( 2025:HHC:19831 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA LPA No: 277 of 2025 Decided on: 22.05.2025 __________________________________________________________ State of Himachal Pradesh and others .... Appellants Versus Ishwar Dutt ….Respondent Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge. 1Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the appellants: Mr. Pranay Pratap Singh, Additional Advocate General. For the respondents: Nemo. Ranjan Sharma, Judge CMP(M) No. 114 of 2025 State of Himachal Pradesh, being appellant, has filed this application seeking condonation of 79 days delay in filing accompanying Letters Patent Appeal, in assailing the judgement dated 13.08.2024, {referred as Impugned Judgement}, passed by the Learned Single Judge in CWP No 4228 of 2022. Perusal of the application reveals that the appellant received intimation of passing of the judgement dated 13.08.2024 from the office of the Advocate General on 25.09.2024. Thereafter Executive 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 2 - Engineer, Karsog sent the case to Engineer-in- Chief (PW) on 3.10.2024, who sent it further to Government for legal opinion on 08.10.2024. Appellant No.1-Secretary (PW) vide letter dated 26.11.2024 directed Engineer-in-Chief and Executive Engineer Karsog on 4.12.2024 to complete further formalities by attaching the Impugned Judgment in LPA. Upon receipt of the approval of higher authorities on 6.12.2024, the LPA was vetted on 06.12.2024 and the same was submitted to office of Learned Advocate General for vetting. The draft LPA was vetted on 10.12.2024 and was finally filed on 18.12.2024. Upon listing of this application and the sufficient cause narrated therein which appears to be bonafide coupled with the facts that instant application is supported by an affidavit and the delay which is sought to be condoned in nominal, therefore, delay in filing the appeal is condoned. Accordingly, instant application stands disposed of. ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 3 - LPA No. 277 of 2025 Appellant-State has come up against the judgement dated 13.08.2024 in CWP No. 4228 of 2022 in Re: Ishwar Dutt versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, whereby, the Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the respondent-State Authorities to initiate the process for acquiring subject land of the petitioner, which was utilized by the State for construction of road in accordance with law within eight weeks from the date of passing of judgement, with directions to the appellants herein, to complete the entire process within one year thereafter. FACTUAL MATRIX LEADING TO PASSING OF IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT: 2. Writ petitioner, Ishwar Dutt, invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court seeking direction to the respondents to acquire his land comprising in Khewat No. 115, Khata-Khatauni No 273, Khasra No. 529, situated at Mohal Sawindhar, Tehsil Karsog, District Mandi and to pay him compensation in accordance with law. The above ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 4 - prayer was made on the factual platform that the State Authorities constructed a link road i.e. Mahota-Bagshar Road by utilizing the land of writ petitioner but neither the land has been acquired nor any compensation was paid whereas, the State Authorities have acquired similar land(s) and also disbursed the compensation to co-owners of adjoining land namely, Bhoop Ram and Neem Chand, pursuant to judgements dated 24.06.2016 and 5.7.2016, passed in respective petitions i.e. CWP No. 2386 of 2009 (Bhoop Ram vs State of Himachal Pradesh and others) and CWP No. 3090 of 2009 (Neem Chand vs State of Himachal Pradesh). It is averred that incompliance to the aforesaid judgments passed in case of other co-owners namely Bhoop Chand and Neem Chand (supra) State Authorities initiated acquisition proceedings and assessed compensation for utilization of their land(s) in terms of the Award dated 22.02.2022 [Annexure P-2 Colly]. After passing of the Award in the cases of other co-owners, namely Bhoop ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 5 - Ram and Neem Chand (supra), the writ petitioner- Ishwar Dutt, submitted representation on 21.4.2022 for similar benefits, on which the appellant No.3- Land Acquisition Collector vide communication dated 27.04.2022 requested Executing Engineer, HPPWD Division Karsog, District Mandi to take appropriate action. Even appellant No.1-Special Secretary [PW] vide office letter dated 04.05.2022 directed Executive Engineer concerned to take necessary action in the matter, but in vain. STAND OF STATE AUTHORITIES IN WRIT PROCEEDINGS: 3. In writ proceeding, the State Authorities have filed a Reply-Affidavit admitting that Mahota- Bagshar Road was constructed under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna [in short PMGSY] and construction of road was completed before February, 2009 which includes the land of the petitioner also. The State Authorities took a stand that road was constructed on the verbal consent of landowner(s) and writ petitioner never objected to the construction of road and therefore, no ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 6 - compensation was to be paid. It is averred in the reply that under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna there is no provision for acquisition of land or for payment of compensation. The plea of delay and laches was also raised by State Authorities. IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT:DATED 13.08.2024 4. Learned Single Judge dealt with the contentions raised in the Reply Affidavit in the judgement dated 13.08.2024. 4(i). In Para 5(i) & (iii) of the judgment the Learned Single Judge recorded a finding that lands of other co-owners were acquired for the construction of road and compensation has been awarded by the State Authorities to co-owners of adjoining lands namely, Bhoop Ram and Neem Chand in terms of the Award No 5/2022 dated 22.02.2022 passed by Competent Authority and in these circumstances, the writ-petitioner-Ishwar Dutt whose land(s) were utilized for construction of same very subject road deserves similar benefits. In Para 5(iii) of the judgment, Learned Single ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 7 - Judge relied upon the judgment in case of Labdhu Ram versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, CWP No. 6581 of 2021 that once the benefit of acquisition and resultant compensation for utilizing the land for construction of road had been accorded to some land owners, then, similar benefit is to be extended to others also. In Para 5(iv) of the judgment passed by Learned Single Judge, the objection of State Authorities-Appellant that Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna did not provide for acquisition and compensation, in case, the land(s) were utilized for construction of road was negated in view of the Full Bench judgement of this Court, in State of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Sita Ram Sharma, {LPA No. 33 of 2021 decided on 30.3.2022}, by holding that such landowners are entitled for compensation, unless it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that land was voluntarily donated or given by private land owners willingly, which consent/willingness has to be in writing and same ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 8 - has to be substantiated by material on record. In this background, since the State Authorities have failed to establish that land was voluntarily donated/given for construction of road, the plea of the State Authorities was negated. In Para 5(iii), the Learned Single Judge repelled the stand of the State Authorities that claim of writ petitioner suffers from delay and laches by relying upon various judgements, including the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022) 7 SCC 508, with the findings that State cannot evade its legal responsibility by expropriating private lands and then by shirking its responsibility of acquiring land for public use without paying compensation, by taking the plea of limitation or delay and laches. Based on aforesaid reasoning, Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition in terms of Impugned judgement dated 13.08.2024. INSTANT PROCEEDINGS-LPA: ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 9 - 5. Upon listing of instant appeal, Learned State Counsel has vehemently argued the appeal on merits, by almost reiterating same contentions which stood repelled by Learned Single Judge in the Impugned judgement yet, at the insistence of Learned State Counsel, this Court, proceeds to hear this appeal, at this stage. RECAP OF MANDATE OF LAW ON RIGHT OF PROPERTY: 6. Before dealing with the contentions of Learned State Counsel for the appellants, it is necessary to have a recap of the mandate of law on the right to property of a person and its regime. 6(i). Based on principle of eminent domain Article 30(1-A) and proviso to Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution of India the right to property and the right of a person to acquire, hold and dispose of property recognized as a fundamental right. After the enactment of 44th amendment in 1978, introducing Article 300-A in the Constitution of India the right to property was recognized ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 10 - as “constitutional right”, inscribing that “no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law”. 6(ii). Consequent upon recognition of right of property as a constitutional right, a question arose as to whether a person can be deprived of his property, save by authority of law under Article 300-A, merely by an executive fiat, without any legal authority or without sanctity of law made by a competent legislature was answered by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of K.T. Plantation Private Limited and another versus State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 01, mandating that deprivation of property under Article 300-A must be for a public purpose and too on the basis of a right flowing from a duly incorporated law after paying compensation and such deprivation cannot be resorted to by an executive fiat. Deprivation can take place only by operation of law, which has to be lawful, fair and such deprivation does not ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 11 - undermine the rule of law, failing which, any such law shall be subject to judicial review, in the following terms: 168. Article 300-A proclaims that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law, meaning thereby that a person cannot be deprived of his property merely by an executive fiat, without any specific legal authority or without the support of law made by a competent legislature. The expression ‘Property’ in Art. 300-A confined not to land alone, it includes intangibles like copyrights and other intellectual property and embraces every possible interest recognized by law. 169. This Court in State of W. B. & Others v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd & Another (2002) 4 SCC 134, while examining the provisions of the West Bengal Great Eastern Hotel (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1980, held in the context of Article 300-A that the State or executive offices cannot interfere with the right of others unless they can point out the specific provisions of law which authorizes their rights. 170. Article 300-A, therefore, protects private property against executive action. But the question that looms large is as to what extent their rights will be protected when they are sought to be illegally deprived of their properties on the strength of a legislation. Further, it was also argued that the twin requirements of ‘public purpose’ and ‘compensation’ in case of deprivation of property are inherent and essential elements or ingredients, or “inseparable concomitants” of the power of eminent domain and, therefore, of entry 42, List III, as well and, hence, would apply when the validity of a statute is in question. 171. On the other hand, it was the contention ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 12 - of the State that since the Constitution consciously omitted Article 19(1)(f), Articles 31(1) and 31(2), the intention of the Parliament was to do away the doctrine of eminent domain which highlights the principles of public purpose and compensation. 172. Seervai in his celebrated book ‘Constitutional Law of India’ (Edn. IV), spent a whole Chapter XIV on the 44th Amendment, while dealing with Article 300A. In paragraph 15.2 (pages 1157-1158) the author opined that confiscation of property of innocent people for the benefit of private persons is a kind of confiscation unknown to our law and whatever meaning the word "acquisition" may have does not cover "confiscation" for, to confiscate means "to appropriate to the public treasury (by way of penalty)". Consequently, the law taking private property for a public purpose without compensation would fall outside Entry 42 List III and cannot be supported by another Entry in List III. 173. Requirements of a public purpose and the payment of compensation according to the learned author be read into Entry 42 List III. Further the learned author has also opined that the repeal of Article 19(1)(f) and 31(2) could have repercussions on other fundamental rights or other provisions which are to be regarded as part of the basic structure and also stated that notwithstanding the repeal of Article 31(2), the word "compensation" or the concept thereof is still retained in Article 30(1A) and in the second proviso to Article 31A(1) meaning thereby, that payment of compensation is a condition of legislative power in Entry 42 List III. 174. Learned senior counsel Shri T.R. Andhyarujina, also referred to the opinion expressed by another learned author Prof. P.K. Tripathi, in his article "Right to Property after 44th Amendment – Better Protected than Ever Before" (reported in AIR 1980 ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 13 - J pg. 49-52). Learned author expressed the opinion and the right of the individual to receive compensation when his property is acquired or requisitioned by the State, continues to be available in the form of an implied condition of the power of the State to legislate on "acquisition or requisition of property" while all the exceptions and limitations set up against and around it in Article 31, 31A and 31B have disappeared. Learned author opined that Article 300-A will require obviously, that the law must be a valid law and no law of acquisition or requisitioning can be valid unless the acquisition or requisition is for a public purpose, unless there is provision in law for paying compensation, will continue to have a meaning given to it, by Bela Banerjee’s case (supra). 175. Learned author, Shri S.B. Sathe, in his article "Right to Property after the 44th Amendment" (AIR 1980 Journal 97), to some extent, endorsed the view of Prof. Tripathi and opined that the 44th amendment has increased the scope of judicial review in respect of right to property. Learned author has stated although Article 300A says that no one shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law, there is no reason to expect that this provision would protect private property only against executive action. Learned author also expresses the wish that Article 21 may provide viable check upon Article 300A. 176. Durga Das Basu in his book "Shorter Constitution of India", 13th Edition, dealt with Article 300A in Chapter IV wherein the learned author expressed some reservation about the views expressed by Seervai, as well as Prof. Tripathi Learned author expressed the view, that after the 44th amendment Act there is no express provision in the Constitution outside the two cases specified under Article 30(1A) and the second proviso to 31(1A) ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 14 - requiring the State to pay compensation to an expropriated owner. Learned author also expressed the opinion that no reliance could be placed on the legislative Entry 42 of List III so as to claim compensation on the touchstone of fundamental rights since the entry in a legislative list does not confer any legislative power but only enumerates fields of legislation. 177. Learned counsel on the either side, apart from other contentions, highlighted the above views expressed by the learned authors to urge their respective contentions. 178. Principles of eminent domain, as such, is not seen incorporated in Article 300A, as we see, in Article 30(1A), as well as in the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1) though we can infer those principles in Article 300A. Provision for payment of compensation has been specifically incorporated in Article 30(1A) as well as in the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1) for achieving specific objectives. Constitution's 44th Amendment Act, 1978 while omitting Article 31 brought in a substantive provision Clause (1A) to Article 30. Resultantly, though no individual or even educational institution belonging to majority community shall have any fundamental right to compensation in case of compulsory acquisition of his property by the State, an educational institution belonging to a minority community shall have such fundamental right to claim compensation in case State enacts a law providing for compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority community. Further, the second proviso to Article 31A(1) prohibits the Legislature from making a law which does not contain a provision for payment of compensation at a rate not less than the market value which follows that a law which does not contain such provision shall be invalid and the acquisition proceedings would be rendered void. ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 15 - 179. Looking at the history of the various constitutional amendments, judicial pronouncements and the statement of objects and reasons contained in the 44th Amendment Bill which led to the 44th Amendment Act we have no doubt that the intention of the Parliament was to do away with the fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of the property. But the question is whether the principles of eminent domainare completely obliterated when a person is deprived of his property by the authority of law under Article 300Aof the Constitution. Public purpose 180. Deprivation of property within the meaning of Art.300-A, generally speaking, must take place for public purpose or public interest. The concept of eminent domain which applies when a person is deprived of his property postulates that the purpose must be primarily public and not primarily of private interest and merely incidentally beneficial to the public. Any law, which deprives a person of his private property for private interest, will be unlawful and unfair and undermines the rule of law and can be subjected to judicial review. But the question as to whether the purpose is primarily public or private, has to be decided by the legislature, which of course should be made known. 6(iii). Another question arose before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.T. Plantation (supra) as to whether a person who is deprived of property for public purpose is entitled to get compensation, has to be justified by the State on judicially justifiable standards depending upon ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 16 - the law formulated by a State, which has to be just, fair and reasonable. In case a State Enactment provides for acquiring private property for public purpose for “no compensation” or “nil compensation” then, Court in exercise of judicial review will test such a law, as mandated in the following terms: 183. Payment of compensation amount is a constitutional requirement under Article 30(1A) and under the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1), unlike Article 300A. After the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, the constitutional obligation to pay compensation to a person who is deprived of his property primarily depends upon the terms of the statute and the legislative policy. Article 300-A, however, does not prohibit the payment of just compensation when a person is deprived of his property, but the question is whether a person is entitled to get compensation, as a matter of right, in the absence of any stipulation in the statute, depriving him of his property. 189. Requirement of public purpose, for deprivation of a person of his property under Article 300A, is a pre-condition, but no compensation or nil compensation or its illusiveness has to be justified by the state on judicially justiciable standards. Measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for lesser compensation and such a limitation by itself will not make legislation invalid or unconstitutional or confiscatory. In other words, the right to claim compensation or the obligation to pay, though not expressly included in Article 300A, it can be inferred in that Article and it is for the ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 17 - State to justify its stand on justifiable grounds which may depend upon the legislative policy, object and purpose of the statute and host of other factors. 190. Article 300A would be equally violated if the provisions of law authorizing deprivation of property have not been complied with. While enacting Article 300A Parliament has only borrowed Article 31(1) [the “Rule of law” doctrine] and not Article 31(2) [which had embodied the doctrine of Eminent Domain]. Article 300A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be reasonable. It must comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive. 191. The legislation providing for deprivation of property under Article 300-A must be “just, fair and reasonable” as understood in terms of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 26(b), 301, etc. Thus in each case, courts will have to examine the scheme of the impugned Act, its object, purpose as also the question whether payment of nil compensation or nominal compensation would make the impugned law unjust, unfair or unreasonable in terms of other provisions of the Constitution as indicated above. 192. At this stage, we may clarify that there is a difference between “no” compensation and “nil” compensation. A law seeking to acquire private property for public purpose cannot say that “no compensation shall be paid”. However, there could be a law awarding “nil” compensation in cases where the State undertakes to discharge the liabilities charged on the property under acquisition and onus is on the government to establish validity of such law. In the latter case, the court in exercise of judicial review will test such a law keeping in mind the above ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 18 - parameters. 198. Article 300A, unlike Articles 31A(1) and 31C, has not made the legislation depriving a person of his property immune from challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14 or Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but let us first examine whether Article 21 as such is available to challenge a statute providing for no or illusory compensation and, hence, expropriatory. 6(iv). Reference in the case of K.T. Plantation (supra) was answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by mandating that public purpose is a pre-condition for depriving a person from his property under Article 300-A and right to claim compensation is also inbuilt under that Article and when a person is deprived of his property, the State has to justify such deprivation on the basis of the statute or legislative policy and its object and purpose and other related factors. 6(v). The judgement in the case of K. T. Plantation was followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Association of Vasanth Apartments’ Owners versus V. Gopinath and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 137, [Civil Appeal No. 1890-91 of 2010, decided on 13.02.2023] ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 19 - mandating that an illegal deprivation is attracted where a person is deprived of his property, in case of “no compensation”, in the following terms: 118. The Court also reiterated the distinction between ‘no compensation’ and ‘Nil compensation’, as laid down in K.T. Plantations (supra). The Court proceeded to find that it was a case of ‘no compensation’ at all, and therefore, it attracted the vice of illegal deprivation of property and gave relief on the said basis. This is after finding that the property in question was a productive asset. 144. An acquisition is a compulsory vesting of the property of a person with the state. It is traceable undoubtedly to the power of eminent domain assured to every sovereign. It can undoubtedly be exercised only for securing public interest as contrasted with promotion of private interest (See K.T. Plantation (supra). 145. K.T. Plantations (supra) was a case which involved the validity of a law which provided for compulsory acquisition under the State enactment. The understanding of this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra) was that a person cannot be deprived of his property merely by executive fiat without any specific legal authority or without support of law made by a competent Legislature (See paragraph-168). We must notice here that law for the scope of Article 300A has been explained by this Court in Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others as follows: “41. There still remains the question whether the seizure of wheat amounts to deprivation of property without the authority of law. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 20 - his property save by authority of law. The State Government cannot while taking recourse to the executive power of the State under Article 162, deprive a person of his property. Such power can be exercised only by authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat or order. Article 162, as is clear from the opening words, is subject to other provisions of the Constitution. It is, therefore, necessarily subject to Article 300-A. The word “law” in the context of Article 300-A must mean an Act of Parliament or of a State legislature, a rule, or a statutory order, having the force of law, that is positive or State made law. The decisions in Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. [AIR 1954 SC 415: (1955) 1 SCR 408 : 1954 SCJ 600 : 1954 Cri LJ 1029] and Bishan Das v. State of Punjab [AIR 1961 SC 1570 : (1962) 2 SCR 69 : (1963) 1 SCJ 405] are an authority for the proposition that an illegal seizure amounts to deprivation of property without the authority of law…..”. 146. What this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra) meant was to distinguish ‘law’ as a legislative measure as distinct from mere Executive fiat. 6(vi). Right for compensation, in case property of a private owner is utilized by the State has been answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ultra-tech Cement Limited versus Mast Ram and others, (2025) 1 SCC 798, Civil Appeal No. 10662 of 2024 decided on 20.09.2024 in the following terms: ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 21 - 52. Acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent domain of the government much against the wishes of the owners of the land which gets acquired. When such a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden duty and obligation on the part of the government body to ensure that the owners whose lands get acquired are paid compensation/awarded amount as declared by the statutory award at the earliest. 6(vii). The intent and object of Article 300-A having been outlined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.T. Plantation, V. Gopinath and in Ultra-tech Cement Limited (supra) and in view of the mandate of law and the existing material on record, this Court is of the considered view, that appellant- State Authorities have not pointed out any law enacted by State Legislature empowering the State to divest a person of his land without paying compensation. In absence of any such statute having been enacted by State or placed before this Court [in writ proceedings and in LPA] the action of State Authorities in divesting the Writ petitioner-Ishwar Dutt of private property and by utilizing his land(s) for construction of Mahota- Bagshar Road under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 22 - Yojna package 2003-2004, for which the work commenced in the year 2005 and was completed in the year 2009 coupled with the fact that once the State Authorities have initially utilized the lands of other similar co-owners of adjoining lands namely, Bhoop Ram and Neem Chand for the construction of same subject road and had thereafter initiated the acquisition proceedings and paid compensation in terms of the Award dated 22.2.2022, then, this Court sees no reason, as to why the writ petitioner be not held entitled for similar compensation. Even the plea of the State Authorities that the land(s) were utilized for construction of Road under PMGSY-Scheme which does not provides for paying any compensation cannot come to the rescue of the Appellants-State Authorities in view of findings recorded in Para 27 of the Full Bench judgement of this Court, in case of State of Himachal Pradesh versus Sita Ram {LPA No 33 of 2021 dated 30.3.2022}, by answering the reference that the State Authorities ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 23 - cannot by way of an executive fiat divest the landowner(s) of his private land(s), without his consent and without paying compensation and by utilizing such land for construction of road in question. The Full Bench further held in case of Sita Ram (supra) that expropriation of property by the State without any sanction of law visits a landowner with civil consequences by depriving him of the right to use his own property and to reap the benefits accruing thereof reveals a continuing cause of action in favour of landowner for claiming claim compensation. Even whimsical and anarchical manner of depriving the landowner -writ petitioner of his property and in denying him compensation till day shocks the conscience of this Court. Accordingly, the judgment passed by Learned Single Judge after noticing the material on record and the factual and legal aspects, need no interference, in instant appeal. CONTENTION OF STATE AUTHORITIES IN INSTANT APPEAL: 7. First contention of Learned State Counsel ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 24 - for appellant is that the land of writ petitioner- Ishwar Dutt herein, was utilized for construction of road i.e. Mahota-Bagshar Road upon giving a verbal consent and the writ petitioner herein did not object to cutting of aforesaid road in the year 2005 till its completion in February, 2009. Above contention of appellant is ex-facie not tenable, for the reason, that State Authorities have not produced any material on record either before the writ court or even in these proceedings that the writ petitioner had given consent for construction of the said road. Plea of the State Authorities in denying claim for compensation by asserting that land was utilized on oral consent of landowner-petitioner stands negated by the Full Bench of this Court, in Shankar Dass alias Shankru versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others in CWP No 1966 of 2010-C decided on 02.03.2013 [2013 SCC OnLine HP 681], mandating that that the oral consent cannot be presumed or acted upon until some evidence of consent ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 25 - either in form of letter, writing or signatures on a representation for construction of road is placed on record and in these circumstances, the plea of oral was held to be untenable, in the following terms: 51. On the question of consent, I am of the considered view that after the judgement in Nokhia’s case, quoted hereinabove, the State should not have constructed roads without taking consent in writing from the land owners. If the State did so, it did at its own peril. his Court had issued clear cut directions which have held the field since 1984 that the State should ensure that road sare constructed only after the land owners give informed consent. 52. Oral consent cannot be presumed in the case of poor persons or those living in rural or remote areas. In cases where parties are rich and educated and they do not approach this Court within a reasonable period, then the Writ Court may direct them to approach the Civil Court. But in cases where people are poor and uneducated, it would invariably be better to take a more liberal view. 53. The State also cannot plead consent or implied consent only on the basis that the road had been constructed. There must be some better evidence in this regard. If some evidence of consent, either in the form of letter, writing or signatures on a representation for construction of road, is placed before this Court, then this Court may not exercise its writ jurisdiction and direct the party to approach the Civil Court. But if the only sort of consent pleaded is the implied consent due to construction of road, then this Court may entertain the ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 26 - writ petition. 7(i). While negating the plea of “verbal consent of land owner(s)” the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, SLP(C) No. 2373 of 2014 [arising from LPA No. 285 of 2012], decided on 29.10.2015, in the following terms: ….. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Anil Nag, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the High Court was in error in declining to intervene and grant relief prayed for by the appellant. It was submitted that the case of the appellant was no different from that of Kanwar Singh in whose case the High Court had not only issued a Mandamus for acquisition of the land utilised for the very same purpose but order so passed had been complied with by the State by not only initiating the proceedings but even determining and paying compensation lawfully due and payable to them. In the case of the appellant also the State had on its own initiated proceedings for acquisition of land but the said proceedings were allowed to lapse ostensibly because the road in question had subsequently been taken over under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna which did not provide for payment of compensation to the land owners whose lands were utilised for such projects. It was urged that the utilisation of the land for construction of the road was not in dispute before the High Court as was evident from the counter affidavit filed to the writ petition. There was therefore no question of directing the appellant to approach the Civil Court for adjudication of any disputed question of fact. It was also submitted that the transfer of the road to the Pradhan ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 27 - Mantri Sadak Yojna for maintenance etc. was no reason why the owners whose land had been utilised should have been denied the payment of compensation otherwise due to them. It was urged that the State had never claimed that the erstwhile owner of the land and the predecessor in interest of the appellant herein had made any formal or informal donation of the land in favour of the State to facilitate the construction of the road. In the absence of even an assertion that the road was constructed on the invitation of the erstwhile owner, the High Court was in error in declining to grant relief to the appellant who had lost his valuable land and thereby the source of livelihood. The remedy in a civil court was neither speedy nor efficacious. It was urged that the appellant would be satisfied in case the actual extent of land utilised by the State out of his ownership is verified by the Collector and compensation determined in Kanwar Singh's case under Award No. 10 of 2008 directed to be paid to the appellant depending upon the classification of the land that has been utilised by the State Government. It is urged that the appellant would keeping in view the intervening delay give up his right to claim compensation for the user of the land without acquisition and payment of statutory interest recoverable on the said amount. This would according to the learned counsel not only serve the ends of justice but also prevent any further litigation in the matter. It was submitted that this Court could in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and with a view to giving a quietus to the entire controversy make a suitable order that would meet the ends of justice. There is in our opinion considerable merit in the submission made by Mr. Nag. It is true that the appellant had approached the High Court rather belatedly inasmuch the land had been utilised sometime in the year 1985-86 while the writ petition was filed ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 28 - by the appellant in the year 2009. At the same time it is clear from the pleadings in the case at hand that the user of the land owned by the appellant is not denied by the State in the counter affidavit filed before the High Court or that filed before us. It is also evident from the averments made in the counter affidavit that the State has not sought any donation in its favour either by the appellant or his predecessor in interest during whose life time the road in question was constructed. All that is stated in the counter affidavit is that the erstwhile owner of the land “might have donated” the land to the State Government. In the absence of any specific assertion regarding any such donation or documentary evidence to support the same, we are not inclined to accept the ipsit dixit suggesting any such donation. If that be so as it indeed is, we fail to appreciate why the State should have given up the land acquisition proceedings initiated by it in relation to the land of the appellant herein. The fact that the State Government had initiated such proceedings is not in dispute nor is it disputed that the same were allowed to lapse just because the road had in the meantime been taken under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna. It is also not in dispute that for the very same road the land owned by Kanwar Singh another owner had not only been notified for acquisition but duly paid for in terms of Award No. 10 of 2008. 7(ii). Plea of State Authorities that land was utilized on the basis of the oral consent given by the land-owner(s), was negated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Vidya Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2020) 2 SCC 569, ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 29 - reads as under: 12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction and without following due process of law and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967. 12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the State. 7(iii). In Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022) 7 SCC 508, {i.e. CA No 2773 of 2022}, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of any material on record, the plea of verbal consent or the fact that the land owner did not raise any objection cannot be used to deny compensation, in the following terms: 21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court finds that the contentions raised by the State, do not inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The State has merely averred to the appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not placed any material on record to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was unable to produce any evidence indicating that the land of the appellants had been taken over or acquired in the manner known to law, or that they ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 30 - had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to note that this was the State’s position, and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as well, in the other writ proceedings. 22. This court is also not moved by the State’s contention that since the property is not adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity. Despite it not being adjoining (which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellants), it is clear that the subject land was acquired for the same reason-construction of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-73, and much like the claimants before the reference court, these appellants too were illegally dispossessed without following due process of law, thus resulting in violation of Article 31 and warranting the High Court’s intervention under Article 226 jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law. The need for written consent in matters of land acquisition proceedings, has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of the High Court in Shankar Dass (supra) itself, which is relied upon in the impugned judgment. 7(iv). The judgement in the case of Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra) was again taken in Review Petition (Civil) Diary No. 7253 of 2023 titled as The State of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Sukh Dutt Ratra, resulting in dismissal of the review petition on 03.08.2023, in the following terms: Review Petition (Civil) Diary No 7253 /2023 ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 31 - “Delay condoned. Instant petition has been filed by the petitioners for review of order dated 6.4.2022 passed by this Court in CA No 2773 of 2022. Having carefully perused the petition for review and the papers connected therewith, we do not find any reason for reconsideration of the above mentioned order. The Review petition is accordingly dismissed.” Thus, taking into account the material on record in the writ proceedings and even in instant Letters Patent Appeal, this Court is of the considered view, that the State Authorities have not placed any material to substantiate the plea of consent by the writ petitioner(s)-private landowner. Consent has to be based on cogent and concrete documentary evidence-material. Oral consent cannot be invoked to the disadvantage of poor or illiterate or person in rural areas, so as to expropriate them of their property without giving compensation. The action of State Authorities in depriving the landowner-writ petitioner of his land(s) and in divesting a land owner of the right to get compensation for his lands but in utilizing ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 32 - such land for the construction of road, without sanction of law does not stands the test of judicial scrutiny. In absence of any material, the contention of Learned State Counsel is misconceived on facts and also in view of the mandate of law in the case of Shankar Dass, Raj Kumar, Vidya Devi and Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra). 8. Second contention of the Learned State Counsel that Mahota-Bagshar Road was constructed under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna under the package for the year 2003-2004 and the land of the writ petitioner and others was utilized but since there is no provision in Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna guidelines for acquiring land and for payment of compensation, therefore, compensation could not be given to the writ petitioner. The above plea of the Learned State Counsel does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny for the reason that a reference was formulated as to whether a person whose land was utilized for construction of road under Pradhan Mantri ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 33 - Gram Sadak Yojna is entitled to compensation has been answered by the Full Bench of this Court in LPA No. 33 of 2021, State of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Sita Ram, decided on 30.03.2022, in the following terms: 26. In view of the afore discussed law, it must be held that even after the right of property enshrined under Article 19(I) (f) was deleted by the 44th amendment to the Constitution, Article 300A still retains the right to property as the constitutional right as well as legal right and mandates that no person can be deprived of his property except by authority in law. Action of the State in dispossessing a citizen of his private property, without following the due process of law, would be violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, as also negate his human right. Right to property has thus been acknowledged, not only constitutional as well as statutory, but also human right, to be construed in the realm of individual rights, such as right to health, livelihood, shelter, employment etc. in a Welfare State. The State Authorities cannot dispossess any citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law, that too by due process of law and by acquiring land and paying adequate compensation. 27. The PMGSY Guidelines issued in April, 2012 clearly envisaged that land has to be provided by the State Authorities for construction of roads under that Scheme, but under PMGSY, no provision has been made for payment of compensation or acquiring the land. Either the State Government has to provide land by acquiring the land out of its own resources, or by persuading the citizens to voluntarily donate land or provide the land ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 34 - in exchange of some other land given to them by the State or by devising any other mechanism as may be considered appropriate to ensure availability of the land. Even the PMGSY Guidelines also do not envisage taking possession of the land of the citizen without his consent and without payment of due amount of compensation. It is however another matter if the citizen voluntarily surrenders his land, but the factum of voluntariness on his part and free consent to part with possession of such land, has to be established by cogent and reliable material/evidence if and when such an action is called in question. Whether or not someone has voluntarily donated the land or has given his land in exchange of another land provided to him by the State or parted with possession of the land by any other mechanism, are all questions to be decided on facts of each case. 30. The judgments of this Court in Laiq Ram Dogra and Bhoop Ram, in the facts of those cases have been decided correctly by relying on the decision of Supreme Court in Raj Kumar’s case. The Supreme Court in Raj Kumar was also dealing with the case where initially the process for acquisition of land was started, but the proceedings were allowed to lapse, as subsequently the road, in question, was taken over under the PMGSY, which did not provide for compensation for land owners, if land was utilized for such projects. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that such land owners should be directed to approach the Civil Court for adjudication of the disputed questions of facts. It held that there was no reason as to why the owners whose land had been utilized for construction of road under PMGSY should be denied payment of compensation. The Supreme Court in that case also observed that the appellant had approached the High Court rather belatedly inasmuch as the land had been utilized sometime in the year 1985-1986 and the writ petition ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 35 - was filed by the appellant in the year, 2009. But at the same time, the Supreme Court noted that the user of the land owned by the appellant was not denied by the State in the counter-affidavit filed before the High Court or even before the Supreme Court. The plea that the erstwhile owner of the land might have donated the land to the State Government, was not accepted in the absence of any specific assertion regarding any such donation or documentary evidence to support the same. Against the backdrop of these facts, the Supreme Court directed the Collector Solan to verify the exact land utilized for construction of road and determine the amount of compensation and pay the same to the land owners. 32. In view of above, the question referred to by the Division Bench, is, therefore, answered in the affirmative that a person whose land has been utilized for construction of road under PMGSY is entitled to compensation unless it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the land was voluntarily donated or given by him willingly with free will and consent for construction of such road. 8(i). Pursuant to the Full Bench judgement in LPA No. 33 of 2021 decided on 30.03.2022 in the case of Sita Ram (supra) the Division Bench of this Court, dismissed the state appeal titled as State of Himachal Pradesh versus Sita Ram on 3.11.2022, in the following terms: 4. During the course of hearing of the appeal, one of the moot questions arose as to whether a person(s) whose land(s) has been utilized for construction of road under ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 36 - 'PMGSY' is entitled to compensation and upon noticing the conflicting opinions, the issue was referred to Hon'ble Larger Bench for authoritative pronouncement. 5. Now, the Hon'ble Larger Bench of this Court vide its order dated 30.03.2022, has answered the question in the affirmative and held that the person(s) whose land(s) has been utilized for construction of road under 'PMGSY' is entitled to compensation unless it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the land was voluntarily donated or given by him willingly with free will and consent for construction of such road. 8(ii). State Authorities assailed the judgement in LPA No. 33 of 2021 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) Diary No. 31814 of 2023, titled as The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors versus Sita Ram (since deceased) through LRs, which was also dismissed on 3.10.2023, in the following terms: 1. Delay condoned. 2. We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The special leave petition is dismissed accordingly. 3. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. Thus, taking into account the mandate of the Full Bench in the case of Sita Ram ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 37 - (supra) which has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP referred to above, this Court upholds the findings recorded by Learned Single Judge in the judgement dated 13.08.2024 that even in case of construction or utilization of road under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna a land owner including Respondents-writ petitioner herein cannot be deprived of the right to receive compensation from State Authorities for utilizing his/their land for construction of road in question, as in the instant case. 9. Third contention of Learned State Counsel is that the process for utilization-construction of the road relating to package 2003-04 was started by State Authorities in the year 2005 and the same was completed in February 2009 and the writ petitioner approached this Court in June, 2022 and therefore, the claim suffer from delay and laches and therefore, no relief could have been granted to the writ petitioner by the Learned Single Judge. ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 38 - The above contention of the State Authorities in invoking the plea of delay and laches is untenable, when, the State Authorities took possession and utilized the land belonging to writ petitioner/respondent without any sanction of law as mandated by the Honble Supreme Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi and others versus Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others, (2013) 1 SCC 353, in the following terms: 9. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between the principle of "eminent domain" and ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 39 - "police power" of the State. Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the land owner as a 'subject' of medieval India, but not as a 'citizen' under our constitution. 9(i). Repelling the contention of delay and laches or limitation, the Honble Supreme Court has mandated that the defence of delay and laches or limitation will not apply, if the case relates to a continuing cause of action or if circumstances shocks the conscious of the Court while exercising constitutional jurisdiction so as to do substantial justice in Vidya Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2020) 2 SCC 569, in the following terms: 12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, of if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 40 - delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights and the remedy claimed and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. 9(ii). Negativating the contention of delay and laches, where a person was forcibly dispossessed of private property without following due process of law and by mandating that there cannot be a limitation for doing justice the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022) 7 SCC 508 after following the mandate in the case of Vidya Devi (supra), in the following terms: “16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the question remains can the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 41 - towards those from whom private property has been expropriated? In these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness.” [Emphasis supplied] 22. This court is also not moved by the State’s contention that since the property is not adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity. Despite it not being adjoining (which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellants), it is clear that the subject land was acquired for the same reason-construction of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-73, and much like the claimants before the reference court, these appellants too were illegally dispossessed without following due process of law, thus resulting in violation of Article 31 and warranting the High Court’s intervention under Article 226 jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law. The need for written consent in matters of land acquisition proceedings, has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of the High Court in Shankar Dass (supra) itself, which is relied upon in the impugned judgment. 25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their private property without following due process of law, was violative of both their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-A, this court allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this court in Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the present case. 9(iii). A Coordinate Division Bench of this Court based on the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 42 - in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi, Vidya Devi and Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra) had outlined in LPA No. 54 of 2017, In re: State of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Upender Kumar and other connected matters decided on 27.3.2024 that the objection regarding limitation or delay and laches cannot be permitted to come in the way so as render do substantial justice and that too when, the forcible deprivation and expropriation of private landowner from his property was without sanction of law and this act of unlawful and forcible deprivation or expropriation has shocked the judicial conscience of this Court, in following terms: 10. It is now trite law that in dealing with constitutional rights in the exercise of writ jurisdiction, one can no longer apply mutatis mutandis, the time frame stipulated in limitation law as if they were attracted. The issue has been dealt with time and again by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, particularly in the context of land acquisition. 11. In Tukaram Kana Joshi and others through Power-of-Attorney Holder versus Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others (2013) 1 SCC 353 (“Tukaram”), the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to property could not be defeated on technical grounds citing ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 43 - delay. Though, in the case of State of Maharashtra versus Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683 (“Digambar”) the Hon’ble Supreme Court had denied relief to farmers on the ground of delay, but delay was not simply declared to be an absolute bar on filing of a writ petition. 12. It cannot be disputed that while deciding Tukaram’s case (supra), Digambar’s case (supra) had not been noticed, but the same was later noticed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a fairly recent case of Sukh Dutt Ratra and another versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others (2022) 7 SCC 508 (“Sukh Dutt Ratra”) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with a number of its judgments to emphasis that there can be no “limitation” to do justice if it is clear that the right to property has been intruded into without due process of law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repelled the citation of delay and laches in enforcement of the constitutional right to property in land. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, as observed above, has considered the case of Digambar. 13. Thus, the law as stands today is that the State cannot, on the ground of delay and laches, evade its responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated. In any case, what principles a Court must apply while assessing whether a writ petition is so hopelessly barred by delays and laches that a remedy is not worthy of consideration, is well articulated in Maharashtra SRTC versus Balwant Regular Motor Service AIR 1969 SC 329 and these principles stand extracted and endorsed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra’s case (supra) wherein it was held as under: “16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 44 - threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the question remains- can the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated? In these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness. 17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend the benefit of the court’s directions to those who specifically approached the courts. The State’s lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC Online HP 220) and 20.12.2013 (in Onkar Singh vs. State, CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the manner prescribed by law. 18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which conclude either way–as contended by both sides in the present dispute-however, the specific factual matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 45 - behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in a much earlier case- Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (1969) 1 SCR 808, held: "11……Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 14. By now, it is well settled that right to property though no longer a fundamental ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 46 - right and is otherwise a zealous possession of which one cannot be divested save and except by the authority of law as is enjoined by Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Any callous inaction or apathy of the State and its instrumentalities, in securing just compensation would amount to dereliction of a constitutional duty justifying issuance of writ of mandamus for appropriate remedial directions. 9(iv). The judgement in Upender Kumar’s case (supra) was taken by State Authorities in SLP(C) No. 49057 of 2024, titled as The State of Himachal Pradesh and others versus Upender Kumar, wherein, after cautioning the State Authorities with exemplary costs, the SLP was dismissed on 22.11.2024, in the following terms: SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No(s). 49057/2024 [Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 27-03-2024 in LPA No. 54/ 2017 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla] THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS. Petitioner(s) VERSUS UPENDER KUMAR Respondent(s) 1. Delay condoned. 2. We have come across several matters wherein the State of Himachal Pradesh has challenged the orders passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, thereby directing the compensation to be paid to the respondent(s). 3. The writ petitioner(s) has approached the ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 47 - High Court with a grievance that though the possession of their lands were taken for road construction, they did not receive compensation. 4. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has held that the State cannot take possession of citizen land without paying the compensation. 5. Although the right to property is no longer considered a fundamental right, it is still a constitutional right. The State cannot be permitted to acquire citizen land without paying appropriate compensation. 6. In these circumstances, it would have been justified in dismissing the special leave petition(s) with exemplary cost. However, we refrain from doing so now and simply dismiss these special leave petitions. 9(v). While dealing with a claim by landlord for compensation, who was non suited on ground of delay and laches, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the compensation, by negating the plea of delay and laches, so as to rectify injustice and the right of an individual to vindicate and protect private property could not be brushed aside by invoking delay and laches in Urban Improvement Trust versus Vidhya Devi and others, Civil Appeal No. 14473 of 2024 decided on 13.12.2024, in the following terms: 45. Having heard the learned counsels ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 48 - appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the following questions fall for our consideration: (i) Whether the High Court committed any error in taking the view that the respondents herein should be non- suited on the ground of delay and laches? 46. As regards the appellant’s challenge to the inordinate delay of 21 years in filing of the writ petitions by the respondents, we are of the view that the same needs to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the case. While it is true that the courts have consistently held that undue delay in approaching the court can be a ground for refusing relief, the courts have also recognized that in exceptional cases, where the impugned action is patently illegal or affects fundamental rights, the delay must be condoned. 47. It is pertinent for us to consider the judgment of this Court in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569, wherein it was held, inter alia, as follows: 12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]” [Emphasis supplied] 48. The aforesaid view has also been reiterated by this Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2022) 7 SCC 508 wherein the court opined that there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice….”. 50. This Court in its decision in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 49 - reported in (1974) 1 SCC 317 held that: “10. … There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilok chand Moti chand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] “is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose”. …[ SCC para 11] …” (Emphasis supplied) 51. The decisions of this Court have consistently held that the right to property is enshrined in the Constitution and requires that procedural safeguards be followed to ensure fairness and non-arbitrariness in decision-making especially in cases of acquisition by the State. Therefore, the delay in approaching the court, while a significant factor, cannot override the necessity to address illegalities and protect right to property enshrined in Article 300 A. The court must balance the need for finality in legal proceedings with the need to rectify injustice. The ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 50 - right of an individual to vindicate and protect private property cannot be brushed away merely on the grounds of delay and laches. {Emphasis Ours} Based on the factual matrix and the legal mandate as discussed hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view, that once the State Authorities have curtailed the constitutional right of writ petitioner i.e. by forcibly depriving him of his property without sanction of law, by depriving the land owner of compensation despite having utilized his land for public purpose i.e. construction of road. This action of the State Authorities has certainly visited the Respondent with civil consequences, initially by divesting him of his property-lands and thereafter by denying compensation by expropriated his property but without any authority or sanction of law is a recurring loss, which has shocked the conscience of this Court. Further, once the State Authorities have utilized the private lands of other co-owners for construction of same subject lands, namely ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 51 - Bhoop Singh, Neem Chand and others and these co-owners have been given the compensation after initiating acquisition proceedings, pursuant to the intervention of this Court and in order to ensure parity between similarly placed co-owners and to avoid the charge of discrimination, in the teeth of Articles 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India, the plea of delay and laches cannot be permitted to be invoked, which has to be brushed aside so as to rectify injustice and to render substantial justice and to ensure parity to the respondent-writ petitioner herein with other co-owners. Accordingly, the contention of Learned State Counsel based on delay and laches does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny and the same is rejected. 10. Fourth contention of Learned State Counsel is that the judgement in the case of State of Maharashtra versus Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683 has not been considered by the Learned Single Judge. The above plea is misconceived, ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 52 - when, the Learned Single Judge had referred to the judgment in the case of Sukh Dutt Ratra (supra), wherein, the judgement in Digambar’s case(supra) as discussed in the case of Vidya Devi(supra) was relied upon, by negating the plea of delay and laches by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Even otherwise, the plea of delay and laches cannot be permitted to be invoked so as to perpetuate injustice and discrimination to the Respondent-writ petitioner, when, State Authorities have released compensation to many other co-owners, whose lands were utilized for construction of the same subject road [Mahota- Bagshar Road]. Thus, in these circumstances, the contention of Learned State Counsel does not stand test of judicial scrutiny and is accordingly turned down. 11. Fifth contention of Learned State Counsel is that the judgement in the case of Rajiv versus State of Himachal Pradesh has not been considered by Learned Single Judge. ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 53 - The above contention is contrary to the records, when no such judgement was made part of reply affidavit before the writ court and even, in instant appeal, the aforesaid judgement has neither been referred to. Even on a query by this Court, Learned State Counsel was able to point out the aforesaid judgement, as quoted in grounds of appeal today. 12. Last contention of Learned State Counsel is that the Full Bench judgement of this Court [named but without referring to details of Full Bench judgment] has been ignored. The above plea of the State Counsel has been set-up, just to delay the implementation of Impugned judgement and to prolong the release of actual compensation to the land owner-writ petitioner. Moreover, the Learned Single Judge has discussed the mandate of Full Bench of this Court in the case of Sita Ram Sharma(supra), in Paras 4 and 5 of the judgement and has relied on the judgment in case of Sukh Dutt ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 54 - Ratra, wherein another Full Bench judgement in case of Shankar Dass has been duly relied upon- approved by the Honble Supreme Court. 13. Notwithstanding the above, the instant appeal needs to be tested from another angle also. Admittedly, the State Authorities started the construction of Mahota Bagshar Road with total length of 00/00 to 17/00 upto village Telehan under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna under package for the year 2003-04. The land(s) of writ petitioner and other co-owners, having adjoining lands, namely Bhoop Ram and Neem Chand were utilized by State Authorities for construction of same subject road without sanction of law and that too without giving compensation. Feeling aggrieved, Bhoop Ram filed CWP No. 2386 of 2009 and Neem Chand filed CWP No. 3090 of 2009 and both these writ petitions were allowed by Learned Single Judge of this Court vide orders dated 24.06.2016 and 5.7.2016. The judgement in case of Bhoop Ram was taken in LPA No. 79 of 2017 ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 55 - decided on 8.8.2017 wherein the State Appeal was dismissed and CWP was upheld. After decision in LPA, the State Authorities initiated acquisition proceedings on 6.12.2018, by issuing notification under The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act leading to the passing of Award by Land Acquisition Collector, HPPWD (CZ), Mandi on 22.02.2022 [Annexure P-2 colly]. After passing of Award in the case of Bhoop Ram and Neem Chand, the present respondent, namely Ishwar Dutt submitted a representation on 21.04.2022 to State Authorities [Annexure P-3], on which, the Land Acquisition Collector requested Executive Engineer concerned on 27.4.2022 [Annexure P-4], to initiate appropriate action for acquiring land. Even Special Secretary (PW) directed the concerned Executive Engineer as well as Land Acquisition Collector on 4.5.2022 [Annexure P-5], to take steps for acquisition and payment of compensation to the respondent. Since nothing was done, therefore, ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 56 - the respondent herein, [Ishwar Dutt] approached this Court, in CWP No. 4226 of 2022 on 14.06. 2022. Once the compensation has been given to co-owners of adjoining lands for construction of same subject road to Bhoop Ram and Neem Chand therefore, the “Impugned Judgement dated 13.08.2024”, In re: Ishwar Dutt versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others needs no inference, in appeal, for the reason, that parity in treatment deserves to be ensured, so as to avoid the charge of discrimination and to ensure similar treatment amongst co-owners of adjoining lands qua same subject road vis-à-vis the writ petitioner-respondent. The State Authorities cannot compel the respondent to face litigation one after the other, for safeguarding his constitutional right to get compensation from the State Authorities against the illegal and forcible deprivation/expropriation of his property without sanction of law and that too by a mere executive fiat. Not initiating acquisition proceedings and in releasing compensation as given to co-owners ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 57 - of adjoining lands vindicates the need to rectify injustice to the writ-petitioner/respondent and also to ensure equal treatment and to obviate the charge of discrimination amongst similarly placed incumbents. The rights of writ petitioner-respondent needs to be safeguarded by protecting his private property and to ensure the grant of fair, just and reasonable compensation for depriving and expropriating him of his property-land without authority of law. This Court is a sentinel of justice of constitutional right of property embodied in Article 300-A of the Constitution of India cannot tolerate injustice by denying the compensation to the writ petitioner-respondent [Ishwar Dutt] herein, when, compensation stands released to co-owner /landowners having adjoining lands for the same subject road. Unreasonableness, discrimination and arbitrariness in state action is writ large, by giving a complete go-bye to the rights of landowners by acting contrary to the litigation policy of the State. ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 58 - 14. Based on the factual matrix and the mandate of law as discussed hereinabove, this Court does not find any merit in the contentions advanced by the Learned State Counsel, in the instant appeal which are just a reiteration of the pleas taken by the appellate-State Authorities before the Writ Court. Accordingly, the contentions of Learned State Counsel for the appellants are without merit and the same are accordingly turned down. BENEFIT OF COMPENSATION GIVEN TO OTHERS AS PER COURT ORDERS: 15. Indisputably, the case of the appellants is that benefit of acquisition and compensation has been accorded by State Authorities to other co-owners of adjoining lands, for construction of road for the same subject road Mahota-Bagshar Road, incompliance to the judgment passed by this Court in CWP No. 2386 of 2009, dated 24.06.2016, in the case of Bhoop Ram vs State of Himachal Pradesh and in another CWP No. 3909 of 2009, dated 05.07.2016 [in Re: Neem Chand vs State ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 59 - of Himachal Pradesh], leading to the passing of Award on 20.2.2022, Annexure P-2 (colly). After grant of compensation to other co-owners, the writ petitioner-respondent submitted a representation on 21.04.2022, Annexure P-4 (colly), on which the Land Acquisition Officer sent a written communication to Executive Engineer, HPPWD Karsog to extend benefit of acquisition and compensation as has been extended to other co-owners i.e. Neem Chand, Bhoop Ram and others but, despite the aforesaid recommendations no action was taken, in case of the writ petitioner-respondent by Appellants- State Authorities. Once, lands of other co-owners of adjoining lands, namely, Bhoop Chand and Neem Chand were acquisitioned and compensation stands released then, this Court sees no reason, as to why the writ petitioner-respondent-landowner [Ishwar Dutt] be not extended similar benefit. Denying similar benefit(s) to the Respondent-writ petitioner, namely Ishwar Dutt herein, amounts to treating “equals as unequals”. Even the charge ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 60 - of discrimination by the State Authorities qua the writ petitioner/respondent is ex-facie made out in the instant case. Accordingly, the Impugned Judgment dated 13.08.2024, directing the State Authorities to initiate acquisition proceedings and to release compensation to the writ petitioner /respondent [Ishwar Dutt] does not suffer from any infirmity and the same is in accordance with law. All incumbents, whose lands have been utilized by the appellants-State Authorities, for the same subject road [i.e. Mahota-Bagshar Road], constitute one homogeneous class and therefore, the denial of compensation to the writ petitioner-Respondent- Ishwar Dutt herein, while extending these benefits to others co-owners, Bhoop Ram, Neem Chand and many others for the same subject road by passing the necessary Award in the year 2022 [Annexure P-2 colly in writ file] is deprecated so as to avoid discrimination. Granting compensation to other co-owners whose lands were utilized for construction of same subject road, while denying ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 61 - it to respondent-with petitioner is enough to negate the plea of delay and laches. Discrimination, patent illegality and denial of substantial justice is writ large revealing denying of similar treatment to Respondent-writ petitioner as has been given to other co-owners of adjoining lands, whose lands are utilized for construction of same subject-road by the State Authorities, so as to ensure parity and to avoid the charge of discrimination. Thus, the Impugned Judgment passed by Learned Single Judge, does not suffer from any infirmity. 16. While dealing with similar proposition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No (s). 3189 of 2022, titled as Kalyani [Deceased] Through LRs and others vs The Sulthan Bathery Municipality and others, has outlined that unless cogent and convincing material placed on record, to show, that landowners had surrendered their land either by way of donation, gift or other permissible modes of transfer, the plea of voluntary donation or verbal consent cannot be accepted. It ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 62 - was further outlined that if there was no scheme for acquisition or for payment of compensation, then, the absence of provision for acquisition or compensation was fault of the State and in such on eventuality, it was all the more necessary to get the surrender or voluntary donation duly documented in favour of State/PWD/Municipality /Panchayats as the case may be. Indisputably though construction of a road, would serve a public purpose, but such a plea cannot be a justification for not paying the compensation to the landowner, who was deprived or expropriated of his land without sanction or authority of law. Thus, the State Action, in depriving a person, alike the Respondent-writ petitioner herein, of his property without paying compensation is certainly arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. 17. Another co-owner, namely Charan Dass, who was seeking compensation for utilizing his land for same subject road at par with Bhoop ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 63 - Ram and Neem Chand, stands adjudicated by this Court in LPA No. 68 of 2025, In re; State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors versus Charan Dass decided on 01.03.2025 therefore, writ petitioner /respondent [Ishwar Dutt] being similarly placed cannot be non-suited on ground of delay along. Even a perusal of Para 51 of the judgment, in case of Vidhya Devi [Civil Appeal No. 14473 of 2024] mandates that delay in approaching the Court cannot override necessity to address the illegalities and to protect the right to property enshrined in Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. A balance needs to be carved out so that right of an individual qua his property, is not brushed aside merely on the ground of delay and laches but is adequately safeguarded and protected against the impermissible State action by depriving or expropriating or dispossessing the Respondent-writ petitioner of his private lands and also in divesting and not paying the compensation admissible in law and that too by resorting to ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 64 - such impermissible acts, without any sanction or authority of law. Thus, the State action cannot pass the test of judicial scrutiny. The operative part of the judgment in case of Charan Dass (supra) reads as under: 13. Notwithstanding the above, the instant appeal needs to be tested from another angle also. Admittedly, the State Authorities started the construction of Mahota Bagshar Road with total length of 00/00 to 17/00 upto village Telehan under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna[in short PMGSY] under package for the year 2003-04. Land of the writ petitioner and other co-owners, having adjoining lands namely Bhoop Ram and Neem Chand were also utilized for the construction of same subject road without sanction of law by the State Authorities. Feeling aggrieved Bhoop Ram filed CWP No. 2386 of 2009 and Neem Chand filed CWP No. 3090 of 2009 and both these writ petitions were allowed on 24.06.2016 and 5.7.2016 by the Learned Single Judge. These judgement in the case of Bhoop Ram was taken in LPA No. 79 of 2017 decided on 8.8.2017 wherein the State Appeal was dismissed and CWP was upheld. After decision in LPA, the State Authorities as per material on record in the writ proceedings started the acquisition proceedings on 6.12.2018, by issuing notification under Section 11 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,2013 leading to the passing of Award by Land Acquisition Collector, HPPWD (CZ), Mandi on 22.02.2022 [Annexure P-2 colly]. After passing of award in the case of Bhoop Ram and Neem Chand, the writ petitioner submitted representation on 21.04.2022 to State Authorities [Annexure P-3] whereafter ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 65 - the Land Acquisition Collector requested the Executive Engineer concerned on 27.4.2022 [Annexure P-4] to initiate appropriate action for acquiring the land. Even Special Secretary (PW) directed the concerned Executive Engineer and Land Acquisition Collector on 4.5.2022 [Annexure P-5] to take steps for payment of compensation to the writ petitioner [Ishwar Dutt]. Since nothing was done therefore, the writ petitioner approached this Court in CWP No. 4226 of 2022 on 14.06. 2022. In these circumstances, once the compensation has been given to Bhoop Ram and Neem Chand therefore, “Impugned Judgement dated 13.08.2024”, In re: Chaman Dass versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others needs no inference so as to ensure parity in treatment and to avoid the charge of discrimination vis-à-vis other landowners of the adjoining lands for same subject road. The act of the State Authorities in compelling the writ petitioner to face litigation, one after the other, for his constitutional right to get compensation from the State Authorities against the illegal and forcible deprivation of his property without the sanction of law, and that too by a mere executive fiat, cannot be permitted to operate any longer. In order to balance the need for finality in legal proceedings, with the intent and object of need to rectify injustice and to enable the writ petitioner to vindicate and to protect his private property therefore, this Court being a “sentinel of justice” of constitutional right of property embodied in Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, when, benefit of compensation stands given to other landowners having adjoining lands for subject road as detailed hereinabove establishes unfairness, unreasonableness, discrimination and arbitrariness in State action, which also is not in spirit of the litigation policy of the State-Appellants. Accordingly, the Impugned judgement passed by the ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 66 - Learned Single Judge does not suffer from any illegality, infirmity or perversity and therefore, the instant appeal, is devoid of any merit. 18. Needless to observe that the Impugned Judgement passed by the Learned Single Judge on 13.8.2024, is well reasoned, and has been passed after due appreciation of facts and law and the same does not suffer from any infirmity perversity or illegality and is accordingly upheld. CONCLUSION & DIRECTIONS: 19. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant Letters Patent Appeal, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed, in the following terms :- (i). Impugned judgement passed by Learned Single Judge, in CWP No. 4228 of 2022 decided on 13.08.2024 in Ishwar Dutt versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others is upheld ; (ii). Respondents-State Authorities are directed to initiate the acquisition proceedings and/or to otherwise award compensation to the writ petitioner-respondent [Ishwar Dutt] herein; without discriminating the writ petitioner-respondent vis-à-vis other ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 67 - co-owners of adjoining lands i.e. Bhoop Ram and Neem Chand [supra] whose lands were utilized for construction of same subject road; (iii) The directions passed by the Learned Single Judge to complete entire process expeditiously and not later than the outer limit of one year is upheld; (iv) Parties to bear their respective cost. 20. Before parting with this case, this Court observes that the State Authorities have granted /extended benefit of acquisition and compensation to many other co-owners of adjoining lands whose lands were utilized for construction of the same subject road. In this factual backdrop, the action of the State Authorities-appellants reveals a sorry state of affairs, in neither initiating the acquisition proceedings nor in releasing compensation, even after passing of the judgement by Learned Single Judge in directing to release compensation after initiating acquisition proceedings in-accordance with law as has been granted to other co-owners whose lands were similarly utilized for construction of ( 2025:HHC:19831 ) - 68 - same subject road but despite being similarly placed, the instant appeal was filed just to delay the compensation to the Respondent-writ petitioner herein. In this fact-situation, this Court would have imposed exemplary costs but without observing further this Court refrains itself from doing so by taking a lenient view. However, this Court hopes and trusts that the State Authorities shall follow its litigation policy in letter and spirit in future, instead of resorting to frivolous litigation in other matter involving same factual-legal matrix, and in such an eventuality this Court shall be constrained to impose exemplary costs, which shall be liable to be recovered from the officers/ officials concerned. In aforesaid terms, the instant letters patent appeal, is dismissed in limine and all the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly. (G. S. Sandhawalia) (Ranjan Sharma) Chief Justice Judge 22nd May, 2025 [himani/tm]