1 2025:CGHC:55723 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 5555 of 2025 1. Rajendra Puri Goswami S/o Shri Bhagwan Puri Goswami Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Mahadev Pali Chandrapur, Post- Balpur, Tahsil- Chandrapur, District Sakti C.G. Mo. No. 93296679962 ... Petitioner versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Revenue, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Mantralaya, Atal Nagar Raipur, Police Station- Rakhi, Tahsil And District Raipur C.G. 2. Collector Sakti, District Sakti C.G. 3. Tahsildar, Chandarpur, District Sakti C.G. 4. Prakashchandra Agrawal S/o Kailash Agrawal Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Mahadev Pali Chandrapur, Post- Balpur, Tahsil- Chandrapur, District Sakti C.G. ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Sourabh Agrawal, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent No.1 to 3 : Mr. Anurag Tripathi, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No.4 :Mr. T.K. Jha, Advocate SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI Digitally signed by SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI Date: 2025.11.17 18:44:46 +0530 2 SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu Order on Board 14.11.2025 1. Petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking following reliefs:- “10.1.That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be please to call for entire records of the case, from the authorities. 10.2.That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be please to quash the order dated 10.10.2025 passed by the respondent no.3 in revenue case no.202510311200005/B-121/2024-2025 between “Prakashchandra Agrawal vs. Rajendra Puri Goswami”, whereby restraining to the petitioner for raising construction (Annexure-P/2) and further be please to quash the registration order dated 10.10.2025 in aforesaid revenue case (Annexure-P/1), is in the interest of justice. 10.3. That, any other relief/order which may be deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the costs of the petition may be given.” 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that though he has claimed two reliefs in this petition, he is confining respondent No.4 submitted an application before respondent No.3 for removal of alleged illegal construction being raised by petitioner and action to be taken against petitioner for raising such illegal construction. Along with application, respondent No.4 has also filed an application for grant of injunction. Tahsildar registered said application as Case 3 No.202510311200005/B-121/2024-25, issued notice to non- applicants and passed the order impugned granting injunction restraining the petitioner from raising construction. He submits that it is well settled that revenue Courts do not have power to grant injunction, it can be granted only by civil court and by none else. Hence, the order in form of injunction passed by respondent No.3 is without any jurisdiction and authority of law and therefore liable to be set aside. He places reliance on the order dated 3.2.2025 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in WPC No.683/2025 (Smt. Rukhamani Shrivas vs. State of CG & ors). 3. Learned counsel representing respondent No.4 submits that he does not dispute legal submission made by learned counsel for petitioner with respect to jurisdiction of the Tahsildar to pass an order impugned granting injunction. He however submits that petitioner is having efficacious alternate remedy of filing appeal against the order impugned and as such, present petition is not maintainable. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents filed along with writ petition. 5. The issue relating to jurisdiction of the Tahsildar to grant injunction in revenue proceeding has come up for consideration before this Court in the matter of Seraj Ahmed 4 vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, reported in 2017 (4) CGLJ 559, and relying on the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.) vs. Board of Revenue, 2009 (3) MPLJ 660, it was observed thus:- “3. Order to grant injunction is surely vested in the jurisdictional civil court, revenue courts cannot grant order of injunction. Therefore, the order passed by the revenue authority granting temporary injunction restraining transfer following the principle of law laid down in Maya Lalchandani (supra) is without jurisdiction and without authority of law. It is accordingly set aside. However, the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) is directed to take decision on merits after hearing the parties in accordance with law, expeditiously, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” 6. In case of Maya Lalchandani (supra), it was observed thus:- "4. After going through the order passed by the learned President, Board of Revenue and taking into consideration the legal provisions, we are of the opinion that the directions issued in paragraph 7 of the order passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be allowed to stand. Section 32 of the Land Revenue Code talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue Authorities while Section 43 talks of applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is to be seen from Section 32 that nothing in the Land Revenue Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice or as may be necessary 5 to prevent the abuse of the process of Court. Section 43 simply provides that unless otherwise expressly provided in the Code, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure shall, so far as may be, followed in all proceedings under the Code. Section 43 in no case would authorize a Revenue Authority to grant an injunction. Section 43 simply provides that the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure so far as may be followed in all proceedings under the Code. It is also to be seen from the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure that an injunction can be granted only by civil Court and by none else. Section 32 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code only talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue Courts where they are required to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. The powers under Section 32 can be exercised within the Code itself and not beyond the Code. If the Revenue Authority does not have the power to grant injunction then the Board of Revenue also could not grant injunction." 7. Perusal of the impugned order would show that on an application submitted by respondent No.4 herein seeking stay on the construction work being raised by petitioner herein on the land, subject matter of writ petition, the Tahsildar after hearing respondent No.4 herein, passed injunction order restraining petitioner from raising construction. Thus, it is clear that the Tahsildar has granted injunction in favour of respondent No.4, restraining petitioner herein from raising further construction on the land, subject matter of writ petition. 8. Considering the facts of present case and the above quoted 6 decisions, in the opinion of this Court, respondent No.3- Tahsildar has exceeded its jurisdiction because it has no jurisdiction whatsoever to grant an order of interim injunction restraining raising of construction, alienation of property or restraining enjoyment of property. It is the jurisdiction of the competent civil Court only. Any such order passed by respondent No.3 will only amount of usurping the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Hence, the order impugned passed by the Tahsildar granting injunction is contrary to law and cannot be allowed to stand. 9. Coming to submission of learned counsel for respondent No.4 with respect to availability of efficacious alternate remedy to petitioner. It is well settled that an alternative remedy per se does not operate as an absolute bar to maintainability of a writ petition. If an order passed by an authority is without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax & others vs. Commercial Steel Limited, reported in (2021) SCC Online SC 884, following the decision in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) has observed thus: “11.The respondent had a statutory remedy under section 107. Instead of availing of the remedy, the 7 respondent instituted a petition under Article 226. The existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances where there is: (i) a breach of fundamental rights;(ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or(iv) a challenge to the vires of the statues or delegated legislation. 10. For the reasons given in preceding paragraph of this order holding that the impugned order (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent No.3-Tahsildar is without jurisdiction and without authority of law, this Court is of the considered view that writ petition is not liable to be dismissed on account of availability of alternative remedy. Therefore, submission of learned counsel for respondent No.4 in this regard is repealed. 11. For the foregoing discussion and reasons, writ petition is allowed in part. Impugned order dated 10.10.2025, Annexure P-2, is set aside. 12. Certified copy as per rules. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge roshan/-