1 2025:CGHC:56744-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 232 of 2025 Laxman Mishra Urf Pintu S/o Thabir Mishra Aged About 23 Years R/o Village Maulikhar, P.S. Singhoda, District Mahasamund (C.G.) ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Sariya, District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh (C.G.) ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Malay Jain, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 21.11 .2025 1. Heard Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant as well as Mr. Malay Jain, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing on behalf of the State/respondent. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 08.01.2025 passed by the Additional ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.11.21 16:37:22 +0530 2 Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act), Sarangarh, Sessions Bench, Raigarh, District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh in Special Criminal Case under POCSO Act No.37/2022 whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and Section 5(ठ)/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 05 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 04 months, rigorous imprisonment for 07 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 06 months and rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 year respectively, and it was further directed to run all the sentences concurrently. 3. Learned State counsel submits that notice issued to PW-2 father of the victim has been served, but none has appeared on behalf of the victim to contest the present appeal. 4. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is that the father of the minor victim girl (PW-1), namely PW-2, appeared at Police Station Sariya on 06.09.2022 and submitted a written complaint (Exhibit P-1) alleging that his daughter, aged 17 years and 2 months, had been enticed away by an unknown person on 04.09.2022 at about 3 11:30 a.m. and was missing. He further expressed suspicion that the accused, Laxman Mishra @ Pintu, had lured and abducted the victim. Acting upon the said complaint, Missing Person Report No. 25/2022 (Exhibit P-35) was registered, and Inspector Smt. Kiran Gupta (PW-13) registered the First Information Report (Exhibit P-2) in Crime No. 175/2022 under Section 363 IPC and forwarded the counter-complaint (Exhibit P-4) to the competent Court. 5. During the course of investigation, Inspector Smt. Kiran Gupta (PW-13) visited the spot and prepared a spot map (Exhibit P-3) based on the identification by the victim’s father and other witnesses. On 09.09.2022, the victim was recovered in the presence of witnesses as per the recovery memo (Exhibit P-5). In her statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC, the victim disclosed her date of birth as 24.06.2005 and stated that she had become acquainted with the accused during a visit to her maternal uncle’s village, where he resided in the neighbourhood. The accused professed his love for her and expressed his wish to marry her, but she refused on the ground that he was already married and that she herself was a minor. 6. The victim further stated that the accused threatened to defame her in the village by spreading false rumours of their relationship, which induced fear in her, compelling her to give him her mobile number. Thereafter, the accused frequently called her. On 4 04.09.2022, at about 11:00 a.m., he asked her to come to Sarangarh by bus for the purpose of marriage, and upon her refusal, again threatened to defame her. Frightened by the repeated threats, she left home without informing her family, travelled by bus from Sariya to Sarangarh, and from there accompanied the accused to Raipur. After keeping her there for a day, he took her to his house at Village Molikhar, where he allegedly confined her in a room for three days and subjected her to repeated forcible sexual intercourse. When she warned him that she would lodge a complaint, he sent her back alone by bus to Sariya on 08.09.2022. On returning home, she narrated the incident to her parents. 7. With the consent of the victim and her parents, she was medically examined by Dr. Srishti Jha (PW-14), who prepared the medical report (Exhibit P-10). Vaginal slides, vaginal swab, and the victim’s underwear were seized under a sealed packet as per the seizure memo (Exhibit P-11). The accused was also medically examined by Dr. Kishore Kumar Patel (PW-7) with respect to his sexual capability, and medical reports (Exhibits P-23/24) were obtained. His underwear, received in sealed condition, was seized. The seized articles were sent for forensic examination, and the FSL report (Exhibit P-32) was received. To establish the age of the victim, the Principal (PW-8) produced the school admission-withdrawal register (Exhibit P-34), showing her date of 5 birth as 24.06.2005, which was seized under seizure memo (Exhibit P-28). Statements of the victim’s father, mother, and elder sister were also recorded. 8. Upon completion of the entire investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. Thereafter, charges were framed against the accused, Laxman Mishra @ Pintu, under Sections 363, 366, and 376(2)(6) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 9. To establish the charges levelled against the accused persons, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses as PW-1 to PW-14 and exhibited 36 documents vide Exhibit P-1 to Exhibit P-36. In order to prove defence, the accused has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. 10. The statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, wherein he denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him and claimed false implication. 11. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant-accused and sentenced him as mentioned in the second paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court has erred in appreciating the depositions and evidence 6 brought on record in their correct perspective, resulting in a perverse and unsustainable judgment, which is bad in law. It is contended that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. According to learned counsel, there exist material inconsistencies, discrepancies, omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which go to the root of the matter and render the prosecution story wholly unreliable. He further submits that the trial Court failed to properly consider the appellant’s statement under Section 313 CrPC, wherein he categorically pleaded innocence and asserted false implication. He next contends that the trial Court has erred in holding the age of the victim to be 17 years, 2 months, and 11 days on the basis of the Dakhil-kharij register (Exhibit P-34C). It is submitted that the said entry is not substantiated by any material indicating the basis on which the date of birth was recorded. It is argued that the testimony of the victim in the present case suffers from serious inconsistencies and does not inspire confidence. It is further submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the age of the victim beyond reasonable doubt, and equally failed to establish absence of consent, which is essential once the defence of voluntary companionship is raised and the conduct of the victim strongly supports such a hypothesis. According to learned counsel, both these aspects create substantial doubt in favour of the appellant. He contends that in view of the medical evidence, the conduct of the victim, and the unreliable nature of the 7 prosecution witnesses, a reasonable doubt arises which must enure to the benefit of the appellant. It is therefore submitted that the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is unsustainable and the appellant should be acquitted of the charges framed against him. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State/respondent supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and recorded a well-reasoned conviction. It is contended that the findings do not suffer from any illegality, perversity, or infirmity warranting interference by this Court. He further submits that the victim was a minor at the time of the incident, and therefore, the question of consent is wholly irrelevant for the offences under the POCSO Act as well as Section 376 IPC. It is argued that even assuming, without admitting, that the victim accompanied the appellant voluntarily, such alleged voluntary conduct cannot exonerate the appellant once the victim is proved to be under 18 years of age. It is further submitted that the prosecution has duly proved the age of the victim through the Dakhil-kharij register seized from the Government Girls Higher Secondary School, XXX, Tahsil Sariya, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh, which was exhibited during trial. The learned trial Court has rightly relied upon the said document as a public record maintained in regular discharge of official duties. The State contends that minor 8 discrepancies in the testimony of the school teacher or the mother do not dilute the evidentiary value of the school register, particularly when no contrary document has been produced by the defence. 14. Learned State counsel submits that the testimony of the victim (PW-1) is consistent, natural, and trustworthy. She has clearly deposed that the appellant enticed her away and repeatedly subjected her to sexual intercourse against her will at different locations over a prolonged period. Her evidence, it is urged, inspires confidence and is sufficient to sustain conviction even without corroboration, as settled by catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is argued that the mere fact that the victim did not raise an alarm at public places cannot be used to discredit her testimony. Learned counsel submits that victims of sexual offences, particularly minors, often remain under fear, pressure, and psychological control of the accused, and their behaviour cannot be judged by normal human conduct. The State asserts that the defence theory of voluntary companionship is improbable and inconsistent with the deposition of the victim. Learned State counsel further contends that the medical evidence does not disprove the prosecution case. It is submitted that absence of injuries or a definite medical opinion is not conclusive to negate rape, especially when the sexual assault occurred repeatedly over several days and the medical examination was 9 conducted after a considerable delay. Reliance is placed on settled law that medical evidence is only corroborative, and where the testimony of the victim is cogent and credible, conviction can be sustained even in the absence of medical corroboration. The conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is justified and calls for no interference. The sentence imposed is stated to be commensurate with the gravity of the offence and in accordance with statutory mandates. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the entire record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection. The submissions advanced on behalf of both sides have been duly considered in the light of the factual matrix of the case and the legal principles governing the field. Each material aspect of the matter has been examined to determine whether any infirmity, perversity, or jurisdictional error exists in the impugned order so as to warrant interference by this Court. 16. The first and foremost question that arises for consideration is whether the victim was a minor, i.e., below 18 years of age, on the date of the alleged incident ? 17. This issue assumes paramount significance, as the determination of the victim’s age has a direct bearing on the applicability of the provisions of the POCSO Act and the corresponding penal provisions under the IPC. The age of the victim is a foundational fact, and its correct ascertainment is essential for deciding the 10 nature of the offence, the culpability of the accused, and the statutory presumptions that may come into play. Therefore, before adverting to any other aspect of the matter, it is necessary to examine, with due care and on the basis of the evidentiary material available on record, whether the prosecution has satisfactorily established that the victim was indeed below 18 years of age at the relevant point of time. 18. In order to consider the age of the victim, we have examined the evidence available on record. The prosecution has mainly relied upon Dakhil-kharij Register (Exhibit P-34C), statements of the victim (PW-1), father of the victim (PW-2), mother of the victim (PW-3) and Shri P.K. Chaudhari (PW-7), Principal of Government Girls Higher Secondary School, XXX, Tahsil Sariya, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.). According to the Dakhil-kharij Register (Exhibit P-34C), the date of birth of the victim is 24.06.2005. 