1 2025:CGHC:57745-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 13 of 2021 State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Saragaon, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh --- Appellant versus 1 - Smt. Tarshila Toppo W/o Benjamin Toppo Aged About 37 Years R/o Uslapur, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 2 - Shantanu Kumar S/o Indalram Satnami Aged About 24 Years R/o Gidhauri, P. S. Baradwar, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh 3 - Horilal S/o Khulubutu Satnami Aged About 27 Years R/o Village Rohda, P. S. Saragaon, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh (Abated vide order dated 27.11.2025) 4 - Ramesh Kumar Jagatram Burman Aged About 26 Years R/o Pisda, P. S. Jaijaipur, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh --- Respondents ACQA No. 49 of 2014 Gore Singh Rajput S/o . Tijau Singh Aged About 50 Years R/o. Vill.Uslapur, Tah. Bilaspur, P.S. Chakarbhata, Distt. Bilaspur C.G. --- Appellant Versus 1 - Smt. Tarshila Toppo W/o . Benjamin Toppo Aged About 37 Years R/o. Uslapur, P.S. Chakarbhata, Tah. And Distt. Bilaspur C.G. 2 - Santanu Kumar S/o .Khulubutu Satnami Aged About 24 Years R/o. Gidhori, P.S. Baradwar, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G., ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.11.28 10:31:45 +0530 2 3 - Horilal S/o .Khulubutu Satnami Aged About 27 Years R/o. Gidhori, P.S. Baradwar, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G. (Abated vide order dated 27.11.2025) 4 - Ramesh Kumar S/o . Jagatram Burman Aged About 26 Years R/o. Gidhori, P.S. Baradwar, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G. 5 - State Of Chhattisgarh S/o Through Aarakshi Kendra Saragaon, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant/State (ACQA No.13/2021) : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Deputy Advocate General For Appellant (ACQA No.49/2014) : Mr. Anumeh Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondents No.1 & 2 : Mr. Siddharth Pandey, Advocate For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Akhtar Hussain, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 27 .11.2025 1. In compliance of Court’s order dated 26.11.2025, the Superintendent of Police, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) has filed his personal affidavit, relevant portion of which reads as follows :- “3. That, the deponent most respectfully submits that during the course of hearing in the present matter on 12.11.2025, it was informed to the Hon'ble Court that respondent no. 3 (Horilal, S/o Khulubutu Satnami) has died and the Hon'ble Court was pleased to direct the Superintendent of 3 Police, to submit a report with respect to the living status of the said respondent no. 3 in the present matter. 4. That, pursuant to the directions issued by the Hon'ble Court the deponent directed the Police of the Police Station Saragaon under whose jurisdiction the respondent no. 3 was residing to verify the fact, whether the respondent no.3 is alive or dead. On the basis of the said instructions the police of concerned police station, visited the village on 12.11.2025, and upon enquiry come to know that the respondent no. 3 has left for his heavenly abode on 02.04.2024. A copy of the death certificate issued by the competent officer is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE A/1. 5. That, it is most respectfully submitted that the information with respect to the death of the respondent no. 3 Horilal, S/o Khulubutu Satnami duly supported by the death certificate was submitted to the office of Advocate General on 26.11.2025, however, the death certificate was not supported by any application and affidavit for which the deponent tenders his unconditional apology.” 2. From perusal of the aforesaid affidavit, it transpires that the Superintendent of Police, Janjgir, caused an enquiry to be conducted through the Police Station Saragaon regarding the living status of respondent No.3. The verification carried out on 12.11.2025 revealed that respondent No.3, Horilal S/o Khulubutu Satnami, had passed away on 02.04.2024, which fact stands substantiated by the death certificate annexed as Annexure A/1. It further emerges that although the said information, along with the supporting death certificate, was forwarded to the office of the Advocate General on 26.11.2025, the document was 4 inadvertently not accompanied by the requisite application and affidavit, for which the deponent has tendered an unconditional apology. 3. The said death certificate is taken on record. 4. In view of the above, the appeal filed on behalf of respondent No.3, namely Horilal S/o Khulubutu Satnami stands dismissed as abated. 5. From the record, it is evident that leave to appeal against the acquittal was granted to the State vide order dated 04.01.2021, and in consequence, ACQA No.13/2021 stands admitted. 6. Considering that the incident pertains to the year 2010, and in view of the consent extended by learned counsel for the parties, we deem it appropriate to proceed to decide the matter on merits. 7. Although ACQA No.49/2014, preferred by the complainant, was not formally admitted earlier, inasmuch as it arises out of the same incident and the State’s acquittal appeal has already been admitted, we are satisfied that ACQA No.49/2014 also deserves to be and is hereby admitted. 