1( 2025:HHC:21669 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 06 of 2014 Reserved on: 18.06.2025 Date of Decision: . 08.07.2025 Uma Shankar ...Petitioner Versus Anil Sood ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Petitioner : Mr. Raman Jamalta, Advocate. For the Respondent : Nemo ________________________________________ Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 18.11.2013, passed by learned Sessions Judge (Forests) (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 27.11.2012 and order of sentence dated 1.12.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.3, Shimla (learned trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2( 2025:HHC:21669 ) same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short NI Act). It was asserted that the accused obtained a friendly loan of ₹60,000/ from the complainant from time to time. Accused issued three cheques of ₹ 20,000/-each drawn on HDFC, the Mall Shimla, to repay the loan taken by him. The complainant presented the cheques to his bank, but these were dishonoured with an endorsement “Account Closed”. The accused was told about the dishonoured cheque, and he promised to pay the money, however, the accused failed to repay the money. The complainant issued a notice dated 16.1.2010 asking the accused to pay the amount. Notice was served upon the accused, but the accused failed to repay the amount. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court to take action as per the law. 3( 2025:HHC:21669 ) 3. Learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined himself as CW-1. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. admitted that he is known to the complainant. He stated that he had taken a loan of ₹ 40,000/- from the complainant and had handed over blank signed cheques to the complainant at the time of taking the loan. He had repaid the loan. He stated that he wanted to lead the defence evidence, but no evidence was led. 6. Learned trial Court held that the issuance of the cheque was not disputed; therefore, a presumption arose that the cheques were issued in discharge of the legal liability. The complainant admitted in his cross-examination that he had received the payments in the year 2007, but these were regarding some other transactions. There was nothing to disbelieve this version. A holder of a signed blank cheque has the authority to fill the amount and present it to the Bank. The cheques were dishonoured with an endorsement “Account 4( 2025:HHC:21669 ) Closed”, which would attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. The notice was served upon the accused, but he failed to pay the amount. Hence, the accused was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two months and to pay a compensation of ₹ 50,000/- to the complainant. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, (Forests) Shimla (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the cheque carried with it a presumption of consideration, and the burden lies upon the accused to rebut the presumption. The defence taken by the accused was not probable, and he had failed to discharge the burden placed upon him. The cheques were dishonoured with an endorsement “Account Closed”, which would attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. The notice was served upon the accused, and the accused failed to pay the amount despite the receipt of a valid notice on demand; therefore, he was rightly convicted and sentenced by the learned trial Court. 5( 2025:HHC:21669 ) 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The cheques were issued as blank cheques. A sum of ₹ 40,000/- was never payable to the complainant. The accused had repaid the loan taken by him from the complainant, and security cheques were misused by him; therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Raman Jamalta, learned counsel for the petitioner-accused. Since none appeared on behalf of the complainant, therefore, none could be heard. 10. Mr. Raman Jamalta, learned counsel for the petitioner- accused, submitted that the learned Courts below did not appreciate the evidence on record properly. The memo of dishonour did not bear any seal/signatures of the bank, and no reliance could have been placed upon it. The accused had repaid the amount, which is evident from the copies of the diary (EX. DX and DX2). It was duly proved on record that the accused did not have the liability to pay ₹40,000/- and the complainant could not have presented the cheques to the bank. The learned Courts below failed to appreciate this aspect and 6( 2025:HHC:21669 ) erred in convicting and sentencing the accused; therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 7( 2025:HHC:21669 ) 13. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed: “13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory 8( 2025:HHC:21669 ) order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 14. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as 9( 2025:HHC:21669 ) well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 10( 2025:HHC:21669 ) 14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its own view. This Court set aside the High Court's order holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 15. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is therefore, in the negative.” 16. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. The complainant admitted in his cross-examination that his signatures appeared on the copy of the ledger (Ex. DX). He denied that the accused had returned the amount in the instalments of ₹500/- or ₹100/-. He volunteered to say that the accused had taken 11( 2025:HHC:21669 ) money in the year 2007, and this money was returned in the form of ₹100 and ₹500/-. 18. Learned Courts below held that the accused had a different transaction with the complainant and the amount mentioned in the ledger (Ex. DX) pertained to those transactions. This finding cannot be sustained. The complainant stated in para 1 of the complaint that the accused had raised a friendly loan from the complainant from time to time, which means that only one loan was raised. It was nowhere claimed that the loan was repaid by the accused; therefore, the plea taken by him that the amount shown in the ledger (Ex.DX) pertains to some other transaction is not acceptable. 19. The complainant has not mentioned the time when the loan was advanced. The copy of the ledger (Ex.DX) shows the payment of different amounts on various dates. It also shows the previous balance. Since the complainant has admitted his signatures on the ledger book; therefore, its correctness cannot be doubted. The ledger shows the payment of different amounts to the complainant, and the complainant could not have presented the cheque for ₹20,000/- each to recover the money. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh 12( 2025:HHC:21669 ) Mahendrabhai Patel, (2023) 1 SCC 578: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1376 that the cheque can be presented for the amount due and if some payment had been made before the presentation of the cheque, the complainant is bound to endorse the same and present the cheque for the remaining amount. It was observed: - “16. Based on the above analysis of precedent, the following principles emerge: 16.1. Where the borrower agrees to repay the loan within a specified timeline and issues a cheque for security but defaults in repaying the loan within the timeline, the cheque matures for presentation. When the cheque is sought to be encashed by the debtor and is dishonoured, Section 138 of the Act will be attracted. 16.2. However, the cardinal rule when a cheque is issued for security is that between the date on which the cheque is drawn to the date on which the cheque matures, the loan could be repaid through any other mode. It is only where the loan is not repaid through any other mode within the due date that the cheque would mature for presentation. 16.3. If the loan has been discharged before the due date or if there is an “altered situation”, then the cheque shall not be presented for encashment. 17. In Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat [Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat, (2022) 16 SCC 762: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1174], a two-Judge Bench of this Court expounded the meaning of the phrase “debt or other liability”. It was observed that the phrase takes within its meaning a “sum of money promised to be paid on a future day by reason of a present obligation”. The Court observed that a post-dated cheque issued after the debt was incurred would be covered within the meaning of “debt”. The Court held that Section 138 would also include cases where the debt is incurred after the cheque is drawn but 13( 2025:HHC:21669 ) before it is presented for encashment. In this context, it was observed: (SCC para 30) “30. The object of the NI Act is to enhance the acceptability of cheques and inculcate faith in the efficiency of negotiable instruments for the transaction of business. The purpose of the provision would become otiose if the provision is interpreted to exclude cases where debt is incurred after the drawing of the cheque but before its encashment. In Indus Airways [Indus Airways (P) Ltd. v. Magnum Aviation (P) Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539: (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 138: (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 845], advance payments were made but since the purchase agreement was cancelled, there was no occasion of incurring any debt. The true purpose of Section 138 would not be fulfilled if “debt or other liability” is interpreted to include only a debt that exists as on the date of drawing of the cheque. Moreover, Parliament has used the expression “debt or other liability”. The expression “or other liability” must have a meaning of its own, the legislature having used two distinct phrases. The expression “or other liability” has a content which is broader than “a debt” and cannot be equated with the latter. In the present case, the cheque was issued in close proximity to the commencement of the power supply. The issuance of the cheque in the context of a commercial transaction must be understood in the context of business dealings. The issuance of the cheque was followed close on its heels by the supply of power. To hold that the cheque was not issued in the context of a liability which was being assumed by the company to pay for the dues towards power supplied would be to produce an outcome at odds with the business dealings. If the company were to fail to provide a satisfactory LC and yet consume power, the cheques were capable of being presented for the purpose of meeting the outstanding dues.” 20. It was further held that when the payments were made after taking of debt, the presentation of the cheque for the whole amount of the debt is bad. It was observed: - 14( 2025:HHC:21669 ) 20. The judgments of this Court on post-dated cheques, when read with the purpose of Section 138, indicate that an offence under the provision arises if the cheque represents a legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity. The offence under Section 138 is tipped by the dishonour of the cheque when it is sought to be encashed. Though a post-dated cheque might be drawn to represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of its drawing, for the offence to be attracted, the cheque must represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment. If there has been a material change in the circumstances such that the sum in the cheque does not represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of maturity or encashment, then the offence under Section 138 is not made out. 24. It was the contention of the first respondent that the cheque was not dated. On the other hand, it was the contention of the appellant that the cheque was dated 17-3-2014. The courts below did not record a finding on whether the cheque was undated or was dated 17-3-2014. However, it was conclusively held that the cheque was issued by the first respondent for security on the date when the loan was borrowed. It was also categorically recorded by the courts below that a sum of Rs 4,09,315 that was paid by the first respondent was paid to partly fulfil the debt of rupees twenty lakhs. The appellant, in his cross-examination, has stated that a “cheque against a cheque” was given when he loaned the sum of rupees twenty lakhs. Thus, it can be concluded that the cheque was given as a security to discharge the loan, either undated or dated as 17-3-2014. Merely because the sum of Rs 4,09,315 was paid between 8-4-2012 and 30-12-2013, which was after 17-3-2014, it cannot be concluded that the sum was not paid in discharge of the loan of rupees twenty lakhs. The sum of Rs 4,09,315 was paid after the loan was lent to the first respondent. The appellant, in his cross-examination, has not denied the receipt of the payments. He has also stated it was not received as a “gift or reward”. In view of the above discussion, at the time of the encashment of the cheque, the first respondent did not owe a sum of rupees twenty lakhs as represented in the cheque at the time of encashment of the cheque that was issued for security. 15( 2025:HHC:21669 ) 34. In view of the discussion above, we summarise our findings below: 34.1. For the commission of an offence under Section 138, the cheque that is dishonoured must represent a legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity or presentation. 34.2. If the drawer of the cheque pays a part or whole of the sum between the period when the cheque is drawn and when it is encashed upon maturity, then the legally enforceable debt on the date of maturity would not be the sum represented on the cheque. 34.3. When a part or whole of the sum represented on the cheque is paid by the drawer of the cheque, it must be endorsed on the cheque as prescribed in Section 56 of the Act. The cheque endorsed with the payment made may be used to negotiate the balance, if any. If the cheque that is endorsed is dishonoured when it is sought to be encashed upon maturity, then the offence under Section 138 will stand attracted. 34.4. The first respondent has made part-payments after the debt was incurred and before the cheque was encashed upon maturity. The sum of rupees twenty lakhs represented on the cheque was not the “legally enforceable debt” on the date of maturity. Thus, the first respondent cannot be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act when the cheque was dishonoured for insufficient funds. 34.5. The notice demanding the payment of the “said amount of money” has been interpreted by judgments of this Court to mean the cheque amount. The conditions stipulated in the provisos to Section 138 need to be fulfilled in addition to the ingredients in the substantive part of Section 138. Since in this case, the first respondent has not committed an offence under Section 138, the validity of the form of the notice need not be decided.” 16( 2025:HHC:21669 ) 21. The complainant produced on record the memos of dishonour (Ex.CW1/C and Ex.CW1/D), which are computer-generated documents wherein the name of the bank, cheque number, amount and the reason for return have been mentioned. These are not even printed on the official letter pad of the bank, but only on paper. They bear a column of signatures but do not bear any signatures. They do not have any certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down in Vandana v. Abhilasha, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2086: (2019) 2 Mah LJ 645: 2018 ACD 950: (2018) 4 Bom CR (Cri) 774 that when the computer-generated memo of dishonour is produced without the certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, it is not sufficient to prove the dishonour of the cheque. It was observed at page 650: 13. When the complainant (appellant in the present case) asserted that the cheque was returned or dishonoured, it was for her to prove this basic fact, section 146 of the said Act provides that if the complainant places on record a slip or memo issued by the bank having official mark of the bank thereon, denoting that the cheque was dishonoured, it would be presumed that such cheque was dishonoured until such fact was disproved. Thus, if such a document were placed on record by the appellant in the present case, it would constitute prima facie evidence of dishonour of the cheque, and the burden would have been entirely on the respondent to disprove such a fact. But, when the memo produced in the present case by the appellant did not bear the official mark of the bank, there was no document as contemplated under section 146 of the said Act to presume that the fact of dishonour of the cheque had been 17( 2025:HHC:21669 ) proved by the appellant. The burden continued to lie on the appellant to prove the basic fact of dishonour of the cheque, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 14. In such a situation, a mere statement made in the statutory notice and the complaint filed before the Court would not constitute proof of dishonour of cheque, unless further evidence to corroborate the same was placed on record on behalf of the appellant. The appellant is not justified in claiming that such statements would suffice as proof of dishonour of the cheque because the respondent failed to enter the witness box in support of her defence. As the complainant, it was for the appellant to prove the fact of dishonour of the cheque by cogent evidence. The appellant could have examined the bank official to prove that the cheque had indeed been dishonoured, but she failed to do so. 15. The appellant could have placed on record a certificate contemplated under section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in respect of the memo of the Bank, which was allegedly a computer-generated electronic record. But no such evidence was placed on record. The trial Court has also held that there was a lack of evidence to show even the deposit of the cheque because the deposit slip was not placed on record by the appellant. But, a perusal of the cheque in question (Exhibit-21) does show that the stamp of the bank in which the cheque was deposited is very much present on the cheque. To that extent, the trial Court was not right in holding that even the proof of deposit of the cheque was not on record. Yet, this fact alone does not take the case of the appellant any further because the stamp affixed on the cheque shows only the name of the bank, and there is nothing to signify the date on which the cheque was deposited in the bank. Even as per the case of the appellant, the cheque in question was deposited twice, and it is clear that there is no cogent evidence placed on record by the appellant to show dishonour of the said cheque. 16. When the basic fact of dishonour of cheque was not proved by the appellant and the burden was not discharged offence under section 138 of the said Act could not be said to have been committed by the respondent. Another important aspect of the 18( 2025:HHC:21669 ) present case is that when there is lack of evidence to show dishonour of cheque and consequently the date when the cheque was dishonoured, there is no reference point to ascertain as to whether the notice for demand of payment was issued by the appellant to the respondent within 30 days of receipt of information from the bank regarding return of cheque as unpaid, as provided under proviso (b) to section 138 of the said Act. This is the reason why the trial Court has held that the appellant failed to prove that she made a demand for payment of the amount within the statutory period, as the statutory period could not be computed in the facts of the present case.” 22. It was laid down in Tejendrasingh v. Ravindrakumar, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 60: (2019) 3 Mah LJ 612: 2019 ACD 229: (2019) 2 RCR (Cri) 475: PLR (2019) 193 IJ 14: (2019) 1 Bom CR (Cri) 900 that when the document does not bear the official mark/seal, the presumption under Section 146 of the NI Act cannot be drawn. It was observed: “ii. Admittedly, the UCO Bank representative is not examined. The Trial Court refused to accept the bank memo issued by that bank. It does not bear the seal of the bank. I agree with the trial Court. The presumption under section 146 of the N.I. Act will not come to his rescue. There has to be a seal on the bank slip before the presumption as to dishonour can be drawn. I could have given the benefit of this lacuna even if a proper person from SBI, that is the signatory of the letter, could have been examined. It seems that while conducting the prosecution, these minor procedural aspects are overlooked.” 