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2025 DAILYLAW 48374 (CHH)

AVINASH RAI v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

CRA/396/2024 · 2025-12-10

Shri Arvind Kumar Verma

Criminal Appealbody2025

Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:60235 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 396 of 2024 1 - Avinash Rai S/o Vinod Rai Aged About 34 Years R/o Housing Board, Bhilai, P.S. Jamul, District Durg (C.G.) .. Appellant(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Balod, District Balod (C.G.) ---- Respondent ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant : Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, Advocate. For State/Respondent : Mr. Nupur Trivedi, P.L. For Objector : Mr. Aditya Tiwari, Advocate ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge Order on Board 11.12.2025 1. With the consent of the parties, the present matter is heard 4nally. 2. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 04.12.2023, passed in Special Session Case No. 125/2020 by which the learned Special Sessions Judge, Balod District Balod, (C.G.), whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as follows:- 2 Convicted under Sections Sentenced to 324 of Indian Penal Code S.I. for 1 year with fine of Rs. 2000/- in default of payment of which, addi- tional S.I. for one months 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is this that on the date of incident i.e. 29.10.2020, the complainant Smt. Laxmi Nandre submitted a written complaint at Police Station Balod stating that Constable Avinash Rai, during his posting at Rakshit Kendra, Balod, was residing as a tenant in her house. After his transfer to Rakshit Kendra, Durg, he went to Durg. Thereafter, on 24.10.2020, he came to the complainant’s house to recover the amount which he had earlier lent to her and stayed there. The accused Avinash Rai used to treat the complainant’s younger daughter Kumari Gunja as his own daughter and often played with her. On 29.10.2020 at about 8:30 PM, the accused repeatedly insisted that the minor girl should call him “Papa”. Upon her refusal, the accused abused her with 4lthy and obscene words relating to mother and sister, and burnt her face, stomach, back and hands with a lighted cigarette, causing blisters at several places, and also assaulted her with a belt. When the complainant objected to such acts, the accused abused her as well with 4lthy and caste-based derogatory words and assaulted her, causing pain in her arm, back and knee. The complainant further stated that the said incident was seen and 3 heard by nearby residents. On receipt of the said information, FIR No. 338/2020 was registered at Police Station Balod against the accused under Sections 294, 323, 324 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and Section 3(2)(a) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and the matter was taken up for investigation. 4. Prosecution in order to prove its case examined total 14 witnesses. Statements of appellant (accused) was also recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he denied all incriminating evidence appearing against him, pleaded innocence and false implication. 5. After hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating evidence available on record, the trial Court vide impugned judgment dated 04.12.2023 convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant in the manner as described above of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for appellant submits that the appellant has 4led an application i.e. I.A. No. 1/2025 an application for grant of permission to compound the oEence under Section 324 ofIPC/118(1) of BNS and application for under Section 320(2) r/w Section 320(5) and Section 320(4)(A) of the CrPC for gant of permission to compound the oEence under Section 324 of IPC. He further submits that the oEence under Section 324 of IPC is compoundable with the permission of the Court under Section 320(2) of the Cr.P.C./359(2) of the BNSS. The table under Section 4 320 Cr.P.C./359 of BNSS speci4es that the person competent to compound the oEence under Section 324 IPC/118 (1) of BNS is "The person to whom hurt is caused." Since the victim is a minor, she is incompetent to enter into a contract or compound the oEence directly. Therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Section 320(4)(a) of the Cr.P.C./ 359(4)(a) of the BNSS, her mother and natural guardian, Smt. Laxmi Nandre, who is competent to contract on the minor's behalf, is compounding the oEence. Section 320(5) of the Cr.P.C./ Section 359(5) of the BNSS speci4cally provides that when the accused has been committed for trial or when he has been convicted and an appeal is pending, no composition for the oEence shall be allowed without the leave of the Court to which he is committed, or, as the case may be, before which the appeal is to be heard. The compromise has been arrived at voluntarily by the Respondents/Complainant side, without any fear, coercion, threat, or undue inHuence from any corner. In view of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties, continuing the present criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and would not serve the ends of justice, therefore he prays that the parties may be permitted to compound the oEence, and the Appellant may be acquitted of the charges. 7. Learned counsel for the Objector/complainant does not oppose the submission of the learned counsel of the appellant as the compromise has been arrived at voluntarily between the parties and the mother of the victim, after considering the future and 5 welfare of her minor daughter and the family, has decided to compound the oEence. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supporting the impugned judgment and submits that the act committed by the appellant makes him liable for conviction under Section 324 of IPC. Being so, the impugned judgment is strictly in accordance with law and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 9. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the recorded placed on record. 10. Dr. Prabha Barman (PW-10) medically examined the victim and proved her medical reports as Exhibits P-26, P-27 and P-28. She stated that the victim was brought for examination by Woman Head Constable Narmada Kothari of Police Station Balod. At the time of examination, the victim was in a normal condition and ambulatory. On examination, multiple burn spots were found on the body, mostly small in size, present mainly on the face, cheeks, scalp, chin and above the right eye. Burn injuries were also found on the chest, abdomen, right hand, right leg and other parts of the body, predominantly on the right side. The size of the injuries ranged from 0.5 cm to 1.25 cm. Some larger burn marks were present on the abdomen and cheeks. The injuries were assessed as super4cial second-degree burns. PW-10 opined that the injuries appeared to have been caused by a burning solid object such as a cigarette or burning stick. The injuries were simple in nature, involved approximately 15% of the body surface, and were 6 of 36–48 hours duration. If no infection occurred, such injuries would normally heal within 7–10 days. She further noticed linear burn injuries on the back, measuring 9 cm, 8 cm, 6 cm, 5 cm and 2.5 cm, each about 1.25 cm wide, with central yellowing and red margins, consistent with contact by a hot solid object placed longitudinally on the skin, possibly a burning cigarette. 11. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the entire evidence on record. The prosecution examined fourteen witnesses to establish its case. The testimony of the complainant and other material witnesses consistently proves the occurrence and the role attributed to the appellant. Nothing material could be elicited in their cross-examination to discredit their version. 12. The medical evidence of Dr. Prabha Barman (PW-10) fully corroborates the ocular testimony. The doctor found multiple burn injuries on the victim, assessed as super4cial second-degree burns, caused by a burning solid object such as a cigarette or burning stick. The injuries were found to be simple in nature, covering approximately 15% of the body surface, and were of 36– 48 hours duration, which is consistent with the time of the incident. The medical opinion clearly supports the prosecution case regarding the manner of assault. 13. Although the injuries were opined to be simple, the use of a heated object brings the act squarely within the ambit of Section 324 IPC, which penalizes voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous 7 weapons or means. The trial Court has rightly applied the said provision, and no perversity or illegality is found in the appreciation of evidence. 14. As regards the plea for compounding, it is true that an oEence under Section 324 IPC is compoundable with the permission of the Court under Section 320(2) CrPC / Section 359(2) BNSS. Since the victim is a minor, compounding has been sought through her mother and natural guardian under Section 320(4)(a) CrPC / Section 359(4)(a) BNSS, with leave of this Court as required under Section 320(5) CrPC / Section 359(5) BNSS. 15. However, the power to permit compounding at the appellate stage is discretionary and not automatic. The Court must consider the nature of the oEence, the manner of commission, the age of the victim, and the impact on society. In the present case, the victim is a minor child, and the act involves inHiction of burn injuries by a heated object. Such conduct cannot be viewed as a purely private dispute amenable to settlement. Permitting compounding in such circumstances would defeat the object of criminal law and send a wrong signal to society. 16. It is well settled that the power of the Court to permit compounding, particularly at the appellate stage, is discretionary and must be exercised having regard to the nature of the oEence, the manner of its commission, the age and vulnerability of the victim, and the societal impact of the crime. 17. The Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 8 (2012) 10 SCC 303, and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, has held that even where settlement is permissible, the Court must refrain from giving eEect to compromise in cases involving serious oEences or oEences having a social impact, particularly those involving cruelty, violence, or oEences against vulnerable victims. The Court has further reiterated in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, that compromise should not be accepted where the oEence is not merely private in nature or where the conduct of the accused shocks the conscience of the Court. 18. Moreover, upon a full re-appreciation of evidence, this Court 4nds that the conviction of the appellant is fully justi4ed on merits. Once the prosecution case stands proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the 4ndings of the trial Court are free from perversity or illegality, there is no compelling reason to exercise discretion in favour of compounding so as to nullify a lawful conviction. 19. The sentence imposed—simple imprisonment for one year with 4ne of Rs. 2,000/-—is well within the statutory limits prescribed under Section 324 IPC and cannot be said to be excessive or disproportionate considering the nature of the act and the age of the victim. The trial Court has exercised its discretion judiciously. 20. Upon an overall re-appreciation of the evidence, this Court 4nds that the 4ndings of conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and 9 correct application of law, and do not suEer from any in4rmity warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction. 21. Consequently, the criminal appeal being devoid of merit, is dismissed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 04.12.2023, passed by the learned Special Sessions Judge, Balod District Balod (C.G.) in Special Sessions Case No. 125/2020, is hereby aOrmed. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge Jyoti