8. In light of the above and with the concurrence of both sides, we now proceed to hear and decide both the appeals on merits. 9. Heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate for the appellant/State in ACQA No.13/2021 and Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellant in ACQA 5 No.49/2014. Also heard Mr. Siddharth Pandey, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 as well as Mr. Akhtar Hussain, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4. 10. By instituting these appeals, the appellant/State as well as the father of the deceased, who is the complainant, assail the legality and propriety of the judgment of acquittal dated 28.10.2013 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Sessions Case No.117/2010. By the said judgment, the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondents of the charges under Sections 120-B, 148, 302, 201, and 202 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, in connection with the alleged homicidal death of Jagdish @ Golu, which the prosecution alleged to be a case of murder pursuant to criminal conspiracy, followed by disposal of evidence to screen the offenders. 11. The prosecution case, as unfolded during investigation and at trial, is as follows : Accused Tarshila Toppo, who at the relevant time was posted as Station House Officer, Police Station Jarhagaon, had engaged the deceased Jagdish @ Golu as her driver. Even after her subsequent transfer to Police Station Bamhanidih, the deceased accompanied her there as well and continued to reside with her in the official quarters, sharing meals and also driving her vehicle during duty and patrolling. The accused had also kept her minor niece Amandeep in the said quarters for household work, who resided and studied while 6 assisting in domestic chores. 12. According to the prosecution, the deceased had taken obscene photographs of accused Tarshila Toppo on his mobile phone and had been circulating them among his friends, thereby maligning her reputation. When confronted, he allegedly demanded ₹5,00,000 for returning the said photographs and threatened to harm her husband and children if the demand was not met. It was alleged that he continued misusing the accused’s name and official position, causing her distress, fear and agitation, due to which she decided to eliminate him. It is further alleged that in this background she conspired with the co-accused persons. 13. It is the prosecution case that accused Tarshila Toppo had provided ₹60,000 to accused Heeralal Diwakar for contesting the Panchayat elections for the post of Sarpanch, assuring him of a further ₹40,000. During this period, she requested him to kill Jagdish. Though he declined to commit the murder, he agreed to assist and, at her behest, arranged a Bolero vehicle and procured suhaga (borax poison). 14. On the night of 14.03.2010, after returning from patrolling duty, the accused and the deceased had dinner. Amandeep thereafter retired to her room. Jagdish remained watching television. Finding an opportunity, accused Tarshila allegedly mixed suhaga in beer and administered it to Jagdish. Soon after consuming the drink, he suffered severe pain, went out into the courtyard, 7 poured water over himself, and after struggling for some time, collapsed and died. 15. Thereafter, accused Tarshila telephonically called accused Heeralal. Around 11:45 p.m., accused Heeralal arrived in a Bolero vehicle driven by accused Ramesh, accompanied by accused Hori Lal Satnami and accused Shantanu Satnami. They entered the courtyard, lifted the deceased by holding his head, hands, and legs, and placed the body in the vehicle. Accused Hori Lal followed on the deceased’s motorcycle. The accused allegedly transported the body to Champa Road, where they dumped it on the roadway. Accused Hori Lal is alleged to have then inflicted 7– 8 blows on the deceased’s head with an iron poultry-cutting tool he had brought. The motorcycle was left near the spot, and accused Shantanu allegedly took the deceased’s mobile phone from his pocket. 16. During the same night, passersby noticed the body lying with the motorcycle and presumed it to be a road accident. A telephonic intimation was received at the police station but no action ensued. On the following morning, the village kotwar reported the incident. A merg intimation was registered, the spot was inspected, and inquest was prepared. The motorcycle, slippers, blood-stained soil and plain soil were seized. The dead body was sent for postmortem. The autopsy surgeon found nine incised injuries on the head and opined that death was due to cerebral 8 shock. The viscera was preserved and later confirmed to contain suhaga poison. 17. During investigation, the accused persons were arrested. Pursuant to the memorandum statement of accused Shantanu and accused Heeralal, the deceased’s mobile phone was recovered from Shantanu. On the strength of the memorandum of accused Hori Lal, the alleged weapon i.e. a poultry-cutting iron tool was recovered from a pond. The Bolero vehicle said to have been used in transporting the body was seized based on the memorandum of accused Ramesh. 18. Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Champa, where Criminal Case No. 669/2010 was registered. By order dated 07.08.2010, the matter was committed to the Court of Session. On 28.08.2010, charges under Sections 120-B, 148, 302, 201, 202 read with Section 149 IPC were framed against all the accused persons. The accused abjured guilt and claimed false implication. 19. In order to bring home of the offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 23 witnesses as PW-1 to PW-23 and exhibited 51 documents as Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/51 whereas the accused in defence, has not examined any witness, but exhibited one documents i.e. Ex.D/1. 20. The statement of the accused was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all the incriminating 9 circumstances put to him as appearing in the evidence led by the prosecution. He asserted that he has been falsely implicated in the present case and claimed complete innocence. The accused specifically stated that the allegations levelled against him are baseless, that he has no connection with the alleged offence, and that he has been roped in due to ulterior motives. He further submitted that the investigation was not conducted in a fair and impartial manner, and hence, he deserves to be acquitted. 21. After affording due opportunity of hearing to both the parties and upon appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned Sessions Judge, Janjgir-Champa (C.G.), vide the impugned judgment dated 28.10.2013, acquitted the respondents of all the charges framed against him. 22. Aggrieved by the said judgment of acquittal, the State as well as the complainant have preferred the present acquittal appeals. 23. Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the appellant/State in ACQA No.13/2021, submits that the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is wholly unsustainable and warrants interference. He submits that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the prosecution evidence in its correct perspective and has discarded credible and natural witnesses on trivial grounds. He further submits that the prosecution witnesses, including PW-18 Shanti Thakur (mother of the deceased), PW-19 Gore Singh Rajput (father of 10 the deceased), PW-21 Dinesh Singh (brother of the deceased), PW-20 Durga Rajput, and PW-10 Ravindra Netam @ Lakhan, have consistently and truthfully deposed that the deceased Jagdish was working as driver of accused Tarshila Toppo and was residing with her in her official quarters. Their testimony, being natural and trustworthy, clearly established the relationship between the accused and the deceased and the circumstances in which the deceased was last living in the company of the accused. 24. It is further argued by Mr. Thakur that the learned Trial Court failed to attach due weight to the testimony of the last seen witness, PW-9 Parasram Sahu (Nagar Sainik), who categorically stated that he had seen accused Tarshila and the deceased Jagdish together on 14.03.2010 at about 10:30 p.m., i.e., immediately prior to the time of occurrence. This last seen circumstance, coupled with other incriminating evidence, formed a strong chain pointing towards the guilt of the accused. He submits that PW-6 Ashok Pandey (Nagar Sainik), PW-7 Durgesh Dubey, PW-12 Prabhat Tiwari and PW-14 Bhagwat have unequivocally stated that the deceased was murdered on the intervening night of 14.03.2010 before 12:30 a.m. The Trial Court, however, failed to appreciate this crucial evidence which supports the prosecution version regarding the time of death and the movements of the deceased and the accused. He further submits that the recovery of the mobile phone and SIM card of the 11 deceased, pursuant to the memorandum statement (Ex. P-20) of accused Shantanu Lahre and seized vide Ex. P-25, was duly proved by the Investigating Officer PW-23 Santosh Singh as well as PW-11 Prabhakar Tiwari, In-charge Cyber Crime Branch. This recovery constitutes a vital incriminating circumstance linking the accused to the offence. 25. Mr. Thakur contends that pursuant to the memorandum of accused Hori Lal (Ex. P-22), the weapon of offence an iron gandasa was seized vide Ex. P-26 and proved by the Investigating Officer. PW-5 Dr. Sarita Nagrachi, by her query reports (Ex. P-8 and Ex. P-10), opined that the injuries on the deceased were consistent with the said weapon. Further, based on the memorandum of accused Ramesh (Ex. P-23), the Bolero vehicle used for transporting the dead body was seized vide Ex. P-27, which is also a significant incriminating circumstance. He submits that the memorandum statement of accused Tarshila Toppo (Ex. P-24), wherein she disclosed that she mixed suhaga (borax) in beer and administered it to the deceased, is fully corroborated by the FSL report (Ex. P-49), confirming the presence of ethyl alcohol and borax (a poisonous substance) in the viscera of the deceased. This scientific evidence strongly supports the prosecution case and ought not to have been rejected by the Trial Court. He further points out that the statements of PW-3 Manohar Sarthi (Kotwar) and PW-23 Santosh Singh (Investigating Officer), along with the inquest 12 report (Ex. P-6) and post-mortem report (Ex. P-7), clearly establish that the deceased had sustained multiple injuries and that the death was homicidal. The post-mortem findings of PW-5 Dr. Sarita Nagrachi stand duly proved and corroborated by the FSL report (Ex. P-49). 26. It is submitted by Mr. Thakur that minor discrepancies or improvements in the testimony of otherwise reliable witnesses do not demolish the prosecution case. The Trial Court, however, adopted a hyper-technical approach and laid undue emphasis on minor omissions and contradictions, leading to a miscarriage of justice. The evidence was not assessed cumulatively, resulting in the breaking of an otherwise complete chain of circumstances pointing towards the guilt of the accused. Although the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is limited, it is equally settled that where the view taken by the Trial Court is manifestly perverse, unreasonable, or against the weight of evidence, the appellate Court is justified in interfering. In the present case, the findings of the Trial Court are perverse, unjust, and contrary to the evidence on record, therefore prays that the impugned judgment may be set aside and the respondents be convicted of the offences charged. 27. Likewise, Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellant in ACQA No.49/2014, submits that the learned Sessions Judge has gravely erred in discarding the testimony of 13 Ku. Amandeep Nageshiya (PW-16) solely on the ground that she was declared hostile. He submits that the evidence of a prosecution witness does not stand obliterated merely because the prosecution sought permission to cross-examine her. The settled legal position is that even the testimony of a hostile witness may be relied upon to the extent it is found to be trustworthy and corroborated by other evidence on record. The learned Trial Court, however, rejected her evidence in toto without examining those portions of her testimony which supported the prosecution case. He contends that the learned Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that the delayed statement of PW-16, recorded after approximately one and a half months on 30.04.2010, could not have been treated as a circumstance fatal to the prosecution, particularly in light of the sensitive circumstances in which the body was found and the relevance of her testimony to the chain of events. The delay, therefore, stood reasonably explained. 28. Mr. Shrivastava submits that the learned Trial Court has also erred in discarding the cogent and positive evidence of PW-20 Durga Rajput regarding the strained relationship and ongoing conflict between accused No.1 and the deceased. This witness, according to him, provided crucial insight into the proximity and interactions between the two, which strengthened the prosecution case. The conclusion drawn by the Trial Court that the stay of PW-20 (sister-in-law of the deceased) with the deceased for five 14 days was improbable is, according to him, based on conjecture rather than evidence. He further submits that PW-10 Ravindra Netam @ Baban, a neighbour and friend of the deceased, had categorically stated that the deceased used to reside with accused No.1, but the learned Sessions Judge brushed aside his testimony without assigning any reason, thereby committing a manifest error in appreciation of evidence. 29. It is argued by Mr. Shrivastava that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the cumulative effect of the oral testimonies and the circumstantial evidence, all of which unerringly pointed towards the fact that the deceased and accused No.1 were residing in the same premises and that the deceased was provided food and shelter therein. On the contrary, the defence produced no evidence whatsoever to support the plea that the deceased was living separately in a rented premises. Accused No.1 did not examine any landlord or neighbour to establish such residence, whereas the prosecution had three consistent witnesses and supporting circumstances to the contrary. He submits that the Trial Court has completely overlooked the credible testimony of PW-11 Prabhakar Tiwari, Cyber Crime Prabhari Nirikshak, who clearly stated that the mobile phone seized from the accused was the one belonging to the deceased. The IMEI numbers tallied, and there existed no technical discrepancy that could justify the Court’s rejection of this piece of evidence. It is further submitted that learned Sessions Judge disbelieved the evidence of PW-22 15 Dara Singh Rajput and PW-15 Gopal Yadav merely on the ground that they were acquainted with the deceased, which is not a legally sustainable ground. Their credibility ought to have been tested on the basis of their statements, not by reason of their acquaintance with the deceased. 30. Mr. Shrivastava also submits that the learned Trial Court erred in drawing an adverse inference from the absence of bloodstains on the weapon recovered from a water body. He argues that once the weapon was submerged in water, the likelihood of retaining bloodstains was extremely remote, and therefore the reasoning assigned by the Trial Court is erroneous. He contends that the impugned judgment is bad in law, having been delivered without properly considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondents on mere assumptions, conjectures and surmises, rather than on a judicious evaluation of the evidence. It is urged that the Trial Court misinterpreted the facts and failed to apply settled legal principles governing appreciation of evidence, including the law relating to hostile witnesses, circumstantial evidence, and burden of the defence to substantiate its own assertions. He thus submits that the findings and conclusions recorded by learned Trial Court are perverse, contrary to evidence, and liable to be set aside. 31. On the other hand, Mr. Siddharth Pandey, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 and 2, as well as Mr. Akhtar 16 Hussain, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4, submit that the appeals deserve to be dismissed as the learned Trial Court has passed a well-reasoned judgment after a comprehensive and analytical appreciation of the entire evidence on record. It is urged that the prosecution case is riddled with material contradictions, omissions and inconsistencies, and the Trial Court has rightly held that the chain of circumstances is incomplete and does not unerringly point to the guilt of the accused. It is further submitted that the Trial Court was justified in not placing reliance on the testimony of witnesses who were either declared hostile or whose statements suffered from serious infirmities. The defence contends that the prosecution witnesses, including PW-10, PW-15, PW-16 and PW-20, have not been able to withstand cross-examination, and their evidence does not inspire confidence. The learned counsel argue that the delay in recording the statement of Ku. Amandeep Nageshiya (PW-16) was rightly treated as a factor affecting her credibility, particularly when no satisfactory explanation was offered. 32. They further submit that the prosecution has failed to establish any cogent motive for the alleged offence, nor has it been able to prove the alleged recovery, possession of articles or residence of the deceased with the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The alleged seizure of mobile phone or weapon, according to them, is surrounded by serious doubts. It is contended that the prosecution story is built on conjectures and assumptions and 17 lacks substantive, trustworthy evidence. It is also contended that the respondents are entitled to the benefit of doubt, and the settled legal principle is that an order of acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence, making interference by the appellate Court permissible only when the findings are perverse, contrary to record or wholly unsustainable, none of which is demonstrated in the present appeals. Thus, both counsel submit that the judgment of acquittal is based on a reasonable and plausible view, is supported by proper evaluation of evidence, and therefore warrants no interference. 33. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties at length and with due circumspection. We have also carefully perused the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge as well as the entire evidence and material available on record of the Trial Court. The rival submissions advanced before us have received our anxious consideration in the light of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. 34. This appeal challenges the acquittal by the learned Sessions Judge under Section 378(1) Cr.P.C. While exercising appellate jurisdiction, the Court must act with caution, recognizing that the Trial Court has the advantage of observing witness demeanour and assessing credibility firsthand. The accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt, but only if it is real and substantial, such as a 18 doubt a reasonable person would honestly entertain. Mere theoretical doubts or minor discrepancies not affecting the core prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. The appellate Court must ensure the Trial Court properly appreciated all evidence and extended the benefit of doubt in line with settled principles. 35. As held by the Supreme Court in C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair1, and Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha2, an appellate Court should not substitute its own view unless the Trial Court’s findings are perverse or relevant, convincing evidence has been unjustifiably ignored, providing compelling reason for interference. 36. The principles in Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab3, clarify that while an appellate Court can examine an acquittal, it must do so cautiously. The Trial Court has the advantage of observing witnesses and assessing credibility. Interference is warranted only if the Trial Court committed a manifest error, ignored material evidence, or reached a conclusion based on conjecture or misappreciation. Minor discrepancies cannot outweigh the core, consistent, and credible testimony unless they go to the root of the case. Interference is justified only in exceptional circumstances where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice and held in para 6 as under:- 1 AIR 2003 SC 182 2 AIR 2004 SC 1053 3 AIR 1987 SC 1083 19 “……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.” 37. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram4, the Supreme Court held that an appellate Court must exercise extreme caution before interfering with an acquittal. The Trial Court’s advantage in observing witness demeanour and trial conduct cannot be lightly disregarded. Interference is warranted only in exceptional cases where the Trial Court committed a manifest error, overlooked material evidence, relied on conjecture, or reached a palpably perverse conclusion. Minor contradictions or inconsistencies not affecting the core prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. Thus, while an appellate Court may review an acquittal, it must do so 4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984 20 circumspectly, extending the benefit of doubt only when a reasonable and substantial doubt exists and has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 38. Further, in the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala5, the Supreme Court held as under:- "25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters." 39. While exercising appellate jurisdiction against an acquittal, the Court may re-appreciate all evidence such as, oral and documentary, to determine whether the Trial Court correctly weighed the materials and assigned valid reasons. If the Trial 5 (2022) 8 SCC 440 21 Court’s conclusions are unsustainable, erroneous, or perverse, the appellate Court may arrive at its own conclusion. 40. Applying these principles, we have examined the prosecution evidence in its entirety, considering witness credibility, consistency of statements, and logical inferences from proved facts. 41. From perusal of the impugned judgment, it transpires that the first question for determination was whether Jagdish alias Golu met a homicidal death on the night of 14.03.2010. The Sessions Judge has meticulously analyzed the evidence of witnesses, including Durgesh Kumar Dubey (PW-7) as well as Prabhat Kumar Tiwari (PW-12), who stated that on the night of the incident, they saw a motorcycle lying near the Bamhanidih-Pucheli drain with a dead body nearby and immediately informed Ashok Kumar Pandey, Nagar Sainik (PW-06). Kotwar Manohar Sarthi (PW-3) corroborated that the next morning, he learned from villagers about a possible accident and reported the matter to the police. Investigating Officer Santosh Singh (PW-23) confirmed the receipt of such information. 42. The Sessions Judge has noted that Ku. Amandeep Nageshiya (PW-16) was declared hostile by the prosecution as she did not support the prosecution case. She denied that the deceased used to drive the vehicle of accused Tarshila Toppo, that he had taken obscene photographs of her, or that she administered beer 22 mixed with poison. The Court observed that although her testimony did not support the prosecution, the delay of over one and a half months in recording her statement on 30.04.2010 raised suspicion regarding its genuineness, and being the niece of the accused, she may have withheld facts to protect her aunt. Nevertheless, the Court found her testimony incapable of assisting the prosecution. 43. Regarding circumstantial evidence, the Sessions Judge referred to the principles laid down in Laxman Naik v. State (1994 Cr.L.R. 285, SC), noting that for conviction on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be complete, leading only to the conclusion of the accused’s guilt. The Sessions Court observed that the prosecution failed to establish conclusively that the deceased resided with accused Tarshila. Witnesses such as Gore Singh Rajput (PW-19), Durga Rajput (PW-20), and Dinesh Singh Thakur (PW-21) provided evidence suggesting he stayed with her, but this was contradicted or uncorroborated by other family members. Similarly, evidence of PW-10 Ravindra Netam @ Baban indicated the deceased resided in the same locality but did not confirm he stayed in the accused’s house. 44. The Sessions Judge examined the recovery of the mobile phone, SIM card, Bolero vehicle, and poultry-cutting weapon allegedly linked to the crime. He noted discrepancies in the forensic identification of the mobile handset (IMEI numbers did not 23 conclusively match), and the alleged recovery of the weapon and vehicle lacked independent corroboration under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. FSL analysis did not establish presence of blood on the weapon, and no forensic evidence connected the vehicle to the crime. As for accused Tarshila’s memorandum (Ex. P-24), while borax was found in the viscera of the deceased, the Court noted that no proper investigation was conducted regarding the source of the poison or other co-accused involvement. 45. Further, the Sessions Judge highlighted serious lapses in investigation, including negligent conduct by the police at the scene and in the seizure process, and the failure to examine relevant circumstances such as financial transactions or corroborative witnesses. Evidence regarding the deceased’s alleged defamation of the accused and last-seen circumstances was found to be inconclusive and contradictory. The deceased’s possible voluntary consumption of poison, prior stomach pain, and alternate motives were also considered. 46. The Sessions Judge, after evaluating the totality of the evidence, observed that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances relied upon were neither fully proved nor inconsistent with any hypothesis other than the accused’s guilt. Consequently, giving the benefit of doubt to the accused, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused conspired to 24 murder the deceased, committed murder as members of an unlawful assembly, or caused disappearance of evidence. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 148, 302, 201 and 202/149 IPC. 47. From a careful consideration of the record, the impugned judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Janjgir-Champa, and the submissions advanced by the parties, this Court finds no merit in the appeals filed by the State as well as by the father of the deceased challenging the acquittal of the respondents. 48. Upon a careful and comprehensive examination of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Sessions Judge has conducted a meticulous and thorough appraisal of the evidence placed before the trial Court. This includes careful scrutiny of oral testimony, documentary evidence, and material exhibits, and the application of well- established legal principles pertaining to circumstantial evidence in a reasoned and balanced manner. The Sessions Judge has rightly observed that the prosecution has failed to establish the chain of circumstances in a complete and unbroken manner that would lead inexorably to the guilt of the respondents. 49. In the present case, this Court finds that the prosecution’s case suffers from several serious deficiencies, which are elaborated as follows:- 25 • Credibility of witnesses: A critical examination of the testimony reveals substantial inconsistencies and contradictions. Key prosecution witnesses, including Ku. Amandeep Nageshiya (PW-16), turned hostile and did not support the prosecution. Other witnesses provided conflicting or uncorroborated accounts regarding fundamental aspects such as the residence of the deceased, his alleged relationship with accused Tarshila Toppo, and the circumstances surrounding the alleged events leading to his death. The delays in recording statements, discrepancies between the statements of family members and neighbours, and internal contradictions within the testimonies severely undermine the credibility and reliability of the evidence. • Recovery and forensic evidence: The alleged recovery of items such as the mobile handset, SIM card, Bolero vehicle, and the poultry-cutting weapon, purportedly connected with the offence, is fraught with infirmities. For instance, the mobile handset recovered from accused Shantanu Lahre did not correspond to the IMEI number of the deceased’s original mobile. Similarly, the poultry-cutting weapon, allegedly recovered from a pond, was found to have no blood stains. Moreover, there is no evidence linking the Bolero vehicle to the transportation or disposal of the deceased’s body. Consequently, even if the memoranda of the accused are 26 assumed to be true, they fall short of constituting conclusive proof of the alleged offence. • Investigation lapses: The investigation, as conducted by the police, is marred by multiple procedural lapses. These include negligent handling by police personnel, incomplete and improper seizure procedures, and failure to pursue critical leads, including the source of borax and certain financial transactions allegedly promised to co-accused Hiralal. Such lapses seriously weaken the prosecution’s case and diminish the evidentiary value of the recovered materials. • Circumstantial evidence and alternative explanations: The chain of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution is neither complete nor exclusive to the guilt of the respondents. The evidence leaves scope for reasonable alternative hypotheses, including voluntary ingestion of borax by the deceased, pre-existing health conditions, or motives arising from past conduct of the deceased. The prosecution has failed to exclude every hypothesis other than the guilt of the respondents, a requirement that is mandatory under settled legal principles governing circumstantial evidence. • Absence of direct evidence against accused Tarshila Toppo and co-accused: The prosecution has not produced direct, cogent, or corroborated evidence to establish that 27 accused Tarshila Toppo, or any of the other respondents, administered poison, engaged in a criminal conspiracy, or participated in the disappearance of evidence. There is no material evidence linking them conclusively to the alleged homicidal death. • Long delay since the incident: It is significant to note that the alleged incident occurred in the year 2010, and nearly fifteen years have elapsed before the present adjudication in 2025. Such a prolonged period has inevitably affected the recollection of witnesses, the availability and condition of material evidence, and the overall integrity of the prosecutorial case. This passage of time substantially militates against the reliability and credibility of the prosecution’s evidence, and, in keeping with the fundamental principle that the benefit of doubt must favor the accused, it weighs heavily in favor of acquittal. 50. Having considered all these factors, and after taking into account the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is satisfied that the learned Sessions Judge has correctly appreciated the evidence in its entirety and has reached a reasonable and just conclusion. The prosecution has manifestly failed to prove the guilt of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. The acquittal, therefore, is legally sound and does not warrant interference. 28 51. In view of the foregoing, both the appeals filed by the State and the father of the deceased, being ACQA No.13/2021 and ACQA No.49/2014 respectively, challenging the acquittal of respondents No.1 to 4, are hereby dismissed. The judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Janjgir-Champa, is upheld in its entirety. 52. The Registry is directed to transmit a certified copy of this judgment along with the trial Court record to the Court concerned forthwith for its information and necessary compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu