1 2025:CGHC:60225-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1970 of 2024 1 - Vishwanath Mishra S/o Late Dwarika Prasad Mishra Aged About 61 Years R/o Smriti Nagar, Bhilai District Durg (C.G.) 2 - Smt. Vijay Laxmi Mishra W/o Shri Vishwanath Mishra Aged About 58 Years R/o Smriti Nagar, Bhilai District Durg (C.G.) 3 - Shubham Mishra S/o Shri Vishwanath Mishra Aged About 31 Years R/o Smriti Nagar, Bhilai District Durg (C.G.) --- Petitioners versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station - Sarkanda, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 2 - Ritu Mishra W/o Shri Sudhanshu Mishra Aged About 32 Years R/o Divya Mount Premises, Lingiyadih, Police Station Sarkanda, District Bilaspur (C.G.) --- Respondents CRMP No. 2292 of 2024 Sudhanshu Mishra S/o Shri Vishwanath Mishra Aged About 34 Years R/o Smriti Nagar, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) --- Petitioner Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Officer In-Charge, Police Station Sarkanda, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.12.12 10:43:59 +0530 2 2 - Ritu Mishra W/o Shri Sudhanshu Mishra Aged About 32 Years R/o Divya Mount Premises, Lingiyadih, PS Sarkanda, District Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners (In CRMP No.1970/2024) : Mr. Adil Minhaj, Advocate For Petitioners (In CRMP No.2292/2024) : Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Advocate For State/Respondent No.1 : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Om Prakash Sahu, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 11.12 .2025 1. Heard Mr. Adil Minhaj, learned counsel for the petitioners in CRMP No.1970/2024, Mr. Kshitij Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners in CRMP No.2292/2024, Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent No.1 and Mr. Om Prakash Sahu, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 2. CRMP No.1970/2024 has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer:- “(i) allow this petition & consequently quash the 3 charge sheet No. 315/2024 filed on 15.04.2024 (Annexure P- 1) for offences U/s. 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC, in respect of Crime No. 816/2023 registered at P.S. Sarkanda, District Bilaspur (C.G.). (ii) Further quash the proceedings pending vide Criminal Case No. 2724/2024 (State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Sudhanshu Mishra & Ors) before learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bilaspur (C.G.). (iii) Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. CRMP No.2292/2024 has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayer:- “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may Kindly be pleased to allow this petition and consequently quash the FIR No. 816/2023 registered with the Respondent No.1 on 19.06.2023, also the charge sheet No. 315/2024, dated 15.04.2024 for the alleged offence Under Sections 498-A. 294, 323, 506 R/w. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.” 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both the petition jointly submit that the marriage of the petitioner–Sudhanshu Mishra with respondent No.2 was solemnized on 19.04.2022 at the parental village of the petitioner at Kasdol, District Baloda Bazar (C.G.) as per Hindu rites and rituals. Soon after the 4 marriage, certain matrimonial disputes arose between the couple, resulting in frequent altercations and very limited cohabitation, primarily because both were serving as Teachers at different postings, the petitioner in CRMP No.2292/2024 as PT Teacher at Gurughasidas Hr. Sec. School, Kohka, Bhilai, District Durg, and respondent No.2 as Teacher at Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, Kirandul, District Bastar. Owing to persistent discord and the alleged hostile attitude of respondent No.2 towards the petitioner and his family members, the petitioner-husband initiated proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking restitution of conjugal rights, registered as Case No. 346/2023 before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Durg. 5. They further submitted that respondent No.2 had earlier lodged a complaint before Mahila Thana, Bilaspur, where the matter was referred to the Mediation Cell. The proceedings, copies of which, reveal that no allegations of dowry demand were made at that stage and the dispute was reflected merely as matrimonial differences. The said mediation proceedings were ultimately dropped at the instance of respondent No.2 on 12.06.2023. Thereafter, respondent No.2 preferred a transfer petition seeking transfer of the matrimonial case from Durg to Bilaspur, which came to be dismissed by this Court on 08.05.2024. 6. Subsequently, respondent No.2 lodged a detailed complaint alleging demand of dowry and cruelty, pursuant to which FIR 5 No.816/2023 was registered at Police Station Sarkanda, Bilaspur, and charge sheet No. 315/2024 was filed for offences under Sections 498-A, 294, 323, 506 read with Section 34 IPC against the petitioner-husband, his parents and his brother, who are petitioners in CRMP No.1970/2024. The petitioners contend that the allegations in the FIR are materially inconsistent with respondent No.2’s earlier version before the Mediation Cell, and that substantial improvements and embellishments have been made. It is further alleged that respondent No.2, acting with ill intention and with the object of causing harm to the service career of the petitioner-husband and his brother, who are government employees, even lodged complaints before their respective Departments seeking disciplinary action. 7. It is contended that the records produced with the charge sheet include manipulated or overwritten documents purportedly from the earlier mediation proceedings, whereas the unaltered copies obtained by the petitioner-husband under RTI, which clearly demonstrate fabrication of official records. Complaints to that effect were made before the police authorities for taking cognizance. 8. Lastly, they would submit that even if the allegations in the FIR and charge sheet are taken at face value, the petitioners submit that no ingredients constituting an offence under Section 498-A IPC or other alleged provisions are made out against them. It is 6 urged that the prosecution has been launched only to wreak vengeance, particularly in view of the pending matrimonial proceedings and the dismissal of the transfer petition filed by respondent No.2. The allegations in the FIR and witness statements, according to the petitioners, are omnibus, vague and do not disclose any specific overt act on the part of the petitioners warranting their criminal prosecution. To bolster their submission, they would rely upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters of Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another1, Preeti Gupta and another v. State of Jharkhand and another2, Swapnil v. State of Madhya Pradesh3, Rashmi Chopra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another4 (Para-24), Rajesh Sharma and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another5, Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and others v. State of Bihar and others6 and Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh7. 9. On the other hand, Mr. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondent No.1, submits that after due and proper investigation, the petitioners have been charge- sheeted for the aforesaid offences and the material collected during investigation prima facie discloses their involvement, 1 (2012) 10 SCC 741 2 (2010) 7 SCC 667 3 (2014) 13 SCC 567 4 2019 SCC OnLine SC 620 5 (2018) 10 SCC 472 6 (2022) 6 SCC 599 7 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 7 sufficient to require them to stand trial. He submits that the petitioners are already facing trial before the Court below, and on the basis of the material available on record, it cannot be said that no prima facie case exists against them. He further contends that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS is extremely limited and cannot be exercised to quash an FIR or charge sheet where there is adequate material justifying prosecution. As such, the petitions are devoid of merit and deserve to be dismissed. 10. Learned counsel for the objector / respondent No.2 submits that the petitioners have suppressed material facts and that respondent No.2 was subjected to continuous cruelty, dowry demands, and harassment, which compelled her to lodge the complaint resulting in FIR No. 816/2023. It is submitted that prior to the marriage the petitioner’s family demanded money, further amounts were taken at the time of marriage, and thereafter respondent No.2 was repeatedly ill-treated and assaulted, including on 02.01.2023 when a further demand of Rs.21,00,000/- was allegedly made. It is contended that the allegations raised by the petitioners regarding contradictions or manipulation of records are baseless, and the charge sheet contains sufficient prima facie material to proceed against them. It is contended that the mediation process is presently continuing before the trial Court, is likely to conclude shortly, and there exists a reasonable possibility of settlement between the parties. 8 Hence, it is urged that in view of the serious allegations and the ongoing conciliatory process, the present petitions for quashing deserve to be rejected. 11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and have perused the documents appended with these petitions. 12. From perusal of the record, it appears that CRMP No. 2292/2024 was referred to mediation vide order dated 27.08.2024. However, as per the mediation report dated 05.12.2024, the mediation has been reported as unsuccessful, as the parties could not arrive at any settlement. 13. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of the BNSS. 14. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others8, the Supreme Court has held that the accused can approach the High Court either under Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of BNSS or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him. 15. The Supreme Court in the mater of State of Haryana and others 8 (1998) 5 SCC 749 9 v. Bhajan Lal and others9 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of BNSS should be exercised, which are as under: - “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in 9 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 10 their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and 11 continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 16. The principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) has been followed recently by the Supreme Court in the matters of Google India Private Limited v. Visaka Industries10, Ahmad Ali Quraishi and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another11 and Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra and others12. The Supreme Court in Google India 10 (2020) 4 SCC 162 11 (2020) 13 SCC 435 12 (2019) 18 SCC 191 12 Private Limited (supra), explained the scope of dictum of Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and “that too in the rarest of rare cases” as indicated in paragraph 103 therein of the report. 17. Having noticed the scope of interference by this Court in the petition relating to quashment of FIR/charge-sheet, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that in the impugned charge-sheet, four petitioners have been charged for offences under Sections 498-A/34 of the IPC. 18. Chapter XXA of the IPC deals with offence of cruelty by husband or relatives of husband. Section 498A of the IPC defines the offence of cruelty as under:- “498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or 13 (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 19. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in order to establish offence under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution must establish- (i) That, woman must be married; (ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment and (iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by relative of her husband. 20. The word 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC has been explained in Explanation appended to Section 498A of the IPC. It consists of two clauses namely clause (a) and clause (b). To attract Section 498A of the IPC, it must be established that cruelty or harassment to the wife to coerce her or cause bodily injury to herself or to commit suicide or the harassment was to compel her to fulfill illegal demand for dowry. It is not every type of harassment or cruelty that would attract Section 498A of the IPC. Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC contemplates harassment of woman to coerce or any relation of her to meet 14 any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. The complainant if wants to come within the ambit of Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC, she can succeed if it is proved that there was an unlawful demand by the husband or any of his relatives with respect to money or of some valuable security. 21. The Supreme Court in the matter of Priya Vrat Singh and others v. Shyam Ji Sahai13 considered the issue of delay in lodging the complaint as well as role that has been ascribed to the accused therein and quashed the complaint holding the delay of two years in lodging FIR to be fatal and further held that no role has been ascribed to the petitioner/accused therein. It was observed as under:- “8. Further it is pointed out that the allegation of alleged demand for dowry was made for the first time in December, 1994. In the complaint filed, the allegation is that the dowry torture was made some times in 1992. It has not been explained as to why for more than two years no action was taken. 9. Further, it appears that in the complaint petition apart from the husband, the mother of the husband, the subsequently married wife, husband's mother's sister, husband's brother in law and Sunita's father were impleaded as party. No role has been specifically ascribed to anybody except the husband and that too of a dowry demand in February 1993 when the complaint 13 (2008) 8 SCC 232 15 was filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It is to be noted that in spite of service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of Respondent No.1.” 22. Similarly, in the matter of Sunder Babu and others v. State of Tamil Nadu14 delay in filing complaint against accused therein was taken note of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court holding the case to be covered by Category Seven of para-102 highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the prosecution for offence under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was quashed. 23. Similarly, in the matter of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), the Supreme Court held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as co-accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process. 24. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others15 their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and held that the Court should be careful in 14 (2009) 14 SCC 244 15 (2018) 14 SCC 452 16 proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out. 25. 25. In the matter of Rashmi Chopra (supra) it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) that criminal proceedings can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) by holding as under:- “24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint 17 indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra. 25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants..…” 26. Having noticed the legal position governing the quashment of FIR and charge-sheet, the question that arises for consideration is whether, taking the allegations made in FIR No. 816/2023 and the 18 material in charge sheet No. 315/2024 at their face value, any prima facie offence under Sections 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 IPC is made out against the petitioners. 27. It is the case of the prosecution that the marriage of respondent No.2 was solemnized with petitioner–Sudhanshu Mishra on 19.04.2022 as per Hindu rites and rituals, and that soon thereafter she was subjected to cruelty, harassment and demands for dowry by the petitioner-husband and his family members. On the basis of her written complaint, FIR No. 816/2023 was registered at Police Station Sarkanda, Bilaspur, and after completion of investigation, the police filed charge-sheet No. 315/2024 for the aforesaid offences before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur. 28. However, a careful examination of the FIR and the statements forming part of the charge sheet reveals that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are general, omnibus and lacking in specific particulars regarding dates, instances, or overt acts attributable to each of the petitioners. The earlier mediation proceedings conducted at Mahila Thana, Bilaspur, which were initiated at the instance of respondent No.2 herself, contain no allegation of dowry demand, and the dispute was recorded only as matrimonial discord. The later allegations made in the FIR reflect substantial improvements and embellishments inconsistent with her earlier version. Except broad and vague assertions that 19 the petitioners demanded dowry and ill-treated her, no specific allegation is made against the parents or brother of the petitioner- husband to constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. 29. Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and the material placed on record, particularly the nature of allegations in the FIR and charge sheet, which are bald, omnibus and inherently inconsistent with earlier proceedings, this Court is of the considered opinion that no prima facie offence under Sections 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 IPC is made out against the petitioners. The allegations do not disclose any specific conduct amounting to cruelty as defined under Section 498-A IPC, nor do they disclose any unlawful demand of dowry so as to satisfy Explanation (b). The prosecution appears to be covered by Category 1, 3 and 7 of paragraph 102 of Bhajan Lal (supra), being based on vague assertions, improvements, and indications of mala fide arising out of matrimonial discord and parallel civil proceedings. Accordingly, continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law. 30. As a natural consequence of the above analysis, Criminal Case No. 2724/2024 pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, arising out of Crime No. 816/2023 registered at Police Station Sarkanda, Bilaspur under Sections 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 IPC against the petitioners, is hereby quashed. 20 31. The petitions filed under Section 528 BNSS being CRMP No.1970/2024 and CRMP No.2292/2024, are accordingly allowed, to the extent indicated hereinabove. 32. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu