1 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 278 of 2018 Judgment Reserved on 03.11.2025 Judgment Delivered on 11.11.2025 • State of Chhattisgarh, Through- Police Station Ambagarh Chowki, District- Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. ...Appellant versus • Rekhchand Banote, S/o Balkrishna Banote, aged about 35 Years, R/o- Railway Colony, Dongargarh, Police Station Dongargarh, District- Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant : Ms. Pragya Pandey, Deputy Government Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Khilendra Sahu, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal & Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal CAV Judgment Per Radhakishan Agrawal, J. 1. This acquittal appeal filed by the Appellant/State arises out of the judgment dated 17.11.2017 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Rajnandgaon, C.G. in Sessions Case No.90/2016, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent herein of the charge under Section 376(2) & 506 of Indian Penal Code. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 03.09.2016, victim, a married woman, aged about 32 years, lodged a written report (Ex.P-4) at Police Station Ambagarh Chowki stating that accused/respondent, on the pretext of false assurance of marriage, established physical relations with her on many AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2025.11.11 17:06:59 +0530 2 occasions. After that, when she came to know that accused/respondent was deceiving her and had no intention of marrying her, she lodged the present report. Based on the said written report (Ex.P-4), an FIR (Ex.P-7) has been registered against the accused/respondent. 3. During investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-1 and after obtaining consent letter vide Ex.P-5, victim was sent for medical examination whereupon PW-4 Dr. E.D examined her and did not notice any signs of recent forcible sexual intercourse upon her nor did she find any sign of injury over the body of the victim either internally or externally and gave her MLC vide Ex.P-3. Accused-respondent was taken into custody vide Ex.P-9. 4. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and after completing investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused-respondent before the concerned trial Court. Accused-respondent abjured the guilt and prayed for trial. 5. The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent herein of said charge leveled against him. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/State would submit that the trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused/respondent of the said charges by recording perverse findings. She would further submit that there is ample evidence on record, particularly the testimony of PW-5 victim, to establish that the accused/respondent, on the false pretext of marriage, had established physical relations with the victim on several occasions and despite the availability of sufficient evidence on record, the learned trial Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused/respondent. Therefore, the impugned 3 judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality and is liable to be set aside. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/accused would support the impugned judgment and submit that there is no cogent or clinching evidence on record to show that the respondent, on the false pretext of marriage, had established physical relations with the victim. He would further submit that the victim was aware from the very beginning that the accused/respondent was a married person and despite this knowledge, she continued her relationship with accused/respondent. Thus, the learned trial Court, after evaluating the entire evidence on record, has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the appeal filed by the State deserves to be dismissed. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaspal Singh Kaural vs. The State of NCT of Delhi and Another, arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024, decided on 07.04.2025. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 4 10. Now the question is whether the respondent is the author of the crime in question? 11. PW-5 victim has stated in her deposition that she and the accused/respondent were working in the same office. She has further stated that the accused/respondent was already a married man and was residing with his wife. She has also stated that the accused/respondent, on the false pretext of marriage, established physical relations with her on several occasions and that from the year 2011 to 2015, he maintained such physical relations with her on the same false assurance. In her cross-examination, she admitted that her first marriage took place in the year 2001–2002 with one Tilak Yadav and that no divorce had taken place between them. She further admitted that on 29.02.2016, she got married to one Bhikam Dewangan. She also admitted that she and the accused/respondent had stayed together in a hotel at Raipur, where the room was booked using her identity card, and that they had physical relations in that hotel. She further admitted that she had informed the accused/respondent that she was already a married woman. She also admitted that the accused/respondent got married in April 2011, and that she came to know about his marriage a few days before it took place, yet she never raised any objection to his marriage before his family or anyone else. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jaspal Singh Kaural (supra), relying on its earlier judgment in Naim Ahmed vs State (NCT) of Delhi, (2023) 15 SCC 385, has held in paras 13 & 14 as under:- ““13. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in the case of Naim Ahmed (supra) whereby this Hon’ble Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly, the prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual relationship with the accused/Appellant, upon an assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a married woman having three children, had continued to have such relationship with the accused Appellant, at least for about five years till she gave the complaint. In the conspectus of such facts and 5 circumstances, this Court had observed as under: “21.The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court. 22. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far. The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother of three children was mature and intelligent enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him. She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of the accused, she did not have any complaint against the accused of he having given false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She also visited the native place of the accused in 6 the year 2012 and came to know that he was a married man having children also, still she continued to live with the accused at another premises without any grievance. She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must have taken place between them, that she filed the present complaint. The accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375 IPC. 14. The decision in Naim Ahmed (supra) is squarely applicable to the conspectus of present case. It has been time and again settled by this Hon'ble Court, that the mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section 375 IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix given her consent for sexual relations.”” 13. When the present case is examined in the light of the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is quite evident from the testimony of the victim (PW-5), who was admittedly a major woman, that there was a love affair between the victim and the respondent. She was a consenting party with respect to the alleged acts and used to stay and travel with the respondent to different places on her own free will. Further, the evidence of the victim indicates that from the very beginning she was aware that the accused/respondent was a married person and despite knowing this fact, she continued her relationship with him. It is also apparent from the record that from 2010 to 2015, she did not lodge any report against the accused/respondent and submitted a written report (Ex.P-4) only on 03.09.2016, after she had performed her second marriage with one Bhikam 7 Dewangan on 29.02.2016, alleging thereafter that the accused/respondent had established physical relations with her on the false pretext of marriage. This sequence of events reflects the conduct of the victim and casts a serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations made by her. That apart, PW-8 father of the victim, has also turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. 14. After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment impugned passed by the trial Court, we are of considered opinion that the judgment impugned acquitting the accused / respondent herein of the said charges is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 15. Accordingly, the present acquittal appeal filed by the appellant/State against the acquittal of accused/respondent is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Akhilesh