- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO. 853 OF 2025 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: 1. SRIRAMA ANGIRASA AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS, S/O NAGESH KV ANGIRASA DEVAGODU VILLAGE, HERUR POST KOPPA TALUK, CHIKKAMAGALURU DISTRICT 577 118. 2. SHREEVATSA D GAVNSKAR AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS, C/O DINESH GAVNSKAR GANESH FLOUR MILL, UDUPI- 576105. 3. GANESH POOJARY AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS S/O RAVINDRA POOJARY 8-1-107-54 ANUGRAHA, UDUPI – 576 102. 4. HARSHITH K AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS S/O MOHANA BANGERA 2-66/4 KOILA HOUSE KOILA POST, DAKSHINA KANNADA, -574 211. 5. SHREYAS C/O SHRIDHAR POOJAR AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS 2-45 BATTENI, KOLLANJE EDDU, KARKALA TALUK, UDUPI – 574 109. 6. SWASTHIK S/O SHANKARA POOJARY AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS JARKALA MUNDI, KARKALA TALUK, UDUPI DISTRICT-574 101. Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 7. SHASHANK AGED ABOUT 20 2-68 B, HOROLIMAKKI KUNDAPURA TALUK, HENGAVALI POST, UDUPI DISTRICT – 576 212. 8. KISHORE KUMAR AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS C/O RAMANANDA 2-434 SHREE MEENAKSHI MARPALLI KORANGRAPADY UDUPI – 574 118. 9. SAMITHA K AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS D/O OF K T SUBRAMANYA 264 KALIKAMBA TEMPLE ROAD, SACHIDANANDAURA, SRINGERI, CHIKKMAGALURU -577 139. 10. MANVI U SHETTY AGED ABOUT 18 YEARS D/O UDAY KUMAR SHETTY GOLIDADI HOUSE, INNA POST, KARKALA TALUK UDUPI DISTRICT – 576 121. 11. SHARVARI AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS D/O VISHWANATHA ADIGA 4-24, HORALI, KOKKARNE POST, KUDLI, UDUPI-576 234. 12. MANIKYA BHAT AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS C/O HS SEETHARAM BHAT 2-5B4, SRI RAMADHAMA NAGARA, 2ND MAIN ROAD, KITTI NAGARA, UDUPI – 576 101. 13. HRUTHIK AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS S/O NAGARAJ GOLI 1-157, KASADI, KUNDAPURA TALUK, HALADY POST, UDUPI DISTRICT – 576 222. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 14. CHIRAG BHASKAR DEVADIGA AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS S/O BHASKAR DEVADIGA 1-16M KATHYAYINI KRIPA KATHYAYINI NAGARA, KUNJIBETTU, UDUPI DISTRICT 15. KARTHIK M AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS C/O MAHABALA MADIVALA 2-124 MANDAGADDE, HEBRI TALUK, UDUPI – 576 112. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. E. SUYOG HERELE, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA THROUGH FLYING SQUAD OFFICER KUMAR NAYAK V CDPO, UDUPI TALUK FST-2, 120 UDUPI ASSEMBLY CONSTITUENCY UDUPI. 2. THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER UDUPI TOWN PS, REP BY THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT BUILDING, BENGALURU – 560 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. CHANNAPPA ERAPPA, HCGP) THIS W.P IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 27 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W SECTION 482 OF CPC PRAYING TOQUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN CC NO. 1664/2024 PENDING ON THE FILE OF PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, UDUPI INCLUDING THE ORDER OF TAKING CONGIZANCE, FIR, COMPLAINT AND CHARGE SHEET IN CRIME NO. 80/2024 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT POLICE FOR ALLEGED OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 143,147,341, 290 R/W 149 OF IPC, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A,B,C AND D RESPECTIVELY.) - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN ‘B’ GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR ORAL ORDER In this petition, petitioners have sought for the following reliefs:- “ 1) Issue a writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other writ and quash the entire proceedings in C.C.No.1664/2024 pending on the file of Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Udupi including the order of taking cognizance, FIR, Complaint and charge sheet in Crime No.80/2024 registered by the respondent Police for alleged offences punishable under Section 143, 147, 341, 290 r/w 149 of IPC, in the interest of justice (produced at Annexure- A,B,C and D Respectively). 2) Grant such other and further reliefs as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 2. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the petitioners are students, who are studying in various colleges across Udupi and some of them having completed their studies recently, are public spirited persons claiming to have utmost concern about safety of women and society. On 18.04.2024, one late Neha Hiremath, student of KLE College of Hubballi, was said - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 to be murdered, following which, petitioners and other youth participated in a protest by marching from Jodukatte to Udupi service bus stand. The respondents filed the impugned complaint registered as an FIR in Crime No.80/2024 against petitioners – accused Nos. 1 to 15 and others for alleged offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 149, 290 and 341 IPC, which was investigated into and culminated in a charge sheet which is currently pending in the impugned proceedings in C.C.No.1664/2024, aggrieved by which, petitioners are before this Court by way of the present petition. 3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned HCGP for respondents and perused the material on record. 4. A perusal of the material on record will clearly indicate that on account of the demise / alleged murder of Neha Hiremath, the petitioners and 300 other youth conducted a peaceful march from Jodukatte to Udupi service bus stand by way of protest to condemn her alleged murder having regard to the safety of women and society. In this context, a perusal of the complaint, FIR, charge sheet material, statement of witnesses, documents etc., will clearly indicate that the petitioners cannot be incriminated for the alleged - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 offences in the absence of any material to establish their role or involvement in the commission of the alleged offences. It is needless to state that the petitioners were entitled to demonstrate their legal rights and had not caused any disturbance to the public, since the protest march was peaceful in nature and the FIR and all further proceedings pursuant thereto, do not disclose any act of violence and in the absence of evidence / lack of it in this regard, I am of the view that the impugned proceedings qua the petitioners deserve to be quashed. 5. There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioners have the fundamental rights constitutionally guaranteed and protected under Article 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of India, in that they are entitled to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peacefully including the right to protest; in the instant case, in the absence of necessary ingredients constituting the alleged offences and without there being any material to establish public inconvenience or any act of violence committed by the petitioners during their peaceful march / protest on account of the alleged murder of Neha Hiremath, the impugned proceedings qua the petitioners deserve to be quashed on this ground also. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 6. In the case of Mazdoor Kisan Sakti Sangathan vs. Union of India & another – (2018) 17 SCC 324, the Apex Court held as under:- “ 48. We may state at the outset that none of the parties have joined issue insofar as law on the subject is concerned. Undoubtedly, holding peaceful demonstrations by the citizenry in order to air its grievances and to ensure that these grievances are heard in the relevant quarters, is its fundamental right. This right is specifically enshrined under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. Article 19(1)(a) confers a very valuable right on the citizens, namely, right of free speech. Likewise, Article 19(1)(b) gives the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Together, both these rights ensure that the people of this country have the right to assemble peacefully and protest against any of the actions or the decisions taken by the Government or other governmental authorities which are not to the liking. Legitimate dissent is a distinguishable feature of any democracy. Question is not as to whether the issue raised by the protestors is right or wrong or it is justified or unjustified. The fundamental aspect is the right which is conferred upon the affected people in a democracy to voice their grievances. Dissenters may be in minority. They have a right to express their views. A particular cause which, in the first instance, may appear to be insignificant or irrelevant may gain momentum and acceptability when it is duly voiced and debated. That is the reason that this Court has always - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 protected the valuable right of peaceful and orderly demonstrations and protests. 49. In Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra [Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 16 : (1961) 3 SCR 423] , this Court observed: (AIR p. 891, para 31) “31. The right of citizens to take out processions or to hold public meetings flows from the right in Article 19(1)(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms and the right to move anywhere in the territory of India.” 50. In Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar [Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 369 : AIR 1962 SC 1166] the Court was mainly dealing with the question whether the right to make a demonstration is protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and (b) and whether a government servant is entitled to this right. This Court held: (AIR p. 1171, para 13) “13. … A demonstration might take the form of an assembly and even then the intention is to convey to the person or authority to whom the communication is intended the feelings of the group which assembles. It necessarily follows that there are forms of demonstration which would fall within the freedoms guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b). It is needless to add that from the very nature of things a demonstration may take various forms; it may be noisy and disorderly, for instance stone-throwing by a crowd may be cited as an example of a violent and disorderly demonstration and this would not obviously be within Article 19(1)(a) or (b). It can equally be peaceful and orderly such as happens when the members of the group merely wear some badge drawing attention to their grievances.” 51. The Supreme Court has also gone beyond upholding the right to protest as a fundamental right and has held that - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 the State must aid the right to assembly of the citizens. In the Constitution Bench judgment, Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commr. of Police [Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commr. of Police, (1973) 1 SCC 227 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 280] , while dealing with the challenge to the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act regulating public meetings on streets, held that the Government has power to regulate which includes prohibition of public meetings on streets or highways to avoid nuisance or disruption to traffic and thus, it can provide a public meeting on roads, but it does not mean that the Government can close all the streets or open areas for public meetings, thus denying the fundamental right which flows from Articles 19(1)(a) and (b). The Court held: (SCC pp. 239 & 248, paras 33 & 70) “33. This is true but nevertheless the State cannot by law abridge or take away the right of assembly by prohibiting assembly on every public street or public place. The State can only make regulations in aid of the right of assembly of each citizen and can only impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order. 70. Public meeting in open spaces and public streets forms part of the tradition of our national life. In the pre- Independence days such meetings have been held in open space and public streets and the people have come to regard it as a part of their privileges and immunities. The State and the local authority have a virtual monopoly of every open space at which an outdoor meeting can be held. If, therefore, the State or Municipality can constitutionally close both its streets and its parks entirely to public meetings, the practical result would be that it would be impossible to hold any open-air meetings in any large city. The real problem is that of reconciling the city's function of providing for the exigencies of traffic in its streets and for the recreation of the public in its parks, with its other obligations, of providing adequate places for public discussion in order to safeguard the guaranteed right of public assembly. The assumption - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 made by Justice Holmes is that a city owns its parks and highways in the same sense and with the same rights as a private owner owns his property with the right to exclude or admit anyone he pleases. That may not accord with the concept of dedication of public streets and parks. The parks are held for public and the public streets are also held for the public. It is doubtless true that the State or local authority can regulate its property in order to serve its public purposes. Streets and public parks exist primarily for other purposes and the social interest promoted by untrammelled exercise of freedom of utterance and assembly in public street must yield to social interest which prohibition and regulation of speech are designed to protect. But there is a constitutional difference between reasonable regulation and arbitrary exclusion.” 52. While adjudicating with respect to the validity of police action against protestors, this Court again reiterated that right to protest was a fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens under Article 19. In Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re [Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re, (2012) 5 SCC 1 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 820 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 241 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 810] , the Court observed that the right to assembly and peaceful agitations were basic features of a democratic system and the Government should encourage exercise of these rights: (SCC p. 99, para 245) “245. Freedom of speech, right to assemble and demonstrate by holding dharnas and peaceful agitations are the basic features of a democratic system. The people of a democratic country like ours have a right to raise their voice against the decisions and actions of the Government or even to express their resentment over the actions of the Government on any subject of social or national importance. The Government has to respect and, in fact, encourage exercise of such rights. It is the abundant duty of the State to aid the exercise of the right to freedom of speech as understood in its comprehensive sense and not to throttle or frustrate exercise of such rights by exercising its executive or legislative powers and passing orders or taking action in - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 that direction in the name of reasonable restrictions. The preventive steps should be founded on actual and prominent threat endangering public order and tranquillity, as it may disturb the social order. This delegated power vested in the State has to be exercised with great caution and free from arbitrariness. It must serve the ends of the constitutional rights rather than to subvert them.” 53. Further, in Anita Thakur [Anita Thakur v. State of J&K, (2016) 15 SCC 525 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 695] , the Court recognised that the right to peaceful protest was a fundamental right under Articles 19(1), (b) and (c) of the Constitution, subject to reasonable restrictions. It was finally held that in that while the protestors turned violent first, the police used excessive force: (SCC pp. 533-34, paras 12-13 & 15) “12. We can appreciate that holding peaceful demonstration in order to air their grievances and to see that their voice is heard in the relevant quarters is the right of the people. Such a right can be traced to the fundamental freedom that is guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b) and 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) confers freedom of speech to the citizens of this country and, thus, this provision ensures that the petitioners could raise slogan, albeit in a peaceful and orderly manner, without using offensive language. Article 19(1)(b) confers the right to assemble and, thus, guarantees that all citizens have the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Right to move freely given under Article 19(1)(d), again, ensures that the petitioners could take out peaceful march. The “right to assemble” is beautifully captured in an eloquent statement that “an unarmed, peaceful protest procession in the land of “salt satyagraha”, fast-unto-death and “do or die” is no jural anathema”. It hardly needs elaboration that a distinguishing feature of any democracy is the space offered for legitimate dissent. One cherished and valuable aspect of political life in India is a tradition to express grievances through direct action or peaceful protest. Organised, non-violent protest marches were a key weapon in the struggle for - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 Independence, and the right to peaceful protest is now recognised as a fundamental right in the Constitution. 13. Notwithstanding above, it is also to be borne in mind that the aforesaid rights are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, as well as public order. It is for this reason, the State authorities many a times designate particular areas and routes, dedicating them for the purpose of holding public meetings. 15. Thus, while on the one hand, citizens are guaranteed fundamental right of speech, right to assemble for the purpose of carrying peaceful protest processions and right of free movement, on the other hand, reasonable restrictions on such right can be put by law. Provisions of IPC and CrPC, discussed above, are in the form of statutory provisions giving powers to the State to ensure that such public assemblies, protests, dharnas or marches are peaceful and they do not become “unlawful”. At the same time, while exercising such powers, the authorities are supposed to act within the limits of law and cannot indulge into excesses.” 54. The right to protest is, thus, recognised as a fundamental right under the Constitution. This right is crucial in a democracy which rests on participation of an informed citizenry in governance. This right is also crucial since it strengthens representative democracy by enabling direct participation in public affairs where individuals and groups are able to express dissent and grievances, expose the flaws in governance and demand accountability from the State authorities as well as powerful entities. This right is crucial in a vibrant democracy like India but more so in the Indian context to aid in the assertion of the rights of the marginalised and poorly represented minorities. 55. At the same time, the aforesaid rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution are not untrammelled and unlimited in their scope. Articles 19(2) to - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 (6) make a specific provision for imposing reasonable restrictions on the rights conferring restrictions on the exercise of such rights. Articles 19(2) and (3), in this behalf read as under: “19. (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, insofar as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. (3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.” 56. It can be deciphered from the aforesaid provisions that exercise of right to speech conferred in clause (a) and right to assemble peaceably and without arms in clause (b) is made subject to reasonable restrictions which can be imposed, inter alia, in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India or public order. This legal position is also accepted by all the parties. 57. In this hue, we have to examine as to whether total ban of demonstrations, etc. at Jantar Mantar Road amounts to violation of the rights of the protestors of the Constitution or this would amount to a reasonable restriction in the interest of “public order”. There would be also an incidental and interrelated issue, namely, whether the manner in which the demonstrations, etc. are held at Jantar Mantar, they violate the fundamental right of the residents guaranteed - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 under Article 21 of the Constitution. If the answer is in the affirmative, it would raise another issue, namely, balancing of the two rights. The right of the protestors under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution and the rights of the residents under Article 21 of the Constitution, as both the rights are fundamental rights. 58. In the aforesaid context, it would be pertinent to point out that there may be situations where conflict may arise between two fundamental rights. Situation can be conflict on inter-fundamental rights, intra-fundamental rights and, in certain peculiar circumstances, in respect of some person one fundamental right enjoyed by him may come in conflict with the other fundamental right guaranteed to him. In all such situations, the Court has to examine as to where lies the larger public interest while balancing the two conflicting rights. It is the paramount collective interest which would ultimately prevail. 59. We may reproduce the following discussion from the judgment of this Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India [Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 1] : (SCC pp. 318-19, paras 136-37) “Balancing of fundamental rights 136. To appreciate what we have posed hereinabove, it is necessary to dwell upon balancing the fundamental rights. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the right conferred under Article 19(1)(a) has to be kept at a different pedestal than the individual reputation which has been recognised as an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution. In fact the submission is that right to freedom of speech and expression which includes freedom of press should be given higher status and the individual's right to have his/her reputation should yield to the said right. In this regard a - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 passage from Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. [Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305] has been commended to us. It says: (AIR pp. 313-14, para 37) ‘37. … Freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be curtailed in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged, it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it are justifiable under clauses (3) to (6). For, the scheme of Article 19 is to enumerate different freedoms separately and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and clause (1) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the plain meaning of this clause. It follows from this that the State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom.’ 137. Having bestowed our anxious consideration on the said passage, we are disposed to think that the above passage is of no assistance to the petitioners, for the issue herein is sustenance and balancing of the separate rights, one under Article 19(1)(a) and the other, under Article 21. Hence, the concept of equipoise and counterweighing fundamental rights of one with other person. It is not a case of mere better enjoyment of another freedom. In Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat [Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 11] , it has been observed that a particular fundamental right cannot exist in isolation in a watertight compartment. One fundamental right of a person may have to coexist in harmony with the exercise of another fundamental right by others and also with reasonable and valid exercise of power by the State in the light of the directive principles in the interests of social welfare as a whole. The Court's duty is to strike a balance between competing claims of different interests. In DTC v. Mazdoor Congress [DTC v. Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1213] the Court has ruled that articles relating to fundamental rights are all parts of an integrated scheme in the Constitution and their waters must mix to constitute that grand flow of unimpeded and impartial justice; social, economic and political, and of equality of status and - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 opportunity which imply absence of unreasonable or unfair discrimination between individuals or groups or classes. In St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi [St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558 : 1 SCEC 404] this Court while emphasising the need for balancing the fundamental rights observed that: (SCC p. 612, para 96) ‘96. … It is necessary to mediate between Article 29(2) and Article 30(1), between letter and spirit of these Articles, between traditions of the past and the convenience of the present, between society's need for stability and its need for change.’” 60. In Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar [Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 376] , this test of larger public interest to balance two rights has been explained in the following manner: (SCC pp. 432-35, paras 57- 62) “57. The aforesaid decision [Ed.: The reference is to ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’, (1998) 8 SCC 296] is an authority for the proposition that there can be a conflict between two individuals qua their right under Article 21 of the Constitution and in such a situation, to weigh the balance the test that is required to be applied is the test of larger public interest and further that would, in certain circumstances, advance public morality of the day. To put it differently, the “greater community interest” or “interest of the collective or social order” would be the principle to recognise and accept the right of one which has to be protected. 58. In this context, reference to the pronouncement in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P. [Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., (1977) 1 SCC 677 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 147] would be instructive. In the said case, the Constitution Bench was dealing with two sets of appeals, one arising from Madhya Pradesh that related to Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam, 1968 and the other pertained to the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967. The two Acts insofar as they were concerned with prohibition of forcible conversion and punishment therefor, were similar. The larger Bench stated the facts from Madhya Pradesh case which eventually travelled to the High Court. The High Court ruled [Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., 1974 SCC OnLine MP 16 : AIR 1975 MP 163] that there was no justification for the argument that Sections 3, 4 and 5 were violative of Article 25(1) of the Constitution. The High Court went on to hold that those sections ‘establish the - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 equality of religious freedom for all citizens by prohibiting conversion by objectionable activities such as conversion by force, fraud and by allurement’. The Orissa Act was declared to be ultra vires the Constitution by the High Court. To understand the controversy, the Court posed the following questions: (Rev. Stainislaus case [Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., (1977) 1 SCC 677 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 147] , SCC p. 681, para 14) ‘14. … (1) whether the two Acts were violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 25(1) of the Constitution, and (2) whether the State Legislatures were competent to enact them?’ 59. It was contended before this Court that the right to propagate one's religion means the right to convert a person to one's own religion and such a right is guaranteed by Article 25(1) of the Constitution. The larger Bench dealing with the said contention held: (Rev. Stainislaus case [Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., (1977) 1 SCC 677 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 147] , SCC p. 682, para 20) ‘20. We have no doubt that it is in this sense that the word “propagate” has been used in Article 25(1), for what the article grants is not the right to convert another person to one's own religion, but to transmit or spread one's religion by an exposition of its tenets. It has to be remembered that Article 25(1) guarantees “freedom of conscience” to every citizen, and not merely to the followers of one particular religion, and that, in turn postulates that there is no fundamental right to convert another person to one's own religion because if a person purposely undertakes the conversion of another person to his religion, as distinguished from his effort to transmit or spread the tenets of his religion, that would impinge on the “freedom of conscience” guaranteed to all the citizens of the country alike.’ And again: (SCC p. 682, para 21) ‘21. … It has to be appreciated that the freedom of religion enshrined in the Article is not guaranteed in respect of one religion only, but covers all religions alike, and it can be properly enjoyed by a person if he exercises his right in a manner commensurate with the like freedom of persons following the other religions. What is freedom for one, is freedom for the other, in equal measure, and there can - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 therefore be no such thing as a fundamental right to convert any person to one's own religion.’ 60. The aforesaid judgment in Rev. Stainislaus case [Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., (1977) 1 SCC 677 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 147] clearly lays down, though in a different context, that what is freedom for one is also the freedom for the other in equal measure. The perception is explicated when the Court has said that it has to be remembered that Article 25(1) guarantees freedom of conscience to other citizens and not merely to followers of particular religion and there is no fundamental right to convert another person. The right is guaranteed to all citizens. The right to propagate or spread one's religion by an exposition of its tenets does not mean one's religion to convert another person as it affects the fundamental right of the other. We have referred to this authority as it has, in a way, dwelt upon the “intra-conflict of a fundamental right”. 61. Be it stated, circumstances may emerge that may necessitate for balancing between intra-fundamental rights. It has been distinctly understood that the test that has to be applied while balancing the two fundamental rights or inter- fundamental rights, the principles applied may be different than the principle to be applied in intra-conflict between the same fundamental right. To elaborate, as in this case, the accused has a fundamental right to have a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. Similarly, the victims who are directly affected and also form a part of the constituent of the collective, have a fundamental right for a fair trial. Thus, there can be two individuals both having legitimacy to claim or assert the right. The factum of legitimacy is a primary consideration. It has to be remembered that no fundamental right is absolute and it can have limitations in certain circumstances. Thus, permissible limitations are imposed by the State. The said limitations are to be within the bounds of law. However, when there is intra-conflict of the right conferred under the same article, like fair trial in this case, the test that is required to be applied, we are disposed to think, it would be “paramount collective interest” or “sustenance of public confidence in the justice dispensation system”. An example can be cited. A group of persons in the name of “class honour”, as has been stated in Vikas Yadav v. State of U.P. [Vikas Yadav v. State of U.P., (2016) 9 SCC 541 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 621] , cannot curtail or throttle the choice of a woman. It is because choice of woman in choosing her partner in life is a legitimate constitutional right. It is founded on - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 individual choice that is recognised in the Constitution under Article 19, and such a right is not expected to succumb to the concept of “class honour” or “group thinking”. It is because the sense of class honour has no legitimacy even if it is practised by the collective under some kind of a notion. Therefore, if the collective interest or the public interest that serves the public cause and further has the legitimacy to claim or assert a fundamental right, then only it can put forth that their right should be protected. There can be no denial of the fact that the rights of the victims for a fair trial is an inseparable aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution and when they assert that right by themselves as well as the part of the collective, the conception of public interest gets galvanised. The accentuated public interest in such circumstances has to be given primacy, for it furthers and promotes “Rule of Law”. It may be clarified at once that the test of primacy which is based on legitimacy and the public interest has to be adjudged on the facts of each case and cannot be stated in abstract terms. It will require studied scanning of facts, the competing interests and the ultimate perception of the balancing that would subserve the larger public interest and serve the majesty of rule of law. In this regard, we are reminded of an ancient saying: ‘Yadapi siddham, loka viruddham Na adaraniyam, na acharaniyam’ The aforesaid saying lays stress on public interest and its significance and primacy over certain individual interest. It may not thus have general application, but the purpose of referring to the same is that on certain occasions it can be treated to be appropriate. 62. There may be a perception that if principle of primacy is to be followed, then the right of one gets totally extinguished. It has to be borne in mind that total extinction is not balancing. When balancing act is done, the right to fair trial is not totally crippled, but it is curtailed to some extent by which the accused gets the right of fair trial and simultaneously, the victims feel that the fair trial is conducted and the court feels assured that there is a fair trial in respect of such cases. That apart, the faith of the collective is reposed in the criminal justice dispensation system and remains anchored.” - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 61. Undoubtedly, right of people to hold peaceful protests and demonstrations, etc. is a fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. The question is as to whether disturbances, etc. caused by it to the residents, as mentioned in detail by the NGT, is a larger public interest which outweighs the rights of protestors to hold demonstrations at Jantar Mantar Road and, therefore, amounts to reasonable restriction in curbing such demonstrations. Here, we agree with the detailed reasoning given by the NGT that holding of demonstrations in the way it has been happening is causing serious discomfort and harassment to the residents. At the same time, it is also to be kept in mind that for quite some time Jantar Mantar has been chosen as a place for holding demonstrations and was earmarked by the authorities as well. Going by the dicta in Asha Ranjan [Asha Ranjan v. State of Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 376] , principle of primacy cannot be given to one right whereby the right of the other gets totally extinguished. Total extinction is not balancing. Balancing would mean curtailing one right of one class to some extent so that the right of the other class is also protected. 62. We feel that the pathetic conditions which were caused as a result of the processions, demonstrations and agitations, etc. at the Jantar Mantar were primarily because of the reason that the authorities did not take necessary measures to regulate the same. Had adequate and sufficient steps been taken by the authorities to ensure that such dharnas and demonstrations are held within their bounds, it - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 would have balanced the rights of protestors as well as the residents. For example, the dharnas and protests were allowed to be stretched almost on the entire Jantar Mantar Road, on both sides, and even across the width of the road. Instead, a particular area could have been earmarked for this purpose, sufficiently away from the houses, etc. so that there is no unnecessary blockage of roads and pathways. Likewise, the demonstrators were allowed to go on with non- stop slogans, even at odd hours, at night, and that too with the use of loudspeakers, etc. The authorities could have ensured that such slogans are within the parameters of noise pollution norms and there are no shoutings or slogans at night hours or early morning hours. Again, these dharnas, agitations and processions could be prohibited on certain occasions, for example, whenever some foreign dignitaries visit and pass through the said area or other such sensitive occasions. The authorities could also ensure that the protestors do not bring their trucks/buses, etc. and park those vehicles in and around the residential buildings; the protestors are not allowed to pitch up their tents and stay for days together; they are not allowed to bathe or wash their clothes using Delhi Jal Board tankers or defecate in the open, on pavements; and do not create any unhygienic situations. The authorities could also examine, while allowing such demonstration, as to the number of protestors who are likely to participate and could refuse permission to hold any such demonstration, etc. when the number is going to be abnormally large which, if allowed, would per se create hardships of various kinds to the residents. These are some - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 of the examples given by us. The underlying message is that certain categories of peaceful protests and demonstrations, in a guarded and regulated manner, could be allowed so as to enable the protestors to exercise their right and, at the same time, ensuring that no inconvenience of any kind is caused to the residents. 63. Before the NGT, the authorities took the position that such demonstrations are to be allowed as the area was earmarked for such purposes. The residents, on the other hand, in the petition filed by them, highlighted the infringement of their rights which were caused by these demonstrations. In this kind of adversarial approach adopted by the parties before the NGT, the NGT went by the ground realities and the pathetic situation faced by the residents because of such demonstrations. Though this analysis of the NGT is without blemish, we, however, feel that the solution was not to ban the demonstrations altogether. Instead, the NGT would have directed the authorities to adopt such measures (some of which are indicated by us above) so that there is a balancing of the rights of both the sections of the society. 64. At this juncture, while discussing the aspect of balancing of the two rights, we have to keep in mind certain other relevant factors as well. In the first instance, what needs to be noted is that a portion of Ramlila Maidan has been earmarked for such demonstrations, etc. Therefore, that space is already available. One of the arguments raised by the petitioner in the writ petition and the appellants in the appeal is that Ramlila Maidan is far away from that portion of - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 New Delhi area where there is a concentration of “power” and, therefore, holding protests and demonstration at a far place in Ramlila Maidan would have no impact or very little effect. It was stressed that the purpose of holding such demonstrations and raising slogans is that they reach persons concerned for whom these are meant. This may be correct. However, it is also to be borne in mind that we are living in an era of technology where a concerned voice by a group of persons can reach the right quarters by numerous means. Electronic and print media play a pivotal role. Then, we have social media and various applications like “WhatsApp”, “Twitter”, “Instagram”, etc. which take no time in spreading such events. Secondly, though holding protests and demonstrations is an accepted right, at the same time, nobody can claim that I have a right to hold demonstration at one particular area only. While regulating such demonstrations in public interest, particular areas can be earmarked. On the other hand, it is also to be acknowledged that Ramlila Maidan may not be sufficient to cater to this requirement. Again, this place in old Delhi is a part of very congested area and it has its own limitations when it comes to using this area for such purposes. Therefore, some other area is required. Since, Jantar Mantar was the area chosen by the authorities and has been in use for quite some time, balancing can be done by permitting a limited part of this area for holding peaceful public meetings, processions, etc., at least to small groups and, in such a manner, that there is no disturbance or inconvenience of any nature whatsoever, insofar as residents are concerned. - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 65. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, we direct the Commissioner of Police, New Delhi in consultation with other agencies concerned, to devise a proper mechanism for limited use of the area for such purposes but to ensure that demonstrations, etc. are regulated in such a manner that these do not cause any disturbance to the residents of Jantar Mantar Road or the offices situated there. Detailed guidelines in this respect can be formulated. We may also clarify that a provision can be made for taking requisite prior permission from the Police Commissioner (or his delegated authority) for holding such demonstration by a particular group and while examining such proposals the parameters can be laid down which shall be looked into in order to decide whether the permission is to be granted or not. Two months' time is given to the Commissioner of Police, New Delhi for formulating such guidelines. 66. The petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1153 of 2017 wants boat club area to be available for demonstrations, etc. The petitioner has successfully demonstrated that it is their fundamental right under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. At the same time, it is also not denied that there can be reasonable restrictions on exercise of this right in the larger public interest. The respondents have also highlighted in equal measure the sensitivity of this area because of its proximity to the Parliament House, North and South Blocks and other Central Government offices, including frequent visits of Heads of foreign States and other such factors. The respondents are also justified in pointing out that alarmingly large number of - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 requests for holding demonstrations at this place are made. Further, intelligence reports reveal that some of such demonstrations, if allowed, may cause serious law and order situation. The respondents are also correct to the extent that this Court has not adopted “clear and present danger test” [Ed.: Devised by Justice Holmes in 1919, see Schenck v. United States, 1919 SCC OnLine US SC 62 : 63 L Ed 470 : 249 US 47 (1919)] , as applied by the US courts, and instead it is the “apprehension of breach of peace test” which is to be used in order to decide as to whether a particular demonstration/dharna is to be allowed or not. When orders passed under Section 144 CrPC are examined in this context, one may not find foul with such orders. These orders do not, on their face, appear to be infected with any illegality as they prohibit public meetings, assembly of five or more persons, processions, demonstrations, dharnas, etc. “without written permission”. Further, such orders are passed on the basis of intelligence reports which indicate that “unrestricted holding of public meetings”, processions, demonstrations, etc. in the area are likely to cause obstruction to traffic, danger to human safety and disturbance of public tranquillity. 67. The tenor or these orders and the specific language used therein bring about the following two features: (a) there should not be “unrestricted” holding of public meetings, processions, etc.; and (b) as a corollary, the order mentions that such public meetings, processions, demonstrations, etc. would not be allowed “without written permission”. - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 68. The reading of these orders, thus, would indicate that there is no absolute prohibition from holding public meetings, processions, demonstrations, etc. Such activities are to be restricted in larger public interest and, therefore, before any group of persons or person wants to carry out any such processions and dharnas, it has to take prior written permission. This clearly implies that whenever such a request is made, the authority is to examine the same and take a decision as to whether it should allow the proposed demonstration, public meeting, etc. or not, keeping in view its likely effect, namely, whether it would cause any obstruction to traffic or danger to human safety or disturbance to public tranquillity, etc. If requests made are considered and then allowed or rejected keeping in view the aforesaid considerations, there cannot be any quarrel as to the validity of such an order made under Section 144 CrPC. That is, however, not the ground reality.” 7. In the case of Javed Ahmed Hajam vs. State of Maharastra & Another – (2024) 4 SCC 156, the Apex Court held as under:- Consideration of submissions “ 6. The only offence alleged against the appellant is the one punishable under Section 153-AIPC. Section 153- AIPC, as it exists with effect from 4-9-1969, reads thus: “153-A. Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 residence, language, etc. and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.—(1) Whoever— (a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, or (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity, (c) organises any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending that the participants in such activity shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, or participates in such activity intending to use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, against any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community and such activity, for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Offence committed in place of worship, etc.—(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.” - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 In this case, clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 153- AIPC is admittedly not attracted. 7. In Manzar Sayeed Khan [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417] , while interpreting Section 153-A, in para 16, this Court held thus : (SCC p. 9) “16. Section 153-AIPC, as extracted hereinabove, covers a case where a person by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities or acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity. The gist of the offence is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-AIPC and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning.” 8. This Court in Manzar Sayeed Khan [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417] referred to the view taken by Vivian Bose, J., as a Judge of the erstwhile Nagpur High Court in Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt. [Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt., 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5 : AIR 1947 Nag 1] A Division Bench of the High Court dealt - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 with the offence of sedition under Section 124-AIPC and Section 4(1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. The issue was whether a particular article in the press tends, directly or indirectly, to bring hatred or contempt to the Government established in law. This Court has approved this view in its decision in Ramesh v. Union of India [Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266] . In the said case, this Court dealt with the issue of applicability of Section 153-AIPC. In para 13, it was held thus : (Ramesh case [Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266] , SCC p. 676) “13. … the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. … It is the standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law ‘the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus’. (Bhagwati Charan Shukla case [Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt., 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5 : AIR 1947 Nag 1] , SCC OnLine MP para 67)” Therefore, the yardstick laid down by Vivian Bose, J., will have to be applied while judging the effect of the words, spoken or written, in the context of Section 153-AIPC. 9. We may also make a useful reference to a decision of this Court in Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya [Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya, (2021) 15 SCC 35] . Paras 8 to 10 of the said decision read thus : (SCC pp. 41- 43) “8. ‘It is of utmost importance to keep all speech free in order for the truth to emerge and have a civil society.’— Thomas Jefferson. Freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is a very valuable fundamental right. However, the right is not - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 absolute. Reasonable restrictions can be placed on the right of free speech and expression in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Speech crime is punishable under Section 153- AIPC. Promotion of enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc. and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both under Section 153-A. As we are called upon to decide whether a prima facie case is made out against the appellant for committing offences under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c), it is relevant to reproduce the provisions which are as follows: 9. Only where the written or spoken words have the tendency of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or affecting public tranquillity, the law needs to step in to prevent such an activity. The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-AIPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. [Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 432] 10. The gist of the offence under Section 153-AIPC is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the piece of writing and the circumstances in which it was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417] .” 10. Now, coming back to Section 153-A, clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC is attracted when by words, either spoken or written or by signs or by visible - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 representations or otherwise, an attempt is made to promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities. The promotion of disharmony, enmity, hatred or ill will must be on the grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste, community or any other analogous grounds. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC will apply only when an act is committed which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity. 11. Now, coming to the words used by the appellant on his WhatsApp status, we may note here that the first statement is that August 5 is a Black Day for Jammu and Kashmir. 5-8-2019 is the day on which Article 370 of the Constitution of India was abrogated, and two separate Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir were formed. Further, the appellant has posted that “Article 370 was abrogated, we are not happy”. On a plain reading, the appellant intended to criticise the action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India. He has expressed unhappiness over the said act of abrogation. The aforesaid words do not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community. It is a simple protest by the appellant against the decision to abrogate Article 370 of the Constitution of India and the further steps taken based on that decision. The Constitution of India, under Article 19(1)(a), guarantees freedom of speech and expression. - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 Under the said guarantee, every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the action of abrogation of Article 370 or, for that matter, every decision of the State. He has the right to say he is unhappy with any decision of the State. 12. In Manzar Sayeed Khan [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417] , this Court has read “intention” as an essential ingredient of the said offence. The alleged objectionable words or expressions used by the appellant, on its plain reading, cannot promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities. The WhatsApp status of the appellant has a photograph of two barbed wires, below which it is mentioned that “AUGUST 5 — BLACK DAY — JAMMU & KASHMIR”. This is an expression of his individual view and his reaction to the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India. It does not reflect any intention to do something which is prohibited under Section 153-A. At best, it is a protest, which is a part of his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a). 13. Every citizen of India has a right to be critical of the action of abrogation of Article 370 and the change of status of Jammu and Kashmir. Describing the day the abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of protest and anguish. If every criticism or protest of the actions of the State is to be held as an offence under Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature of the Constitution of India, will not survive. - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 14. The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). Every individual must respect the right of others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against the decisions of the Government is an essential part of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner must be treated as a part of the right to lead a dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21. But the protest or dissent must be within four corners of the modes permissible in a democratic set up. It is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 19. In the present case, the appellant has not at all crossed the line. 15. The High Court has held [Javed Ahmed Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 819] that the possibility of stirring up the emotions of a group of people cannot be ruled out. The appellant's college teachers, students, and parents were allegedly members of the WhatsApp group. As held by Vivian Bose, J., the effect of the words used by the appellant on his WhatsApp status will have to be judged from the standards of reasonable women and men. We cannot apply the standards of people with weak and vacillating minds. Our country has been a democratic republic for more than 75 years. The people of our country know the importance of democratic values. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the words will promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious groups. The test to be applied is not the effect of the words on some individuals with weak minds or who see a danger in every hostile point of view. - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 The test is of the general impact of the utterances on reasonable people who are significant in numbers. Merely because a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will not be sufficient to attract clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC. 16. As regards the picture containing “Chand” and below that the words “14th August-Happy Independence Day Pakistan”, we are of the view that it will not attract clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC. Every citizen has the right to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their respective Independence Days. If a citizen of India extends good wishes to the citizens of Pakistan on 14th August, which is their Independence Day, there is nothing wrong with it. It is a gesture of goodwill. In such a case, it cannot be said that such acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed to the appellant only because he belongs to a particular religion. 17. Now, the time has come to enlighten and educate our police machinery on the concept of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the extent of reasonable restraint on their free speech and expression. They must be sensitised about the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. 19. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 10-4-2023 [Javed Ahmed Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 819] of the High Court - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 of Judicature at Bombay and quash the impugned FIR bearing No. 295 of 2022 registered at PS Hatkanangle, District Kolhapur, Maharashtra and the proceedings based on the impugned FIR. 20. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.” 8. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sharath Bachegowda & others vs. State by Hosakote P.S. & another – Crl.P.No.4067/2023 dated 07.07.2023, held as under: “ Heard Sri. Chand Pasha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri. Mahesh Shetty, the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondents No.1 and 2. 2. The petitioners are before this Court calling in question the proceedings in C.C.No.10277/2022, registered for offences punishable under Sections 341, 143, 147, 149 and 283 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the issue in the lis stands covered by two orders passed by, one by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Crl.P.No.3916/2018 disposed on 17.02.2020 and one by this Court in Crl.P.No.7575/2022 disposed on 22.08.2022, wherein held as follows: In Crl.P.No.3916/2018 disposed on 17.02.2020 has held as follows: " This petition is filed by petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the charge sheet in C.C. No.23259/2017 pending on the file of VIII - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 Additional CMM, Bengalulru for the offence punishable under Section 143 read with Section 149 of IPC. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for petitioners and learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent – State. 3. Though this case is listed for admission, with the consent of learned counsel appearing for both the parties, the same is taken up for final disposal. 