[2025:RJ-JP:49894] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 189/2025 Ram Prakash Son Of Ramchandra, Aged About 54 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 02, New Officer Colony Police Station Jawahar Nagar, District Shri Ganganagar Posted At Present Junior Engineer Samagra Shiksha Block Sri Ganganagar District Sri Ganganagar ----Petitioner Versus State Of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Nirmal Kumar Goyal, Adv. For Respondent(s) For Complainant(s) : : Mr. M.S. Shekhawat, PP Mr. Dhruv Atri, Adv. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN Order 02/12/2025 1. By way of this Criminal Revision Petition under Section 438 read with Section 442 of BNSS, challenge has been made by the petitioner to the order dated 12.12.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, No.1, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, Jaipur in Criminal Misc. Application No.276/2024 in Regular Criminal Case No.05/2023 (CIS No.209/2023) titled as State of Rajasthan V. Harmeet Singh & Ors., whereby, cognizance has been taken against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 7, 7A & 8 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PC Act’) read with Section 120B of IPC. 2. Succinctly stated, the relevant facts are that the petitioner was appointed as a Teacher by the District Education Officer (Primary) vide order dated 20.12.1997, and at the time of the alleged incident, he was working on deputation as a Junior [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (2 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] Engineer in the office of the Chief Block Education Officer, Block Sri Ganganagar. 3. On 05.08.2021, one Indra Sain submitted a written complaint before the Anti-Corruption Bureau alleging that two work orders pertaining to Government Sr. Secondary School, Noorpura Dhani and Kheruwala, Block Sadul Sahar, District Sriganganagar were issued to him. The work order for Noorpura stood completed therefore, a bill of Rs.35 lakhs was raised by the complainant, out of which, he received bill amount of Rs.27,84,448/- and Rs.7,18,582/- remained due. It was alleged that for processing and releasing the remaining bill amount, Assistant Engineer Harmeet Singh demanded bribe of Rs.52,000/-. Further, it was alleged that on earlier occasion, complainant had already given bribe of Rs.1,00,000/- each to A.En. Harmeet Singh and J.En. Narendra Bhakar. Acting upon the complaint, a trap was organized at Jaipur. As per the trap proceedings, the complainant allegedly tendered Rs.45,000/- to co-accused Harmeet Singh, who thereafter handed over the amount to the present petitioner for counting. A further sum of Rs.3,30,000/-, along with a handwritten slip, was also recovered from the seat of Harmeet Singh. Consequently, FIR No.334/2021 was registered at Police Station ACB, Jaipur for offences punishable under Sections 7, 7A & 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B of IPC. 4. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 7, 7A [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (3 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] and 8 of PC Act read with Section 120B IPC before the concerned Court. Upon grant of prosecution sanction, vide order dated 09.01.2023, trial Court took cognizance against the petitioner for the said offences. The said order of cognizance was assailed by the petitioner before this Court by way of filing SB Cr. Revision Petition No.245/2023 and vide order dated 04.05.2023, said petition was allowed and the cognizance order dated 09.01.2023 was set aside for the reason that the prosecution sanction was not found valid one as the same was issued by an incompetent authority i.e., District Education Officer (Headquarter), Secondary, Sriganganagar and the authorized officer i.e., District Education Officer (Headquarter), Primary Education, Sriganganagar, without application of mind, signed it, and, the petitioner was also not provided an opportunity of hearing. In consequence of the said order, the learned trial Court discharged the petitioner vide order dated 14.06.2023. Subsequently, vide order dated 04.08.2023, Criminal Writ Petition No.481/2022 and Criminal Misc. Petition No.6914/2021, filed by the petitioner, came to be dismissed as withdrawn by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, as cognizance order had already been set aside. 5. After the petitioner’s discharge from the aforesaid offences, the District Education Officer (Headquarter), Primary Education, Sriganganagar, issued a letter dated 30.01.2024 calling upon the petitioner to submit his objections/reply prior to taking decision for issuing fresh prosecution sanction. The petitioner filed a detailed reply asserting that, since the cognizance taken against him by the trial Court had been set aside by this Court, the Anti- [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (4 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] Corruption Bureau did not have jurisdiction and right to ask/get fresh prosecution sanction. Despite the aforesaid objection of the petitioner, the Sanctioning Authority proceeded to issue fresh prosecution sanction dated 12.03.2024 before the learned trial Court on 31.07.2024 for issuance of process. Thereafter, the learned trial Court, vide order dated 16.08.2024, directed to issue process of summon against the petitioner. The petitioner assailed the said order by filing a SB Cr. Revision Petition No.1650/2024, which was allowed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 30.09.2024, whereby, while setting aside order dated 16.08.2024, the matter was remanded to the trial Court for deciding afresh by way of a reasoned order. 6. Now again, vide impugned order dated 12.12.2024, the learned trial Court has taken cognizance against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 7, 7A and 8 of PC Act read with Section 120B of IPC. Hence, this Criminal Revision Petition has been filed by the petitioner against the order of cognizance dated 12.12.2024. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner has falsely been implicated in the present case and that no act constituting any offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act is attributable to him. It is submitted that the petitioner, being on deputation, had no role whatsoever in the processing of the complainant’s work or bills and had no occasion to demand or accept any bribe. It is argued that the petitioner merely used to travel with the co-accused occasionally in the course of official [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (5 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] duties and had no knowledge of any alleged bribe transaction. Counsel contends that co-accused Harmeet Singh handed over the amount to the petitioner, and the petitioner, believing it to be official cash, counted it in good faith, without any awareness that the same constituted tainted money. It is submitted that the alleged acts attributed to the petitioner are wholly devoid of mens rea, which is an essential ingredient for offences under Sections 7, 7A, and 8 of PC Act read with Section 120B of IPC. It is argued that for criminal conspiracy to arise, there must exist a meeting of minds between the accused and the co-accused in respect of demand, acceptance, or facilitation of bribe. In the present case, it is contended that the petitioner had no knowledge, intention, or agreement regarding the purported bribe and was merely handed over the money by the co-accused for counting. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the absence of any meeting of minds and the lack of conscious participation or criminal intent preclude the imposition of any criminal liability, rendering the proceedings against the petitioner unsustainable in law. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the prosecution sanction dated 12.03.2024, issued by the District Education Officer (Primary), Headquarter Sri Ganganagar, is not tenable in the eye of law. It is contended that the sanctioning authority has failed to consider or even advert to the order dated 04.05.2023, wherein cognizance had been quashed on merits and no liberty was granted to the respondent–ACB to seek or obtain a fresh sanction. It is contended that in the absence of any express liberty from this Court, the respondent could not have revived the [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (6 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] prosecution through a fresh sanction, and as such, it has acted in derogation of the binding directions of this Court. 9. Learned counsel further contends that the order of cognizance passed by the learned trial Court suffers from a patent lack of application of mind. It is argued that the learned Court has mechanically taken cognizance without adverting to the absence of any allegation of demand or conscious acceptance of bribe by the petitioner, and without appreciating that the entire material collected during investigation does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged. It is submitted that the said order has been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the learned trial Court has failed to consider the earlier orders passed by this Court whereby cognizance and process issued against the petitioner had been set aside. 10. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the following judgments:- 1. Pritam Singh & Anr. V. State of Punjab, reported in (1955) 2 SCC 446. 2. Chagan Singh V. State of Rajasthan, arising out of Criminal misc. petition No.283 of 1996. 3. Ladu Devi and Anr. V. State of Rajasthan, arising out of Criminal misc. petition No.177 of 2004. 4. State of Karnataka V. Ameerjan, reported in (2007) 11 SCC 273. [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (7 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] 5. Mehmood Ul Rehman V. Khazir Mohammad Tunda & Ors., reported in (2015) 12 SCC 420. 6. M/s GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust V. M/s India Infoline Limited, reported in AIR 2013 SC 1433. 7. Himanshu Yadav V. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Raj 2960. 8. Mahavir Singh V. State (Delhi), reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Del 290. 9. State of Andhra Pradesh V. Kesavapatnam China Swamy, reported in (2015) 14 SCC 9. 10. State of Maharashtra V. Nandlal Babulal Sakhare, arising out of Criminal Appeal No.498 of 1999. 11. Per contra, learned State counsel fervently opposed the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner and supported the impugned order of cognizance. However, learned counsel appearing for the complainant does not oppose the prayer made by the counsel for the petitioner. 12. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and scanned through the material placed before me during the course of arguments by learned counsel for the parties. 13. Arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that prosecution sanction dated 12.12.2024 is not legally [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (8 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] sustainable because after rejection of the first prosecution sanction, appropriate authority could not have issued another prosecution sanction as explicitly, no liberty was granted to do so in the order dated 04.05.2023 passed by co-ordinate bench of this Court. This Court does not find any merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as this issue has already been considered and firmly settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments, which are as under: 1. State of Mizoram v Dr. C. Sangnghina reported in AIR 2018 SC 5342. 2. State of Goa v Babu Thomas reported in AIR 2005 SC 3606. 3. Nanjappa v State of Karnataka reported in (2015) 14 SCC 186. 4. K. Kalimuthu v State by DSP reported in (2005) 4 SCC 512. 5. State of Karnataka Lokayukta police v S. Subbegowda reported in (2023) 17 SCC 699. Through these decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has settled the position that where a prosecution sanction is found to be invalid, the trial Court is within its power to discharge the accused. Such an order of discharge does not bar the prosecution from obtaining a fresh sanction after due application of mind. The absence of an express liberty granted in the earlier order does not [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (9 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] preclude the prosecution from securing a valid sanction and proceeding in accordance with law. 14. Now, this Court would like to examine the legality of cognizance order passed by learned trial Court whereby trial Court took cognizance against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 7, 7A & 8 and Section 120B of IPC vide order dated 12.12.2024. 15. It is an admitted case of the prosecution that the petitioner had never demanded any illegal gratification from the complainant and, as a matter of fact, was not even known to him previously. The petitioner was only travelling in the same vehicle in which the main accused was travelling and, upon the request of the co- accused, he bonafidely counted the currency notes, which are alleged to have been offered as bribe to the co-accused. Curiously, this Court finds no material much less, to suggest any prior meeting of minds or conspiracy between the petitioner and the co- accused regarding the alleged bribe amount. The petitioner has been arrayed as an accused simply because his hands turned pink when they were washed during the trap proceedings which reveal the presence of Phenolphthalein. However, the said circumstance stands reasonably explained in view of the admitted position that the petitioner had handled the currency notes only for the limited purpose of counting the same, and that too at the request of the co-accused. 16. It is well settled by a catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that mere recovery of tainted currency notes, by [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (10 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] itself, is not sufficient to bring a case within the ambit of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The prosecution is under a mandatory obligation to establish the foundational facts of demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification. Possession or recovery of currency notes, unless proved to be in furtherance of such demand, cannot sustain criminal liability. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the petitioner never met the complainant prior to the trap, had no acquaintance with him, and that no official work of the complainant was pending with or connected to the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. 17. A five-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), reported in (2023) 4 SCC 731, categorically held that an offer by bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. Mere acceptance of illegal gratification without proof of offer by bribe-giver and demand by the public servant would not make an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow: “88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without there being any demand from the public [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (11 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (12 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.” 18. From the above exposition of law, it may be safely concluded that mere possession and recovery of tainted currency notes from a public servant, in the absence of proof of demand, is not sufficient to establish an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. Consequently, without evidence of demand for illegal gratification, it cannot be said that the public servant used corrupt or illegal means, or abused his position, to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage in terms of Section 7 of the PC Act. 19. A perusal of the impugned order further shows that the same has been passed mainly based upon the prosecution sanction accorded at the subsequent stage. It is also pertinent to note that the Sanctioning Authority, while issuing notice to the petitioner, had specifically directed him to submit a representation. It was accordingly filed in compliance with the said direction. However, even a bare look at the sanction order shows that the contents of the petitioner’s representation were neither considered, nor dealt with in any meaningful manner. The prosecution sanction seems to have been issued in a mechanical manner, based solely upon the premise that the petitioner’s hands turned pink after a wash during the trap proceedings. Such an approach completely defeats the object and spirit of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which requires the Sanctioning Authority to apply its independent mind to the entire material on record and arrive at a [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (13 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] conscious and reasoned decision. The role of the sanctioning authority is to act as a check against frivolous and unwarranted prosecution and not merely to play a second fiddle by affixing a rubber stamp. In the absence of any material evidence much less, proving demand or acceptance or even conscious possession of the bribe amount allegedly received by the petitioner, the impugned order, resting as it does upon mechanically granted sanction, is unsustainable in the eyes of law. A Perusal of the impugned cognizance order would reveal that there is not even a slightest discussion regarding the role attributed to the present petitioner in the charge-sheet, particularly when it is admitted case of the prosecution that petitioner was stranger to the complainant and not concerned at all with the work of the complainant. It is also apposite to mention here that complainant has no grievance with the petitioner and before this Court also he has supported the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the conspiracy being alleged against the petitioner here seems to be prima facie baseless as a charge under Section 120B of IPC most often requires a prior meeting of mind (common intention) to commit a crime. Looking at the present case, along with the submissions of the complainant, it becomes clear that the petitioner did not have anything to do with the bribery offence committed by the co- accused and certainly did not have any intention to commit the crime of taking a bribe. The petitioner here is arrayed into the case through the charge-sheet which states that he, in conspiracy with the co-accused, was involved in the offence of accepting a [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (14 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] bribe. But it is important to probe into this accusation carefully as the only evidence of such conspiracy against the petitioner is that his hands turned pink upon washing during the trap proceedings. This alone is not enough to bring him under the purview of Section 120B of the IPC as it fails to demonstrate the common intention, i.e., meeting of minds between both, the petitioner and the co- accused. In essence, the charge-sheet does not demonstrate any reason as to why the present petitioner might be involved in this crime except that he just counted the notes handed over to him by the co-accused when they were in the car together. 20. At the stage of taking cognizance, the learned Trial Magistrate/Court must assess the whole matter that is placed on record, including the documents filed along with the charge-sheet or complaint and the evidence brought in support thereof, with the aim of determining whether there is a prima facie case to issue process against the accused. The initiation of criminal proceedings is not simply a procedural formality. On the filing of the charge- sheet or the complaint in the Court, the learned Magistrate is not expected or obliged to act like a mouthpiece or post-office of the prosecution. In this initial stage, it shall become the obligatory requirement of the learned Magistrate/Court to use its judicial mind and scrutinize the material placed by the investigation agency/complainant and see if there are any prima facie shortcomings/contradictions/improbability in the prosecution’s case. Although it is well settled that a Detailed/ Roving Inquiry into the merits of evidence is not required/mandatory at this stage of cognizance of cases, it shall yet remain the requirement of the [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (15 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] Court to conduct an informed scrutiny of the record for sole and limited purposes of issuance of criminal processes. Such application of judicial mind assumes greater significance because the initiation of criminal prosecution has serious civil and social consequences. A person against whom criminal process is issued is compelled to face police investigation, court proceedings, repeated appearances, mental harassment, loss of reputation, and various other pressures. Therefore, before subjecting an individual to the rigours of criminal law, the learned Magistrate/Court must be satisfied that the material on record discloses sufficient grounds to proceed and that the criminal law is not being set into motion in a casual or arbitrary manner. 21. Though, the word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, but the meaning of cognizance can be derived from the number of precedents and judicial pronouncements. The dictionary meaning of cognizance is taking account of, taking note of, to gain knowledge about, to have knowledge regarding something. The meaning of Cognizance given in Black's Law Dictionary, reads as under: “Cognizance – Jurisdiction, or the exercise of jurisdiction, or power to try and determine causes; judicial examination of a matter, or power and authority to make it.” 22. In Ajit Kumar Palit Vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1963 SC 765, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (16 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] “.....The word “cognizance” has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law or procedure. It merely means - become aware of and when used with reference to a Court of Judge, to take notice of judicially.” 23. In Subramanian Swamy Vs. Manmohan Singh reported in (2012) 3 SCC 64, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “....though, the term 'cognizance' has not been defined either in the 1988 Act or the Cr.P.C, the same has acquired a definite meaning and connotation from various judicial precedents. In legal parlance cognizance is “taking judicial notice by the court of law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented before it so as to decide whether there is any basis for initiating proceedings and determination of the cause or matter judicially.” 24. In State of West Bengal & Anr. Vs. Mohd. Khalid & Anr. reported in (1995) 1 SCC 684, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “Section 190 of the Code talks of cognizance of offences by Magistrates. This expression has not been defined in the Code. In its broad and [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (17 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word 'cognizance' indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons. It has, thus, reference to the hearing and determination of the case in connection with an offence.” 25. In R.R. Chari Vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1951 SC 207, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies his mind to the suspected commission of offence.” 26. It was further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it can be said that when any Magistrate takes cognizance of any offence [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (18 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] under Section 190 Cr.P.C. he/she must apply his/her mind for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of Chapter. Taking cognizance of an offence is the first and foremost step towards trial. Cognizance in the literal sense means knowledge or notice, and taking cognizance of offence means taking notice, or becoming aware of the alleged commission of an offence. The Judicial Officer will have to take cognizance of the offence before he/she could proceed to conduct a trial. A Magistrate takes cognizance when he/she applies his/her mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiate proceedings in respect of offence which is said to have been committed. It bears repetition to state that taking cognizance is entirely an act of the Magistrate. 27. Taking guidance from all the above mentioned pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it can be safely concluded that before taking cognizance, judicial mind must be applied by learned trial Court. 28. Now adverting to the facts of the present case, this court finds that from bare first look of the order of taking cognizance, it reveals that judicial mind was not applied by the learned Magistrate while taking cognizance. In this regard, this Court has recorded its observations in the foregoing paragraph Nos.15, 16 & 19. 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the cognizance order must reflect prima- facie opinion of the learned Magistrate on the material collected during investigation. The order of issuance of process is not an [2025:RJ-JP:49894] (19 of 19) [CRLR-189/2025] empty formality as it may affect the personal liberty of a person. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees personal liberty of a person and same cannot be deprived of, without due procedure of law. Apart from this, summoning of accused to appear before criminal Court after taking cognizance is a serious matter, affecting the dignity, self-respect and his/her image in society. 30. Consequently, this Criminal Misc. Petition is allowed. The cognizance order dated 12.12.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, No.1, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, Jaipur in Criminal Misc. Application No.276/2024 in Regular Criminal Case No.05/2023 (CIS No.209/2023) whereby learned trial Court took cognizance against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 7, 7A & 8 of PC Act and Section 120B of IPC, is quashed and set aside. The petitioner is hereby discharged from the aforementioned offences. 31. The stay application and pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J Lalit Mohan/48