1 2025:CGHC:59106-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1339 of 2021 Sanju Patel S/o Late Rikhi Ram Patel Aged About 36 Years Patel Complex, Near Adarsh Nagar Gate, Mova, P.S.Pandri, Dist. Raipur (C.G.), District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The S.H.O. P.S. - Pandri, Dist. Raipur (C.G.). ...Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Devershi Thakur, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Soumya Rai, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge 05 .12.2025 1. Heard Mr. Devershi Thakur, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the SOURABH BHILWAR Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2025.12.09 10:50:46 +0530 2 respondent/State. 2. This criminal appeal 2led by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.10.2021, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Raipur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 249/2018, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction under Section Sentence U/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code Imprisonment for life and 2ne of Rs. 1,000/-, with default stipulation. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the deceased, Rikhi Ram Patel (father of the appellant herein) was employed at the Bhilai Steel Plant and, after retiring about 10-12 years ago, lived with his family in his house Patel Complex, located near Adarsh Nagar Gate, Mowa, Raipur. The deceased had four sons, Devendra Patel, Santosh Patel, Ashwan Patel, and the accused, Sanju Patel, out of them, Santosh Patel has died. The accused, Sanju Patel, is the eldest son of the deceased. The Patel Complex contains eight shops and several houses. The deceased Rikhi Ram Patel used to collect the rent for the rented shops. The accused did not work and wandered around all day. Rikhi Ram paid the accused Rs.10,000/- per month for expenses, but despite this, the accused continued to argue with him regularly. On July 31, 2018, at approximately 9:30 p.m., the accused demanded Rs.30,000/- per month from his father, instead of Rs.10,000, for expenses. Rikhi Ram refused, asking where he would 2nd that much money. The accused then began arguing with him. During the argument, Rikhi Ram was trying to get the accused out of the 3 house, telling him to get out. The accused then picked up a brick from a pile of bricks under the stairs and struck Rikhi Ram in the head and face, causing fatal injuries. Rikhi Ram bleed and fell unconscious at the scene. He was taken to Shri Balaji Hospital, Mowa, Raipur, where he died at approximately 11:30 p.m. during treatment. The incident was reported by Devendra Patel, younger son of deceased to Police Station Pandri, Raipur, where after recording Merg Information Ex-P/15. An FIR (Ex.P/01) was registered. 4. During investigation, spot map (Ex.P/16) was prepared and after due investigation, Statements of the witnesses were recorded. Subsequently after completing the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted before the Court. After framing the charges against the accused/appellant, the charges were read out and explained to him, he denied committing the crime and demanded trial. 5. In order to bring home the oAence, the prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses and exhibited 24 documents. Statement of the accused/appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C was recorded, wherein he has pleaded his innocence and false implication in the matter. 6. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 26.10.2021, convicted the accused/ appellant for the oAence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been 2led. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjusti2ed in convicting the appellant, as the prosecution has 4 failed to prove the oAence beyond reasonable doubt. He would submit that the learned trial Court has not taken into consideration the evidence available on record in its proper prospective and thereby committed grave error in being selective in appreciating those piece of evidence which are incriminatory to the appellant/accused and discarded those piece of evidence which are favourable to the appellant. The learned trial Court has failed to see that the there is no eyewitness to the incident and there are material omission and contradiction in statements of prosecution witnesses. He would further submit that the conviction of appellant is purely based on the evidence adduced by the police oBcials during investigation which is highly unreliable, though their evidence has not been duly corroborated by the independent witness. He would further contend that the appellant without any basis has been falsely roped in the present case as the learned trial Court has failed to consider that the prosecution could not prove any incident against the accused. He further submits that there was no motive or intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of passion and in anger, the appellant caused injuries to the deceased, which caused his death. Therefore, the case of the present appellant falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and therefore, it is a 2t case where the conviction of the appellant for the oAence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an oAence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Further, as the appellant is in jail since 01.08.2018 and he has completed more than 07 years of his jail sentence, and therefore, considering the period he had already undergone, 5 he be awarded the sentence of the period already undergone by him. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part. 8. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the oAence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. He further submits that the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the oAence under Section 302 of the IPC. It has been contended that the appellant has committed heinous crime of murder and in such circumstances, it is not the case where conviction of the appellant for the oAence under Section 302 of IPC requires to be altered to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. The question for consideration would arise before this Court whether the appellant has committed such oAence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The prosecution for proving its case beyond reasonable doubt examined the witnesses whose statements have been recorded before the trial Court observed hereinbelow. 11. PW-1 Rekha Patel stated that she lived in Patel Complex with her father-in-law Rikhiram Patel, her brothers-in-law and their families. The accused Sanju Patel is her brother-in-law. She stated that the accused did not work and was addicted to liquor and ganja. The deceased, a retired BSP employee, used to collect rent from the shops in the complex and also 6 gave Rs.10,000/- per month to the accused. She stated that about 5–6 months before recording of her evidence, at around 9:30 p.m., the accused was demanding Rs.30,000/- from the deceased, which the deceased refused. Shortly thereafter, she heard the sound of something falling. When she came down from the 2rst Eoor, she saw the deceased lying on the ground with bleeding injuries on his head and the accused assaulting him on the head with a brick. The deceased became unconscious and was taken to Balaji Hospital, where he died. She denied the suggestion that the deceased had suAered a heart attack, the accused was not present at the spot, or she was deposing on the basis of hearsay and stated that she had seen the incident herself. 12. PW-2 Devendra Patel, the son of the deceased and brother of the accused, stated that on 31.07.2018 at about 9:30 p.m., a quarrel took place between the accused and the deceased at the main entrance of their house in Patel Complex. The accused was demanding Rs.30,000/-, which the deceased refused to pay. During the quarrel, the accused picked up a brick lying near the door and struck the deceased on the head. The deceased fell to the ground, became unconscious, and blood was oozing out from his head. He was immediately taken to Balaji Hospital, where he was declared dead around 11:00–11:30 p.m. PW-2 lodged the FIR and also participated in further proceedings. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the accused ran a motorcycle servicing centre in the complex and earned from it. He stated that only he and his sister-in-law were present at the spot. He denied the defence suggestion that the deceased died of a heart attack or by falling on a heap of bricks, and stated that the accused had hit the deceased with 7 a brick. He further stated that although they 2rst admitted the deceased to the ICU, he had eAectively died at the time of the incident itself. 13. PW-10 (Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal), who conducted the post-mortem on 01.08.2018, stated that the deceased was brought wrapped in a cloth and had bandages on his head. On examination, she found multiple lacerated wounds on diAerent parts of the head, including around the left eye and the right temporal region. She also noticed that the jaw and the skull were deformed, and there were multiple fractures. Inside the head, she found extensive bleeding under the skull, tears in the brain, multiple skull fractures, and a complete fracture at the base of the skull. The abdominal and chest organs were mostly normal, except for congestion and some age-related thickening of the heart walls. Dr. Bansal stated that all the injuries were caused before death and were the result of hard and blunt force, such as a brick or a similar object. She con2rmed that the injuries were fresh and were suBcient to cause death. According to her, the cause of death was the severe head and facial injuries. She clari2ed that the heart condition she noted was only age- related and not due to a heart attack. She also stated that the injuries could not have been caused by accidentally falling on bricks, as their pattern clearly indicated more than one intentional blow. In her opinion, the nature of the injuries suggested a homicidal assault. 14. Perusal of the above statement would show that the accused, in the heat of passion, has assaulted him in a 2t of rage, due to which, the deceased suAered grievous injuries and succumbed to death. 15. From the material available on record, we are of the considered view 8 that the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant/accused who has caused injuries over the body of the deceased, his own father and caused his death. Accordingly, we hereby aBrm the said 2nding. 16. The aforesaid 2nding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant. 17. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu2 has made the following observations : “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not di!cult to perceive that they connote 1 (2012) 8 SCC 289 2 AIR 1956 SC 488 9 di"erent things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 19. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two diAerent terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not diAerent things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 of the IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satis2ed and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 of the IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inEict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was suBcient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inEicted. 10 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana3 has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the o"ence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden +ght in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The +nding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of o"ence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of o"ence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a +ne of Rs.5000. In default of payment of +ne, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The 3 (2002) 3 SCC 327 4 (2009) 15 SCC 635 11 relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while in9icting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden +ght; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for in9icting the injury and the force with which the blow was in9icted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury in9icted was not su!cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be 12 taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the o"ence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 22. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with 2ne or with both. It has further been held that to make out an oAence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 23. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be ful+lled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 5 (2012) 8 SCC 450 6 (2017) 3 SCC 247 13 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satis+ed, namely, (I) it was a sudden +ght; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who o"ered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the o"ender must have acted in a +t of anger. Of course, the o"ender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the bene+t of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden +ght; (c) without the o"ender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the +ght must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “+ght” occurring 14 in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not de+ned in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a +ght. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A +ght is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not su!cient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the o"ender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 24. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 25. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: 7 (2019) 6 SCC 122 15 “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden +ght; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The o"ender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 disposed off on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under: “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in 16 shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. 17 Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to 18 that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. 19 (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the 20 circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary 21 course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 27. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above- stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that as per the medical evidence, it is evident that on the date of incident, the accused/appellant assaulted the deceased with the help of a brick. There was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause death of deceased. The appellant did not had any intention to cause death of his father, but by causing such injuries, he must had the knowledge that such injuries inEicted by him would likely to cause death of deceased, as such, his case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of the appellant herein completely satis2es the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden 2ght; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 28. Considering the above-stated facts, also considering the evidence of witnesses and taking into consideration that at present appellant- Sanju Patel is aged about 43 years, and he is in jail since 01.08.2018 i.e. more than 7 years, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 22 29. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and sentenced to undergo for a period already undergone by him. 30. The appellant is in jail. He be released forthwith if not required in any other case, on furnishing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like sum to the satisfaction of the trial Court. The bail bond shall remain in operation for a period of six months as required under the provisions of Section 481 of the BNSS. The appellant shall appear before the higher Court as and when directed. 31. The criminal appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated herein-above. 32. Registry is directed to send a certi2ed copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice $. Bhilwar