1 2025:CGHC:57879 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 286 of 2015 1 - Ajit Tex Prop P. Umendra Chandra Jain, R/o Balaji Ward, Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Pistadevi Jhavak W/o Shri Umendra Chandra Jhavak, R/o Maharani Ward, Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh.............Defendants, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus 1 - Sankhla Brothers Prop. Munnalal Jain, S/o Shri Sagarmal Jain, Aged 55 Years, R/o Main Road, Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh.....Dead (Through Lrs ) - , Chhattisgarh 1A. - Smt. Shayar Devi Wd/o Shri Munnalal Sankhla, Aged About 60 Years, R/o Balaji Ward, Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh 1B. - Dinesh Kumar Sankhla Jain S/o Shri Munnalal Sankhla, Aged About 42 Years, R/o Balaji Ward, Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh 1C. - Dilip Sankhla Jain S/o Shri Munnalal Sankhla, Aged About 40 Years, R/o Balaji Ward, Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh........Plaintiffs ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Anurag Dayal Shrivastava, Advocate. For Respondent 1C : Mr. V.S. Mishra, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Prakash Mishra, Advocate. Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.02.23 14:49:43 +0530 2 For Respondents 1A and 1B : None. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board 27-11-2025 1. The present first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC has been filed by the defendants against the impugned judgment and decree dated 14-08-2015 passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Bastar, Place Jagdalpur, in Civil Suit No. 3-B/2014, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.2,60,000/- has been partly decreed in his favour and a decree for recovery of Rs. 2,00,000/- has been passed in favour of the plaintiff. 2. For the sake of convenience, the status of the parties shown in the suit is being taken to refer to the respective parties in the present appeal. 3. The original plaintiff Sankhla Brothers, Prop. Munna Lal Jain had filed a civil suit against the defendants for recovery of Rs. 2,60,000/- as the outstanding amount in the cloth business between the plaintiff and the defendants. During the pendency of the Civil Suit, Munna Lal Jain died, and the other plaintiffs have been substituted in his place. It is pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff is a proprietary firm run by its proprietor, Munna Lal Jain. The plaintiff firm is engaged in the wholesale and retail cloth business, and the defendants are also engaged in the cloth business at Jagdalpur. There was a frequent business relationship between them. In the year 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 the defendants had purchased the clothes total amounting to Rs. 2,63,072/- on various dates in between 01-04-1999 to 27-01-2001, out of which the defendants had paid Rs. 63,072/- in various dates in between 10- 11-1999 to 31-01-2001 and Rs. 2,00,000/- was outstanding upto 31-01-2001 and the defendants had executed a pro-note in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has served a legal notice to the defendants on 14-07-2001 with respect to the remaining outstanding amount and interest payable thereon, which was replied to by the defendant No.1, and he denied the pro-note and sent his reply on 21-07-2001 stating that only 75,179/- is the remaining amount. The plaintiff again sent a legal notice on 08-08-2001, which was served upon defendant No.1 on 09-08-2001, yet 3 the outstanding amount has not been paid to the plaintiff, and then the plaintiff filed a civil suit for recovery of his outstanding amount on 19-01-2004 with respect to the principal amount and interest accrued thereon. The said civil suit was registered as Civil Suit No. 4-B/2004; however, for want of an affidavit required under Order 6 Rule 15(4) of the CPC, the said plaint was rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC vide order dated 22-11-2005. It is also pleaded in the plaint by way of amendment that the defendant No.1 is engaged in the cloth business in the premises owned by himself and his wife, Smt. Pista Devi. He alienated the said property on 10-07-2009 to Smt. Arti Dulhani and Smt. Asha Dulhani to defeat the fruits of the decree and intended to go to Rajasthan, and therefore, the property of the defendant No.1 is liable to be attached. He claimed Rs. 2,60,000/- from the defendants along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. 4. The defendants contested the claim of the plaintiff, filed their written statement, denied the plaintiff’s averments and pleaded that the plaintiff has not pleaded as to under which law their firm is registered. The defendant firm had last made business transaction on 07-02-2000 and purchased the clothes for Rs.13,776/-, and thereafter no transaction was made between them. There was a cash credit mod, and the defendants had purchased the clothes on credit only. Defendant No.1 admitted the cash credit transaction with the plaintiff firm between 1999 and 2000. He denied the Bill No. 215 dated 23-01-2001 for Rs. 38,833/-, Bill No. 216 dated 23-01-2001 for Rs. 7,650/-, Bill No. 219 dated 25-01-2001 for Rs. 22,400/-, Bill No. 220 dated 25-01-2001 for Rs. 36,072/-, and Bill No. 221 dated 27- 01-2001 for Rs. 21,384/- and stated that the same are forged and fabricated. The said ledger account is not the business transaction account of the plaintiff and is not admissible. After 07-02-2000, there was no transaction between them. The last credit bill was paid by the defendant No. 1 on 14-05-2000. The alleged transactions of 21-02-2000 for Rs. 15,000/- and Rs. 8,550/- have been posted in the ledger twice. The entry of Rs. 1520/- dated 31-01-2001 is bogus. The plaintiff, to bring the suit within the limitation, has got the signature of the employee of the defendant No. 4 1 in the ledger. The amount of Rs. 1,520/- was struck off to make the amount due in a round figure of Rs. 02 Lakhs. The transaction shown in between 23-01-2001 and 27-01-2001 is suspicious and bogus. He also denied the final account settlement on 31-01-2001 and the outstanding amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- against him. He also denied the execution of any pro-note in favour of the plaintiff. It is further stated in the written statement that on 22-10-2000, the defendant No. 1 had met with an incident of assault by dacoits, and he received grievous injuries on his head and was admitted to the MMI hospital, Raipur. During this period, his financial condition was poor, and the marriage of his two daughters was also postponed. Taking advantage of the situation, the plaintiff demanded Rs. 75,179/- from the defendant No. 1 as the outstanding amount of their business transaction. In such a condition, he was being called by the plaintiff on 25-01-2001 and, under coercion, got the pro-note signed. The defendant No.1 signed the blank pro-note on 25-01-2001 on the coercion and assurance given by the plaintiff that the total outstanding amount was Rs. 75,179/-, and without his intimation or knowledge, the plaintiff made an endorsement of the outstanding amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-. He admitted that on 16-07-2001, a registered envelope was received by him, which was sent by the plaintiff; however, he denied that the said envelope contained a legal notice, but it contained a torn piece of newspaper, and then the defendant No.1 informed the plaintiff that he should not misuse the alleged pro-note. In fact, no notice was received by the defendant No.1, and only a torn piece of paper was received. He also denied his liability of Rs. 2,60,000/-, including interest and further pleaded that once the limitation started running, it cannot be stopped, and after the limitation period, the present suit has been filed. It is further pleaded that to take undue advantage, the Civil Suit No. 4B-/2004 was filed by the plaintiff, and the plaint was rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC; however, no liberty was granted in favour of the plaintiff. It is further pleaded that the plaintiff disclosed cause of action arose on 31-01-2001, 14-07-2001 and 29-08-2001, whereas, the present suit has been filed on 21-11-2005 and even on 21-11-2005 it was not duly constituted suit, 5 but it was only an application and the plaintiff has paid requisite court fee on 28-03- 2008 only and thereafter, the suit was registered and it has not been instituted within time and it is barred by limitation. The Civil Revision No. 130/2006 has been dismissed by the Chhattisgarh High Court on 15-11-2007. The last transaction on 07-02-2000 and the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation, and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 5. Based on the pleadings of the parties the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- “01- D;k izfroknh QeZ }kjk oknh QeZ ds diM+k O;olk; ds ysu nsu ds varxZr oknh QeZ dks 2]60]000@& #i;s ns; gS \ 02- D;k oknh QeZ }kjk izLrqr okn le;kof/k ls ckf/kr gS \ 03- D;k oknh QeZ }kjk vi;kZIr U;k; 'kqYd izLrqr fd;k gS \ 04- D;k fnukad &31-01-2001 dks izfroknh QeZ }kjk oknh QeZ ds i{k esa fu"ikfnr izksuksV izfroknh }kjk LosPNk ls fu"ikfnr fd;k x;k gS \ 05- D;k oknh QeZ] izfroknh QeZ ls 2]60]000@& #i;s dh jkf’k C;kt lfgr izkIr djus ds vf/kdkj gS \ 06- lgk;rk ,oa O;; \” 6. In support of his claim, the plaintiff has examined Dilip Jain as PW-1 and relied upon the documents Ex.-P/1 certified copy of the order dated 22-10-2005 of the previous suit, and the order dated 22-10-2005 Ex. P-2, copy of registration certificate of Sankhla Traders Ex. P-3(C), copy of registration certificate of plaintiff firm Ex. P-4(C), invoices Ex.-P/5 to P/20, receipts of the amount deposited by the defendant Ex. P-21(C) to P-24(C), Ex.