19. The victim herself (PW-1) has deposed in her evidence that her date of birth was 24.06.2005, but in cross-examination she has admitted that children are generally admitted to school at the age of six years. She further stated that she mentioned her date of birth on the basis of the school admission records and denied the suggestion that she had stated her date of birth by guesswork or that her parents had given an approximate date of birth at the time of her admission. She explained that her parents had written her 11 date of birth in a notebook kept at home, though the said notebook was not produced before the police. She also admitted that there is no Kotwari register entry or government-issued birth certificate in their house but volunteered that a birth certificate issued by the Sarpanch is kept at home. She denied the suggestion that the birth certificate issued by the Sarpanch was not given to the police. She stated that she was born in a hospital and denied the suggestion that no hospital birth certificate exists. However, she admitted that the hospital birth certificate was not handed over to the police. 20. The father of the victim (PW-2) has deposed in his examination- in-chief that the year of birth of the victim was 2005, but in cross- examination he has admitted that he cannot state the exact date or day of the incident and that he did not see the victim going with any person on the date of the occurrence. He further admitted that he has not obtained any birth certificate of the victim, although the victim was born in Sariya hospital, and that he does not possess any hospital documents. He also stated that he did not get the victim’s date of birth entered in the Kotwari register, though he denied the suggestion that the date of birth mentioned at the time of school admission was based merely on an assumption. He admitted that he had admitted the victim to school at the age of about five years, where she studied up to Class IX, and that she left school after completing Class IX about two years prior. He 12 further stated that he does not remember the date of his marriage, though he got married in the year 2000, and that he has two daughters and one son. He candidly admitted that he cannot state the date of birth of himself, his wife, or his other children. His elder daughter is about 19 years old. He also stated that he does not know how many years after the birth of his elder daughter the victim was born. He denied the suggestion that the victim’s present age is 20 or 21 years. 21. Likewise, the mother of the victim (PW-3) has deposed in her evidence that the year of birth of the victim was 2005, but in cross-examination she has admitted that although the incident took place on the 4th, she does not remember the exact date. She stated that on the day of the incident they were not at home and that the victim had left the house at around 11 a.m. She denied the suggestion that no birth certificate of the victim was ever made or that the victim’s date of birth was not entered in the Kotwari register, but admitted that she does not know whether the birth certificate was prepared by the Panchayat or the police station. She further stated that the victim was born in Sariya Hospital and admitted that no birth certificate was obtained from the hospital. She denied the suggestion that an approximate date of birth was furnished at the time of school admission. She also admitted that she did not see the victim leaving or returning with any person on the date of the incident. 13 22. With respect to the family particulars, she stated that her marriage took place in the year 2000, though she cannot tell the exact date, and admitted that she does not know her own date of birth or that of her husband. She stated that she has two daughters and one son, and that the victim is younger than the eldest daughter. Her eldest daughter is about 21 years old, and on being questioned, she responded that the victim is approximately five years younger than the eldest daughter. She also stated that her eldest daughter is not yet married. 23. Shri P.K. Chaudhari (PW-8), Principal of Government Girls Higher Secondary School, XXX, Tahsil Sariya, District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh (C.G.), has deposed that he has been posted and working as the Principal of the said institution since 09.07.2008. He stated that on 17.10.2022, Sariya Police Station issued a notice seeking the Dakhil-Kharij register pertaining to the date of birth of the victim, and the said notice is Exhibit P-30 bearing his signatures. He further deposed that on the same date, he produced the Dakhil-Kharij register containing the entry relating to the victim, wherein her date of birth is recorded as 24.06.2005, for purposes of seizure. After providing a signed copy of the Dakhil- Kharij register, he received back the original. He also stated that he has brought to Court the original Dakhil-Kharij register maintained by the school, which contains entries from the academic year 2018-19 back to 2004 under serial numbers 3721 14 to 4090. The entry relating to the victim is at serial number 3887, showing her date of birth as 24.06.2005, and noting that she was admitted to Class IX. The original Dakhil-Kharij register is Exhibit P-34 and the certified copy placed on record is Exhibit P-34C, also signed by him. He further stated that after the seizure proceedings, a duly certified copy was handed over to the police, while the original was returned to him under acknowledgment Exhibit P-31. 24. In cross-examination, he admitted that he did not prepare or furnish any birth certificate of the victim to the police. He further admitted that the Dakhil-kharij register (Exhibit P-34) does not mention the basis on which the victim’s date of birth was recorded. He volunteered that the victim was admitted on the basis of her Class 8 Transfer Certificate and that her date of birth was entered accordingly. He admitted that the victim’s birth certificate and transfer certificate are not attached to the Dakhil- kharij register, explaining that such documents are maintained in separate registers. He also admitted that no affidavit of the victim’s parents is attached to the Dakhil-kharij register. He denied the suggestion that the victim’s date of birth was entered on an estimated basis and admitted that the entry in Exhibit P-34 is not in his handwriting. 25. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, it emerges that the prosecution 15 could not produce the clinching and legally admissible evidence with respect to the date of birth or age of the victim so as to hold that on the date of incident she was minor and below 18 years of age. Only on the basis of school Dakhil-kharij register, it would not be safe to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident. The statements of the victim herself (PW-1), father of the victim (PW-2), mother of the victim (PW-3), as also the statement of Shri P.K. Chaudhari (PW-8), Principal of Government Girls Higher Secondary School, XXX, Tahsil Sariya, District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh (C.G.) are contradictory to each other and does not inspire confidence upon this Court to hold that the date of birth of the victim is 24.06.2005. 26. Very recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Birka Shiva v. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1454 has observed as under: "8. The evidentiary value of such an entry made in public or official registers may be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. However, admissibility is distinct from probative value. While such documents may be admitted into evidence, their evidentiary weight depends on proof of their authenticity and the source of the underlying information. Mere production and marking of a document as exhibited by the Court does not amount to proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by leading substantive evidence, that is, by the ‘evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’ the truth of the facts in issue’. [See: Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal] We may refer to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court in this regard: 16 8.1. This Court, in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, held that the entries contained in the school register are relevant and admissible but have no probative value unless the person who made the entry or provided the date of birth is examined. It was observed: “14. … If entry regarding date of birth in the scholar's register is made on the information given by parents or someone having special knowledge of the fact, the same would have probative value. … The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry contained in the admission form or the scholar's register must be shown to be made on the basis of information given by the parents or a person having special knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned. If the entry in the scholar's register regarding date of birth is made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have evidentiary value, but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth, such an entry will have no evidentiary value. … 15. Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that entry in any public, official book, register, record stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty specially enjoined by the law of the country is itself the relevant fact. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to the date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act, but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. … The courts have consistently held that the date of birth mentioned in the scholar's register or secondary school certificate has no 17 probative value unless either the parents are examined or the person on whose information the entry may have been made is examined…" (Emphasis Supplied) This decision has been consistently followed by this Court in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand; Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand; Murugan v. State of T.N.; State of M.P. v. Munna; C. Doddanarayana Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy; and Manak Chand v. State of Haryana. 8.2. A coordinate Bench of this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram, through S.B. Sinha, J., clarified that though entries in school registers are admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, their evidentiary value improves only when corroborated by oral testimony of persons who are aware of its content, such as parents or the person who made the entry at the time of admission. It held as under: “12. A register maintained in a school is admissible in evidence to prove date of birth of the person concerned in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Such dates of births are recorded in the school register by the authorities in discharge of their public duty. PW 5, who was an Assistant Teacher in the said school in the year 1977, categorically stated that the mother of the victim disclosed her date of birth. The father of the victim also deposed to the said effect. 13. …The materials on record as regards the age of the victim were, therefore, required to be considered in the aforementioned backdrop. It may be true that an entry in the school register is not conclusive, but it has evidentiary value. Such evidentiary value of a school register is corroborated by oral evidence as the same was recorded on the basis of the statement of the mother of the victim." 8.3. Similarly, this Court in Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana, stated that though a document may be admissible, but to determine whether the entry contained therein has any probative value, may still be required to be examined in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. It held as follows: 18 “26. In Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] while dealing with a similar issue, this Court observed that very often parents furnish incorrect date of birth to the school authorities to make up the age in order to secure admission for their children. For determining the age of the child, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by unimpeccable documents. In case the date of birth depicted in the school register/certificate stands belied by the unimpeccable evidence of reliable persons and contemporaneous documents like the date of birth register of the municipal corporation, government hospital/nursing home, etc., the entry in the school register is to be discarded. x x x 28. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised that the entry made in the official record by an official or person authorised in performance of an official duty is admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the party may still ask the court/authority to examine its probative value. The authenticity of the entry would depend as to on whose instruction/information such entry stood recorded and what was his source of information. Thus, entry in school register/certificate requires to be proved in accordance with law. Standard of proof for the same remains as in any other civil and criminal case.” 8.4. In Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant, this Court held that the entries made in the official record may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, but the Court has a right to examine their probative value. The authenticity of the entries would depend on whose information such entries stood recorded. It was held as follows : “20. So far as the entries made in the official record by an official or person authorised in performance of official duties are concerned, they may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the Court has a right to examine their probative value. The authenticity of the entries would depend on whose information such entries stood recorded and what was his source of information. The entries in school register/school 19 leaving certificate require to be proved in accordance with law and the standard of proof required in such cases remained the same as in any other civil or criminal cases. 21. … For determining the age of a person, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by unimpeachable documents. In case the date of birth depicted in the school register/certificate stands belied by the unimpeachable evidence of reliable persons and contemporaneous documents like the date of birth register of the Municipal Corporation, government hospital/nursing home, etc., the entry in the school register is to be discarded. …” 8.5. This Court, in Alamelu v. State, while dealing with a similar factual matrix, held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the girl was a minor at the relevant date since the transfer certificate of a Government School showing age was not duly proved by witnesses. It observed as under: “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ext. P- 16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15-6- 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident i.e. 31-7-1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a government school and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 41. We may notice here that PW 1 was examined in the Court on 9-8-1999. In his evidence, he made no reference to the transfer certificate (Ext. P-16). He did not mention the girl's age or date of birth. PW 2 was also examined on 9-8-1999. She had also made no reference either to her age or to the transfer certificate. It appears from the record that a petition was filed by the complainant under 20 Section 311 CrPC seeking permission to produce the transfer certificate and to recall PW 2. This petition was allowed. … In her cross- examination, she had merely stated that she had signed on the transfer certificate, Ext. P-16 issued by the school and accordingly her date of birth was noticed as 15-6- 1977. She also stated that the certificate has been signed by the father as well as the Headmaster. But the Headmaster has not been examined. Therefore, in our opinion, there was no reliable evidence to vouchsafe for the truth of the facts stated in the transfer certificate.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. In the attending facts, we find that the evidentiary value of ExhibitP11 is significantly undermined in the absence of corroborating material. We say so for the following reasons: (i) PW-13, who is the Headmaster of Zilla Parishad High School, Chandanapur, Peddapalli District (erstwhile Karimnagar District), stated that the victim studied in his school from 2007 to 2013, i.e., 6th Class to 10th Class and that the Admission Register records her date of birth as 3rd November 1996. However, in his cross-examination, he admitted that he had no personal knowledge as to the source or basis on which the date of birth was recorded therein or if the recorded date of birth was correct or not. The relevant part of his testimony is extracted hereunder: “…In our school there is not clerk to maintain records. I did not produce any certificate pertaining to earlier school I, In which P.W.3 studies up to 5th Class. There must be basis for entering date of birth of a student in our school such as her earlier school record. I do not have personal knowledge as to what record was produced by parents of P.W. 3 as basis to enter her date of birth in our school as I was not Head Master in 2007. I cannot say in which school P.W.3 studied up to 5th Class. In the nominal roll register of our school, the signature of P.W.3 was obtained. I do not have personal knowledge whether the said date of birth of P.W.3 was correct or not and I am giving evidence only on the basis of record.” (Emphasis Supplied) 21 (ii) The prosecution has failed to examine the person who had made the entry in the Admission Register to ascertain on what basis such an entry was made. More so, the entry in respect of the date of birth of the victim in the primary school register, i.e., 1st Class to 5th Class, has not been produced and proved before the Courts below to verify the age as per its records. It is also not possible to ascertain from the records as to whether the date of birth was provided by the parents or simply entered at the behest of another party, without verification, at the time of admission to Zilla Parishad High School. (iii) The testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 are also telling that none of them mentioned the victim's age with specificity. There is no reference to ExhibitP11, and no attempt was made by the prosecution to adduce corroborative testimony regarding the victim's date of birth from her family members. Thus, while examining the issue at hand, on the anvil of the principles elucidated above, it is essential to notice that the prosecution has failed to toe the line of legal requisites. There is nothing on record to corroborate the date of birth of the victim as recorded in the birth certificate (ExhibitP11) issued by the school. Therefore, it cannot be relied upon to definitely determine the age of the victim and held with certainty that the victim was below sixteen/eighteen years of age. 11. Furthermore, none of the victim's family members, i.e., her mother and brothers have said anything about the age of the victim in their depositions made in the Court. Even the victim is effectively silent on this aspect, only stating that she and her siblings were born approximately two years apart and thereby making an estimation of their ages as well as her own. Throughout her deposition, the victim has remained silent with regard to her particular date of birth. 12. Well, suffice it to say that Courts of law cannot make a determination of guilt in thin air, based on estimations. In the present facts and circumstances, the proof submitted by the prosecution in the form of ExhibitP11 (birth certificate issued by the school) was not sufficient to arrive at a finding that the victim was less than sixteen/eighteen years of age, 22 especially when such a document was not sufficiently corroborated. Therefore, it was neither safe nor fair to convict the appellant based on it, particularly in the context where the age of the victim was such a pivotal factor. " 27. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of abovementioned judgment, the victim (PW-1), father of the victim (PW-2) and mother of the victim (PW-3) have not stated anything in their cross-examinations with regard to date of birth of the victim as well as Shri P.K. Chaudhari (PW-8), Principal of Government Girls Higher Secondary School, XXX, Tahsil Sariya, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) has though has admitted that in the Dakhil-kharij register (Exhibit P-34C), date of birth of the victim has been mentioned as 24.06.2005, but in cross- examination, he has stated that he did not know that on what basis the date of birth of victim has been mentioned in the documents. 28. Except for these evidences, no other evidence like Kotwari register or birth certificate have been produced by the prosecution to determine her age that on the date of incident, she was minor or less than 18 years of age. The oral evidence of the witnesses i.e. the victim herself (PW-1), father of the victim (PW-2), mother of the victim (PW-3) and Shri P.K. Chaudhari (PW-8), Principal of Government Girls Higher Secondary School, XXX, Tahsil Sariya, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) as also Dakhil-kharij register (Exhibit P-34C) are not sufficient to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident because of the reason that no documents 23 has been shown to ascertain the fact that on what basis the date of birth of the victim was recorded. The entry with regard to age of the victim has been mentioned in the Dakhil-kharij register (Exhibit P-34C) is not sufficient to hold actual date of birth of the victim. There is every possibility that the date of birth of the victim is recorded on assumption otherwise, the prosecution must have produced the relevant record on the basis of which her date of birth recorded in the said register. The evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to the age of the victim are not of that sterling quality which is sufficient to determine the age of the victim. Therefore, there is lack of clinching and cogent evidence to hold her minor on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court held her minor. 29. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the appellant had committed rape upon the victim or not? 30. This issue goes to the very root of the prosecution case and requires a careful evaluation of the testimony of the victim, the corroborative medical and forensic evidence, and the surrounding circumstances brought on record. Since the charge of rape carries grave penal consequences, the Court must scrutinize the evidence with due sensitivity while ensuring adherence to the well-settled principles governing appreciation of evidence in sexual offence cases. 24 31. The law is equally clear that the sole testimony of the victim, if found to be cogent, credible, and trustworthy, is sufficient to sustain a conviction and does not require further corroboration. At the same time, the Court must remain mindful that the evidence must inspire confidence and must not suffer from inherent improbabilities or material contradictions. 32. Accordingly, to determine whether the offence of rape stands established, it becomes necessary to examine the version of the victim, the medical findings, the conduct of the parties, and other attendant circumstances to assess whether the prosecution has proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt. 33. Very recently, in the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh v. The State Of Uttarakhand, 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court while dealing with the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, has held as under :- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the victim was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is 25 whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub- Registrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which 26 the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 18. It is thus clear that the victim, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her.” 34. PW-1, the victim has deposed in her evidence that she had first seen the accused in her maternal uncle’s village, where he had coaxed her into giving her mobile number. Thereafter, the accused started calling her frequently and expressed his desire to marry her. She stated that about one year prior to the incident, the accused called her on her mobile phone, threatened to defame her if she did not comply, and summoned her to Sarangarh. Out of fear, and as no one was at home, she went to Sarangarh, where the accused met her and took her to Raipur on the pretext of marriage. She further deposed that the accused kept her in a room at his house for about three days and had sexual intercourse with her against her will. Subsequently, when a report was lodged by her family members, the accused left her mid-way and absconded, after which she returned home and narrated the 27 incident to her parents. She identified her signatures on the recovery memo (Exhibit P-5), medical consent (Exhibit P-6), her statement before the Child Welfare Committee (Exhibit P-15), and her statement under Section 164 CrPC (Exhibit P-18). 