- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 7TH DAY OF APRIL, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA WRIT APPEAL NO.100192 OF 2022 (SCST) BETWEEN: SIDDAPPA S/O. DHAREPPA MEESHI AGE. 49 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE, R/O. NEAR MURAGOD PETROL PUMP, JAMAKHANDI-587301, BAGALKOT. …APPELLANT (BY SRI. A. LOURDU MARIYAPPA, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SMT. PARVATHI W/O. MADIWALAPPA MURAGOUD AGE. 79 YEARS, OCC. HOUSE HOLD, 2. BHAVURAJ S/O. MADIWALAPPA MURAGOUD AGE. 59 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS, 3. ARAVIND S/O. MADIWALAPPA MURAGOUD AGE. 56 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS, 4. GEETA D/O. MADIWALAPPA MURAGOUD AGE. 54 YEARS, OCC. HOUSE HOLD, RESPONDENTS NO.1-4 ARE R/O. NEAR MURAGOD PETROL PUMP, JAMAKHANDI-587301, BAGALKOT DISTRICT. 5. SIDDALINGAPPA S/O. BASAPPA MURAGOUD AGE. 61 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS, R/O. NEAR MURAGOD PETROL PUMP, JAMAKHANDI-587301, BAGALKOT DISTRICT. MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR Digitally signed by MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 6. MAHADEVI W/O. MALLIKARJUN MURAGOD AGE. 56 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS, R/O. NEAR MURAGOD PETROL PUMP, JAMAKHANDI-587301, BAGALKOT DISTRICT. 7. RAMESH S/O. MALLIKARJUN MURAGOD AGE. 46 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS, R/O. NEAR MURAGOD PETROL PUMP, JAMAKHANDI-587301, BAGALKOT DISTRICT. 8. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED REG. OFF:G-9, ALIYAVAR JUNG MARG BANDRA (EAST) MUMBAI-400051, MAHARASHTRA STATE, R/BY CHAIRMAN. 9. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER JAMAKHANDI DIVISION, JAMAKHANDI-587301, BAGALKOT DISTRICT. 10. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BAGALKOT DISTRICT, BAGALKOT-587101. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. SHRIHARSH NEELOPANT, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R4; SRI. C.V. ANGADI, ADVOCATE FOR R8; SRI. M.M. KHANNUR, AGA FOR R9 & R10; NOTICE TO R7 IS SERVED) THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S.4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO, ALLOW THE ABOVE WRIT APPEAL AND THERE BY SET-ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE HON’BLE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE ORDER DATED 22-03-2022 IN W.P.NO.63416/2011(SC-ST) AND ETC. THIS WRIT APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT) Respondent No.1 before the Writ Court is in appeal under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court, 1961, being aggrieved by the order dated 22.03.2022 passed in W.P. No.63416/2011 whereunder the resumption order dated 15.07.2010 (Annexure-C) and the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 19.05.2011 are quashed. 2. Heard Sri. Lourdu Mariyappa, learned counsel for appearing for appellant/respondent No.1, Sri. Shriharsh Neelopant, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 4, Sri. Madanmohan M.Khannur, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondents No.9 & 10, and Sri. C.V.Angadi, learned counsel for respondent No.8. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant/respondent No.1 claims that the land in question was granted to his father in March, 1965. Thereafter, on 27.03.1969, the property was sold in favour of the father of the respondents herein i.e., the petitioners before the learned - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 Single Judge. Appellant/respondent No.1 approached respondent No.9-Assistant Commissioner seeking resumption of land in question under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short, ‘the PTCL Act’). Respondent No.6-Assistant Commissioner under Order dated 15.07.2010 allowed the said application and directed restoration of land to the appellant herein. The respondents/petitioners’ father being aggrieved filed appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioner by order dated 19.05.2011 confirmed the order of the Assistant Commissioner. Aggrieved by both the orders of the Assistant Commissioner as well as the Deputy Commissioner, the petitioners were before this Court in W.P. No.63416/2011. The learned Single Judge taking note of the fact that the application for resumption is filed by respondent No.1 i.e., appellant herein, after 40 years from the date of sale, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka and Another1 allowed the writ petition and quashed 1 2017 SCC OnLIne SC 1862 - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 the order of the Assistant Commissioner, dated 15.07.2010, and the order of the Deputy Commissioner, dated 19.05.2011. Aggrieved by the same, respondent No.1 is in appeal. 4. Learned counsel, Sri. Lourdu Mariyappa, appearing for appellant/respondent No.1 contends that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the material on record and further submits that placing reliance on Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi’s case by the learned Single Judge is misplaced. He submits that when the sale has taken place contrary to the provisions of the PTCL Act, the question of limitation would not arise. He submits that the amendment brought to the PTCL Act would state that there is no limitation to file resumption application. Therefore, the learned counsel would submit that the order of the learned Single Judge is illegal and opposed to material on record, and prays for allowing the writ appeal by setting aside the order passed in the writ petition. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the writ petitioners submit that there is an inordinate delay of 40 years in seeking resumption of land. Learned counsel would submit that the sale has taken place in the year 1969, whereas application for - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 resumption is filed in the year 2010. The decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi’s case (supra) would aptly apply to the facts of the present case and thus he supports the order of the learned Single Judge. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the writ appeal papers, the only point that falls for consideration is, Whether the order of the learned Single Judge requires interference at the hands of this Court? 7. The answer to the above point would be in the negative for the following reasons: (a) Respondent No.1/appellant claims that the land in question was granted to his father on 12.03.1965 in terms of Annexure-A. However, on going through Annexure-A, it is seen that it is not a grant order and it is an enquiry under Section 37(2) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code [Section 67(2) of the Mysore Land Revenue Act, 1964]. The appellant has not placed any material to establish that the land in question is a granted land. Be that as it may. - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 (b) The claim of respondent No.1/appellant is that the land is a granted land in terms of Annexure-A, dated 12.03.1965, and the sale of the land in question has taken place on 27.03.1969, whereas the application for resumption of land under Section 5 of the PTCL Act was filed before respondent No.6-Assistant Commissioner only in the year 2009 nearly after 40 years from the date of sale. The delay in filing the resumption application is inordinate and would not stand to reason. In the application for resumption and even in the writ petition, there is no averment as to why there was 40 years delay in filing the resumption application. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi’s case (supra) has held that if the application for restoration is not made within a reasonable time, the authorities would not get jurisdiction to initiate such proceedings. It is true that no limitation is prescribed under the PTCL Act and it is also true that the State Government has brought an amendment to the effect that no limitation would come into play in filing the resumption application. But any action to seek any relief one should approach the Court or competent authority within a reasonable time. The delay in approaching either the - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 competent authority or Court and entertaining such belated application would put the other party in a prejudicial position. (c) A co-ordinate Bench had an occasion to consider identical contention raised with regard to amendment brought to Section 5 of the Act in the case of Smt.Gouramma @ Gangamma Vs. State of Karnataka and Others2. The relevant portions of the said decision read as follows: "3. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Government Advocate, we decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons: (a) The subject land does not answer the definition of ‘granted land’ in terms of Section 2(b) of the 1978 Act cannot be much disputed, inasmuch as the grant was not on account of social status of the grantee. The said grant was originally made in 1930 and later in 1958. The sale of this land happened vide registered Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn, sold a part of the land to one Mr.Mahadevappa vide registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly, the resumption application filed earlier was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against the same also came to be turned down vide order 27.08.2004. Even prior to this, there were resumption orders that were set 2 W.A. No.100101/2014, disposed of on 29.07.2024 - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 aside by a learned Single Judge in W.P. No.2608/2000 vide order dated 22.11.2000, remitting the matter back for fresh consideration. That is how the subsequent application came to be moved; that was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002. Even appeal met the same fate vide order 23.12.2003. (b) When above was the state of things as per record, it is ununderstandable as to how persons claiming under the original grantee could move another application afresh on 27.08.2004. The Assistant Commissioner could not have allowed the said application vide order dated 22.11.2004. It sounds strange that even the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the appeal against the same vide order dated 17.03.2011. The records reveal that the first alienation took place vide Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972 and the subject application for resumption was filed on 27.08.2004. In the meanwhile, the Re-grant of the land was obtained since it was a “hereditary land” falling within the precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. Apparently, there is a time gap of about thirty- two years spanning between alienation and the filing of resumption application. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the laches that militate on record and against justice. Thus, the case squarely fits into the Apex Court decision in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs State Of Karnataka, that tardy and belated claims should not be - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 favoured. This reasoning has animated the impugned judgment, rightly and therefore, the same cannot be faltered. (c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses (c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section and therefore, the concept of “limitation and delay” has to remain miles away. These new clauses read as under: “(c) notwithstanding anything conained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.” It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time, the 1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for moving application for the resumption of granted land after it is alienated. (d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity. (e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of “limitation period” at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time between alienation of granted land and the filing of claim for its resumption. Observations occurring in para 8 of the decision lend support to this view: "8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled….. ” (Emphasis is ours) Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the above case has not been altered by the subject amendment, even in the least. (f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas “laches” is decided keeping in view a host of factors. - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate. (g) There is a marked difference between ‘delay & laches’ that operate in equity and ‘limitation & delay’ that obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan make out this point: "Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create nonconsideration of condonation in certain circumstances.… The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches. 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.” (h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment has been put in challenge in W.P. No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending consideration. We make it clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We do not want to say even a word about the validity, that is being examined by the learned Single Judge before whom the matter is pending. We have only placed our interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act and nothing beyond." 8. The learned Single Judge, rightly placing reliance on Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi’s decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, has rejected the writ petition on the ground that the application for resumption is filed after 40 years from the date of sale. There is no reason to disagree with the finding of the learned Single Judge. - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:6182-DB WA No. 100192 of 2022 9. The appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly, the appeal stands rejected. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are disposed of as not surviving for consideration. Sd/- (S G PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (C.M. POONACHA) JUDGE KMS, CT:VP LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 2