-P/25(C) and P-26(C) are the copies of the ledger of the plaintiff firm, Ex.-P/27(C) is the legal notice, Ex.-P/28(C) and P-29(C) are the acknowledgments, a copy of the legal notice Ex. P-30(C), notice to plaintiff Ex. P-31(C), pro-note Ex. P-32(C. 7. The defendants have examined P. Ummed Chandra Jain DW-1 and have not relied upon any document. 8. After considering the evidence led by the parties, the learned trial Court has come to the conclusion that there is an outstanding amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- 6 against the defendants. The defendant had executed the pro-note on 31-01-2001 without any coercion, and the suit of the plaintiff is within limitation and passed the decree of recovery of Rs. 2,00,000/- in favour of the plaintiff against defendant No.1, which is under challenge in the present first appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned trial Court has erred in holding that the suit is within limitation. The learned trial Court has observed that the promissory note was executed on 31-01-2001, and demand for payment was made on 14-07-2001 and on 08-08-2001, and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for protection of Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act. The defendant has denied the execution of the promissory note, and the due execution and contents of the promissory note have not been proved in accordance with the law. The civil suit filed by the plaintiff was rejected on 22-10-2005 and thereafter, the fresh suit was filed on 21-11-2005. The learned trial Court has further erred in considering that the cause of action arose on 31-01-2001, 14-07-2001 and 09-08-2001, and the subsequent suit was filed on 21-11-2005 after rejection of the plaint of the previous suit, and therefore, it is within the limitation, which is erroneous. He would also submit that Article 35 of the Limitation Act provided a limitation to file the suit within three years from the date of the bill or pro-note. In the present case, the pro-note was allegedly executed on 31-01-2001, and the first suit was filed on 19-01-2004. After rejection of the plaint on 22-10-2005, the subsequent suit was required to be filed up to 02-11-2005; however, the subsequent suit was filed on 21-11-2005. He would also submit that Section 9 of the Limitation Act further provides that once the time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit stops it. The limitation to file the suit started running from 31-01-2001, and it stopped on 30- 01-2004 when the first suit was filed. It again started running from 22-10-2005 when the plaint was rejected, and therefore, the suit of the plaintiff was apparently barred by limitation. He would further submit that the plaintiff has failed the suit under Order 30 Rule 10 of the CPC and filed it in the name of a firm. The mandatory compliance provided under Order 30 of the CPC has not been complied with by the plaintiff by 7 making sufficient pleading or documents in the case, and therefore, the suit was not filed by the competent person, and it is not maintainable. The suit has been filed in the name of Sankhla Brothers through its proprietor Munna Lal Jain, but the plaintiff No. 3, Dilip Sankhla, PW-1, has admitted in his cross-examination that he had not produced any document to substantiate his proprietorship of the said firm except the documents of Ex. P-3 and P-4. It is further submitted that the defendant has executed the promissory note under coercion, and that he signed the blank form of promissory note. The plaintiff admitted that Bill No. 219 and 220 were issued on the same day, i.e. on 25-01-2001. The acknowledgment receipt No. 66 and 67 were also issued on the same day. The printed promissory note was already with the plaintiff, Sankhla Brothers, Jagdalpur. He further admitted that he filed the present suit on the basis of an admission made with respect to a pro-note of the Ajit Tex firm, on 31-01-2001. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree are erroneous and are liable to be set aside. In support of his submission, he would rely upon the order in the matter of Smt. Arifa & Ors. Vs. Abhiman Apartment Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors., dated 14-07-2025, passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) @ Diary No. 14976 of 2024, and the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court in the matter of Miraj Marketing Corporation Vs. Vishaka Engineering and another, AIR Online 2004 Delhi 38. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1C vehemently opposes the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that the defendant has admitted vide its notice dated 21-07-2001 that there is a total outstanding amount of Rs. 75,179/- due against the transaction made between the parties. In the said notice dated 21-07-2001, Ex.