35. In cross-examination, she admitted that she knew the accused for 2–3 years and that his house was situated in the same locality as that of her maternal uncle. She further admitted that after talking to the accused over the phone, she began developing feelings for him. She admitted that she left her house voluntarily without informing her family members and that she did not raise any alarm at Sarangarh or Raipur, nor did she inform anyone from the public. She stated that the accused had snatched her mobile phone and threatened to beat her, due to which she could not shout or resist. She admitted that she did not sustain any injury, that she did not shout at the time of the alleged sexual intercourse, and that she did not resist because she was afraid of being beaten. She further stated that the police took her for medical examination after 2–3 days and that she was not wearing the same clothes she had worn earlier. She denied the suggestions that she had gone with the accused willingly, that she had not visited Raipur or the accused’s house, or that the accused had not committed any sexual act with her. She also denied the suggestion that she was giving false evidence to implicate the accused. 28 36. The father of the victim (PW-2) has deposed in his evidence that on 04.09.2023 the accused abducted his daughter. When she did not return home despite their search for two to three days, he lodged a missing report at Police Station Sariya on the third day. He stated that on 08.09.2023 the accused left the victim midway and, upon her return home, she narrated the incident to him and his wife. Thereafter, he took the victim to Police Station Sariya, where she disclosed the incident to the police. He further proved the written complaint submitted by him (Exhibit P-1), the site map prepared during investigation (Exhibit P-3), the seizure memo relating to the victim’s recovery (Exhibit P-5), and the medical consent form (Exhibit P-7), all bearing his signatures. He stated that the accused had taken the victim away and that the victim was medically examined with his consent. He also admitted that the incident took place on 04.09.2022. He further admitted that the accused, a resident of his in-laws’ village, had absconded from his house on the date of the incident, and that earlier he had warned his daughter as the accused used to talk to her whenever she visited her maternal uncle’s village. 37. In cross-examination, PW-2 stated that he could not recollect the exact date or day of the incident, though it occurred at around 5:00 p.m., and admitted that he had not seen the victim going with any person on that day. He stated that he did not see the victim returning with the accused and had not seen the accused leaving 29 the victim at village Pathsendri. He also stated that he did not remember the date of lodging the report, which was written verbally at about 7:00 p.m. On being shown Exhibit P-1, Exhibit P- 3, Exhibit P-5, and Exhibit P-7, he stated that being illiterate, he only knows how to sign and therefore could not explain why he had signed those documents, but denied the suggestion that the police had not read over the documents to him prior to obtaining his signatures. 38. Likewise, the mother of the victim (PW-3) has broadly supported the testimony of the victim’s father (PW-2) and substantially corroborated the prosecution version. She deposed that about one and a half years prior to the incident, the victim had left the house without informing anyone, and despite their efforts, she could not be traced, compelling her husband to lodge a report at Police Station Sariya. She stated that the victim had gone missing on the 4th and returned home on the 8th, and that the accused had left her midway and put her on a bus. According to her, when she enquired, the victim told her that the accused had eloped with her. 39. In cross-examination, PW-3 stated that although the incident occurred on the 4th, she did not remember the exact date. She stated that on the day of the incident they were not at home and that the victim had left at around 11 a.m. She denied the suggestion that no birth certificate of the victim was ever made or 30 that the victim’s details were not entered in the Kotwari register, but admitted that she did not know whether such a certificate was prepared by the Panchayat or the police station. She admitted that the victim was born in Sariya Hospital but they had not obtained any hospital documents, and denied the suggestion that an approximate date was supplied at the time of school admission. She further stated that she had not seen the victim leaving or returning with any person. 40. Dr. Shristi Jha (PW-14) has deposed in her evidence that the victim’s blood pressure and pulse were normal and she was physically as well as mentally stable. No external injuries were found on her body. On internal examination of the genital area, no injury marks were detected; however, the hymen was found to be torn and her secondary sexual characteristics were developed. The victim had stated that her last menstrual period occurred on 04.09.2022. She further deposed that she had collected two vaginal slides and two vaginal swabs, sealed them, and handed them over to the concerned woman constable for examination. She also stated that the victim’s light brown underwear did not contain any stains, and for a conclusive opinion, the same was sealed and handed over to the woman constable with a recommendation for FSL examination. 41. PW-14 Dr. Shristi Jha further stated that, in her opinion, there were no signs of forcible sexual intercourse on the victim and that 31 the victim appeared to be habituated to sexual intercourse. She identified the medical examination report as Exhibit P-10, bearing her signatures. She further deposed that the FSL report dated 18.10.2022 (Exhibit P-32) revealed the presence of semen stains and human spermatozoa on the victim’s vaginal slide (Exh. A), vaginal swab (Exh. B), underwear (Exh. C), and on the accused’s underwear (Exh. D). Based on the results contained in the F.S.L. report, she opined that the victim had recent sexual intercourse. 