4. The gist of the complaint is that on 23.05.2017 at about 11.30 a.m., received a credible information that a group of people gathered on Queen’s Road shouting slogans against the Government. Immediately, he went to the spot and found that 50 young men assembled illegally and disturbed the public and vehicles without prior permission from the station. On enquiry he found that they are the members of Campus Front of India Karnataka and protesting against interference religious and personal freedoms by imposing dress code in ‘AIIMS Exam’ which is against the personal and religious rights of our Constitution. Immediately they were disbursed and a case has been registered and after investigation, the charge sheet has been filed. 5. It is the submission of the learned counsel for petitioners that though there is no substantial material as against petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48, the respondent have investigated the case and have filed the charge sheet against petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48. It is his further submission that in order to file a charge sheet under Section 143 of IPC, the unlawful assembly must satisfy the ingredients as contemplated under Section 141 of IPC but none of the ingredients are satisfied in this case. It is his further submission that mere presence in an unlawful assembly, cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object, they were actuated by the common object and that object is one of those set out under Section 141 of IPC. It is his further submission that if the common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted either under Section 143 of IPC or under Section 149 of IPC. It is his further submission that the prosecution has to prove the overt- acts as against the persons who have been alleged as a member of unlawful assembly. In order to substantiate his said contention, he has relied upon the decision of - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CHARAN SINGH AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH reported in (2004) 4 SCC 205. It is his further submission that as per the Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies and Public Processions (Bangalore City) Order 2009, the permission is required in Bangalore City if the congregation of more than 250 persons assembling at one place with an intention to conduct the meeting, protest, to hear a public speech including political, social, religious and cultural meetings to which the public have got free access. The said condition specially says that no permission or license is required in Bangalore City if the congregation of more than 250 persons assembling at one place with an intention of conducting meeting to protest. It is the specific submission that petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 have given the letter dated 20.05.2017 seeking permission but no such permission is granted by the Commissioner of Police., under such circumstance, the said assembly cannot be held as an unlawful assembly and the provisions of Sections 141, 143, 147, 149, 188 of IPC are not attracted. On these grounds, he prayed to allow the petition and to quash the proceedings. 6. Per contra, learned High Court Government Pleader vehemently argued and submitted that as per the Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies and Public Processions (Bangalore City) order, 2009 the congregation of more than 250 persons is required but as per Section 141 of IPC, an assembly of five or more persons is considered to be an unlawful assembly and if they have assembled with a common object, then under such circumstance, accused persons can be prosecuted for the alleged offences. It is his further submission that the contents of the complaint and other materials clearly indicate that they were intending to proceed to Raj Bhavan in that light, they have obstructed the public traffic, public movement and thereby, they have violated the provisions of Section 141 of IPC and other provisions of law. It is his further submission that there are independent eye-witnesses and they have also categorically stated with regard to the overt-acts of each of the accused persons and there is ample materials to connect the accused persons to the alleged crime. On these ground, he prayed to dismiss the petition. - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 7. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties and perused the records. 8. On perusal of records, it is the case of the prosecution that the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 have assembled and were protesting against interference and dress code imposed by AIIMS exam and also have not obtained any permission from the concerned Authorities. But as could be seen from the Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies and Public Processions (Bangalore City) Order, 2009 assembly means a congregation of more than 250 persons assembling at one place with an intention of conducting meeting or protest, to hear a public speech including political, social, religious and cultural meetings to which the public have got free access, license is required only when more than 250 persons are there. Admittedly in the instant case, the contents of the complaint and other materials indicates that only 50 persons have assembled. In that light, a license said to have been is not necessary as per the Order of 2009. The only question which remains for consideration of this Court is that whether the assembly of petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 had constituted an unlawful assembly as per Section 141 of IPC? In order to attract the said provision, the assembly must satisfy five ingredients which have been stated therein but on close reading of the contents of the complaint, charge sheet material and other materials, it indicates that none of the ingredients are present as contemplated under Section 141 of IPC. 9. Be that as it may. If 50 persons have assembled at a particular place, then under such circumstance, it cannot be held as an unlawful assembly. Mere presence of a person in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141 of IPC. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CHARAN SINGH (Quoted supra) at paragraph No.13, it has been observed as under: “13. Coming to the others who were armed with double-barrelled guns and country-made pistols, the - 39 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 question is regarding applicability of Section 149 IPC. Section 149 IPC has its foundation on constructive liability which is the sine qua non for its operation. The emphasis is on the common object and not on common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149. The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of an assembly. The only thing required is that he should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within the purview of Section 141. The word “object” means the purpose or design and, in order to make it “common”, it must be shared by all. In other words, the object should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it. A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage. The expression “in prosecution of common object” as appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly construed as equivalent to “in order to attain the common object”. It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must be community of object and the object may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly may have community of object up to a certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects and the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not only according to the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of - 40 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 Section 149 IPC may be different on different members of the same assembly.” 10. On close perusal of the charge sheet material, it indicates that none of the ingredients specify in Section 141 of IPC are present so as to attract the provisions of Sections 141, 143, 149, 188 of IPC. When that being the case, then under such circumstances, the proceedings initiated as against petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 appears to be not in accordance with law and the same is liable to be quashed. 11. Accordingly, petition is allowed and the proceedings initiated in C.C. No.23259/2017 pending on the file of VIII Additional CMM, Bengaluru for the offence punishable under Section 143 read with Section 149 of IPC is hereby quashed. I.A. No.1/2018 does not survive for consideration. Accordingly, it is disposed off” In Crl.P.No.7575/2022 disposed on 22.08.2022 has held as follows: “The petitioners are before this Court calling in question the proceedings in C.C.No.2052/2014 registered for offences punishable under Sections 143, 144, 145, 353 read with Section 149 of the IPC. 2. Heard the learned counsel, Sri. Mohammed Tahir, appearing for the petitioners, Smt. K.P. Yashodha, learned HCGP appearing for the respondents and have perused the material on record. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the issue in the petition is akin to what is decided in Crl.P.No.3916/2018 disposed on 17.02.2020, wherein this Court has examined identical facts and offences alleged against the petitioners therein. While so examining, this Court has held as follows: “4. The gist of the complaint is that on 23.05.2017 at about 11.30 a.m., received a credible information that a group of people gathered on Queen’s Road shouting slogans against the Government. Immediately, he went to the spot and found that 50 young men assembled illegally and disturbed the public and vehicles without prior permission from the station. On enquiry he found that they - 41 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 are the members of Campus Front of India Karnataka and protesting against interference religious and personal freedoms by imposing dress code in ‘AIIMS Exam’ which is against the personal and religious rights of our Constitution. Immediately they were disbursed and a case has been registered and after investigation, the charge sheet has been filed. 5. It is the submission of the learned counsel for petitioners that though there is no substantial material as against petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48, the respondent have investigated the case and have filed the charge sheet against petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48. It is his further submission that in order to file a charge sheet under Section 143 of IPC, the unlawful assembly must satisfy the ingredients as contemplated under Section 141 of IPC but none of the ingredients are satisfied in this case. It is his further submission that mere presence in an unlawful assembly, cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object, they were actuated by the common object and that object is one of those set out under Section 141 of IPC. It is his further submission that if the common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted either under Section 143 of IPC or under Section 149 of IPC. It is his further submission that the prosecution has to prove the overt-acts as against the persons who have been alleged as a member of unlawful assembly. In order to substantiate his said contention, he has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CHARAN SINGH AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH reported in (2004) 4 SCC 205. It is his further submission that as per the Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies and Public Processions (Bangalore City) Order 2009, the permission is required in Bangalore City if the congregation of more than 250 persons assembling at one place with an intention to conduct the meeting, protest, to hear a public speech including political, social, religious and cultural meetings to which the public have got free access. The said condition specially says that no permission or license is required in Bangalore City if the congregation of more than 250 persons assembling at one place with an intention of conducting meeting to protest. It is the specific submission that petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 have given the letter dated 20.05.2017 seeking permission but no such permission is granted by the Commissioner of Police., under such circumstance, the said assembly cannot be held as an unlawful assembly and the provisions of - 42 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 Sections 141, 143, 147, 149, 188 of IPC are not attracted. On these grounds, he prayed to allow the petition and to quash the proceedings. 6. Per contra, learned High Court Government Pleader vehemently argued and submitted that as per the Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies and Public Processions (Bangalore City) order, 2009 the congregation of more than 250 persons is required but as per Section 141 of IPC, an assembly of five or more persons is considered to be an unlawful assembly and if they have assembled with a common object, then under such circumstance, accused persons can be prosecuted for the alleged offences. It is his further submission that the contents of the complaint and other materials clearly indicate that they were intending to proceed to Raj Bhavan in that light, they have obstructed the public traffic, public movement and thereby, they have violated the provisions of Section 141 of IPC and other provisions of law. It is his further submission that there are independent eye- witnesses and they have also categorically stated with regard to the overt-acts of each of the accused persons and there is ample materials to connect the accused persons to the alleged crime. On these ground, he prayed to dismiss the petition. 7. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties and perused the records. 8. On perusal of records, it is the case of the prosecution that the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 have assembled and were protesting against interference and dress code imposed by AIIMS exam and also have not obtained any permission from the concerned Authorities. But as could be seen from the Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies and Public Processions (Bangalore City) Order, 2009 assembly means a congregation of more than 250 persons assembling at one place with an intention of conducting meeting or protest, to hear a public speech including political, social, religious and cultural meetings to which the public have got free access, license is required only when more than 250 persons are there. Admittedly in the instant case, the contents of the complaint and other materials indicates that only 50 persons have assembled. In that light, a license said to have been is not necessary as per the Order of 2009. The only question which remains for consideration of this Court is that whether the assembly - 43 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 of petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 had constituted an unlawful assembly as per Section 141 of IPC? In order to attract the said provision, the assembly must satisfy five ingredients which have been stated therein but on close reading of the contents of the complaint, charge sheet material and other materials, it indicates that none of the ingredients are present as contemplated under Section 141 of IPC. 9. Be that as it may. If 50 persons have assembled at a particular place, then under such circumstance, it cannot be held as an unlawful assembly. Mere presence of a person in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141 of IPC. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CHARAN SINGH (Quoted supra) at paragraph No.13, it has been observed as under: “13. Coming to the others who were armed with double-barrelled guns and country-made pistols, the question is regarding applicability of Section 149 IPC. Section 149 IPC has its foundation on constructive liability which is the sine qua non for its operation. The emphasis is on the common object and not on common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149. The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of an assembly. The only thing required is that he should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within the purview of Section 141. The word “object” means the purpose or design and, in order to make it “common”, it must be shared by all. In other words, the object should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it. A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual - 44 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage. The expression “in prosecution of common object” as appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly construed as equivalent to “in order to attain the common object”. It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must be community of object and the object may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly may have community of object up to a certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects and the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not only according to the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149 IPC may be different on different members of the same assembly.” 10. On close perusal of the charge sheet material, it indicates that none of the ingredients specify in Section 141 of IPC are present so as to attract the provisions of Sections 141, 143, 149, 188 of IPC. When that being the case, then under such circumstances, the proceedings initiated as against petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 appears to be not in accordance with law and the same is liable to be quashed 11. Accordingly, petition is allowed and the proceedings initiated in C.C. No.23259/2017 pending on the file of VIII Additional CMM, Bengalulru for the offence punishable under Section 143 read with Section 149 of IPC is hereby quashed.” The aforesaid order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court would cover the case at hand on all its fours. That apart, no untoward incident has occurred in the protest. There are no independent witnesses who would speak about the incident as alleged against the petitioners, which has happened in a broad day light, apart from police officials, who are examined as witnesses. 4. Therefore, in the light of the order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court supra, the following: - 45 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 ORDER (i) Criminal Petition is allowed. (ii) Proceedings pending in C.C.No.2052/2014 on the file of the II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Mysuru, stands quashed qua the petitioners.” 4. In the light of the orders passed by this Court and the Co-ordinate Bench (supra) and for the reasons aforementioned, the following: ORDER (i) The Criminal Petition is allowed. (ii) The proceedings in C.C.No.10277/2022 pending on the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dn) & JMFC Court, Hoskote, Bangalore Rural District stands quashed.” 9. A similar view has been expressed by the Madras High Court in the case of Jaffar Sathick @ Jahabar Sathick vs. State & Another – Crl.O.P.(MD)No.4609/2021 dated 25.03.2021, and in the case of J.Jayaraj & others vs. Chief Educational Officer – W.P.No.(MD)Nos.13049/ 2022 & connected matters dated 25.09.2023. 10. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, and the principles enunciated in the aforesaid judgments, the necessary ingredients constituting the alleged offences by the petitioners are - 46 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:31644 WP No. 853 of 2025 completely and totally absent and consequently, continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioners would amount to an abuse of process of law warranting interference by this Court in the preset petition. 11. In the result, I pass the following:- ORDER (i) Petition is hereby allowed. (ii) The impugned proceedings in C.C.No.1664/2024 arising out of Crime No.80/2024 registered by the 1st respondent –Police, pending on the file of Prl. Civil Judge & JMFC, Udupi, insofar as the petitioners are concerned are hereby quashed. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE SD/SRL List No.: 1 Sl No.: 88