2025:CGHC:59219 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 634 of 2019 1 - Gajpati Ratre S/o Ratnu Ratre Aged About 46 Years R/o Village Supa, Police Station And Tahsil Pusour, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Ganesh Ram S/o Ram Singh Aazad Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Jevara, Police Station And Tahsil Sarangarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - Ghanshyam Sahu S/o Ratthu Ram Sahu Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Reda, Police Station And Tahsil Sarangarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Oriental Insurance Com. Ltd. Branch Office Tiwari Baar Ke Pass Raigarh, Tahsil And District Raigarh Chhattisgarh, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manoj Kumar Jaiswal, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Suman Keshari, Adv For Respondent No.3 : Ms. Shrishti Upadhyay, Adv. (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput) Order on Board 05/12/2025 1. Challenge in this writ petition is to an order dated 26.04.2019 passed by learned First Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Raigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh in Civil Case No. MJC Civil / 109/ 2018 by which the application of the petitioner filed under Order 9 Rule 9 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) and Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 (for short “Limitation Act”), was dismissed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner sustained permanent special ablement on account of an accident that occurred on 16.07.2003 by rash and negligent driving of offending vehicle i.e. commander Jeep bearing DL- 4/C.C.- 2 5134 driven by respondent No.2, owned by respondent No.1 and insured with respondent No.3. An application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “MV Act”) was filed before the 4th Additional Motor Accident claims Tribunal Raigarh (CG) which was registered as Claim Case No.77/2004. Vide its award dated 05.07.2005, the learned Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.3,11,578/- with interest and the insurance company was directed to deposit the amount. The said award was challenged by respondent No.3/ Insurance Company before this Court in MAC No. 1339/ 2005. This Court vide its order dated 13.01.2012 partly allowed the appeal of Insurance Company and remanded the matter before the learned Claims Tribunal for fresh adjudication. Thereafter, the claim case remained pending before the learned claims tribunal. The claim case was listed on 11.03.2016 for evidence and was dismissed for default on account of absence of the petitioner. Later, on 09.09.2018 the petitioner moved an application under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC for restoration of the claim case. The learned claims tribunal vide the impugned order held that non-appearance of the petitioner before the Claims Tribunal was not bonafide, and thus rejected the application filed under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC read with Section 151 of CPC and Section 5 of Limitation Act. It was further observed that the petitioner appeared on 23.01.2013 and remained absent till 16.03.2016. He submits that the petitioner is a rustic villager and, after the award was earlier passed in his favour, he suffered a permanent special ablement and is somehow he managing his livelihood. For that purpose, he had gone out and was not in contact with his counsel. Therefore, his appearance could not be made on the date fixed, which is not bonafide in nature. As soon as he came to know about the registration of the claim case, the application was filed with an application for condonation of delay. He submits that the delay is not intentional/ bonafide and the MV Act is a benevolent legislation, the learned Claims Tribunal should have considered this aspect of the matter. Therefore, he submits that the impugned order may be set aside restoring the Claim Case No. 77/ 2004 to its original number. 3 3. Opposing the submissions, Mr. Keshari submits that the conduct of the petitioner was not bonafide. He submits that the case is of the year 2004 and, after the remand, the petitioner did not appear for almost 2-3 years before the Claims Tribunal. Thus, the Claims Tribunal has rightly rejected his claim application for want of prosecution. The application for restoration of claim application was also filed after a considerable period of delay, and no sufficient cause has been shown, therefore, this writ petition has no merit and is liable to be rejected. 4. Ms. Upadhyay adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Keshari and further submits that the petitioner ought to have been vigilant in prosecuting his case, which he failed to do so. She states that in the event this Court allows the writ petition and restores the claim application before the Claims Tribunal, and in the event any award is passed, the Insurance Company would be saddled with interest for which the Insurance Company is not liable for the mistake committed by the petitioner. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. From a perusal of the record, it appears that an award was passed in favour of the petitioner on 05.07.2005. The said award was challenged by respondent No.3/ Insurance Company before this Court, which ultimately set aside the award passed, and the matter was remanded back. From the record, it appears that the petitioner was not vigilant about the prosecution of the claim case. However, from a perusal of the material available on record and submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears that the petitioner had gone to earn his livelihood. The Motor Vehicle Act is a benevolent legislation, and particularly looking to the fact that an award has already been passed by the learned Claims Tribunal, though it was set aside, an observation was made by this Court while setting aside the award that the amount which the Insurance Company has deposited, shall remain fixed deposit in a nationalized bank for a period of one year extendable from time to time. The delay appears to be about 2 years and 6 months and period of delay is not the only criteria for rejecting an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. It is the sufficient cause which is shown by a person seeking for condonation of delay sometime long 4 delay may be condoned and some time a shorter period of delay may not be condoned, as it is the sufficient cause which is the paramount consideration. 7. The Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 held as under:- “A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss. In this case explanation for the delay set up by the appellant was found satisfactory to the trial court in the exercise of its discretion and the High Court went wrong in upsetting the finding, more so when the High Court was exercising reversional jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the respondent must be compensated particularly because the appellant has secured a sum of Rs. Fifty thousand from the delinquent advocate through the Consumer Disputes Riderless Forum. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the impugned order by restoring the order passed by the trial court but on a condition that appellant shall pay a sum of Rupee Ten thousand to the respondent (or deposit it in this court within one month from this date.” 8. Parameters to allow the application for condonation of delay has been well settled by the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing 5 Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 450 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 21 observed as under:- “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant S.A. No.331 of 2013 not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking Page 7 of 8 recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 6 xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 9. In the case in hand, in the opinion of this Court and for the reasons assigned by the petitioner, this Court is inclined to condone the delay in filling the application under Order 9 Rule 9 of the CPC. As the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for non- appearance on the date, the impugned order cannot sustain and is liable to be set aside. The Claim Case No. 77/ 2004 is restored to its original number. However, this Court is conscious of the fact that the initial award was passed in the year 2005 and Insurance Company must have deposited a certain amount in compliance with the same. For the delay on account of the petitioner, respondent No.3 cannot be saddled with the interest in the event any award is passed. Thus, in order to strike the balance, it is observed that while deciding the claim application, the learned Claims Tribunal would keep in mind these aspects of the matter and pass an appropriate order with regard to the imposition of interest if the award is passed in favour of the petitioner. 10. With this observation, this writ petition is disposed of. 11. All pending applications stand disposed of. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) JUDGE Parul PARUL MITTAL Digitally signed by PARUL MITTAL Date: 2025.12.10 11:15:34 +0530