23. A similar view was taken by this Court in Rajinder Singh Verma vs. B.K. Hanchnmani (30.04.2019 - HPHC): MANU/HP/0437/2019 wherein it was observed: 19( 2025:HHC:21669 ) 9. Even if, assumingly, the complainant may, upon recoursing to an appropriate remedy, be cast under the provisions of Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, rather could therethrough strive to prove the afore-mentioned cheque, borne in Ex. CW1/A, carrying the authentic signatures of the accused, (a) and, thereafter it, was permissible for the complainant, to rely upon the statutory provisions, cast under the provisions of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, qua his holding it in discharge, of, a contractual or other legal liabilities, arising inter se him, and, the accused. Nonetheless, dehors, the aforecurative recoursings, for, hence, dispelling the effect of Ex. CW1/A, rather being feigned, in the testification rendered hence by the complainant, to, hence assuredly contain the signatures of the accused, also, the mandate, of Section 146 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter, was, also vis- a-vis, Ex. CW1/B, the purported return memo given, Ex. CW1/A, hence enjoined, to be cogently satiated. "146. Bank's slip prima facie evidence of certain facts. The Court shall, in respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of a bank's slip or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until such fact is disproved. Even though, the court is statutorily empowered, to, qua the apposite return memo hence enunciating, the, declining to honour the negotiable instrument concerned, rather avail the apposite therewith presumption, as, engrafted therein, (a) yet the afore presumption would be aptly galvanized, upon, the memo evidently carrying thereon, the official mark, and, seal, of the bank concerned. However, the afore presumption, as occurring therein, and, with a statutory coinage, "unless and until such fact is disproved", is, rebuttable, only upon, adduction into evidence, the return memo, (b) whereupon hence, it would also stand proven qua it not carrying the official mark or seal of the bank concerned. The evidence in consonance with the afore-mentioned statutory coinage, occurring in the last part of Section 146 of the N.I. Act is, prima facie, rather upsurging, given, Ex. CW1/B evidently not carrying 20( 2025:HHC:21669 ) the seal or official mark of the bank concerned, (I) AND, with one Naresh Kumar, Accounts Officer from ICICI Bank, The Mall Shimla, upon his stepping into the witness box, rather showing his inability to bring the original of Ex. CW1/B, given, it not being traceable in the apposite records, (ii) and, when only on production, of the original in the Court of EX. CW1/B, and, evident existence thereon, of the afore statutorily mandated requirements, of it, hence carrying the official mark or seal of the bank concerned, would, hence enable, the, marshalling, of, the statutory presumption qua the apposite cheque being declined, to be honoured, to, rather hold the fullest conclusivity or sway, (iii) besides it would benumb any endeavour of the defence, to rely, upon the afore statutory coinage, occurring in the last part of Section 146 of the N.I. Act, (iv) reiteratedly for want of production of the original of Ex. CW1/B, this court is constrained to conclude qua the statutory requirement of Ex. CW1/B on its presentation, for its being honoured, hence being declined to be honoured, rather remaining within the ambit of Section 146 of the N;l. Act, to be hence, disproven.” 24. In the present case also, the official mark/seal is missing from the memo of dishonour; therefore, the presumption of dishonour cannot be drawn under Section 146 of the NI Act. 25. The complainant did not examine any official of the bank to prove the reason for dishonour; therefore, another requirement of Section 138 of N.I. Act that the cheque was dishonoured due to “Account Closed” is not satisfied in the present case. 26. Both the learned Courts below did not advert to this aspect of the case and proceeded to hold that all the requirements of Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Since the requirements were not 21( 2025:HHC:21669 ) satisfied, therefore learned Courts below committed a jurisdictional error, which is liable to be corrected while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. 27 In view of the above, the present revision is allowed. The judgment dated 18.11.2013, passed by learned Appellate Court and the judgment and order dated 27.11.2012/01.12.2012 of the learned Trial Court, are set aside. The accused is acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act. The fine amount, if deposited be refunded after the expiry of the period of limitation in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused are directed to furnish bail bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 22( 2025:HHC:21669 ) 29. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 08 July, 2025. (veena)