-P/30(C), the defendants have described the transaction between 06-07-1999 and 07-02-2000, and thus, Rs. 75,179/- is the remaining amount, and the plaintiff may receive the same and not misuse the said promissory note. Once he acknowledged in writing about his liability, the fresh period of limitation starts from that day and from that 8 point of view, also the suit is within limitation. He would further submit that the plaintiff has duly pleaded in paragraphs 1 and 2 that it is a running cloth business in the name of the firm, and Munna Lal Jain was the proprietor of the plaintiff firm. The defendant has not denied that he was engaged in a business transaction with the plaintiff firm. The plaintiff firm is propriety firm, and even if the relevant document of the plaintiff firm is not produced, the plaintiff himself is running the proprietorship firm in the name of Sankhla Brothers. The firm does not have any limb and it has to be prosecuted by its proprietor. He would further submit that the plaintiff has proved that he is the proprietor of the plaintiff firm by documents, which are the registration certificate. The proprietor is running its business in the name of ‘Sankhla Brothers’, for which the suit does not suffer from any defect, and there is no violation of any provision of Order 30 of the CPC. He would further submit that after rejection of the plaint on 22-10-2005 the plaintiff has filed another suit on 21-11-2005 while invoking provisions of Order 7 Rule 13 of the CPC and liberty was also granted in the order dated 22-10-2005 by the learned trial Court while rejecting the plaint that the plaintiff may filed his fresh suit on the same cause of action under Order 7 Rule 13 of the CPC and therefore, there is no defect in filing the suit by the plaintiff. It is further submitted that the plaintiff has duly signed the pro-note and proved the liability upon the defendant by producing the bills and vouchers of the plaintiff firm and the clothes purchased by the defendant. He would further submit that the date of filing of the suit is relevant irrespective of payment of its court fee, and the suit was filed on 21-11-2005, and the time was extended for payment of court fee under Section149 of the CPC; therefore, there is no merit in the appeal, and the same is liable to be dismissed. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court. 12. The main ground of challenge of the appeal is the period of limitation to file the suit. It is contended by the appellant that the pro-note was executed on 31-01- 2001, and under Article 35 of the Limitation Act, the limitation of 3 years is provided 9 to file a suit based on the pro-note from the date it is signed. Article 35 of the Limitation Act is necessary to notice here:- Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 35. On a bill of exchange or promissory note payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue Three years The date of the bill or note The alleged pro-note is said to have been signed on 31-01-2001, as reflected from its contents, which is ex.-P/32(C). It is pleaded by the plaintiff in para 6 that on 31- 01-2001, the final accounting was made between the parties, and the defendant has denied the pro-note and acknowledged the outstanding amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-. It is also pleaded by the plaintiff in para 7 that on 21-07-2001, the defendant, through the legal notice, acknowledged the outstanding amount of Rs. 75,179/-. 13. The defendant in their written statement denied the execution of the pro-note on 31-01-2001; however, it is pleaded that his signature over the pro-note was taken by the plaintiff on 25-01-2001. The defendant has admitted that he served a notice to the plaintiff through his counsel. Ex.-P/30(C) is the notice served by the defendant through his counsel to the plaintiff, which is dated 21-07-2001, in which the defendant admitted and acknowledged the liability of Rs. 75,179/- with respect to the business transaction between 06-07-1999 and 07-02-2000. It is specifically denied by the defendant that the notice ex.-P/30(C) has not been served by him; rather, the same is admitted in his evidence. The liability of Rs. 75,179/- was admitted by the defendants in their written statement. 14. Section 18 of the Limitation Act defines the fact of acknowledgement in writing. Section 18 is necessary to reproduce here, which reads as follows:- “18. Effect of acknowledgement in writing— (1) where, before expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right is 10 claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the permissions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation. —For the purposes of this section— (a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set off, or is addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right, (b) the word “signed” means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf, (c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be an application in respect of any property or right.” 15. The pro-note was stated to be signed on 31-01-2001, though, as per the defendant, it was signed on 25-01-2001. The date of 31-01-2001 or 25-01-2001 is relevant for counting of the limitation period, because as per Section 18 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation starts from the date of acknowledgement, i.e., 21-07-2001. In the present case even if the pro-note is considered to be executed on 31-01-2001 and the suit is filed on 19-01-2004 no any time was left to file the suit, however from 19-01-2004 to 22-10-2005, i.e., the date on which the plaint was rejected, the limitation stops and again started running from 23-10-2005 and the subsequent suit was filed on 21-11-2005 which is just within the limitation period of three years from the date of 22-10-2005. 16. True it is, the submission of learned counsel for the appellant is correct to the point that as per Section 9 of Limitation Act once time is begun to run any subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit stops it, but even if the provision of Section 9 would be applicable in the present case, the limitation starts from 20-07- 11 2001 when the acknowledgment of liability was made by the defendant through notice Ex.-P/30(C) which stops on 19-01-2004 when the suit was filed and again starts running from 22-10-2005 when the plaint was rejected and thereafter within the stipulated time the subsequent suit was filed. When the acknowledgement was made by the defendant through the notice dated 21-07-2001 Ex.-P/30(C), the limitation to file the suit does not start from the date of signing the alleged pro-note, but it starts from the acknowledgement, i.e., from 21-07-2001 as provided under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Thus, there is no merit in the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant that the suit was barred by limitation. 17. Another submission made by learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit as framed by the plaintiff is not maintainable for want of sufficient pleading and the evidence with respect to the proprietorship of the firm in favour of Munna Lal Jain. 18. From perusal of the plaint filed by the plaintiff, it transpires that the plaintiff has impleaded in the cause title as lka[kyk cznlZ] izksijkbZVj eqUuk yky tSu vkRet Lo- lkxjey tSu] mez 55 o"kZ] esu jksM txnyiqj ftyk cLrj N-x- and para 1 of his plaint, he pleaded that “1@ ;g fd oknh lka[kyk cznlZ QeZ ds uke oL= ¼diM+ksa½ dk Fkksd ,oa QqVdj O;olk; djrk gS A oknh dk QeZ iathd`r izksijkbZVªh QeZ gS A”- In the affidavit filed by the plaintiff firm in support of the plaint, it has been disclosed by the plaintiff that “ZeSa mijksDr irs ij O;olk; djrk gwWa vkSj lka[kyk cznlZ dk izksijkbVj gwWaA”. In the written statement, the para 1 of the plaint is admitted and partly denied. It is pleaded in the written statement that the plaintiff has not satisfied as to under which the institution has been registered. Though, in cross-examination of the plaintiff, the defendant have examined on this point that the plaintiff has not filed any document with respect to his proprietorship, however, in his cross-examination he admitted that at the time when Sankhla Brothers was registered, Munna Lal Jain was the proprietor of the firm, after death of Munna Lal Jain, the firm was transferred in the name of his legal heirs/plaintiffs and they have been made proprietor of the plaintiff firm, though he has not filed any document of its proprietorship, however, he produced the documents ex.-P/3(C) and P/4(C), which are the establishment 12 certificate of the firm registered in the name of its proprietor Munna Lal Jain and from the document Ex.-P/4 the name of the business Sankhla Brothers is registered as proprietorship firm with the Commercial Tax Department from which it has been duly proved by the plaintiff that Munna Lal Jain is proprietor of the Sankhla Brothers and he validly prosecuting the suit against the defendant and there is no merit in the submission that the suit has not been validly filed by the plaintiff. 19. 19. The facts and consideration in the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in Miraj Marketing Corporation (supra) are distinguishable with the facts of the present case as there are sufficient pleading and proof that Munna Lal Jain is proprietor of the Sankhla Brothers and the suit has been filed by Sankhla Brothers through its proprietor Munna Lal Jain, therefore, no benefit can be extended to the appellant from the judgment in Miraj Marketing Corporation (supra). 20. The plaintiff has pleaded in his plaint that between 01-04-1999 and 27-01- 2001, there was a total credit transaction of Rs. 2,63,072/- between the plaintiff and defendant firm, and the defendant No.1 paid Rs. 63,072/- up to 31-01-2001 in various installments. On 31-01-2001, the final accounting was done between the parties and a total of Rs. 2,00,000/- has come outstanding against the defendant No.1 and a promissory note was signed by the plaintiff with respect to the outstanding amount. 21. The defendant No.1 has also admitted in his written statement that with respect to the transaction between 01-04-1999 and 27-01-2001, there was a total liability of the outstanding amount of Rs. 75,179/-, but he stated that the same is time-barred. 22. It is not clear from the written statement of defendant No.1 that the payment made by him was against which bills. The learned trial Court has divided the transactions between the parties in three parts, in first part he kept those bills which was already paid by the defendant No.1, in second part those bills were kept which were paid by defendant No.1 but claimed that it was barred by limitation and in third part those bills were kept which were denied by defendant No.1. The receipts have 13 also been produced by the plaintiff which are marked as Ex.-P/21(C) to Ex.-P/24(C) and he also filed ledger book Ex.-P/25(C) and Ex.-P/26(C). There are various instances pleaded by the respective parties with respect to the transaction between them and the payment of the amount towards the bills of the transaction. The learned trial Court has examined the bills in detail and their payment. After considering the documentary as well as oral evidence, the learned trial Court has come into conclusion that defendant No.1 has paid the amount of Rs. 75,179/-. The plaintiff has pleaded that defendant No.1 has not paid the remaining amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-. From the notice Ex.-P/30(C) sent by the defendant No.1 to the plaintiff dated 21-07-2001, the outstanding amount is Rs. 75,179/-, which was admitted by defendant No.1. The defendants have disputed the entries made in the bill vouchers and ledger account and denied their liability, stating that he has not purchased the cloths with respect to certain bills. 23. From perusal of the ledger account, Rs. 89,528/- was carried forward in the year 2000-2001 as has been reflected by the document Ex.-P/26(C) and as per the ledger document Ex.-P/26(C), the transaction was between 01-04-1999 to 07-02- 2000 for which the amount of Rs. 89,528/- was carry forward and transaction upto 27-01-2001 Rs. 2,00,000/- were outstanding. 24. The plaintiff has admitted in his evidence that he has filed the suit on the basis of the acknowledgment of the defendant in the pro-note Ex. P-32(C). The receipts have not been pleaded in his plaint, but he filed the same as documents. He admitted that the bills No. 215 and 216 were issued by Motilal Jain, who is his uncle. 25. The learned trial Court, though, has considered the outstanding amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- from the documents produced by the plaintiff, but there are certain missing entries and discrepancies with respect to the issuance of bills and their payment. The ledger account was maintained by Motilal Jain, who is the uncle of the plaintiff Munna Lal Jain, and the plaintiff has not issued any bills or vouchers and has not made any entry in the ledger. The bills and vouchers have to be proved 14 by the person who issued them because he would be the best person who says as to on what basis he issued the bills, and the bills issued by him are actually issued against a true transaction. Therefore, though there are certain entries of bills and its payment in the documents filed by the plaintiff, but in the opinion of this Court it is not sufficient to hold liability of payment of amount against the defendant No.1. Under the disputed facts of transaction and its payment the defendant’s admission is very relevant and he accepted his liability of Rs. 75,179/- as the outstanding amount against him towards the business transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1. There is no need to ask for any proof of the said amount as the defendant himself has admitted his liability and the fact admitted need not be proved as provided under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 26. So far as the signing of the pro-note by defendant No.1 is concerned, the plaintiff tried to establish that there was an outstanding amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- as on 31-01-2001 for which the defendant No.1 has signed the pro-note. The defendant is denying voluntarily signing the pro-note on 31-01-2001, and he defended that the plaintiff had obtained his signature on the pro-note on 25-01-2001 by putting pressure upon him, and he signed the same under coercion. At that time, the said pro-note was a blank format of a pro-note in which the plaintiff had obtained his signature. The plaintiff PW-1 has admitted in para 60 of his cross-examination that he has not prepared the pro-note. In para 59, he also admitted that the printed proforma was already available to the plaintiff. Since the outstanding amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- as on 31-01-2001 is disbelieved by this Court, there is no question to sign the pro-note for the outstanding amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-. However, the defendant admitted the outstanding amount of Rs. 75,179/-. 27. In the matter of Veena Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representative Vs. District Registrar/Additional Collector (F/R) and another, (2022) 7 SCC 1 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 50, 51, 52, 53 and 65 that:- “50. Section 35(1)(a) of the Registration Act uses the expression "admit the execution of the document", while Section 35(3)(a) uses the expression 15 "denies its execution", Similarly, Section 72(1) has adopted the expression "denial of execution", while Section 73(1) uses the expression "denies its execution" However, the word "execution" itself is not defined by the Registration Act. 51. Before us, two possible interpretations have been urged by the parties: 1. First, that "execution" is tantamount to "signing" a document. Hence, once a person admits to their signature on a document, they admit to having executed it; and 2. Second, that "execution" cannot be equated with merely signing a documents Hence, even if a person's signature on the document admitted, they can still deny its execution if they did not agree to or understand the contents of the document while signing it. We must now decide which of these two interpretations should be adopted by this Court. 52. The first interpretation of "execution" is supported by the definition provided in the Stamp Act, 1899 ("the Stamp Act"). Section 2(12) defines "executed" and "execution" in the following terms: "2. (12) Executed and execution.—"Executed" and "execution", used with reference to instruments, mean "signed" and "signature" and includes attribution of electronic record within the meaning of Section 11 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);" However, since the Registration Act has been enacted for a purpose different from the Stamp Act, the definition under the Stamp Act is not conclusive. 53. Black's Law Dictionary defines the expression "execute" and "executed" thus [Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters, 2009), 9th Edn., pp. 649-50] : "execute, vb. (14c) 1. To perform or complete (a contract or duty) <once the contract was fully executed, the parties owed no further contractual duties to each other> . . . 3. To make (a legal document) valid by signing; to bring (a legal document) into its final, legally enforceable form <each party executed the contract without a signature witness>... executed, adj. (16c) 1. (Of a document) that has been signed <an executed will>…. 16 “[T]he term “executed” is a slippery word. Its use is to be avoided except when accompanied by explanation …. A contract is frequently said to be executed when the document has been signed, or has been signed, sealed, and delivered. Further, by executed contract is frequently meant one that has been fully performed by both parties.” William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 26 n. *[Arthur 1. Corbin (Ed.), 3d Am. ed. 1919].” 65. Adverting to the above decisions and to the views of the Calcutta [Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhuttacharji, 1881 SCC OnLine Cal 1 : ILR (1881) 7 Cal 736], Orissa [Uma Devi v. Narayan Nayak, 1984 SCC OnLine Ori 94], and Assam High Court [Bhutkani Nath v. Kamaleswari Nath, 1971 SCC OnLine Gau 53 : AIR 1972 Assam & Nagaland 15], the Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in N.M. Ramachandraiah [N.M. Ramachandraiah v. State of Karnataka, 2007 SCC OnLine Kar 192] emphasised that the execution of the document does not mean merely signing it, but signing it after having understood its contents in their entirety: (N.M. Ramachandraiah case [N.M. Ramachandraiah v. State of Karnataka, 2007 SCC OnLine Kar 192], SCC OnLine Kar para 15) . “15. Therefore, the law is well settled. Execution of a document does not mean merely signing, but signing by way of assent to the terms of the contract embodied in the document. Execution consists in signing a document written out and read over and understood, and does not consist of merely signing a name upon a blank sheet of Paper. It is a solemn act of the executant who must own up the recitals in the instrument must be clear evidence that he put the signature after knowing the contents of document fully. To be executed, a document must be in existence: there is no document in existence there cannot be execution. Mere proof or admission that a person’s signature appears on a doc itself amount to execution of a document. Registration does not dispense with the necessity of proof of execution when the same is denied. Thus, execution of document is not mere signing of it.” (emphasis supplied) 28. in the matter of H. Siddiqui (dead) by LRs. Vs. A. Ramalingam, (2011) (4) SCC 240, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 and 15 that:- “14. In our humble opinion, the trial Court could not proceed in such an 17 unwarranted manner for the reason that the respondent had merely admitted his signature on the photocopy of the power of attorney and did not admit the contents thereof. More so, the court should have borne in mind that admissibility of a document or contents thereof may not necessarily lead to drawing any inference unless the contents thereof have some probative value. 15. In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishan Singh [(1983) 3 SCC 118 : AIR 1983 SC 684] this Court considered the issue in respect of admissibility of documents or contents thereof and held as under: (SCC p. 138, para 40) “40. …. Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.” 29. In the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that merely admitting the signature of the executant over the deed does not amount to proof of its contents. The outstanding amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- and the contents of pro-note has to be proved by the plaintiff that there was the outstanding amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- and the defendant No.1 has voluntarily signed in the pro-note, whereas in the present case the defendant No.1 denied voluntarily signing the pro-note and the plaintiff could not prove that the pro-note was voluntarily executed by Munna Lal Jain, in such a situation it cannot be said that the plaintiff is able to prove the contents of the pro-note and the same has been voluntarily signed by the defendant No.1. In absence of any sufficient evidence the liability that mentioned in the pro-note cannot be fastened upon defendant No.1, however, the liability of Rs. 75,179/- can be fastened upon him which he admitted in the case. 30. The observations of the Apex Court in the matter of Eastern Coalfields Limited and others Vs. Rabindra Kumar Bharti, (2022) 12 SCC 390, is relevant here to be referred:- “18. We may also observe that reference made to Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure may not have been justified. Order 41 Rule 18 33 no doubt clothes the appellate court with an extraordinary power, which however is a rare jurisdiction. It is to reach justice in the special facts of a case. It is not an ordinary Rule to be applied across the board in all the appeals. In fact, the principle is inter alia no doubt that even if there is no appeal by any of the parties in the proceedings, an order can be passed in his favour in the appeal carried by the other side. Any order which ought to have been passed can be passed.” 31. In Satya Prakash Dwivedi v. Munna alias Chandrabhan Yadav and Others, (2025) 5 SCC 525, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:- “11. Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC reads as under: “33. Power of Court of Appeal.—The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees:— Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. (emphasis in original)” 12. Upon a plain reading of Order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC, it reveals that the appellate court has the power to pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed, and to pass such other decree or order as the case may require. Notwithstanding that the appeal is against a part of the decree, this power may be exercised by the court in favour of all or any of the respondents although such respondent may not have filed any appeal or objection. However, the said power must be exercised with caution or circumspection, particularly, in the absence there being any cross objection or appeal filed by the respondents. Such a power has to be exercised in 19 exceptional cases when its non-exercise will lead to difficulties in the adjustment of rights of the parties.” 32. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the defendant is partly allowed and the impugned judgment and decree with respect to liability of Rs. 2,00,000/- against defendant No.1 is modified to the extent of the liability of defendant No.1 to Rs. 75,179/-, which is payable to the plaintiff. While invoking powers under Section 41 Rule 33 of the CPC and also in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Satya Prakash Dwivedi’s case (supra) looking to the business transactions between the parties and Section 34 of the CPC, though the learned trial Court has not awarded any interest, but this Court is inclined to grant interest over the amount of Rs. 75,179/- and orders that the said amount of Rs. 75,179/- is payable along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till its realization. 33. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. The parties are to bear their own cost. 34. Appellate decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil