2025:CGHC:55740 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 132 of 2007 Industrial Development Bank of India Limited Company, Regular & Registered under Indian Company Act 1956 and Banking Company under Section 5(C) Banking Regulation Act 1949, Head Office, IDBI Office, WTC Complex, Cafe Pared, Kulaba Mumbai-400 005 Branch Raipur, MG Road, Raipur Through Branch Manager, Industrial Development Bank of India Limited Branch MG Road, Raipur (CG) ... Appellant/ Plaintiff versus 1. M/s B.S. Enterprises, through Proprietor, Samir Kumar Majumdar, S/o Sri SN Majumdar, Address- 68, Janta Colony, Gudihari, Raipur (CG) 2. Sri Hiranand Vachchhani, MIG 1-164 Dindayal Upadhyay Nagar, Raipur (CG) 3. Sri Vipul Shah s/o Jayanti Lal Shah Sri Zee Marketing, Rizavi Gali, MG Road Raipur ... Respondents /Defendants (Cause title is taken from the CIS) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ For Appellant : Shri Sudhir Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent : None appears ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judgment on Board 14.11.2025 1. This appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, 1908 arises out of the impugned judgment and decree dated 16.07.2007, passed by the learned 10th Additional District Judge, Raipur, in Civil Suit No.3B of 2007, whereby, the Civil Suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of amount of Rs.2,65,218/- (Rupees two lakh sixty-five thousand two hundred eighteen) from the defendant has been dismissed. 2. For the sake of convenience, status of the parties in this appeal is being taken as shown in the plaint. Digitally signed by V PADMAVATHI Date: 2025.12.12 15:43:04 +0530 Fa 132 of 2007 2 3. The plaintiff had filed the Civil Suit on 17.10.2005 with the pleading that the plaintiff is a Banking Company, which comes under the Schedule 2 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, and its Head Quarter is at 172/4, Ravivar Pet, Shivaji Circle, Satara, Mahrashtra, having its Branch at MG Road, Raipur. In the month of October, 2002, defendant-1 has obtained Cash Credit/Loan facility (for short, ‘the loan facility’) to the extent of Rs.5,00,000/-, and executed Hypothecation Agreement with the Bank, to which, defendants- 2 and 3 were guarantors. As per the agreement, one demand promissory note was executed between the parties on 14.10.2002 that the amount of Rs.5,00,000/- was to be repaid in installments, with yearly interest @ 14.75%, failing which, it shall carry penal interest @ 1.75% was also to be charged. Defendant-1 had also pledged his property i.e the house situated at Janata Colony Gudiyari, Raipur, and an equitable mortgage was executed with respect to the said property. After completion of the entire process of the Bank, defendant-1 started using the loan facility. 4. On 15.04.2003, defendant-1 issued a letter to the plaintiff/Bank that he closed his biscuit business, and started a new business of electrical goods, and the nature of business may be changed in his loan facility. On 29.04.2003, defendant-1 requested for enhancement of the loan facility for Rs.3,00,000/- more. As per the account statement of defendant-1, up till 08.10.2005, there was an outstanding amount against defendant-1 to the extent of Rs.2,66,218/-, for which, defendant-1, principal borrower, as well as defendants-2 and 3, who were the guarantors, are liable to repay the said outstanding amount to the plaintiff/bank. When after repeated demand made by the Bank, defendant-1 fails to repay the outstanding amount, a legal demand notice was served to Fa 132 of 2007 3 defendant-1 on 29.04.2005, and thereafter, Civil Suit has been filed on 20.10.2005. 5. After service of summons to the defendants, defendants-1 and 2 remained ex-parte before the learned trial Court, and defendant-3 has filed written statement, denied the plaint averment, and pleaded that defendant-3 is also availing the loan facility in the Bank, and on the instance of the plaintiff, he made signature on the documents related to defendant-1 at the time of extending the loan facility to defendant-1, and the plaintiff had also assured him that the house of the defendant-1 is being kept in equitable mortgage with the Bank, and therefore, there is no difficulty for recovery of the amount of outstanding loan, in case he fails to repay the same. On the assurance given by the plaintiff, he produced himself before the Bank as guarantor to defendant-1. The plaintiff, and defendant-1, in collusion with each other, and sold the house to one DK Thomas, which was well within the knowledge of plaintiff/Bank, and despite his knowledge that mortgage property was sold by defendant-1, they did nothing. Therefore, defendant-3 is not liable to pay any amount of defendant-1. Even, no notice has been served upon him before institution of suit. Since the suit is a collusive one, it is not maintainable. It has also been pleaded in the written statement that the suit is barred by limitation, and no cause of action arises against defendant-1. 6. After considering the pleadings made by the respective parties, learned trial Court has framed the following issues: okn iz’u fu"d"kZ 1- D;k izfroknh dzekad 1 us vDVwcj 2002 es oknh cSad ls ik¡p yk[k :i;s dh _.k izkIr fd;k Fkk ? gk¡A Fa 132 of 2007 4 2- D;k izfroknh dzekad &2 o 3 mDr _.k ds fy;s izfroknh dzekad 1 ds tekurnkj gS \ gk¡A 3-D;k oknh us izfroknh dzekad &3 dks /kks[ks es j[kdj izfroknh dzekad & 1 ds _.k ds tekur ds nLrkostksa es gLrk{kj djk fy;s \ ugha A 4- D;k mDr _.k dk nks yk[k NslB gtkj nks lkS vVBkjg :i;s fnukad 08-10-2005 rd izfroknh dzekda&1 ij cdk;k gS \ gk¡A 5- D;k fyf[kr ,oa ekSf[kd ekWx fd;s tkus ij Hkh izfroknh dzekad&1us mDr jkf’k vnk ugha dh \ gk¡A 6- D;k ;g nkok le;kof/k ckgz; gS \ gk¡A 7- vuqrks"k ,oa okn~ O;; \ gk¡A nkok le;kof/k esas u gksus ds dkj.k [kkfjt fd;k x;kA vfrfjDr okn iz’u& 8- D;k oknh ] nkok d`r jde] izfr& cknhx.k ls la;qDrr% o i`Fkdr% izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS \ gk¡ A ijUrq nkok le;kof/k es u gksus ls [kkfjt fd;k x;kA 7. To prove the claim, plaintiff had examined its witnesses PW1- Avinash Vinayak Durge, PW2- HA Kelkar, and relied upon the documents Ex.P1, which is the loan application format, Ex.P2- Memorandum of loan sanction, Ex.P3- recommendation of the Branch, Ex.P4- promissory note, Ex.P5-Agreement of hypothecation, Ex.P6- general format of guarantee, Ex.P7 and P8- consent of the guarantors, and information letter, Ex.P9-property equitable mortgage deed, Ex.P10- letter of deposited title lead, Ex.P11- affidavit, Ex.P12- Agreement to create equitable mortgage to secure the loan account, Ex.P13- Information about the sale property, and the format, Ex.P14- balance sheet of defendant-1, Ex. P15-balance sheet of M/s Maharaja Enterprises, Ex.P16 and 17- Insurance policy , Ex.P18- proposal note over general finance department, Fa 132 of 2007 5 Ex.P19-Account statement, Ex.P20 - intimation of closing Biscuit business, and starting of electrical goods business, Ex.P21- request for enhancement of loan facility, and Ex.P22- legal demand notice dated 29.04.2005. 8. Defendant-3 has examined himself as DW-1 before the learned trial Court. 9. While considering the issues, learned trial Court has found proved the issues- 1 to 5 in favour of the plaintiff/bank. However, the suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed holding that it was barred by limitation. While considering the issue of limitation to file the suit, learned trial Court has held that the loan facility obtained by defendant-1 was extended on 14.10.2002, and within three years of the said date, plaintiff/bank was required to file the suit for recovery of amount but the bank filed the suit beyond the limitation period, i.e. on 17.10.2005, which is barred by limitation of two days. While considering the said issue, learned trial Court has also held that defendant-1 though has deposited the last installment on 26.09.2005 but the plaintiff witnesses PW1 and PW2 have admitted that they did not know as to when defendant-1 has deposited the last installment, thereby, the limitation would start from the date of grant of loan facility to defendant-1, and therefore, the suit is barred by limitation, and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by the plaintiff/Bank. 10. In the present First appeal, the appellant/plaintiff has filed IA-2 of 2007, application filed under Order-6, Rule-17, read with Section 151 of the CPC, for amendment in para-7 of the plaint, and another application, IA-3 of 2007, filed under order-41 Rule-27 read with Section 151 of the CPC, for taking additional evidence on record, along with list of documents for the said application, Fa 132 of 2007 6 original vouchers through which defendant-1 deposited the installment with the bank. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that learned trial Court has wrongly held that the suit is barred by limitation. Learned trial Court should have considered that the loan facility obtained by defendant-1 was sanctioned on 14.10.2002, and as per the bank account statement Ex.P19, last installment deposited by defendant-1 was on 26.09.2005. In para-7 of the plaint, plaintiff/bank had pleaded that from the bank account statement dated 08.10.2005, there is outstanding amount of Rs.2,66,218/- against defendant-1, and the said bank account Ex.P19 has been proved by PW1-Avinash Vinayak Durge. He would also submit that the said bank account statement and the entries made in it are admissible as provided under Section 4 of the Banker’s Book Evidence Act. He would also submit that through the letter Ex.P20 dated 15.04.2003, and Ex.P21 dated 29.04.2003, defendant-1 requested the bank for enhancement of the loan facility for Rs.3,00,000/- more, and acknowledges the earlier liability under the loan facility. He would further submit that as per Section 19 of the Limitation Act, acknowledgment of payment on the account of debt extended the limitation period for filing of the suit, and the fresh period of limitation shall start from the time when the payment was made. He would also submit that along with the application IA-3 of 2007, he has filed the original vouchers by which defendant-1 deposited the amount to the bank on 07.04.2003, 15.07.2003, and 30.07.2003, thereby, the said deposit of amount would renew the limitation period for filing of the suit as provided under Section 19 of the limitation Act. It is also submitted that defendants- 1 and 2 have remained ex parte, and have not contested the suit, and the liability and last payment made by defendant-1 is deemed to be admitted. However, to Fa 132 of 2007 7 clarify the last payment, and to bring the documents on record, plaintiff also filed an application for amendment in the plaint. First Appeal being the continuity of the suit, the proposed amendment in the plaint may be allowed, and the additional evidence produced by the appellant may be taken on record, which are very relevant to the facts, and just decision of the case. He would further submit that the documents produced by the appellant are sufficient to decide the case in favour of the appellant, yet, in support of its claim, appellant filed additional evidence without any delay, which may be taken on record. Therefore, the appeal may be allowed, and decree may be passed in favour of the appellant/Bank. 12. Despite service of notice upon the respondents, no one appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the appeal. 13. Heard learned counsel for the appellant, and gone through the documents, and pleadings made by the parties, and the evidences led by the parties. 14. Point for determination in the present appeal would be, whether the learned trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit holding that it is barred by limitation. 15. From perusal of impugned judgment, it transpires that learned trial Court has decided the issues-1 to 5 in favour of the plaintiff/Bank, that the loan facility was extended to defendant-1 in the month of October, 2002, and defendants-2 and 3 are the guarantors. There is no fraudulent act by the plaintiff/Bank, and as on 08.10.2005, there was outstanding amount of Rs.2,66,218/-. However, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed on the ground of limitation. Fa 132 of 2007 8 16. On perusal of the consideration with respect to issue-6, it transpires that the learned trial Court though found that up to 26.09.2005, defendant-1 has deposited some amount with the bank against the loan facility which he availed, which was found proved by the document Ex.P19, and the total outstanding amount was Rs.2,66,218/-. However, PW1 and PW2 have shown their ignorance as to on which date, defendant -1 has deposited the last installment of the loan facility, and therefore, the limitation to file the suit starts from 14.10.2002, which is the date on which the cash Credit/Loan facility was extended to defendant-1, and the complainant-Bank should have filed the suit within three years from 14.10.2002 but the suit has been filed on 17.10.2005, which is two days’ delay, and therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. 17. Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides that a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made. Section 19 of the Limitation Act reads as under: Section 19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy.—Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made:Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— (a) where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce of Fa 132 of 2007 9 such land shall be deemed to be a payment; (b) “debt” does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court. 18. Although the plaintiff has filed the document Ex.P19, claiming that last transaction was made on 26.09.2005 by the defendant-1, however, from perusal of document Ex.P19, it transpires that from 30.04.2004 to 26.09.2005, interest was credited in the said loan facility account. It does not transpire about the deposition of any amount by the defendant-1, which would be considered as the last transaction made by him by depositing the amount with the bank towards the loan facility account. The document Ex.P19 shows that up to 31.08.2005, there was an outstanding balance of Rs.2,66,218/-, however, in the entry made on 26.09.2005, it has been mentioned that “charge interest added back to account balance for marking it NPA”, and by crediting Rs.61,839/-, the total closing balance shown as 2,04,379/- (Ex.P19). There is no entry made in this account statement that defendant-1 has deposited any amount in between 30.04.2004 to 31.08.2005, which give benefit to the plaintiff for extension of the limitation period for filing the suit. Although the request letter made by defendant-1 for increasing the limit of the loan facility up to three lakh rupees more, which was made on 25.09.2003 can be considered as acknowledgment of the loan facility, however, as per Section 19 of the Limitation Act, the limitation period shall be computed from the time when the payment was made. In the letter Ex.P21, there is no endorsement about the payment of any amount towards the loan facility. It can be considered only an acknowledgment of cash credit facility in favour of the plaintiff/bank. There is no other documentary evidence led by the plaintiff , which shows that during the trial, the date on which defendant-1 has deposited the last installment of the loan facility. In the appeal, the plaintiff has filed IA-2 Fa 132 of 2007 10 of 2007, application for amendment in para-7 of the plaint, and the plaintiff wanted to make the following amendment in the plaint: “mDr _.kh izfroknh dz-&1 us bl izdj.k ds fookfnr [kkrk esa cdk;k dh vnk;xh ds mn~ns’; ls fnukad 07-4-2023 dks 3]50]000@&:- uxn ,oa fn-15-7-2003 dks 60]000@ :- uxn rFkk fn-30-7-2003 dksa 49]500@&:- uxn Ogkmpj ds ek/;e ls tek fd;k Fkk vkSj ftlds QyLo:i Hkh bl tek djus dh rkjh[k ls 3o"kZ ds Hkhrj dHkh Hkh oknh ds }kjk ‘’ks"k cdk;k ds olwyh ds fy;s okn dks yk;k tk ldrk Fkk vkSj bl rjg oknh us mDr rhuksa of.kZr tek ds rhu o"kZ ds Hkhrj fnukad 20- 10- 2005dks bl okn dks cdk;k dh olwyh ds fy;s E;kn ds vanj oknh cSd us izfroknhx.kds f[kykQ izLrqr dj fn;k vkSj bl rjg Hkh ;g okn izfroknh dz-&1 ds fu"ikfnr tek mDr rhuksa Ogkmpj ds vk/kkj ij Hkh oknh dk okn] dkuwuh izko/kku ds rgr~E;kn ds vanj gSA mDr of.kZr izLrfor va’k dks okn i= esa tksMus dh vuqefr iznku djuk] U;k;fgr esa gksxkA ” 19. In the matter of Surendra Kumar Sharma Vs Makhan Singh, 2009 (10) SCC 626 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that amendment in the plaint can be allowed, if it does not change the nature of the suit. In its judgment at para 5, 6 and 7, it has been held that: “5. As noted hereinearlier, the prayer for amendment was refused by the High Court on two grounds. So far as the first ground is concerned i.e. the prayer for amendment was a belated one, we are of the view that even if it was belated, then also, the question that needs to be decided is to see whether by allowing the amendment, the real controversy between the parties may be resolved. It is well settled that under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wide powers and unfettered discretion have been conferred on the Court to allow amendment of the pleadings to a party in such a manner and on such Fa 132 of 2007 11 terms as it appears to the Court just and proper. Even if, such an application for amendment of the plaint was filed belatedly, such belated amendment cannot be refused if it is found that for deciding the real controversy between the parties, it can be allowed on payment of costs. Therefore, in our view, mere delay and latches in making the application for amendment cannot be a ground to refuse amendment. 6. It is also well settled that even if the amendment prayed for is belated, while considering such belated amendment, the Court must bear in favour of doing full and complete justice in the case where the party against whom the amendment is to be allowed, can be compensated by cost or otherwise. [See B.K. N. Pillai Vs. P. Pillai and another [AIR 2000 SC 614 at Page 616]. Accordingly, we do not find any reason to hold that only because there was some delay in filing the application for amendment of the plaint, such prayer for amendment cannot be allowed. 7. So far as the second ground is concerned i.e. the prayer for amendment of plaint, if allowed, shall change the nature and character of the suit, we are unable to accept this view of the High Court. We have carefully examined the amendment prayed for and after going through the application for amendment of the plaint, we are of the view that the question of changing the nature and character of the suit, if amendment is allowed, cannot arise at all. The suit has been filed for eviction inter alia on the ground of arrears of rent. It cannot be disputed that even after the amendment, the suit would remain a suit for eviction. Therefore, we are unable to agree that if the amendment of the plaint is allowed, the nature and character of the suit shall be changed. Accordingly, the High Court was not justified in holding that the nature Fa 132 of 2007 12 and character of the suit shall be changed, if such prayer for amendment is allowed.” 20. From the proposed amendment, it transpires that the plaintiff wants to amend the plaint with respect to the deposition of the amount by defendant-1 with the bank on 07.04.2003, 15.07.2003, and 30.07.2003, to show that defendant-1 has lastly deposited the amount on 30.07.2003, and the period of limitation starts from his last deposition, i.e.30.07.2003, and the suit filed by the plaintiff/bank is within the limitation period. Since the suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed on the ground of limitation, it is in the interest of justice that the plaintiff should be provided opportunity to extend the limitation under which he filed the suit, and in the opinion of this Court, the proposed amendment does not change the nature of the suit. It is only a clarification that how the suit of the plaintiff is within the limitation period. This Court has found no impediment to deny the proposed amendment to be incorporated in the plaint, and accordingly, IA-2 of 2007 is allowed, and the appellant is permitted to incorporate the amendment in the plaint, as he proposed in the application. 21. Another application IA-3 of 2007 has been filed for taking additional evidence on record. Along with the application, the plaintiff has filed the original deposit vouchers on record, by which he has deposited the amount in his loan facility account with the bank. The three deposit vouchers are of 07.04.2003, 15.07.2003, and 30.07.2003. 22. Considering the judgment passed by the learned trial Court that the suit is dismissed on the ground on limitation, and the plaintiff is having document to explain that their suit was within the limitation, and also in view of the fact that the application for amendment in the plaint is allowed, the said document is Fa 132 of 2007 13 relevant, and necessary to prove their pleading that defendant-1 lastly deposited the amount in the loan facility account on 30.07.2003. although the plaintiff could not file those documents before the learned trial Court, however, keeping in view the nature of document, and relevancy with the facts of the case, irrespective of the negligence, or due diligence of the plaintiff, the said documents are required to be taken as additional evidence. 23. The judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Wadi Vs Amilal and others (2015) 1 SCC 677, in para 5, it has been held that: “5. Now it is clear that Rule 27 deals with production of additional evidence in the appellate court. The general principle incorporated in Sub-rule (1) is that the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence (oral or documentary) in the appellate court to cure a lacuna or fill up a gap in a case. The exceptions to that principle are enumerated thereunder in Clauses (a), (a) and (b). We are concerned here with Clause (b) which is an enabling provision. It says that if the appellate court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, it may allow such document to be produced or witness to be examined. The requirement or need is that of the appellate court bearing in mind that the interest of justice is paramount. If it feels that pronouncing a judgment in the absence of such evidence would result in a defective decision and to pronounce an effective judgment admission of such evidence is necessary, Clause (b) enables it to adopt that course. Invocation of Clause (b) does not depend upon the vigilance or negligence of the parties for it is not meant for them. It is Fa 132 of 2007 14 for the appellant to resort to it when on a consideration of material on record it feels that admission of additional evidence is necessary to pronounce a satisfactory judgment in the case.” 24. Accordingly, application IA-3 of 2003 is also allowed, and the appellant is permitted to lead additional evidence produced by the appellant is taken on record. 25. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Akhilesh Singh @ Akhileshwar Singh Vs Lal Babu Singh and others (2018) 4 SCC 659 has laid down the procedure for taking additional evidence on record, and if the additional evidence is being taken on record, the decourse of order 41 Rule 28 is to be followed, and in para-15, and 16 it is held that: “15. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board Vs. H. Narayanaiah & Ors., (1976) 4 SCC 9 had occasion to consider Order LXI Rule 27 in context of admission of additional evidence by Appellate Court. This Court had observed that in event the High Court admits an additional evidence, an opportunity should have been given to the other party to rebut any inference arising from its existence by leading evidence. In Para 28 of the judgment, following has been laid down:- “28. The Karnataka High Court had, however, not complied with provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC which require that an appellate court should be satisfied that the additional evidence is required to enable it either to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. It had recorded no reasons to show that it had considered the requirements of Rule 27 Order 41 of the CPC We are of opinion that the High Court should have recorded its Fa 132 of 2007 15 reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some sub- stantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it, an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its existence by leading other evidence.” 16.To the same effect is another judgment of this Court in the case of Shalimar Chemical Works Limited Vs. Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (Refineries) & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 423. In this case also, the Court had occasion to consider Order LXI Rule 27, this Court has again laid down that when documents are taken in additional evidence, an opportunity ought to have been given to other party to lead evidence in rebuttal. In the above case also, the High Court simultaneously proceeded to decide the appeal alongwith admitting additional evidence on record. In Paragraphs 16 to 18 following has been laid down:- “16. The learned Single Judge rightly allowed the appellant’s plea for production of the original certificates of registration of trade mark as additional evidence because that was simply in the interest of justice and there was sufficient statutory basis for that under clause (b) of Order 41 Rule 27. But then the Single Judge seriously erred in proceeding si- multaneously to allow the appeal and not giv- ing the respondent-defendants an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal of the documents taken in as additional evidence. 17. The Division Bench was again wrong in taking the view that in the facts of the case, the production of additional evidence was not permissible under Order 41 Rule 27. As shown above, the additional documents produced by the appellant were liable to be Fa 132 of 2007 16 taken on record as provided under Order 41 Rule 27(b) in the interest of justice. But it was cer- tainly right in holding that the way the learned Single Judge disposed of the appeal caused serious prejudice to the respondent-de- fendants. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the proper course for the Division Bench was to set aside the order of the learned Single Judge without disturbing it insofar as it took the originals of the cer- tificates of registration produced by the ap- pellant on record and to remand the matter to give opportunity to the respondent- defendants to produce evidence in rebuttal if they so desired. We, accordingly, proceed to do so. 18. The judgment and order dated 25-4-2003 passed by the Division Bench is set aside and the matter is remitted to the learned Single Judge to proceed in the appeal from the stage the originals of the registration certificates were taken on record as additional evidence. The learned Single Judge may allow the respon- dent-defendants to lead any rebuttal evidence or make a limited remand as provided under Order 41 Rule 28.” 26. Therefore, from the aforesaid consideration, this Court is of the opinion that this Court considered the application filed by the plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 17 read with 151 of the CPC, and application under 41, Rule 27 read with 151 of the CPC for taking additional evidence on record are allowed. 27. As per the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Akhilesh Singh (supra), it deem it appropriate to remit the matter back to the learned trial Court for deciding the case afresh, after permitting the plaintiff to incorporate the amendment in para-7 of the plaint, and to record further Fa 132 of 2007 17 evidence with respect to the additional evidence produced along with the application, and to prove the same. The defendants are also permitted to amend their written statement consequently, and to lead further evidence in rebuttal of the evidence produced by the appellant. 28. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree with respect to issue-6 is set aside, and the matter is remitted back to the learned trial Court for deciding the same afresh, after considering the proposed amendment, and the personal evidence after providing proper opportunity of hearing , further leading evidence to the parties. The parties are directed to appear before lthe learned trial Court on 19.12.2025. 29. Copy of the amendment application, as well as additional evidence produced by the appellant/plaintiff in this appeal shall also be sent to the learned trial Court for its proof during recording of evidence, and which shall be made as part of the record of the trial Court. 30. Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated herein above, parties to bear their own costs. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) JUDGE padma