1 2025:CGHC:54768-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 814 of 2025 Chhattisgarh Board Of Secondary Education Through Its Secretary, Raipur Distt.- Raipur (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus Miss Nisha Darro D/o Tulsi Darro Aged About 20 Years R/o Village- Vyaskongera, Police Station- Kanker Post And Tahsil- Kanker Distt.- Uttar Bastar Kanker (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Parag Kotecha, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 11.11.2025 1. Heard Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant on I.A. No. 01/2025, which is an application for condonation of delay of 33 days in preferring the appeal. Also heard Mr. Parag Kotecha, learned MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.11.12 10:44:53 +0530 2 counsel for respondent. 2. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against an order dated 23.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No. 3827 of 2025 (Miss Nisha Darro Vs. Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education), by which the learned Single Judge has disposed of the writ petitions filed by the writ petitioner / respondent herein observing as under: “5. Considering the facts and circumstance of the case, and consider- ing the judgment passed by the Division of this Court in the matter of Rahul Kumar Thawait Vs. The State of Chhattisgarh in WA No. 121 of 2020, this Court finds it appropriate to direct the petitioner to appear with all the relevant documents (birth certificate, Dakhil Kharij Register, 5th and 8th mark-sheet) before the respondent No. 1 on 18.08.2025 at 11:00AM. After verification of the same, if it is found that, the documents submitted by the petitioner are genuine, necessary correction will be caused to be made in the relevant records and in mark-sheet for the 10th class and thereafter proper mark-sheet will be issued showing the correct date of birth as "22.12.2004".” 3. From perusal of the appeal, it transpires that the appeal is barred by days of 33 days for which, I.A. No. 01/2025 i.e. application for condonation of delay is filed, which reads as under: “1. That, the appellant is filing the instant appeal before this Hon'ble court against order dated 23/07/2025 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition (SC) No. 3827/2025 (Annexure A/1), in the 3 matter of Miss Nisha Darro VS Chhattisagrh Board of Secondary Education. 2. That, the appellant was obtaining legal advice and was under a bona fide impression that filing a writ appeal was not necessary. However, upon further consultation and reconsideration, the appellant decided to prefer the present writ appeal before this Hon'ble Court. Hence, some time was consumed in arriving at this decision, resulting in the delay in filing the appeal by 33. days. 3. That, the delay caused by the appellant is no intentional and liable to be condoned with PRAYER It is therefore prayed that the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the application and condone the delay in filing the appeal, in interest of justice” 4. On a pointed query being made to the learned counsel for the appellant as to why he has approached this Court against the impugned order dated 23.07.2025 after an inordinate delay of 33 days, he has not offered any plausible explanation or cogent reason for the said delay. A perusal of I.A. No. 01/2025, which is an application for condonation of delay, reveals that the appellant has merely stated that some time was consumed in obtaining legal advice and in reconsidering the necessity of filing a writ appeal. It is stated that he was under a bona fide impression that filing a writ appeal was not required, however, upon further consultation, he decided to prefer the same. 5. A bare reading of the said application goes to show that the 4 explanation offered by the appellant is vague, general, and devoid of any satisfactory particulars. It is wholly perfunctory in nature, lacking in substance and particulars. Such a general and casual explanation cannot be accepted as a “sufficient cause” as contemplated under law. 6. It is a well-settled principle that the expression sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, however, the party seeking condonation must demonstrate bona fide diligence and reasonable explanation for the delay. In the present case, the appellant has failed to establish any such bona fide reason or unavoidable circumstance which prevented him from filing the appeal within the prescribed period. The plea of obtaining legal advice or being under a mistaken impression of law cannot, by itself, constitute a sufficient cause for condonation. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the writ appeal is barred by delay and laches and further there is no cogent reason or explanation has been given in the delay and laches application filed for condonation of delay. Hence, the appeal is not liable to be entertained. 8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the settled principles in the following manner:- “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to 5 the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and others reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115, having found that the employee suddenly brought up a challenge to the order of termination of his services after 20 years and claimed all consequential benefits, held that the relief sought for was inadmissible. The legal position in this regard was laid out in the following terms:- “10. Every representation of the Government for relief, may not be applied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply 6 may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 11. When a decision is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits,being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of “acknowledgement of a jural relationship” to give rise to a fresh cause of action. 12. When a government abandons service to take alternative employment or to attend to personal affairs, and does not bother to send any letter seeking leave or letter of resignation or letter of voluntary retirement, and the records do not show that he is treated as being in service, he cannot after two decades, represent that he should be taken back to duty. Nor can such employee be treated as having continued in service, thereby deeming the entire period as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. That will be a travesty of justice. 13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage 7 discipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a result of a routine order for back wages.” 10. In the light of the principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments (supra), and upon due consideration of the grounds urged in I.A. No. 01 of 2025, we find that the delay of 33 days in preferring the writ appeal has not been satisfactorily explained with any cogent or plausible reason. The appellant has failed to demonstrate sufficient cause so as to justify condonation of such delay. Therefore, no ground is made out to exercise our discretion in favour of the appellants for condoning the delay. 11. Moreover, the appellant has assailed the impugned order dated 23.07.2025 primarily on the ground that the learned Single Judge has erred in failing to appreciate that the respondent/writ petitioner had approached the authorities after an inordinate and unexplained delay, and that the rejection of her application by the Board was legal, justified, and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, before assailing the order on merits, the appellant was duty-bound to first establish that the delay in filing the appeal was due to sufficient and bona fide cause. Having failed to do so, the appeal itself cannot be entertained. 12. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no justification 8 to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to condone the delay of 33 days. Accordingly, I.A. No. 01/2025, seeking condonation of delay, is rejected, and consequently, the writ appeal stands dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 13. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet