismiss the appeal. 8. Reg- Substantial question of law No.1: The plaintiffs filed a suit in O.S.No.48/2006 for possession that the plaintiffs had purchased the suit schedule property under a registered sale deeds dated 24.04.1992 and 03.04.1993 for a valuable consideration. Originally the suit schedule property belonged to N.S. Krishnarao, who acquired the suit schedule property by a registered sale deed dated 01.07.1932, and he was in possession of the suit schedule property during his lifetime. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the defendant’s father late Ishwarappayya, was a relative and approached N.S. Krishnarao, requested for a temporary accommodation on the ground that his nearby Devaragudde properties have gone out of his hands and therefore, he wanted a place of residence and he was permitted to enjoy the property as a tenant on nominal - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 rent. N.S. Krishnarao died, leaving behind his children from whom the plaintiffs has purchased the said property for a valuable consideration. The Ishwarappayya died, leaving behind the defendant has his legal heir. 9. Based on the sale deeds revenue records were transferred in the name of the plaintiffs. The defendant challenged the entries effected in the name of the plaintiffs before the Tahasildar wherein the defendants’ claim was dismissed and the plaintiffs challenged the same by an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner. The appeal was dismissed. The matter was remanded for a fresh enquiry to the Tahasildar, Sullia. The Tahasildar, after remand, ordered the mutation in favour of the plaintiffs, against which the defendant filed an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner, who dismissed the appeal. The defendant filed a Writ Petition in W.P.No.21348/1996 before the High Court of Karnataka and the Writ Petition was dismissed, confirming the order of the Tahasildar. - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 10. The defendant also filed a suit in O.S.No.107/1994 for the relief of a declaration of title based on the adverse possession. The trial Court clubbed both the suits and recorded common evidence. The defence of the defendant is that the defendants are in possession of the suit schedule property for about 70 years and have perfected their title by way of adverse possession. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.48/2006 to prove that father of the defendant was a tenant regarding the suit schedule property produced the records, marked at Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.35. 10.1. There is no dispute regarding the ownership over the suits schedule property. The defendant claims ownership over the suit schedule property by way of an adverse possession and the defendant has filed form No.7 for the grant of an occupancy rights. The said application was rejected by the Land Tribunal and the order passed by the Land Tribunal has attained finality, now there is no dispute regarding the tenancy. Hence, the provisions of - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 the Karnataka Land Reforms Act do not apply to the case on hand. 11. As the dispute is between the plaintiffs and defendant regarding termination of tenancy, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are applicable to the case on hand. The first appellate Court has rightly held that there exists a relationship of the lessor and lessee, between the plaintiffs and defendant. Further, though the defendant in O.S.No.48/2006 has filed a suit for a declaration of title based on adverse possession, the defendant must admit the title against whom adverse possession, is sought. 12. The coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of R. Prakash Vs. Smt. G.P. Marthamma reported in ILR 2000 Kar 1223 held that the “adverse possession whether can be claimed by the defendant denying the title of the plaintiff who is the true owner? Held without - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 admitting the title of the plaintiff, the defendant raising question of adverse possession is not known to law. 13. Admittedly, in the instant case the defendant has not admitted the title of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. Hence, the question of claiming adverse possession does not arise. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Baswanthrao since deceased by his legal representatives Vs. Rajkumar reported in ILR 2009 Kar 1099 had an occasion to examine the plea of adverse decision, in para 13 and 14 which reads as follows: “13. Adverse possession is a question of fact and in a claim of adverse possession, the title is not disputes; what is alleged is only its extinction. A plea of adverse possession being based on facts which have to be raised to that effect, is not necessarily a legal plea. The plea of adverse possession raises a mixed question of law and fact. Where a person wants to base his title on it, he should specifically set up the plea. Unless the plea is raised, it cannot be entertained. A plea must be raised and it must be shown when possession became adverse, so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. The prayer clause may not be taken as a substitute for a plea. A person acquires title by way of adverse possession when he is in continuous, uninterrupted, hostile possession over a period of 12 years. In order to calculate 12 years period - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 there should be a starting point. Therefore, the law mandates that the plaintiff who seeks a declaration that he has perfected his title which his possession becomes adverse to that of the defendant. It is from that date if the plaintiff shows continuous, uninterrupted possession for a period of 12 years, then the right of the defendant to the property stands extinguished and the plaintiff would acquired title by way of adverse possession. 14. In so far as proof of adverse possession is concerned, it is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario”, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the owner. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) On what date he came into possession, (b) What was the nature of his possession, (c) Whether the factum of possession was known to the other party (d) How long his possession has continued, and (e) His possession was open and undisturbed. It is only on proof of all these ingredients the case of adverse possession is said to have been established. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour, since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Annakili Vs. Vedanayagam and others reported in AIR 2007 SCW 6892 held in paragraph No.22, as follows: “22. Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the possession of the defendant - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 should become adverse to the plaintiff; and (2) the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession , it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more do not ripen into a title.” 15. Admittedly, the defendant in O.S.No.48/2006 has claimed the plea of adverse possession and failed to prove the plea of adverse possession and the said suit was dismissed and the plaintiff in O.S.No.107/1994 i.e., defendant in O.S.No.48/2006 preferred the appeals in R.A.No.84/2011 and 85/2011. The appeals came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 29.02.2016. Mere long possession of the defendant over the suit schedule property will not confer a title by way of an adverse possession. The Plea of Tenancy has already attained finality in the writ petition No.21348/1996. There is no challenge to the order passed in the aforesaid writ - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 petition. The provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act are not applicable to the suit property. Hence, the Civil Court has a jurisdiction to entertain the suit for ejectment filed by the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court has rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiff. In view of the above discussion, I answer Substantial Question of Law No.1 in the negative. 16. Reg- Substantial Question of Law No.2. Though, the plaintiffs contended that the father of the defendant has taken the suit premises on a lease. There exists a relationship of the lessor and lessee between the parties to the suit. Though, the plaintiff has not issued a notice under Section 106 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 terminating the tenancy, however, the lease has been determined by the efflux of time. Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act provides for determination of lease. According to it, a lease of an immovable property determines by efflux of time limited thereby. - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 17. It is settled law that a notice to a quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not necessary when the tenant had denied the landlord’s title before the institution of the suit. A lessor as such is not entitled to bring a suit for eviction as against a lessee so long as the lease subsists, and has not been terminated. Clause (a) to (h) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides for the various ways, and circumstances in which a lease of an immovable property is determined. Under Clause (a) of the said section, a lease can be determined by efflux of time. Therefore, that in a case where an ejectment of the lessee is claimed on the ground of efflux of time, there can be no question of issue of a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is not open to the defendant to raise the plea that there has been no determination of the tenancy on account of the non-service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is quite untenable. - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 18. In view of the determination of a lease by efflux of time, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the possession of the suit property without issuing any notice as contemplated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The first appellate Court, considering the entire evidence on record, has rightly held that there exists a relationship between the parties to the suit as a lessor and lessee, and by efflux of time, a lease was determined, and has rightly passed the impugned judgment. 19. In view of the above discussion, I answer Substantial Question of Law No.2 in the negative. 20. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER (i) The Appeal is dismissed. (ii) The Judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court below is hereby confirmed. (iii) No order as to the costs. - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23099 RSA No. 1026 of 2016 In view of the dismissal of the appeal, pending I.A.s, if any, do not survive for consideration and accordingly, disposed of. Sd/- (ASHOK S.KINAGI) JUDGE SSB/BVK;