1 2025:CGHC:56743-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 358 of 2010 The State of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Khushi Lal S/o Tulsi Das Patel Aged About 41 Years R/o Sakil Dubganwa, P. S. Mahuganj, District Rewa M. P., District : Rewa, Madhya Pradesh 2. Mahendra Kumar S/o Bashishthdhar Patel Aged About 22 Years R/o Kharkhati, P. S. Mahuganj, District Rewa M. P., District : Rewa, Madhya Pradesh ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For State/Appellant : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Deputy Government Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. Vikash A. Shrivastava, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 21.11 .2025 1. Heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate for the State/appellant. Also heard Mr. Vikash A. Shrivastava, learned counsel, appearing for the respondents. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.11.24 17:30:00 +0530 2 2. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that, in compliance with the order dated 18.11.2025, the respondents/accused appeared before the learned Special Judge, NDPS Act, and furnished their bail bonds on 20.11.2025. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondents has filed an affidavit, which is taken on record. Accordingly, the Court proceeds to hear the matter finally. 3. By this acquittal appeal under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as “CrPC”), the appellant/State calls in question legality and propriety of the judgment of acquittal dated 10.09.2008 passed by learned Special Judge (Court constituted under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985) in NDPS Case No. 31 of 2007, whereby the respondents have been acquitted from the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, ‘NDPS Act’). 4. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 25.03.2007, the Investigating Officer, Chandar Lal Dhruv (PW-5), received secret information regarding illegal possession of contraband cannabis (Ganja) by the respondents at the bus stand at Keshkal. Upon receiving the secret information, the Investigating Officer reduced the same into writing (Ex. P/13) and made an entry in the daily diary (Rojnamcha Sanha No. 1034). Acting in accordance with the provisions of the NDPS Act, the Investigating Officer recorded his grounds of belief that obtaining a search warrant immediately would not be feasible (Ex. P/3), 3 as doing so would afford an opportunity to the accused persons to conceal or dispose of the contraband. He forwarded the information to his superior officer through a Constable. Thereafter, in order to apprehend the accused persons named in the secret information, the Investigating Officer proceeded to the bus stand at Keshkal and found the respondents sitting with four bags. The respondents were served with notices (Ex. P/4) seeking their consent for search, and upon obtaining such consent, the Investigating Officer searched the bags (Ex. P/5), recovered contraband (Ganja), and seized the bags (Ex. P/14). Upon weighment, the total quantity of the contraband was found to be 59 kg (Ex. P/1). Samples were drawn from the recovered contraband. 5. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the learned trial Court, and the respondents were charged with the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act. 6. To bring home the charge, the prosecution examined five witnesses and exhibited 30 documents, marked as Exs. P/1 to P/30. 7. The statements of the accused/respondents were recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, wherein they denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution evidence. They asserted that they had been falsely implicated in the case and claimed complete innocence. 8. After affording due opportunity of hearing to both sides and upon appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned Special Judge (NDPS Act), Jagdalpur (C.G.), by the impugned judgment dated 4 10.09.2008, acquitted the accused/respondents of the charge framed against them. 9. Aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal, the State has preferred the present appeal. 10. Learned State counsel submits that the learned trial Court has erred in acquitting the respondents from the offences charged. He further submits that the learned trial Court is not justified by discarding the prosecution case as the independent seizure witnesses Premlal (PW-1) and Budheshwar (PW-2) have not supported the case of the prosecution. He also submits that it has been settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court that independent attesting witnesses are of not much importance and hostility of them is not fatal for prosecution. He further submits that the learned trial Court is not justified by holding the case of the prosecution a suspected one vide paragraph 14 of the judgment, wherein it has been held that the non-compliance of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act is fatal for prosecution. It is respectfully submitted that the provisions of Section 42 are procedural provisions and those have been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as the directive in nature and not mandatory. The strict non-compliance does not affect the authenticity of the prosecution version. He further contended that there is no reason to disbelive the evidence of the Investigating Officer who conducted the whole investigating and proved the case of prosecution. It is respectfully submitted that the respondents had been found in possession of 59 kgs of Ganja and have failed to account for their possession. As such, the 5 acquittal appeal deserves to be allowed, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and the respondents deserves to be convicted of the charge under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents supports the impugned judgment and submits that learned trial Court after considering the material available on record has rightly acquitted the accused / respondents. As such, the acquittal appeal deserves to be dismissed. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and records of the trial Court. 13. This appeal challenges the acquittal by learned Special Judge (NDPS Act) under Section 378(1) of the CrPC. While exercising appellate jurisdiction, the Court must act with caution, recognizing that the learned trial Court has the advantage of observing witness demeanour and assessing credibility firsthand. The accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt, but only if it is real and substantial, such as a doubt a reasonable person would honestly entertain. Mere theoretical doubts or minor discrepancies not affecting the core prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. The appellate Court must ensure the trial Court properly appreciated all evidence and extended the benefit of doubt in line with settled principles. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of C. Antony v. 6 Raghavan Nair1, and Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha2 has observed that an appellate Court should not substitute its own view unless the learned trial Court’s findings are perverse or relevant, convincing evidence has been unjustifiably ignored, providing compelling reason for interference. 15. The principles in Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab3, clarify that while an appellate Court can examine an acquittal, it must do so cautiously. The learned trial Court has the advantage of observing witnesses and assessing credibility. Interference is warranted only if the trial Court committed a manifest error, ignored material evidence, or reached a conclusion based on conjecture or misappreciation. Minor discrepancies cannot outweigh the core, consistent, and credible testimony unless they go to the root of the case. Interference is justified only in exceptional circumstances where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice and held in para 6 as under:- “……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the 1 AIR 2003 SC 182 2 AIR 2004 SC 1053 3 AIR 1987 SC 1083 7 evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.” 16. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an appellate Court must exercise extreme caution before interfering with an acquittal. The trial Court’s advantage in observing witness demeanour and trial conduct cannot be lightly disregarded. Interference is warranted only in exceptional cases where the learned trial Court committed a manifest error, overlooked material evidence, relied on conjecture, or reached a palpably perverse conclusion. Minor contradictions or inconsistencies not affecting the core prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. Thus, while an appellate Court may review an acquittal, it must do so circumspectly, extending the benefit of doubt only when a reasonable and substantial doubt exists and has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not 4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984 8 permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 17. Further, in the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala5, the Supreme Court held as under:- "25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate Court has to consider whether the trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters." 18. While exercising appellate jurisdiction against an acquittal, the Court may re-appreciate all evidence such as, oral and documentary, to determine whether the trial Court correctly weighed the materials and assigned valid reasons. If the trial Court’s conclusions are unsustainable, erroneous, or perverse, the appellate Court may arrive at its own conclusion. 19. The learned trial Court, while acquitting the accused/respondents, 5 (2022) 8 SCC 440 9 observed in paragraph 14 of the impugned judgment that the testimony of Investigating Officer Chandar Lal Dhruv (PW-5) suffers from material contradictions. In paragraph 5 of his deposition, the witness stated that at about 1:30 p.m., he had dispatched Constable No. 168, Ashwani Kumar, to deliver a copy of the Mukhbir Soochna Panchanama to the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer (Police), Kondagaon. However, for the purpose of establishing compliance with the mandatory provisions of Sections 42 and 43 of the NDPS Act, the same witness stated in paragraph 18 that he had sent the Mukhbir Soochna Panchanama, the Panchanama regarding the inability to obtain a search warrant, and Rojnamcha Sanha entries No. 1035 and 1042 to the SDOP, Kondagaon, through Constable No. 168. It is an admitted fact that Rojnamcha Sanha No. 1042 was recorded at 10:00 a.m. Thus, the claim that this document, recorded at 10:00 a.m., was dispatched at 1:30 p.m. along with the Mukhbir Soochna Panchanama gives rise to a clear and irreconcilable contradiction. This discrepancy casts a serious doubt on the prosecution’s assertion of compliance with statutory requirements. Furthermore, the prosecution did not examine Constable No. 168, Ashwani Kumar—who allegedly carried the documents to the SDOP office—nor did it examine any officer or employee posted in the SDOP office, Kondagaon, who could have confirmed the receipt of the relevant documents. No explanation was offered for the non- examination of these material witnesses. Such failure attracts an adverse inference against the prosecution. As a result, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the mandatory 10 provisions of Sections 42 and 43 of the NDPS Act were duly complied with. This lapse is fatal to the prosecution case, rendering the alleged recovery, seizure, and subsequent proceedings doubtful. 20. The State has preferred the present appeal challenging the acquittal of the respondents—Khushi Lal and Mahendra Kumar— recorded by the learned Special Judge (NDPS Act), Jagdalpur (C.G.) for the offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act. The learned trial Court, upon a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence, particularly the testimony of the Investigating Officer and the documentary records, concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The core basis for acquittal was the prosecution’s inability to prove compliance with the mandatory provisions of Sections 42 and 43 of the NDPS Act. The learned trial Court noted that the contradictory statements of PW-5 regarding dispatch and timing of the Mukhbir Soochna Panchanama and the Rojnamcha entries created a fundamental doubt about the authenticity of the investigation process. Additionally, the prosecution failed to examine the material witness— Constable No. 168, Ashwani Kumar—who purportedly carried the documents to the SDOP office, and did not examine any official from the SDOP office to verify receipt of the documents. The absence of such crucial evidence, without justification, substantially weakened the prosecution case. In view of these deficiencies, the learned trial Court held that the statutory safeguards under the NDPS Act were not adhered to, which vitiated the prosecution. Consequently, the acquittal of the respondents was recorded. The State now challenges this finding 11 in the present appeal. 21. The State’s appeal rests on challenging the learned trial Court’s appreciation of evidence and alleging misjudgment. However, it is settled law that an appellate Court cannot interfere with an acquittal unless the trial Court’s conclusions are perverse, based on manifest illegality, or ignoring material evidence. The learned trial Court is best positioned to assess witness credibility and demeanor. Minor inconsistencies or theoretical doubts do not justify setting aside an acquittal. Where two plausible views exist, the appellate Court must respect the view taken by the trial Court unless it is impossible or perverse. No material evidence has been overlooked by the learned trial Court in reaching its decision and as such, the accused / respondent is entitled to the benefit of doubt, which has been correctly applied by the learned trial Court. 22. Considering all these factors, the acquittal is a plausible and well- reasoned conclusion. The State’s appeal under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. lacks merit and is dismissed. The judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court is hereby affirmed. 23. The bail bonds furnished by the respondents shall remain in force for a further period of two months in terms of Section 437A of the CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan