1 2025:CGHC:54984 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 7428 of 2023 1 - Smt. Padmawati Bhoy W/o Shri Ganesh Kumar Bhoy Aged About 34 Years Resident Of Village - Balajhar, Block And Police Station - Patthalgaon, District Jashpur (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Panchayat And Rural Development Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Collector And District Programme Coordinator Jashpur, District Jashpur (C.G.) 3 - The Chief Executive Officer Zila Panchayat, Jashpur, District Jashpur (C.G.) 4 - The Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat, Patthalgaon, District - Jashpur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ajeet Kumar Yadav, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Government Advocate (Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge) Order on Board 11.11.2025 1. The core issue in the present writ petition revolves around the ABHIGYA SAXENA Digitally signed by ABHIGYA SAXENA 2 termination of the petitioner, who was working as a Rojgar Sahayak under the Scheme of MGNREGA. The petitioner was issued a show cause notice on 30.01.2023 regarding alleged irregularities, despite submitting a detailed reply within the stipulated time, the petitioner was terminated by order dated 04.09.2023 on the ground that his explanation was unsatisfactory. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the prese writ petition, seeking the following reliefs: “10.1. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, thereby set-aside the impugned order dated 04.09.2023 and further be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to reinstate the petitioner on the post of Employment Assistant with all consequential benefits with back wages. 10.2. That, any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the costs of the petition may be given.” 2. Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Employment Assistant at Gram Panchayat, Balajhar, and has since been discharging her duties with utmost sincerity and integrity, to the satisfaction of her superior authorities, without any blemish or complaint. Clause 3 of her appointment order specifically provides that she shall be governed by the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965. However, pursuant to a false, baseless, and vague complaint made against her, respondent No. 4 issued 3 a show cause notice dated 30.01.2023 directing her to submit a reply. The petitioner duly submitted her reply denying all allegations and enclosed affidavits and statements from villagers affirming that no complaint had been made by them against her. Despite this, respondent No. 4 conducted an enquiry and submitted a report dated 28.04.2023 to respondent No. 3 recommending action against the petitioner. Acting upon the said report, respondent No. 3, by order dated 31.08.2023, directed respondent No. 4 to remove the petitioner from service after obtaining approval from respondent No. 2. Consequently, vide impugned order dated 04.09.2023, respondent No. 4 terminated the petitioner from service without conducting any departmental enquiry or affording her an opportunity of hearing, thereby acting in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Hence, the present petition. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the impugned termination order is arbitrary, unjust, and has been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was appointed through a valid selection process after fulfilling all eligibility criteria, and had been discharging his duties with utmost integrity and diligence under the MGNREGA scheme. He submits that once an adjudication has attained finality and the appointment was duly made in accordance with law, the same ought to be respected and cannot be interfered with in a casual or arbitrary manner. The termination of the petitioner without proper 4 investigation, and without giving due consideration to the reply submitted by petitioner, amounts to a clear violation of due process and settled legal principles. It is further submitted that the manner in which the respondent authorities have proceeded reflects a deliberate and unjust attempt to shift the burden of systemic failure upon the petitioner. The show cause notice issued to the petitioner was vague and lacked substantive grounds. Though the petitioner responded in a detailed and time-bound manner, explaining the site conditions and challenges encountered during the Project, the respondent authority chose to ignore petitioner’s explanation. The learned counsel for petitioner emphasizes that no allegation of personal financial gain or corruption has been made against the petitioner. The funds under the MGNREGA scheme were directly transferred to the registered accounts of the labourers, and the petitioner had no role in disbursement of payments. Therefore, penalizing the petitioner without finding any personal involvement or misappropriation is manifestly unjust and the utter violation of Principle of Natural Justice and Rule 7 of Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 and the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965. The principle that “if the manner of doing an act is prescribed under a statute, it must be done in that manner or not at all” has been blatantly disregarded by the respondent authorities. Reference is made to Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426 and Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 5 PC 253, which reinforce this rule. 4. Learned counsel further submits that while the petitioner was terminated summarily, no action was taken against the superior authorities under whose direct supervision the work was executed and whose sanction was necessary for disbursing payments. Instead, such authorities were let off with a mere warning, revealing the discriminatory and selective targeting of the petitioner. The entire exercise was carried out without proper investigation, there was no site verification by the Sub-Divisional Officer, no recording of statements of the labourers who performed the work, and no technical assessment to verify the claims regarding work. It is further argued that the conduct of the respondent authorities reflects clear misfeasance in public office and a deliberate attempt to scapegoat a field-level functionary. The petitioner was denied fair treatment and subjected to arbitrary decision-making, in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Doctrine of Approbation and Reprobation is also squarely attracted in this case, as the respondents, having accepted the work and sanctioned the labour payments, now seek to turn around and punish the petitioner for the same work. A party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold” at the same time. Moreover, the termination of petitioner, based solely on a departmental note and without any proper verification or inquiry, amounts to colourable exercise of power. The authorities have failed to adhere to statutory requirements and 6 have acted in a manner contrary to constitutional norms, thereby undermining public trust in the administrative system. The petitioner was not afforded a meaningful opportunity of hearing, and no speaking order was passed reflecting application of mind. In view of the above submissions, the learned counsel prays that this Court may be pleased to set aside the impugned termination order as being illegal, arbitrary, and passed without jurisdiction, and further direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service. 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel and learned counsel for respondents oppose the submission made by learned counsel for petitioner and jointly submit that the petitioner was appointed as a Employment Assistant under Janpad/Zila Panchayat Office. Further, the petitioner was negligent in discharging her duties as such the petitioner was issued a show-cause notice, after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, upon which petitioner has already filed an reply which was not been found satisfactory then only the services of the petitioner was terminated by passing the termination order. A joint inquiry confirmed that the recorded work was grossly inflated compared to the actual work done. Based on the inquiry findings and her unsatisfactory explanation, her services were terminated by order dated 04.09.2023 under provision of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965, and the terms of her contractual appointment. It is submitted that due process was followed, and 7 the action taken is legal, justified, and in accordance with the applicable rules and scheme guidelines. Therefore, the order impugned in passed in accordance with law and this petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and also perused documents annexed along with the record. 7. Considering the entire aspect of the matter and further considering the order passed by this Court in WPS No. 8212 of 2023 as also in WPS No. 8458 of 2024, in which a detail discussion was made while considering the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Swati Priaydarshani v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2139 decided on 22.08.2024 in which the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is to the effect that even in case of contractual appointment, if any stigmatic order is to be passed, it may be passed only after holding proper enquiry and after giving due opportunity of hearing to the concerned delinquent/employee. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in WPS No. 4969/2015 (Digambar Chandrakar v. State of Chhattisgarh and others) decided on 22.08.2024 held that in order to pass a stigmatic or cumulative order, the concerned authorities are required to hold a departmental enquiry after giving due opportunity of hearing to delinquent/ employee. 8. The view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Swati Priyadarshini (supra) goes to show that before passing 8 any stigmatic order for removal of any employee from service, a departmental enquiry is required to be done, which has not been done in this case. In para 34 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5: "28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420: 1953 SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1954) 1 SCC 572: (1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of the two above mentioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on 9 the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, [58 Bom LR 673: AIR 1956 Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has. by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency other disqualification, then it is or a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very 10 reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty The use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the 11 kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant." 9. Same view has been taken further considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in matter of State of Haryana and other v. Piara Singh reported in (1992) 4 SCC 118, this Court is of the opinion that the termination of the petitioner from the post of Employement Assistant under the MGNREGA scheme was carried out without following due process of law. Although a show cause notice was issued and a reply was submitted by the petitioner within the stipulated time, there is nothing on record to show that the explanation offered was objectively considered through a fair and transparent inquiry. No detailed speaking order has been passed, and there appears to be no independent verification of the response of petitioner, nor any material to indicate that a proper opportunity of hearing was afforded. 10. This Court further observes that the allegations on the petitioner pertains to procedural or technical lapses during project 12 implementation, which, if established, ought to be determined through a fair inquiry. The principle of natural justice mandates that before taking any adverse action, especially termination, the affected party must be given a real and meaningful opportunity to be heard. 11. The petitioner is an employee of the Gram Panchayat. Therefore, in accordance with Rule 7 of the Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules, 1999"), the prescribed procedure :- comprising issuance of notice, submission of reply, framing of charges, and conduct of a full- fledged enquiry after affording a proper opportunity of hearing—is required to be followed. However, in the present case, the said procedure has not been adhered to. 12. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 04.09.2023 (Annexure P/1) is quashed. The petitioner be reinstated to the post of Rojgar Sahayak. However, liberty is granted to the respondent authorities to initiate proceedings afresh against the petitioner, if so advised, strictly in accordance with law, and only after giving the petitioner a proper opportunity of hearing and conducting a fair inquiry. No opinion is expressed on the merits of the allegations. 13. The writ petition stands allowed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) JUDGE Saxena