1 WPCR No.299 of 2025 2025:CGHC:56740-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPCR No. 299 of 2025 1 - Sanjay Kumar Sainik S/o Gopal Prasad Sainik Aged About 53 Years R/o Village Tumgaon, P.S.Tumgaon, Distt. Mahasamund C.G., Present Address Sector 3, Road 03, Block 05, Quarter No 06, Bhilai, Distt. Durg, C.G. 2 - Abhishek Kumar Singh S/o Vijay Prasad Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Sarsa, P.S. Risiya, Distt. Aurangabad, Present Address Sector -4, Road No 03, Block 15 Quarter No. H, Bhilai Distt. Durg. 3 - Shayam Kumar Singh S/o Late Kesho Singh Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Sarsa, P.S. Risiya, Distt. Aurangabad, Present Address Sector -4, Road No 03, Block 15 Quarter No H, Bhilai Distt. Durg. 4 - Premanand Sahu S/o Late Uderam Sahu Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Nawagaon (B), P.S. Ranitarai, Distt. Durg, Present Address Sector 03, Road No 09, Block 06, Quarter No D Bhilai, Cisf Head Constable No 993580015, Unit Bsp, Distt. Durg ... Petitioners versus State of Chhattisgarh Through SHO Bhilai Bhatti, District Durg, C.G. ---- Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. B.P. Singh, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Deputy Government Advocate. AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2025.11.21 17:19:05 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru, J. 21.11.2025 1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayers: “10.1 That this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased direct to remove/expunge the remark "benefit of doubt in the order passed by the Id. JMFC Durg, Distt. Durg In RCC no 1838/2020 on dated 31/01/2025 in para 28 of the judgment and order. 10.2 Any other relief which deemed fits may grant to the petitioner.” 2. Facts of the case, in brief, is that the petitioners are the employee of the CISF unit and posted in the side of BSP, Bhilai at present and Crime No 16/2020 under section 457, 380, 34 of the IPC has been registered against the petitioners and another person. It is alleged that the complainant Ravishankar Kushwaha is posted in the side of BSP Bhilai while working as Deputy Manager in Heavy engineering corporation Ranchi, and the complainant company's has a contract with the BSP Bhilai under the contract dated 12/02/2011, and he got the work of supply, erection and commissioning of EOT crane and DSL, for which he has supplied 16 copper cable drums from HEC Ranchi to BSP on 16/05/2019 and the same were kept in TPL area on 20/05/2019 and the same area was surrounded by boundary from all sides and there is a gate for entry and exit and the CISF force was deployed for the security and out of 16 drums, 6 drums of copper cable was shifted from TPL area to BRM BSP for BSL work on 01/07/2019, and when the remaining 10 drums of copper cable were 3 checked in TPL area on 17/01/2020 then he saw that 5 drums of cable were not there, an unknown person has stolen them and on the said report of the complainant the police has lodged crime no 16/2020 and after investigation and taken 161 statement, the police has arrested the petitioners. 3. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, would submit that though the learned JMFC has clearly recorded a finding that prosecution has failed to prove any of the ingredients of charged offence to the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt, yet instead of acquitting them honorably, extended and gave them the benefit of doubt, which operated as stigma for grant of service benefit to them as well as it affects their reputation socially, therefore it deserves to be expunged in exercise of jurisdiction vested in the court. The phrase “benefit of doubt” as mentioned in the judgment and order dated 31.1.2025 (paragraph No. 28) deserves to be expunged in the ends of justice. 4. Learned Deputy Government Advocate supports the observation made by learned JMFC acquitting the petitioners by extending them the benefit of doubt and submit that writ petition as framed and filed being not maintainable deserves to be dismissed. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered their respective submissions made hereinabove and went through the record with utmost circumspection. 6. The question for consideration would be whether the petitioners have made out a case for expunging the phrase “Benefit of Doubt” in paragraph No. 28 of the Judgment, by learned JMFC while acquitting the petitioners ? 7. In order to adjudicate the plea so raised, it would be appropriate to notice 4 here the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which takes cognizance and speak of “acquittal”. Sections 227, 235, 248, 255 and 330 of the Code speaks of acquittal. The word ‘discharge’ is employed under Sections 227, 239 and 245 of the Code. As a matter of fact, Section 227 of Cr.P.C. enjoins a court of Session to discharge an accused, if upon consideration of record of the case, and documents submitted, it considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Section 232 of Code, enjoins a court of session to order for acquittal of an individual, if after taking the evidence for prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on point, the judge considers that there is no evidence to show that the accused committed the offence. It is pertinent to mention under Section 232 of Code, order of acquittal can be passed after evidence of prosecution is recorded, but order of discharge can be passed prior to recording of evidence. 8. Thus, in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any other enactment the word ‘acquittal’ has not been defined. As per Stroud’s Dictionary (5 th Edition) acquittal has been defined as under:- “ACQUITTAL. (1) ‘To acquite him’ : acquite is compounded of ad, and the old verbe quietare, and signifieth in law to discharge, or keepe in quiet, and to see that the tenant be safely kept from any entries, or other molestation for any manner of service issuing out of the land to any lord that is above the mesne. And hereof commeth Acquitall, and quietus est, (that is) that he is discharged; and he that is discharged of a felony, etc., by judgment, is said to be acquitted of the felony, acquietatus de felonia; and if he be drawne in question againe, he may plead outerfoits acquite” (Co. Litt. 5 100a). (2) “The word ‘acquittal’ is verbum equivocum, and may in ordinary language be used to express either the verdict of a jury, or the formal judgment of the Court, that the prisoner go thereof without day” (per Tindal C.J., Burgess v. Boetefeur, 13 L.J.M.C. 126; see Cowel, Acquitall). Cp. CONVICTED.” 9. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (6 th Edition) ‘acquittal’ in criminal law has been defined as under:- “Acquittal. Contracts. A release, absolution, or discharge from an obligation, liability, or engagement. Criminal law. The legal and formal certification of the innocence of a person who has been charged with crime; a deliverance or setting free a person from a charge of guilt; finding of not guilty. Also, one legally acquitted by a judgment rendered otherwise than in pursuance of a verdict, as where he is discharged by a magistrate because of the insufficiency of the evidence, or the indictment is dismissed by the court of a nol. Pros. Entered. Or, it may occur even though the question of guilt or innocence has never been submitted to a jury, as where a defendant, having been held under an indictment or information, is discharged because not brought to trial within the time provided by statute. Acquittals in fact are those which take place when the jury, upon trial, finds a verdict of not guilty. 6 Acquittals in law are those which take place by mere operation of law; as where a man has been charged merely as an accessory, and the principal has been acquitted.” 10.Thus, the acquittal means that a person is not guilty of a crime, with which he has been charged. 11.From the above-stated narration, it is quite vivid that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 speaks and contemplates only of acquittal and not as acquittal based on benefit of doubt and there is no difference between clean acquittal and honourable acquittal under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. These concepts have been evolved and developed by courts of law by time and coined by judicial pronouncements. 12.Lord Williams J, for the first time in the matter of Rober Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor1 observed qua honourably acquitted as under:- “The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extra judicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the Government authorities and by the magistrate., Further we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what Government authorities term “honourably acquitted.” 1 (1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168 7 13.The above-quoted passage was quoted with approval by their Lordships of Supreme Court in the matter of State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari2. 14.In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India3, it was held by their Lordships as under:- “Even in case of acquittal, proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable.” 15.In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal4 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have recognized the distinction between honourable acquittal and acquittal based on benefit of doubt as under:- “13............When the High Court acquitted the respondent- employee by its order of November 21, 1977 giving the benefit of doubt, the Bank rightly refused to reinstate him in service on the ground that it was not an honourable acquittal as required by Regulation 46(4). *** 15. ...........It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period.......…” 16.In the matter of Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram5 the Supreme Court noticed its earlier pronouncement in Bhopal Singh 2 1972 S.L.R. 44 3 AIR 1964 SC 787 4 (1994) 1 SCC 541 5 (2013) 1 SCC 598 8 Panchal (supra) and pointed out distinction between honourable acquittal and technical acquittal as under:- “24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [(1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 : (1994) 26 ATC 619] . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 787] it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari [1972 SLR 44 (SC)] this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] which is as follows: (Raghava case [1972 SLR 44 (SC)] , SLR p. 47, para 8) 9 “8. ... ‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted.” (Robert Stuart case [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168], ILR pp. 188- 89) . 17.Thereafter, the Supreme Court in the matter of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh6 considering its earlier judgments held that when accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution and prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can be said that accused was honourably acquitted. Paragraph 25 of report states as under:- “25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram [Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] . In that case this Court was concerned with a 6 (2013) 7 SCC 685 10 situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [(1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 : (1994) 26 ATC 619] , where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank's action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame” and “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. This Court expressed that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.” 18.The Bombay High Court in the matter of Hafizuddin Inayatullah Kazi v. J.C. Agarwal and others7 defining the meaning of honourable acquittal held as under:- 7 1980 (Vol.41) Indian Factories & Labour Reports-171 11 “8. It is very difficult to define what is the meaning of the words" honorable acquittal" In my view it will depend on the fact and circumstances of each case as to whether a person can be said to have been discharged or acquitted honourably or not. The Judgment of Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Raghvan, (1972) S.L.R. 344, is relied on by both the sides on the meaning of honourable acquittal as well as to show whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case petitioner can be said to have been honourably acquitted. At page 347 paragraph 8 a reference is made to a note and administrative instructions appearing under the rule similar to one applicable in this case, which seem to show that the words" honorably "meant, acquitted of or that the Government servant has been fully exonerated. According to the Supreme Court this meaning was supported by a judgment of Calcutta High Court in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor, I.L.R. 1934 Cal. 168. 9. In my view, therefore, though it is very difficult to define precisely what is meant by the words" honorably acquitted", it is safe to say that if an accused is acquitted or discharged because of some technicality not having been complied with or on the ground that though there is some evidence against him, he must be acquitted by giving benefit of doubt, it may not amount to an honourable acquittal. However, if an accused is acquitted after full consideration of evidence because the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges it would amount to honourable acquittal. It is difficult to understand what more is required for honourable acquittal of the accused than acquittal of the accused 12 on disbelieving the prosecution evidence in toto In the present case, though there are some observations made at the end of the judgment by the High Court acquitting the petitioner which may appear to be ambiguous, if the judgment is read as a whole, there can be little doubt that the accused was acquitted not by giving benefit of doubt, in spite of there being some evidence against him but because the prosecution failed to prove the case against him.” 19.Recently their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of M.P. v. Bunty8 relying upon its earlier decision rendered in Mehar Singh (supra) held as under:- “13. The law laid down in the aforesaid decisions makes it clear that in case of acquittal in a criminal case is based on the benefit of the doubt or any other technical reason. The employer can take into consideration all relevant facts to take an appropriate decision as to the fitness of an incumbent for appointment/continuance in service. The decision taken by the Screening Committee in the instant case could not have been faulted by the Division Bench.” 20.On conspectus of the above-stated authorities, it is quite vivid that if an accused is acquitted of charged offence(s) after full-fledged appreciation and consideration of evidence brought out by the prosecution, holding that prosecution has failed to prove the charged offences(s) beyond reasonable doubt, it would amount to honourable/clean acquittal not being a technical acquittal or acquittal based on benefit of doubt. 21.Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of principles of law laid 8 2019 SCC Online SC 430 13 down in above-stated judgments as analyzed in preceding paragraphs, it is quite vivid that the petitioners were charged for offence under Sections 457, 380, 34 IPC while they were holding the job in CISF and deployed in the services of BSP, Bhilai. The learned Judge proceeded to acquit the petitioners by giving benefit of doubt. 22.Thus, it is a case, where the prosecution has miserably failed to prove any of the ingredients of offence under Section 457, 380, 34 IPC beyond reasonable doubt; as such it is a case of clean acquittal of the petitioners and learned JMFC is totally unjustified in acquitting them on the basis of benefit of doubt, it ought to have granted clean acquittal in view of specific finding recorded by him noticed hereinabove. The Criminal Courts are expected to be careful and be clear as to whether it is clean acquittal or acquittal based on benefit of doubt. 23.Now, the question for consideration would be, what would be the consideration for expunging those remarks. 24.Way back in the year 1964, in the matter of The State U.P. v. Mohammad9 the Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) has held that the High Court can in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction expunge remarks made by it or by a lower court if it be necessary to do so to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and observed as under:- "9. ...We think that the High Court of Bombay is correct and the High Court can in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction expunge remarks made by it or by a lower court if it be necessary to do so to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; the jurisdiction is however of an exceptional nature 9 A.I.R. 1964 SC 703 14 and has to be exercised in exceptional cases only.…" Their Lordships have also laid-down the test in considering the expunction of disparaging remarks made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes for consideration before the Court of law to be decided by them by summing up as under:-- "(a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself. (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognized that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve." 25.Similarly, in the matter of Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and another10 the Supreme Court has held that the High Court has inherent power to expunge objectionable remarks in judgment and order of the subordinate court against stranger, after it has become final and culled out the principles as under:-- "7-8. From the aforesaid discussion the following principles emerge: (1) A judgment of a criminal Court is final; it can be set aside or 10 A.I.R. 1964 SC 01 15 modified only in the manner prescribed by law. (2) Every Judge, whatever may be his rank in the hierarchy, must have an unrestricted right to express his views in any matter before him without fear or favour. (3) There is a correlative and self-imposed duty in a Judge not to make irrelevant remarks or observations without any foundation, especially in the case of witnesses or parties not before him, affecting their character or reputation. (4) An appellate Court has jurisdiction to judicially correct such remarks, but it will do so only in exceptional cases where such remarks would cause irrevocable harm to a witness or a party not before it. 29. When the question arises before the High Court in any specific case whether to resort to such undefined power it is essential for it to exercise great caution and circumspection. Thus when it is moved by an aggrieved party to expunge any passage from the order or judgment of a subordinate Court it must be fully satisfied that the passage complained of is wholly irrelevant and unjustifiable, that its retention on the records will cause serious harm to the person to whom it refers and that its expunction will not affect the reasons for the judgment or order." 26.These principles of law laid down as noticed above have been followed and approved by the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Gujarat Vs. 16 Justice R.A. Mehta (Retired) & other11, Omprakash Chautala Vs. Kanwar Bhan12 and Amar Pal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others13. 27.Thus, on the basis of above-stated legal analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the remark “benefit of doubt” by learned JMFC in paragraph No. 28 of the judgment and order dated 31.1.2025 in criminal case no. 1838 of 2020 (State v Sanjay Kumar Sainik & Others), while acquitting petitioners deserves to and is hereby expunged accordingly. 28.The petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. No cost(s). SD/- SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Gowri/ Amardeep 11 (2013) 3 SC 01 12 (2014) 5 SCC 417 13 (2015) 6 SCC 716