42. In her cross-examination, she admitted that the police had not produced any identity document of the victim at the time of the examination and that no one else was present during the medical examination except herself. She also admitted that the victim’s actual age could be more or less than the age stated by her and that she had not conducted any test for age determination. She denied the suggestions that no recent sexual intercourse had taken place with the victim or that she had not sealed the vaginal slides, swabs, and underwear. 43. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the 32 appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do so in the instant case. 44. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, as also the evidence on record, it would not be safe for this Court to hold that the appellant has committed rape upon her, rather it reflects from the evidence that the victim herself had made physical relations with the appellant and she has not made any complaint to anyone and has not raised any alarm. Had she been forcefully raped against her will or consent, she would definitely raise alarm or to make complaint to anyone. Since, it is held that the victim is not below the 18 years of age, she is capable to give her consent and therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant procured a minor girl with the intention to illicit intercourse or committed rape upon her. 45. Upon a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence brought on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1), though asserting that she was taken to Raipur and subjected to sexual intercourse against her will, is fraught with material contradictions and admissions which substantially weaken the prosecution case. She categorically admitted in her cross-examination that she had known the accused for 2–3 years, had developed feelings for him, and had voluntarily left her house without informing her family. She further admitted that she neither raised any alarm at Sarangarh or Raipur 33 nor made any attempt to seek help from the public at any stage. Her admission that she did not shout, sustain any injury, or resist during the alleged intercourse, coupled with the fact that her medical examination was conducted after 2–3 days and she was no longer wearing the clothes worn at the relevant time, raises significant doubt regarding the prosecution version. 46. The testimonies of PW-2 (father) and PW-3 (mother) also do not provide direct evidence of abduction or coercion. Both witnesses admitted that they had not seen the victim leaving or returning with the accused. Their depositions are based on what the victim narrated to them upon her return, and their statements suffer from inconsistencies regarding dates, timings as also circumstances. PW-2 admitted that he did not recollect the exact date of the incident or the date of lodging the report and acknowledged that he only signed the documents prepared by the police without fully understanding their contents. 47. The medical evidence also does not support the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse. Dr. Shristi Jha (PW-14) clearly opined that the victim exhibited no signs of forceful sexual assault and appeared to be habituated to sexual intercourse. The absence of any external or internal injuries, despite the allegation of repeated forced intercourse over three days, renders the prosecution story improbable. While the FSL report confirms the occurrence of recent sexual intercourse, it does not, in itself, establish lack of 34 consent. As consistently held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the finding of semen or spermatozoa can only corroborate intercourse, not the allegation of force. 48. Furthermore, the prosecution has failed to satisfactorily establish the age of the victim. PW-14 admitted that she conducted no test for age determination, and PW-3 conceded that no birth certificate or contemporaneous document was ever produced. In the absence of credible, cogent, and legally admissible evidence regarding age, the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption of statutory rape. 49. It is well settled that while the testimony of the victim must be given due weight, the Court must ensure that it inspires confidence and is consistent with the normal course of human behaviour. When the version of the victim suffers from inherent improbabilities and is contradicted by objective medical and forensic evidence, the Court is bound to extend the benefit of reasonable doubt to the accused. The recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tilku @ Tilak Singh (supra), reiterating the principles in S. Varadarajan (supra), also emphasizes that when a girl near the age of discretion voluntarily accompanies a person without inducement or force, the element of “taking” or “enticement” is not automatically established. 50. The cumulative effect of these discrepancies, admissions, and deficiencies in the prosecution evidence creates serious doubt 35 regarding the voluntary nature of the victim’s conduct and the veracity of her allegations. It is well-settled that where two views are possible on the evidence adduced; one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. The benefit of doubt must, therefore, enure to the appellant. 51. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is unsustainable in law. The prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offences charged, and the findings of the trial Court suffer from misappreciation of material evidence and an improper application of legal principles. 52. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 08.01.2025 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges leveled against him. The appellant is in jail since 29.09.2022. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 53. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of 36 Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 54. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back forthwith to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu