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2025 DAILYLAW 48922 (AP)

Rednam Venkata Sesha Chalapathi v. Munagala Chittranjan

AS/943/2010 · 2025-09-22

V Srinivas

body2025

Judgment text

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APHC010585192010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3367] TUESDAY,THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V SRINIVAS FIRST APPEAL NOs: 860 AND 943 OF 2010 Between in A.S.No.860 of 2010: 1. MUNAGALA CHITTRANJAN, S/O LATE SRINIVASA RAO RETIRED EMPLOYEE R/O D.NO. 1182/A, ROAD NO. 45, JUBILEE HILLS, HYDERABAD 2. SMT. MUNAGALA SUREKHA (DIED), W/O. LATE KANNAIAH, ANDHRAKESARI ROAD, BALAJIRAOPET, ONGOLE. 3. SMT. SUNEETA KERCOOD, W/O LATE PHIL BAGWEL TEACHER R/O 2204, SNRISE AVENUE, LAFAYETTE IN 47904 USA 4. SMT. GUNDALA SANGEETA GIRI, W/O GUNDALA GIRI SUBRAMNAYAM BUSINESS MANAGER, SAP INDIA PVT. LTD., R/O C-302, PURVA PAVILION, OPP. SINDHI HIGH SCHOOL, KEMAPURA, HEBBAL, BANGALORE (APPELLANT 3&4 ARE REP. BY THEIR GPA HOLDER 1ST ...APPELLANT(S) AND 1. REDNAM VENKATA SESHA CHALPATHI, S/O LATE HARI KUMAR BUSINESS R/O. D.NO. 47-12-15, DWARAKANAGAR, VISAKHAPATNAM 2. SMT REDNAM REKHA, W/O R.A.S. NAIDU HOUSEHOLD DUTIES, R/O MIG 99, SEETHAMMADHARA NORTH EXTENSION, VISAKHAPATNAM ...RESPONDENT(S): 2 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 Between in A.S.No.943 of 2010: 1. REDNAM VENKATA SESHA CHALAPATHI, S/O LATE SRI HARI KUMAR BUSINESS R/O. D.NO. 47-12-15, DWARAKANAGAR, VISAKHAPATNAM 2. REDNAM REKHA, W/O R.A.S.D. NAIDU HINDU, BUSINESS R/O MIG 99, SEETHAMMADHARA NORTH EXTENSION, VISAKHAPATNAM ...APPELLANT(S) AND 1. MUNAGALA CHITTRANJAN, S/O LATE SRINIVASA RAO RETIRED EMPLOYEE R/O D.NO. 1182/A, ROAD NO. 45, JUBILEE HILLS, HYDERABAD 2. SMT MUNAGALA SUREKHA DIED, S/O LATE SRINIVASA RAO RETIRED EMPLOYEE R/O D.NO. 1182/A, ROAD NO. 45, JUBILEE HILLS, HYDERABAD 3. SMT SUNEETA KERCOOD, W/O LATE PHIL BAGWEL TEACHER R/O 2204, SNRISE AVENUE, LAFAYETTE IN 47904 USA 4. SMT GUNDALA SANGEETA GIRI, W/O GUNDALA GIRI SUBRAMNAYAM BUSINESS MANAGER, SAP INDIA PVT. LTD., R/O C-302, PURVA PAVILION, OPP. SINDHI HIGH SCHOOL, KEMAPURA, HEBBAL, BANGALORE IA NO: 1 OF 2010(ASMP 2337 OF 2010 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay all further proceedings which arise out of Judgement and decree in OS No. 10/2004 on the file of Court of Special Judge for Trial of Cases Under SC & 3 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 ST (POA) Act Cum Additional District Judge at Vizianagaram dt.10-7-2010 pending disposal of the present Appeal and pass IA NO: 4 OF 2010(ASMP 13946 OF 2010 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased IA NO: 1 OF 2013(ASMP 536 OF 2013 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to fix an early date of hearing of the above appeal IA NO: 1 OF 2014(ASMP 1737 OF 2014 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to fix an early date of hearing of the above appeal and heard along with AS.No.943 of 2010 IA NO: 1 OF 2015(ASMP 2403 OF 2015 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to Fix an Early date of hearing of the above appeal and heard along with A.S. No.943/ 2010 IA NO: 1 OF 2017(ASMP 811 OF 2017 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to take up the appeal Out of Tur 4 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 and heard along with AS NO.943/2010 in the interest of Justice and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2010(ASMP 2521 OF 2010 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant stay the operation of the Judgment and Decree made in OS No. 10 of 2004 on the file of the Court of the Spl. Judge for trial of cases under S.Cs & S.Ts (POA) Act Cm Addl. District Judge, Vizianagaram dt. 13-7-2010 pending disposal of the above First Appeal and to pass IA NO: 2 OF 2010(ASMP 2526 OF 2010 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant permission to deposit an amount of Rs. 22,12,400/- (Being the agreed sale consideration under Ex. A-1 after deducting the advance amount already paid) to the credit of the suit in OS No. 10 of 2004 on the file of the Court of the Spl., Judge for trial of Cases under S.Cs & S.Ts (POA) Act Cum Addl. District Judge, Vizianagaram pending disposal of the above First Appeal and to pass IA NO: 3 OF 2010(ASMP 14516 OF 2010 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased Counsel for the Appellant(S) in A.S.No.860 of 2010: PATANJALI PAMIDIGHANTAM Counsel for the Respondent(S) in A.S.No.860 of 2010: N SIVA REDDY 5 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 The Court made the following: COMMON JUDGMENT: These regular appeals under Section 96 Code of Civil Procedure are directed against the decree and judgment in O.S.No.10 of 2004 dated 13.07.2010 on the file of the Court of Learned Special Judge for Trial of Cases under S.Cs. & S.Ts. (POA) Act-cum-Additional District Judge at Vizianagaram. 2. The plaintiffs before the Trial Court are the appellants in A.S.No.943 of 2010.The defendants before the Trial Court are the appellants in A.S.No.860 of 2010. 3. The appellants in A.S.No.943 of 2010 instituted the suit for specific performance of contract directing the defendants to execute a registered sale deed in their favour for the suit schedule property after receiving the balance sale consideration and further to deliver the possession of the schedule property or in the alternative to grant a decree for refund of advance money together with interest. 6 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 4. Before adverting the material and evidence on record and nature of findings in the judgment of the Trial Court, it is necessary to scan through the case pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings. 5. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter referred to as they arrayed before the trial Court. 6. The case of the plaintiffs in brief in the plaint was as follows: (i) The defendants offered to sell the suit schedule property to the plaintiffs at a rate of ₹800 per square yard, amounting to a total consideration of ₹24,62,400. The plaintiffs accepted the offer and entered into a sale agreement dated 28.08.2004, paying ₹2,50,000 in advance through a demand draft and cheque. (ii) As per the terms of the agreement, the plaintiffs were required to pay the remaining sale consideration on or before 10.09.2004, upon which the defendants would execute a registered sale deed in favor of the 7 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 plaintiffs or their nominees. The plaintiffs were always ready and willing to fulfill their part of the contract and were present at the Sub-Registrar’s Office in Vizianagaram on 10.09.2004 with the balance amount. However, the defendants failed to appear and did not execute the sale deed. (iii) On the same day, the plaintiffs sent a telegram to the defendants, reiterating their readiness and requesting execution of the sale deed upon receipt of the remaining consideration. Subsequently, on 12.09.2004, Plaintiff No.1 received a letter dated 09.09.2004 from Defendant No.1 stating that the agreement had been cancelled due to the plaintiffs’ alleged failure to pay the balance amount. Since the defendants unilaterally terminated the agreement one day prior to the agreed deadline, it clearly indicates their mala fide intention to avoid performing their 8 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 contractual obligations. Therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought in the suit. 7. The defendant No.1 denying all the allegations in the plaint and contending in the written statement, which was adopted by the defendant Nos.2 to 4, as follows: a). Plaintiff No.1, a real estate dealer based in Visakhapatnam, learned that the defendants were in urgent need of cash and intended to sell the schedule property quickly. Responding to this, Plaintiff No.1 offered to purchase the property and, on 28.08.2004, brought a demand draft for ₹1,25,000 in the name of Defendant No.1 and a cheque dated 30.08.2004 for ₹1,25,000 in the name of Defendant No.2 at Hyderabad as advance sale consideration. b). The defendants signed an agreement of sale written on a non-judicial stamp paper worth ₹100, which was attested by one Chaya and D.N. Prasad. However, the plaintiffs failed to provide the defendants with a copy of the agreement. 9 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 c). When the plaintiffs failed to comply with the terms of the contract, the defendants issued a letter dated 09.09.2004, formally cancelling the agreement. Therefore, the defendants respectfully request that the suit be dismissed with costs. 8. On these pleadings, the Trial Court settled the following issues for trial: “1.Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 24.8.2004 or in the alternative for the refund of the amount of Rs.2,50,000/- with interest at 24% per annum from the date of payment i.e., on 28.8.2004 till the date of realization? 2.Whether the parties agreed that the time was essence of contract? 3.Who committed the breach of agreement? 4.In view of deposit of Rs.2,50,000/- by the defendants to the credit of the suit, amounts to the cancellation and complying with the alternative relief prayed for? 5.Whether the defendants are entitled to compensatory damages in addition to suit costs? and 6.To what relief?” 10 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 9. At the trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, 1st plaintiff himself was examined as P.W.1 while relying on Exs.A.1 to A.13 in support of their contentions. On behalf of the defendants, 1st defendant himself was examined as D.W.1 and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.16. 10. Based on the material and evidence presented, the Trial Court concluded that it was the defendants who breached the terms and conditions of the agreement of sale marked as Ex.A.1. Since the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, the Court held that they were entitled to the relief of specific performance of the agreement dated 28.08.2004. Furthermore, considering the prevailing market value of the schedule property, the Court directed the plaintiffs to pay double the agreed sale consideration under Ex.A.1. Accordingly, the suit was decreed, and the defendants were ordered to execute a registered sale deed in favor of the plaintiffs upon receipt of the enhanced sale consideration. 11 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 11. It is against this decree and judgment, the defendants and plaintiffs prefer the present appeals, respectively. 12. Heard Sri Patanjali Pamidigantam, learned counsel for the defendants and Sri N.Siva Reddy, learned counsel for the plaintiffs. 13. Sri Patanjali Pamidigantam, learned counsel for the defendants, strongly contends that: 13.1. There is no evidence on record to establish that the plaintiffs were ready to pay the balance sale consideration as per Ex.A.1. He argues that, as stated in the notice dated 09.09.2004 issued by the defendants, the plaintiffs failed to pay the remaining amount, leading to the cancellation of the agreement under Section 54 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 13.2. He further submits that, apart from a mere assertion that the plaintiffs demanded the defendants to accept the balance sale consideration, no supporting material has been placed on record to prove such a demand. The only communication allegedly issued by the plaintiffs is a telegram 12 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 dated 10.09.2004, which was never received by the defendants. 13.3. Moreover, according to Ex.A.3, the plaintiffs claim to have obtained two demand drafts for the full sale consideration, but these drafts were not filed before the Court to substantiate their claim. The demand drafts were allegedly obtained on 10.09.2004 in Hyderabad, while the plaintiffs claim they were present at the Sub-Registrar’s Office in Vizianagaram with the full sale consideration, which casts doubt on the credibility of their claim. 13.4. He asserts that the plaintiffs have approached the Court with unclean hands and, therefore, the Trial Court ought to have dismissed the suit and directed the refund of the advance sale consideration. Accordingly, he prays that the appeal filed by the defendants in A.S. No. 860 of 2010 be considered favorably. 13.5. In support of the above contentions, he relied upon the pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Setia 13 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 v. Madan Lal1, Shenbagam v. K.K.Rathinavel2, U.N.Krishnamurthy v. A.M.Krishna Murthy3, Pemmada Prabhakar v. Youngmen’s Vysya Association4 and Tomorrowland Ltd v. Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd5. 14. On the contrary, Sri N. Siva Reddy, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, contends that the defendants issued the letter marked as Ex.A.2 on 09.09.2004 without waiting until 10.09.2004 to receive the balance sale consideration. However, even before receiving that letter on 13.09.2004, the plaintiffs had already sent a telegram dated 10.09.2004 (Ex.A.3), demanding execution of a regular sale deed. This, according to the plaintiffs, indicates a breach of contract by the defendants. He argues that since time was the essence in the agreement, the defendants themselves failed to honor the terms. To demonstrate their readiness and willingness to 1 (2019) 9 SCC 381 2 2022 SCC Online SC 71 3 (2023) 11 SCC 775 4 (2015) 4 SCC 355 5 (2025) 4 SCC 19 14 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 perform the contract, the plaintiffs obtained two demand drafts of ₹5,00,000 each on the same date and secured letters from their bank confirming that P.W.1 and his wife had sufficient funds in their accounts to fulfill the agreement. 15. He further submits that the Trial Court, after thoroughly examining the evidence, rightly concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the sale agreement dated 28.08.2004. He asserts that there are no valid grounds presented by the defendants to warrant interference by this Court. However, he argues that the Trial Court erred in directing the plaintiffs to pay double the sale consideration, which is unjustified. Therefore, he requests that the decree and judgment of the Trial Court be set aside to that extent and prays for favorable consideration of the appeal filed by the plaintiffs in A.S. No. 943 of 2010. 16. It is against this backdrop, the following point, which arises for determination and need for consideration now: 15 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 Whether the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is liable to be set aside, if so, to what extent and to what relief? 17. POINT: In-order to appreciate this point, this Court has to decide the following points: i. Whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of contract, if not, they are entitled for refund of advance of sale consideration paid under Ex.A.1 agreement of sale dated 28.08.2004? and ii. Whether the defendants committed breach of terms and conditions of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale, if so, the plaintiffs are entitled for any compensatory damage? Before addressing the above point, this Court considers it necessary to refer to certain admitted facts as evident from the record. The defendants are the absolute owners of the suit schedule property and had agreed to sell it to the plaintiffs for a total consideration of ₹24,62,400 under the agreement of sale dated 28.08.2004, marked as Ex.A.1. It is 16 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 also undisputed that the plaintiffs paid ₹2,50,000 as advance towards the sale consideration. As per the terms of Ex.A.1, the plaintiffs were required to pay the remaining balance on or before 10.09.2004 in order to obtain a regular sale deed from the defendants. 18. No doubt, it is settled proposition of law that under Section 16(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, firstly the plaintiffs have to demonstrate their readiness and willingness throughout to perform their obligations under the contract as enunciated in Ravi Seita case (referred to supra-1). 19. Specific performance is a remedy rooted in principles of equity. The Apex court in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan6, in para 7, held as “Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 says that: “Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the specific performance of any contract may, in the discretion of the court, be enforced (a) when there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by the non- 6 (1997) 3 SCC 1 at page 6 17 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 performance of the act agreed to be done; or (b) when the act agreed to be done is such that compensation in money for its non-performance would not afford adequate relief.” Clause (1) of the Explanation appended to the section says that “unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall presume (i) that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money”. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 says that “the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal”. Sub-section (2) sets out the situations in which the court may refuse specific performance. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 says that “the court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a 18 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 contract capable of specific performance”. Section 21 sets out the circumstances in which the court may award compensation in lieu of or in addition to specific performance. Section 23 says that merely because an agreement mentions a particular sum payable by the defaulting party to the other, that shall not be a ground for refusing the specific performance. It allows a party who has suffered damage due to a contract breach to seek enforcement of the contract terms. However, specific performance is not granted automatically. The Court has to consider several factors before compelling specific performance. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion of Courts as to decreeing specific performance. The Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. 20. In K.S.Vidyanandam case (referred to supra-6) summarized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that specific performance of a contract is a discretionary remedy, not 19 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 automatic. The Court emphasized that time was of the essence in the agreement and that the plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in performing contractual obligations justified denial of specific performance. The judgment reinforced that courts must consider the conduct, readiness and willingness of the party seeking enforcement, and that equity does not favor those who sleep over their rights. Same principle is followed in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani7, it is further emphasized this Judgment that a presumption that time is not essential unless the contract or circumstances indicate otherwise. In Gaddiapti Divija v. Pathuri Samrajyam8, the Apex Court reinforced the importance of readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 21. In Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha9, the Apex Court further reiterate that basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with Explanation (ii) is that any person seeking 7 (1993) 1 SCC 519 8 (2023 LiveLaw SC 327) 9 2005 (7) SCC 534 20 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 benefit of the specific performance of contract must manifest that his conduct has been blemishless throughout entitling him to the specific relief. The provision imposes a personal bar. The Court is to grant relief on the basis of the conduct of the person seeking relief. If the pleadings manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the plaint, he should not be denied the relief. 22. In light of the aforementioned legal precedents, upon examining the present case, it is noted that to substantiate the plaintiffs’ claim, the first plaintiff was examined as P.W.1. In his evidence affidavit, he reiterated the statements made in the plaint, asserting that the plaintiffs have always been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. He further stated that they had demanded the defendants to accept the balance of the sale consideration and execute the regular sale deed in their favor, but the defendants have avoided doing so. 21 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 23. To prove the same, it is the prime case of the plaintiffs that they have issued Ex.A.3 Telegram demanding the defendants to come to Vizianagaram and execute registered sale deed and the plaintiffs waited till 05.00 p.m. at the office of Sub-Registrar, but the defendants failed to perform their part of contract. As stated supra, under Ex.A.1 agreement, on or before 10.09.2004, both parties had to perform their part of contract. 24. Upon examining Exhibit A3 (Telegram), it is stated that the balance sale consideration was paid through two demand drafts—No.056876 and 056877—dated 10.09.2004, drawn on Bank of Baroda. The plaintiffs treat this telegram as a pre- suit notice, and its contents clearly reflect their claim that the entire balance amount was paid via these demand drafts. Despite this, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to appear for the registration at Vizianagaram as promised. They further assert that although 10th September was agreed 22 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 upon as the date for registration, the defendants did not even leave Hyderabad to attend the scheduled execution. 25. Documents placed on record speaks; the plaintiffs did not produce the said demand drafts before the Trial Court. Besides, to support their claim, they relied on Exhibits A4 and A5—letters dated 01.10.2004 issued by the Chief Manager of the Asilmetta Branch, Visakhapatnam. Exhibit A4 states: “We have issued demand draft No. 56877 dated 10.09.2004 in favour of M. Surekha Ranganadham for ₹5,00,000/- (Five lakhs only) from our Service Branch, Hyderabad, by debiting Savings Account No. 18732 held by Mrs. Rednam Rekha at our branch.” Similarly, Exhibit A5 confirms: “We have issued demand draft No. 56876 dated 10.09.2004 in favour of M. Chittaranjan for ₹5,00,000/- (Five lakhs only) from our Service Branch, Hyderabad, by debiting Savings Account No. 18780 held by Mrs. Rednam Satyavathi at our branch.” 23 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 26. All the above facts clearly establish that the plaintiffs obtained the demand drafts for ₹.10,00,000/- only from the Hyderabad branch on 10.09.2004, which directly contradicts their own case. Furthermore, the individual who allegedly issued the bank letters was not examined to verify the contents of Exhibits A4 and A5. Additionally, the testimony of P.W.1—that on 10.09.2004, the same day the plaintiffs claim to have obtained the demand drafts in Hyderabad, they waited at the Sub-Registrar’s office in Vizianagaram until 5:00 p.m. with the balance sale consideration, but the defendants failed to appear for execution of the registered sale deed has not been substantiated by any credible evidence. 27. The material on record clearly establishes that the alleged demand drafts, admittedly not filed before the Trial Court and they were said to be obtained on 10.09.2004 at Hyderabad. This raises serious doubts about whether the plaintiffs were actually present at the Sub-Registrar’s Office 24 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 in Vizianagaram on that date with the balance sale consideration, or whether they even had the necessary funds to fulfill their part of the contract. It is not the plaintiffs’ case that copies of the said demand drafts were sent along with Exhibit A3 (Telegram). Admittedly, the defendants did not receive any such copies of the demand drafts in their favour as part of the sale consideration under Exhibit A1. Furthermore, a review of Exhibit A3 reveals that it does not mention the place from where the telegram was issued by the first plaintiff, i.e., whether from Hyderabad or Vizianagaram, which could have helped to establish their bona fides in performing their contractual obligations. 28. Furthermore, the plaintiffs claim that, as per Exhibits A6 to A8 and A10; the letters issued by the Branch Manager of Bank of Baroda taken in name of the wife of P.W.1 had ₹12,00,000/- in her account on the relevant date and was willing to fulfill P.W.1’s contractual obligations. Similarly, the second plaintiff allegedly had ₹11,17,456/- in her account. 25 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 However, apart from these letters, no actual account statements were submitted, nor was any oral testimony from bank officials presented before the Trial Court to substantiate these claims. For the sake of convenience, even if it is presumed that the second plaintiff and the wife of P.W.1 had sufficient funds in their respective accounts on that date, the plaintiffs still failed to prove the existence of the alleged demand drafts dated 10.09.2004 for ₹10,00,000/- in connection with the transaction under Exhibit A1, as discussed earlier. Moreover, the plaintiffs have not claimed that the amounts available in these bank accounts were made ready for transfer to the defendants as balance sale consideration under Exhibit A1 on 10.09.2004 at Vizianagaram. 29. Now, it is relevant to refer certain pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court, which are relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendants, in Tomorrowland Ltd case (referred to supra-5), wherein it was held that “whosoever 26 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 comes to the Court claiming equity, must come with clean hand”. 30. This Court has no quarrel with the said proposition, in the present case on hand, admittedly, the plaintiffs have taken contra plea from the facts culled out during testimony of P.W.1 and documentary evidence. 31. Furthermore, in U.N.Krishnamurthy case (referred to supra-3), it was categorically held that: “To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay money, in terms of a contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of contract in time….” 32. In the present case on hand, in view of the discussion made supra, the plaintiffs utterly failed to adduce substantial evidence to show the availability of funds to make payment on 10.09.2004 in terms of Ex.A.1 agreement. 27 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 33. Admittedly, when there is non-compliance of statutory mandate under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, the Court is not bound to grant specific performance as well when Vendee committing breach of agreement for sale of immovable property, not entitled to decree of specific performance as observed in Shenbagam case (referred to supra-2) and Pemmada Prabhakar case (referred to supra- 4). 34. In the present case on hand, as discussed supra, the plaintiffs failed to prove their readiness and willingness with balance sale consideration as per the terms of Ex.A.1 agreement and approached the Trial Court with inconsistent and contra pleas from the testimony as well documentary evidence, which all shows the failure on the part of the plaintiffs to get the relief of specific performance under Ex.A.1. Thereby, the Trial Court erred in ordering the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale with double the sale consideration as agreed in Ex.A.1. 28 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 35. Now, coming to bonafides on the part the defendants to perform their obligation under Ex.A.1, it is their foremost contention that they have issued Ex.B.13/A.2 to the plaintiffs cancelling the said agreement. Admittedly, the said letter was issued on 09.09.2004 stating that “You have agreed to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.22,12,400/- on or before 10.09.2004. We have made the time as essence of the contract by our agreement of sale vide clause no.6 and also in our letter of offer dated 29-8-2004, that the offer is valid till 10-9-2004. Till today you have neither made any payment of balance consideration nor communicated your intention to comply with the condition. We hereby call upon that the time fixed is the essence of the contract. In case of failure, the agreement dated 28-8-2004 stands cancelled. You are at liberty to come and collect the advance amount in such an event.” 36. Admittedly, as per Ex.A.1, the plaintiffs have to pay the balance sale consideration on or before 10.09.2004. But the 29 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 said letter under Ex.A.2 was issued on 09.09.2004, which is one day prior to the time specified for execution of the sale deed under Ex.A.1 and the same was said to be received by the plaintiffs on 13.09.2004 after issuance of Ex.A.3 Telegram. Furthermore, it is not explained as to why the defendants could not wait till 10.09.2004, which is obligatory under Ex.A.1 and what is necessity for them to issue Ex.A.2 on 09.09.2004 itself. 37. More so, it is not their case that before issuing Ex.A.2 any corresponding was made to the plaintiff regarding non execution of Ex.A.1. It is also not their case that they have waited at Vizianagaram to perform their part of contract as on 10.09.2004 but filed Exs.A.11 to A.13 caveat petitions by the 2nd defendants in various Courts on 13.09.2004 and 14.09.2004 itself. If the defendants have bonafides to perform their part of contract, they would have issued notice to the plaintiff after 10.09.2004 instead of filing Exs.A.11 to A.13, but they did not place any material before the Trial Court to 30 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 show their willingness to perform their part of contract except bare pleading. It is also not the case of the defendants that immediately after 10.09.2004, they have returned the advance amount to the plaintiffs or sent any notice calling them to collect the advance sale consideration. 38. The above referred judgments of Apex Court as well facts in the present case goes to show that the readiness and willingness as averred by the plaintiff is not in tune with the settled legal proposition and even the conduct of the plaintiff is not unblemished throughout the suit as found from the material placed on record. For the above reasons, this court is of the view that plaintiff could not succeed the claim as prayed for. 39. Furthermore, the above all circumstances and material on record goes to show that the defendants are also not in consistent in performing their part of contract, resulted breach of terms and conditions under Ex.A.1, thereby, they 31 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 are liable to return the advance sale consideration with interest to the plaintiffs. 40. Having regard to the above discussion, this Court has no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the Trial Court went in wrong ordering specific performance of agreement of sale with double the sale consideration as agreed under Ex.A.1 in favour of plaintiffs instead of refund of advance sale consideration to the plaintiff with interest at 24% per annum from the date of Ex.A.1 by the defendants, thereby, the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs in A.S.No.943 of 2010 is liable for dismissal and the appeal preferred by the defendants in A.S.No.860 of 2010 is liable to be considered partly. 41. In the result, the appeal in A.S.No.860 of 2010 is allowed in part, setting aside the decree and judgment dated 13.07.2010 passed in O.S.No.10 of 2004 on the file of the Court of learned Special Judge for Trial of Cases under S.Cs. & S.Ts. (POA) Act-cum-Additional District Judge at 32 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 Vizianagaram. Consequently, directing the defendants to return the advance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh Fifty Thousand only), with interest at 24% per annum from the date of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale i.e., on 28.08.2004 till the date of realization, to the plaintiffs, within three months from the date of this judgment. There shall be no order as to costs. 42. The appeal in A.S.No.943 of 2010 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim orders granted earlier, if any, stand vacated. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, stand closed. ___________________ JUSTICE V.SRINIVAS Date: 23.09.2025 Krs 33 A.S.Nos.860 and 943 of 2010 719 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.SRINIVAS APPEAL SUIT NOs.860 & 943 of 2010 ( COMMON JUDGMNET ) DATE: 23.09.2025 Krs