1 ACQA No.486 of 2010 2025:CGHC:53522-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 486 of 2010 State Of Chhattisgarh Aged About 24 Years Through The S.H.O., P.S. Ambikapur, District - Surguja (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1. Atul Singh, S/o Late Satya Narayan Singh, Aged about 42 years, Occupation Contractor, R/o Babupara, Jail Road, Ambikapur (Surguja) (C.G.) 2. Santosh Kumar Soni, S/o Late Ganesh Soni, Aged about 34 years, Occupation Private Service, R/o Ring Road, Namnakala, Ambikapur (Surguja) C.G. 3. Jai Mangal Singh, S/o Ramkripal Singh, Aged about 42 years, Occupation - Private Service, Permanent R/o Village Chotka Rajpur, Thana Semari, Distt. -Bakar (Bihar) Presently R/o- Bauripara, Shikari Road, Ambikapur (Surguja) C.G. 4. Anil Singh @ Annu Singh, S/o Late S.P. Singh, Aged about 32 years, Occupation Contractor, R/o Babupara, Ambikapur (Surguja) C.G 5. Basant Lal Tirkey, S/o Swayamwar Tirkey Aged about 27 years, Occupation-Agriculturist, R/o Manik Prakashpur, Ambikapur Surguja, C.G. 6. Saroj Jaiswal, S/o Fulchand Jaiswal, Aged about 40 years, Occupation Electrical Goods Shop, R/o Ramadattpur, (Sanjay Nagar) Thana Kent, Varanasi, (U.P.) 7. Ekbal Ahmad (Died). Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For State/appellant : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Dy.G.A. For Respondent Nos.1 to 5 : Mr. Siddharth Dubey, Advocates. For Respondent No.6 : Mr. Aditya Dhar Diwan, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2025.11.07 10:41:24 +0530 2 ACQA No.486 of 2010 3.11.2025 1. In the present case, there are 13 accused persons and out of them, 02 accused persons namely; Shubhkaran Dwivedi & Harish Patel have died during the trial. 04 accused persons are absconding namely; Sanjay @ Santosh, Chintamani, Yogesh Shukla & Manoj @ Pintu. On completion of trial, 07 accused persons namely Atul Singh, Sanotsh Kumar Soni, Jai Mangal Singh, Anil Singh, Basant Lal Tirkey, Saroj Jaiswal & Ekbal Ahmad have been acquitted. Against the same, the State has preferred this appeal. During pendency of this appeal, respondent No.7/accused namely Eqbal Ahmad is died and as such by a separate order passed today, the appeal in his respect is abated. 2. The State has preferred the instant appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 23-10-2007 passed in Sessions Trial No. 305/2004 by the learned Sessions Judge, Surguja (Ambikapur), CG, whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondents from the offences punishable under Sections 120 (B), 302 of IPC. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 14 September 2003 at 10:15 p.m., Vinay alias Raja Singh (PW-1) lodged a report at Ambikapur Police Station, stating that at about 9:45 p.m., near the Saheli Shop located on Deviganj Road, two unidentified persons shot his father Lal Babu Singh (since deceased) and fled on a motorcycle, resulting in his father’s death. Thereafter an FIR vide Ex.P-1 was registered and during investigation, it was found that there was business rivalry between Atul Singh and the deceased Lal Babu Singh. 3 ACQA No.486 of 2010 On 3rd September 2003 and 9th September 2003, Atul Singh had threatened to kill Lal Babu Singh. Furthermore, on 10th September 2003, at Shere Punjab Dhaba, Chakrabhatta, Atul Singh expressed before his associates his intention to kill Lal Babu Singh soon. To execute this plan, he contacted a shooter named Shubhkarn (died) through other accused persons via telephone and hired him. In pursuance of this criminal conspiracy, on the night of 14th September 2003, around 9:15 p.m., at the complex on Deviganj Road, Lal Babu Singh was shot dead by the assailant when he was coming down the stairs from his office to the ground floor. Based on the disclosure statement of Shubhkaran Dwivedi under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, a pistol was seized. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-10. The dead-body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination and in the postmortem examination report (Ex.P/23), Dr. N.K. Pandey (PW- 16) opined that cause of death is massive hemorrhages, fracture of bone of skull & laceration of brain due to gun shot injuries. After completing investigation, charge-sheet was filed against respondents. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined 37 witnesses. Statements of the respondents under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C were recorded wherein they have pleaded false implication. 5. After appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned trial Court vide its judgment dated 23.10.2007 acquitted the respondents/accused herein from the charges framed against them. Hence, this appeal. 4 ACQA No.486 of 2010 6. Learned counsel for the State submits that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence and material available on record. Learned trial Court has misapprehended and miss-appreciated the findings available on record and has arrived an erroneous finding. He submits that the vehicle used in committing the crime has also been recovered from the accused. The weapon of offence has been recovered from the accused Atul as per the memorandum of co- accused Shubhkaran. Learned counsel submits that the fire arm pistol seized were sent for Forensic Laboratory, Chandigarh, who opined that the part of cartridge part of bullet were fired by the seized pistol. Hence, looking to the act committed by the respondents, the impugned judgment is bad in law and liable to be set-aside. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the judgment of acquittal is well merited and does not require any interference. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the judgment passed by the trial Court along with the trial Court record annexed with the present appeal with utmost circumspection. 9. This is appeal against the judgment of acquittal filed by the State under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. in exercising the appellate jurisdiction under Section 378(1) or under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. The appellate Courts are required to keep in mind that the trial Court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness-box and also 5 ACQA No.486 of 2010 required to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonably person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused. 10. The Supreme Court in the matter of C.Antony v. Raghavan Nair (AIR 2003 SC 182), unless the High Court arrives at definite conclusion that the findings recorded by trial Court are perverse, it would not substitute its own view on a totally different perspective and also as held by the Supreme Court in Ramanand Yadav V. Prabhunath Jha (AIR 2004 SC 1053), the appellate Court in considering the appeal against judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 11. The scope of interference in appeals against acquittal is well settled. In Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC 1083), the Supreme Court has held in para 6 as under:- “. . . . the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an 6 ACQA No.486 of 2010 appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous." 12. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram (2022 SCC OnLine SC 984) has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the 7 ACQA No.486 of 2010 way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.” 13. In the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala (2022 8 SCC 440), the Supreme Court held as under: "25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters." 14. While exercising the appellate jurisdiction against judgment of acquittal, the High Courts or the appellate Courts are fully empowered to appreciate and reappreciate the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. The appellate Court is required to discuss the grounds given by the trial Court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. 8 ACQA No.486 of 2010 15. In the present case, the learned trial Court while acquitting the accused/respondents has observed as follows:- “ 69. Hemant Khare (P.W.-36) stated that, along with a letter written by the Superintendent of Police dated 22 June 2005, he received a letter written on Lal Babu Singh’s letterhead, which is marked as Exhibit P-45. After perusing of this letter, it is revealed that Atul Singh and Amarjeet Bhagat had made certain complaints (Exhibits P-55 and P- 56) against Lal Babu Singh regarding contract-related matters. In response, Lal Babu Singh had addressed the aforesaid letter (Exhibit P-45) to the Chief Minister, in which he made counter-allegations against Atul Singh. In light of the analysis made in the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that the prosecution has failed to prove the allegation that Atul Singh had threatened to eliminate or kill Lal Babu Singh. Therefore, mere business rivalry or animosity between them is not sufficient to implicate the accused Atul Singh in such a serious offence as murder. xxx xxx xxx 71. Thus, based on the analysis made above, it is concluded that the prosecution has failed to produce reliable evidence. In other words, the prosecution has not been able to prove the charges, and therefore, all seven accused persons are acquitted of the charge under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 16. D.K. Mishra (P.W.-37) stated in cross-examination, in para 24, that he did not obtain any documentary evidence from the concerned company to verify the mobile number of the Nokia phone (Article-2) seized from the office of Atul Singh. In cross-examination, paragraph 9 ACQA No.486 of 2010 26, D.K. Mishra further stated that he did not check the call details to confirm whether the number in question actually belonged to Atul Singh. In chief examination, paragraph 14, D.K. Mishra stated that CSP Lal Umed Singh had informed him that the mobile number of Atul Singh number was 98261-74028, but no documentary evidence was available to substantiate this fact. Therefore, the call details described in Articles A-6 and A-7 cannot be linked to Atul Singh’s Nokia mobile phone. 17. D.K. Mishra (PW-37) stated in paragraph 10 of his examination- in-chief and paragraph 23 of his cross-examination that on 07/10/2003, CSP Lal Umed Singh and his team brought Saroj Jaiswal/accused from Banaras to Ambikapur along with a motorcycle bearing registration No. UP65/U-8009 and the same was seized vide Exhibit P-4. However, none of the witnesses presented by the prosecution stated that they had seen this motorcycle near the place of incident either immediately before or right after the occurrence. No witness stated that they had seen Saroj Jaiswal or Shubhkaran approaching or leaving the scene of the incident on that motorcycle. Therefore, the seizure does not provide any support to the prosecution’s case. 18. Munna (PW-23) stated in paragraphs 8 and 9 of his cross- examination that upon hearing a noise, he came from the office room to Lalbabu Singh within 2-3 minutes and remained there with him for 2- 3 minutes. After that, he ran towards the road, where he saw two boys on a motorcycle heading toward Sangam Chowk from a distance of about 100–150 yards. At that time, the street light on the pole was not 10 ACQA No.486 of 2010 functioning. Hence, it appears that he reached the main road about 4 to 6 minutes after hearing the noise and then saw two boys riding away on a motorcycle from behind. He has not seen the face of the boys who was riding motorcycle. Therefore, the testimony of Munna does not appear to be credible. 19. Theodor Lakda (P.W.-18), in his cross-examination at paragraph 29, stated that the smell of gunpowder can remain for a day after firing a pistol, but if the barrel is closed, the odor can persist for 10–15 days. In his examination report dated 20/02/2004 (Exhibit P-25), he noted that on smelling the pistol, a gunpowder-like odor was detected. However, he did not state that the pistol had been fired approximately a week earlier. Therefore, the pistol cannot be linked to the incident that occurred on 14/09/2003. Since the prosecution has not established that the pistol was sealed and properly secured under safe custody after its seizure on 04/01/2004, it cannot be ruled out that the pistol might have been fired before being sent to PW-18 for testing, potentially to fabricate evidence. Consequently, the evidence of PW-18 undermines the credibility of the prosecution’s case. 20. It is undisputed fact that the accused, Atul Singh, holds account No. 5/1265 (new number 01090005517) in the State Bank of India, Pendraroad branch, and that the statement of transactions in this account is marked as Exhibit P-27. It is also undisputed that on 19/09/2003 and 20/09/2003, amounts of ₹3,00,000 and ₹3,25,000 respectively were withdrawn from this account through bearer cheques, 11 ACQA No.486 of 2010 which were encashed by a person named Manish. A study of Exhibit P- 27 reveals that between January 2003 and September 2003, withdrawals of ₹3,00,000 or more were made 19 times. Since Atul Singh is engaged in contract work, such withdrawals are not considered unusual. The prosecution did not examine Manish as a witness in this case, who received the two withdrawals in September 200. Therefore, it has not been proven that the money withdrawn was used to arrange the murder of Lalbabu Singh. 21. It is undisputed that Anil alias Annu Singh stayed at Surabhi Hotel, located on Amarkantak Road, Pendra, on various dates during the months of May to September of 2003. He stated that he stayed there in connection with his contract work. Murli Yadav (PW-15), Manager of Surabhi Hotel, stated in paragraph 9 of his cross- examination that Anil Singh had large-scale contract work going on in Pendra, and therefore, he had been regularly staying at the said hotel since 2001–2002. Thus, the statement of accused Anil Singh is corroborated by the testimony of prosecution witness Murli Yadav. Therefore, merely on the basis of Anil Singh’s stay at Surabhi Hotel, no adverse inference can be drawn against him. 22. Upon careful consideration of the entire evidence on record, it becomes evident that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. The alleged recovery of the mobile phone and the call details could not be credibly linked to accused persons involved in the case, as no 12 ACQA No.486 of 2010 documentary verification or call record substantiation was produced. The seizure of the motorcycle from accused Saroj Jaiswal also does not support the prosecution’s case, as no witness has identified the said vehicle at or near the scene of the crime. Similarly, the testimony of Munna (PW-23) regarding seeing two persons on a motorcycle suffers from serious inconsistencies and does not inspire confidence. The alleged monetary withdrawals from Atul Singh’s bank account were consistent with his regular business transactions as a contractor, and no evidence has been presented to show that these funds were used for any unlawful purpose. Further, the stay of accused Anil alias Annu Singh at Surabhi Hotel is satisfactorily explained and corroborated by the hotel manager’s testimony, which rules out any adverse inference. In view of the above analysis, the prosecution evidence appears insufficient, unreliable, and based on conjectures rather than concrete proof. Further, the evidence of Theodor Lakda (P.W.-18) seriously weakens the prosecution’s case. He himself admitted that the gunpowder odor detected on the pistol during testing (Exhibit P-25) could not be reliably linked to the incident on 14/09/2003. The prosecution failed to prove that the pistol was properly sealed and securely stored after its seizure on 04/01/2004, leaving open the possibility that the pistol could have been fired before testing to fabricate evidence. This raises a significant doubt regarding the authenticity and reliability of the prosecution’s firearm-related evidence. Accordingly, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused persons. 13 ACQA No.486 of 2010 23. From the material available on record, it is crystal clear that the prosecution has failed to establish the fact that the present respondents/accused persons are actively involved in the crime in question and they hatched conspiracy with the main accused namely Shubhkaran, who is a Shooter of the crime in question and he died during the pendency of the trial. Thus, from the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, it is clyster clear that no offence under Section 120-B IPC is made out against the respondents/accused. 24. In absence of credible and direct evidence linking the respondents to the alleged assault, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In such circumstances, where material contradictions and lack of conclusive evidence, the benefit of doubt must necessarily go to the respondents. 25. Given the fact that more than 22 years have elapsed since the date of the incident, and taking into consideration the protracted nature of the proceedings, as well as the findings recorded by the trial Court which do not appear to suffer from perversity or manifest illegality, this Court finds no merit in interfering with the acquittal. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of substance, deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. 26. The Registry is directed to transmit the certified copy of this judgment along with the record to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and compliance. 14 ACQA No.486 of 2010 27. Certified copies of the judgment be supplied to the parties only after make necessary corrections in the cause title of the memo of appeal as also in the CIS software. SD/- SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Amardeep